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Abstract 
The primary aim of this thesis is to discern whether Sartre's early work on phenomenal 
consciousness has distinctive and valuable contributions to make to current debates over 
these issues in anglophone philosophy. The method is resolutely analytical, aiming to identify 
and assess the details of Sartre's position and arguments for it in the light of classical and 
current debates. This involves much exegetical work concerned with Sartre's use of terms 
and principles drawn from previous thinkers. The secondary aim is to show the extent to 
which the famous themes of Sartrean existentialism - freedom, bad faith, and the look - 
are grounded in his theory of phenomenal consciousness. The principal text is Being and 
Nothingness, though extensive use is made of works that preceded it. 
The thesis comprises four chapters. Chapter 1 is concerned with clarifying Sartre's 
conception of intentionality in relation to current anglophone conceptions of intentionality. I 
detail and defend Sartre's view that intentionality is a relation of apprehension that involves 
both qualitative and classificatory awareness. Chapter 2 situates Sartre in relation to classical 
and current theories of consciousness and assesses Sartre's arguments for his conception of 
intentionality. I claim that Sartre has shown that his conception is useful, but not that it is 
correct. In chapter 3,1 argue that Sartre succeeds in maintaining that perception and 
hallucination involve distinct types of experience, where current anglophone attempts to 
maintain this fail. In Chapter 4,1 argue that Sartre's holistic view of the subject as an 
environment-inclusive being-in-the-world is preferable to reductionism, and that his theory of 
qualitative aspects of experience is preferable to the representationalist approaches dominant 
in anglophone thought. I conclude by drawing out the implications of my discussion for 
Sartre's theories of freedom, bad faith, and the look. 
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Introduction 
Conscious ness-i n-the-Worl d 
'To be is to fly out into the world ... to burst out as consciousness-in-the- 
world', wrote Jean-Paul Sartre in an early manifesto article. 'This necessity for 
consciousness to exist as consciousness of something other than itself 
Husserl calls "intentionality"' (1939,5). This excited article is a brief 
presentation of the basic theory of Being and Nothingness, published four 
years later. This basic theory is that, because consciousness is intentional, 
'consciousness has no "inside"', so 'everything is finally outside, everything, 
even ourselves' (1939,5). The intentionality of consciousness, that is, is its 
structure as a relation to the objects of the world. Consciousness is not, for 
Sartre, a sequence of experiences generated by neural stimulation and 
independent of a reality beyond them. And this in turn means that the subject 
of psychological theorising, the entity that has these relational experiences, is 
itself not independent of the objects of experience. It is not a brain or body, 
still less an ego or soul, but comprises the body and brain plus aspects of the 
body's physical environment. This theory, on which Sartrean existentialism is 
built, that is, is opposed to the traditional distinction between subject and 
object. In addition to this, intentional experience provides structures within 
which objects are experienced. So although the being of the objects of 
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experience is independent of consciousness, the way they seem is not: 
C essentially external to consciousness, the world is nevertheless essentially 
relative to consciousness' (1939,4). The hyphenation of 'conscious ness-i n- 
the-world', like that of 'being-in-the-world' (Heidegger's 'in-der-welt-Sein'), is 
meant not only to indicate the dependence of consciousness on the 
independent existence, or being in-itself, of its objects, but also the 
dependence of the structures of the world of experience and action on 
consciousness. 
Anglophone philosophers interested in Sartre's early writings have tended to 
focus on his theories of the freedom of the individual, bad faith as a way of 
hiding truths from ourselves that we would rather not face, and the objectifying 
and alienating 'look' as the basis of intersubjective relations. Sartre's theory of 
the relation between consciousness and reality has only recently been 
attended to in anglophone literature (e. g. McCulloch 1994, ch. s 5-7; Wider 
1997). This new interest is a result of a shift in the methods and concerns of 
anglophone philosophy of mind. At the time Sartre wrote Being and 
Nothingness, the central methods of anglophone philosophy were conceptual 
and linguistic analysis. Philosophical problems, thought some philosophers, 
will dissolve or at least be made more manageable if we first clarify the terms 
in which they are framed. The classic work of anglophone philosophy of mind 
from this era, the middle of the twentieth century, was not about mind or 
consciousness as such. It was aptly titled The Concept of Mind (Ryle 1949). 
Other philosophers thought that philosophy should focus on sentences about 
the mind, rather than the mind itself, on the grounds that disputants in debates 
about the mind have such disparate conceptual schemes that often they do 
not agree on enough to even understand one another's claims, but everyone 
agrees on what sentences about the mind are (Quine 1960, § 56). This gave 
rise to two questions that together drove the philosophy of mind for two 
decades. One was: how are the sentences of psychology, which display 
logical intensionality (see 1.1), related to the sentences of the physical 
sciences, which do not (e. g. Chisholm 1957, ch. 11)? The other was: what are 
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the conditions under which we ascribe mental states or events to one another 
(e. g. Davidson 1970, § 11)? 
This focus on our mentalistic terminology and the ways in which we employ it 
waned in the 1980s as anglophone philosophers began again to ask about 
the nature of the mind, or of consciousness, itself. One landmark on this 
journey was Searle's criticism of linguistic philosophy that it tends to confuse 
features of reports for features of things reported. The property of 
intensionality, a central interest of anglophone philosophy of mind for two 
decades, he pointed out, is a property only of the sentences we use to report 
mental states and events: it is not a feature of mind or consciousness at all 
(see 1.1). This move away from the conceptual and linguistic approaches to 
the philosophy of mind has made the works of the European 
Phenomenologists, who did not employ the methods of linguistic and 
conceptual analysis, more relevant to anglophone debate. 
The recent growth of anglophone interest in Sartre's philosophy of mind and 
metaphysics is a result of this new relevance of the works of the 
Phenomenologists generally. But the works resulting from this new interest 
have two principal shortcomings. First, they tend to treat Sartre's theory of the 
relation between consciousness and reality as simply another aspect of his 
larger picture, alongside freedom, bad faith, and the look. This overlooks the 
fact that, as I hope to show in this thesis, Sartre's theory of the relation 
between consciousness and reality is the foundational theory on which the 
rest of his claims are built. As a result, it overlooks the fact that critiques of his 
theory of consciousness and reality have ramifications for the themes of 
freedom, bad faith, and the look. So the new interest in Sartre's philosophy of 
mind and metaphysics does not make as big a contribution to Sartre 
scholarship as it might. Second, and more importantly, the recent anglophone 
work on Sartre's theory of the relation between consciousness and reality is 
based on misunderstandings of some of the key components of Sartre's work. 
His terms 'phenomenology' and 'intentionality' do not mean what their 
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anglophone homonyms mean (see 0.3 and 1- 1), for example, and his use of 
the term 'body' is ambiguous between the usual sense of the-skin-and- 
everything-within and the Cartesian sense of extended substance (see 4.6). 
Not only does the recent work fail to make as big a contribution to exegetical 
work on Sartre as it might, but it also fails to draw on exegetical work as much 
as it might, and as a result fails to discern in Sartre's work the distinctive and 
challenging contributions that his work can make to current anglophone 
debates over the nature of consciousness. 
My aim in this thesis is to advance the current work on Sartre's theory of 
consciousness and reality through a close exegetical reading and analytical 
critique of Sartre's works that shows the distinctive and valuable contributions 
his work has to make to current anglophone debate over consciousness and 
the contributions current anglophone work on consciousness has to make to 
the consideration of Sartre's theories of freedom, bad faith, and the look. The 
most important contributions Sartre can make to current anglophone debate 
are his relational conception of conscious experience and his conception of 
the extended subject. These conceptions, I claim, support a significant aspect 
of his existentialist theory of freedom, the claim that human behaviour cannot 
be explained purely in terms of mechanistic interaction of the brain with the 
physical environment. In addition, Sartre's work on the relation between 
perceptual and hallucinatory experience provides a strong and innovative way 
of resisting all forms of the argument from hallucination, which has 
traditionally driven theorists to the claim that experience is self-contained with 
respect to the rest of the world, and hence to the dualism of subject and 
object that Sartre aims to dissolve. 
I find that some key aspects of Sartre's account of the way in which 
intentionality provides the structures of the world as we experience it must be 
revised in the light of recent anglophone work on conceptual and 
nonconceptual aspects of experience. These revisions make no significant 
difference to Sartre's conception of the way in which we are aware of our 
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surroundings, but do have ramifications for Sartre's related theories of self- 
awareness and bad faith. I also find that Sartre's account of the way in which 
intentionality presents objects does not support his theory of 'the look' as the 
basis of human relations, and indeed that it provides a way of denying the 
purported inevitability of the misrepresentation of others in the look. And I find 
that Sartre's claim that in imaginative experience the subject can never 
mistake the imagined object for a real and present object is unwarranted. 
Such a mistake need not be common, but I claim that there is no reason to 
rule it out. While this alteration has little impact on Sartre's theory of the 
nature of imagination, or on the contribution made to current debate by his 
theory of the nature of dreams and hallucinations, I claim that it does have an 
impact on his theory of bad faith: the subject in bad faith may, it seems, be 
genuinely ignorant of the truth. 
I present a more detailed overview of the structure and claims of the thesis at 
the end of this introduction. The intervening sections present in more detail 
just which aspects of Sartre's work I am focusing on, and the ways in which I 
approach these aspects. 
0.1 The Early Works of Jean-Paul Sartre 
The 'early works' of Jean-Paul Sartre are, for the purposes of this thesis, 
Being and Nothingness and the works that preceded it. This restriction is not 
to be taken to indicate that I agree with, for example, Warnock (1958, xviii) 
that there is a radical discontinuity between Sartre's early and later, more 
Marxist, work. In fact, I agree with Danto (1991,134), for example, that 
Sartre's life's work is a progression. The restriction is rather imposed by the 
fact that it is in these works that Sartre focuses on the question of the nature 
of consciousness, the world, and the subject, and develops his distinctive 
position. Sartre's later works, concerned with ethics, politics, psychoanalysis, 
and the nature of truth presuppose and build on the theory of the natures of 
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consciousness, the world, and the subject developed in these early works. 
Sartre's major concern in those works is with intersubjective relations and the 
significance of the historical location of the individual for the projects and 
choices of that individual. Although these later works do involve some 
modifications of Sartre's early theory of 'conscious ness-i n-the-world', they do 
not focus on that theory. 
In an interview in 1975, Sartre denied that there was a major break between 
his earlier and later works. 'I think that I underwent a continuous evolution 
beginning with Nausea all the way up to the Critique of Dialectical Reason', he 
said (1981,12). Commentators dealing with the early works often miss this 
point: they too are a 'continuous evolution', and should not be treated as 
presenting aspects of a single theory. The evolution of these works is largely 
the waning of Sartre's commitment to Husserl's phenomenology. Simone de 
Beauvoir's description of Sartre turning 'pale with emotion' on first hearing of 
Husserl's philosophy is well-known, as is the fact that he spent the following 
academic year (1933-4) at the Institut Frangais in Berlin studying Husserl's 
works (Beauvoir 1965,135-6). Sartre later wrote in his diary of the impact of 
Husserl: 
'Husserl had gripped me. I saw everything through the 
perspectives of his philosophy ... I was "Husserlian" and 
long to 
remain so. ' (1983,183) 
Though he always objected to Husserl's belief in a 'transcendental ego' 
underlying and unifying experience, Sartre's earliest published writings on 
Husserl - in Imagination and The Transcendence of the Ego, as well as the 
manifesto article mentioned above - are enthusiastic and raise little dissent. 
By the end of the 1930s, Sartre's comments on Husserl were more 
circumspect: in Sketch for a Theoty of the Emotions and The Psychology of 
Imagination, Sartre commits himself to Husserl's aim of describing the 
essences of experiences but does not explicitly assent to any significant 
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doctrine he considers to be Husserl's and, in the latter case, actively dissents 
from aspects of Husserl's theory of imagination (STE: 21-30; PI: 1-2,32,65). 
The reason for this growing disillusionment, he wrote in his diary in 1940, was 
that Husserl's philosophy 'evolved ultimately towards idealism, which I could 
not accept' (1983,184). 
The introduction to Being and Nothingness, 'The Pursuit of Being', is partly 
concerned with distancing the new work from Husserl and from certain 
aspects of Sartre's earlier works that had been inherited from Husserl. One 
aspect is Husserl's method of phenomenological reduction. This method is the 
suspension, bracketing, or putting out of play, of a pervasive presumption 
tacitly employed in everyday life. In Ideas, the presumption is that we inhabit a 
world comprising things that exist independently of our experience of them, 
and this belief must be suspended, or bracketed, on the grounds that 
experience fails to provide adequate evidence of its truth (1982, §§ 27-32; 
compare §§ 46,55,90). In Cartesian Meditations, on the other hand, the 
prejudice is that the world exists as a 'transcendent reality 7, a reality that 
outstrips our awareness of it even if it is not independent of that awareness, 
and this belief must be suspended (bracketed) on the grounds that it is not 
clear what it amounts to (1950, § 7). In both texts, the presupposition is 
tsuspended' in the sense that any claims that (implicitly or explicitly) require 
the truth of that presupposition are inadmissible to p resu ppos ition less 
philosophy. Although Sartre questioned the use of the phenomenological 
reduction (or 'epoch6) in his first book Imagination (IPC: 138-143), he 
explicitly assented to its use in The Transcendence of the Ego (TE: 35-6), 
Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions (STE: 28), and The Psychology of 
Imagination (Pl: 207). 
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre links the use of the reduction to the idealism 
that he considers Husserl's philosophy to tend towards (B&N: xxvi, xxxvii). 
This is the form of idealism, which Sartre there calls by its alias 
4 phenomenalism , that construes reality 
to be ultimately constructed out of 
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min -dependent appearances. I discuss this form of idealism, and Sartre's 
ascription of it to Husserl, in chapter 2 (2.1 and 2.2). But it is worth noting that 
since Husserl describes perceptual experience as direct contact with reality, 
which involves no subjective intermediaries, while claiming not to be explicitly 
or implicitly relying on the notion of mind-independent reality (in Ideas) or 
transcendent reality (in Cartesian Meditations), it is difficult to see how he can 
avoid the implication that the reality with which we have direct contact in 
perceptual experience is ultimately constructed out of mind-dependent or 
immanent experiences. This is certainly the conclusion Sartre draws, and it is 
for this reason that he begins Being and Nothingness by attempting to prove 
that perceptual experience is direct contact with, or apprehension of, mind- 
independent reality (B&N: xxi-xliii - 'The Pursuit of Being') and rejecting the 
phenomenological reduction as methodologically unsound (B&N: 3-4). Sartre 
wrote in his autobiography that the worldview he developed between the ages 
of five and ten (between 1910 and 1915) was an 'idealism which it took [him] 
thirty years to shake off' (1964,51; see also 180,182,250). It was only twenty 
years until his Husserlian conversion; the third decade of this idealism ended 
with Being and Nothingness. 
Overlooking this development and instead treating Being and Nothingness 
and the works that preceded it as a unified corpus is the root of some errors 
common among commentators. In 2.2, for example, we will see that the 
theory of consciousness as ontologically self-sufficient and founded entirely 
on its awareness of itself that Sartre presents in § III of 'The Pursuit of Being' 
is a view he ascribes to opponents in the course of arguing against them, but 
is usually taken as an expression of Sartre's own view. Sartre is partly to 
blame for this, as he does not clearly separate out the distinct dialectical 
voices that contribute to the discussion in 'The Pursuit of Being' and does not 
explicitly say that he is rejecting a view that he formerly held (see IPC: 115; 
TE: 40). But it is clear that the claim that consciousness is ontologically self- 
sufficient is incompatible with the claim he is arguing for in that passage, that 
'consciousness is born supported by a being which is not itself' (B&N: xxxvii). 
15 
The misreading is aided and abetted, it seems, by the common approach of 
treating Being and Nothingness and the works that preceded it as a unified 
corpus (e. g. McCulloch 1994,101; Wider 1997,86). Similarly, treating the 
novel Nausea (1938) as of a piece with Being and Nothingness leads some 
commentators (e. g. Murdoch 1953, ch. 1; Danto 1991, ch. 1) to claim that one 
of Sartre's major concerns is with the relation between language and reality. 
He is indeed concerned with our ways of understanding reality and 
representing it to ourselves, I claim, but this representation should not be 
taken to be primarily or paradigmatically linguistic (see chapter 1 note 15). 
But the fact that the early works are a progression should not be taken as a 
reason to ignore the works preceding Being and Nothingness. Indeed, in 
Being and Nothingness Sartre often refers the reader to earlier works for 
clarification of a point that he continues to hold (B&N: 60,61,102,258,295, 
392) 445,575,600). The analysis of the relation between perceptual and 
nonperceptual experiences in The Psychology of Imagination and the analysis 
of emotion as a 'specific manner of apprehending the world' (STE: 57) in 
Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, for example, clarify the less detailed 
claims that Sartre makes in Being and Nothingness about hallucination and 
about ways of apprehending the world. I draw on these works in chapters 3 
and 4 respectively for precisely this reason. 
The fact that Sartre's early works are a progression, then, means that they 
should be treated as such. They are not unrelated, and often clarify and 
support one another. But they must be treated with caution, as the claims of 
one work are not necessarily all compatible with the claims of an earlier or 
later work. In particular, Being and Nothingness is based on a final break with 
Husserl's method of phenomenological reduction and the implications that 
Sartre saw that reduction to have. In this thesis, I take Being and Nothingness 
as the canonical text of the early Sartre, as it contains the most detailed 
presentation of his views and most clearly and thoroughly rejects the idealism 
that he found in Husserl and could not accept. I support my reading of this text 
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with reference to earlier works only when Sartre's own references to those 
earlier works indicate that this is acceptable, or when I can detect no 
inconsistency between the earlier claim and any relevant aspect of Being and 
Nothingness. I take the inconsistencies that there are to result from the 
rejection of the earlier use of the phenomenological reduction and the 
resulting earlier view of consciousness as ontologically self-sufficient and 
founded on self-awareness. 
0.2 Phenomenal Consciousness 
When Sartre uses the term 'consciousness' in his early works, he is almost 
always using it as a grammatically transitive term denoting an intentional 
mental relation to an object. 'All consciousness ... is consciousness of 
something' (B&N: xxvii). Sartre's 6consciousness' is not equivalent to Freud's 
'consciousness', which denotes mental items or processes of which the 
subject is aware as they occur (Freud 1964,70). Although Sartre does believe 
that consciousness of an object always involves an awareness of that 
consciousness, he considers this to be a substantial claim and not merely an 
analytical consequence of the term 'consciousness'. It is for this reason that 
he claims that such awareness of consciousness is necessary to account for 
our abilities to turn attention away from the world and towards consciousness 
and to engage in activities involving sequences of consciousness (see 2.2 
and 2.6). 
Sartre describes the basic form of consciousness as Vrrdfldchf, which is 
variously translated as 'unreflective Y, 'unreflecting', and 'non-reflective'. A 
consciousness of this type 'is directed to objects different in kind from 
consciousness' (PI: 10), objects such as clocks and tables (TE: 49; B&N: 
xxvii-xxviii). If I am conscious of something, in this sense, then that thing 
appears to me. These are two ways of saying the same thing (B&N: 3). And 
unreflective consciousness, for Sartre, requires the independent existence of 
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its object, the thing that appears (B&N: xxi-xliii). It is this form of 
consciousness that I label 'phenomenal consciousness': this form of 
consciousness is the appearing of some part of reality. 
A derivative form of consciousness in Sartre's writings, based on unreflective 
consciousness, is 'reflection' (rdflexion). This is 'a consciousness directed 
upon a consciousness, a consciousness which takes consciousness as an 
object' (TE: 44). Where unreflective consciousness is awareness of 
something that is not itself a conscious episode, reflection is awareness of a 
conscious episode. Reflection on an episode of consciousness requires the 
prior existence of that consciousness, but the occurrence of an unreflective 
consciousness does not require the occurrence of reflection on it (TE: 45; 
STE: 56; B&N: 150). Since the consciousness reflected on is itself directed on 
an object, reflection is consciousness of consciousness-of-object. Sartre is 
adamant that the object of a reflective consciousness is necessarily other than 
the consciousness positing it: 'reflection or positional consciousness of 
consciousness ... [is) a complete consciousness directed towards something 
which is not it, that is, toward consciousness as object of reflection' (B&N: 
xxviii; my emphasis). 
But Sartre also holds that a consciousness always involves some awareness 
of that consciousness. This awareness is not reflection, but is 'pre-reflective' 
(prdrdflexiý awareness. Sartre's use of the term 'pre-reflective' echoes both 
Freud's term 'preconscious' and Heidegger's term 'pre-ontological'. For Freud 
(1957,173; 1964,71), mental items and processes are 'preconscious' if the 
subject has no awareness of them as they occur but can easily become 
conscious of them, whereas for Sartre we are always pre-reflectively aware of 
our consciousnesses and can easily become reflectively aware of them. For 
Heidegger (1962, § 4), it is a necessary condition of undertaking ontological 
enquiry (defined as 'that theoretical enquiry which is explicitly devoted to the 
meaning of entities') that one already has at least an undetailed, indistinct, 
pre-theoretical understanding of the object of that enquiry - being. 
Similarly, 
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for Sartre reflection requires that one already has at least the undetailed, 
indistinct, pre-theoretical understanding of the object of reflection that is pre- 
reflective awareness (B&N: xxix, 74). Pre-reflective awareness is not a variety 
of consciousness (like unreflective and reflective consciousness), but a 
structure of both varieties of consciousness, an awareness involved in every 
consciousness. It is a vague and indistinct awareness of consciousness, a 
'nonpositional' and 'nonthetic' awareness of consciousness. To become 
aware of a consciousness in detail requires a shift of attention away from the 
world and towards that consciousness. This is the 'positional' and 'thetic' 
awareness of consciousness that is reflection. Sartre's notions of 'positional' 
and 'thetic' consciousness are discussed in chapter 1, and I discuss the 
relation between phenomenal consciousness and pre-reflective awareness of 
that consciousness in chapter 2 (2.6). 
The primary focus of this thesis, then, is on unreflective consciousness, 
awareness of surrounding reality, as opposed to reflective consciousness or 
pre-reflective awareness. This awareness includes not only seeing, hearing, 
smelling, and touching parts of the body's environment, but also 
proprioceptive and kinaesthetic awareness of the body. It may be objected 
that it is impossible to give a single account of consciousness of things, on 
the grounds that different sense modalities have different structures. Where 
vision seems to involve a visual field, for example, the sense of touch does 
not involve a tactile field: touch reveals the object or surface touched, but not 
its background (see Martin 1992). Any account of phenomenal consciousness 
that is insensitive to the differences between sense modalities runs the risk of 
treating features of one sense modality as features of all sense modalities. In 
particular, many philosophers who purportedly discuss perception in fact 
discuss visual perception and assume that the resulting account will be 
generalisable (e. g. Searle 1983, ch. 2). There is certainly a tendency within 
our culture to treat vision as paradigmatic of mentality in general. We talk of 
having an outlook, worldview, or point of view, and of insight, foresight, and 
hindsight. We can criticise a theory as being myopic (short-sighted) or as 
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having blind spots. The original meaning of 'intuition' is 'directly seeing', and 
'introspection' means 'looking within'. Whether these and other expressions 
manifest a natural tendency to emphasise sight as the primary mental 
modality, or whether such expressions have some other root and are 
responsible for the tendency to emphasise sight, is not to the point here. The 
point is just that we have this tendency, if you see what I mean. And this 
tendency must be guarded against if a single account of phenomenal 
consciousness is not to generalise aspects peculiar to sight. 
Sartre's account of phenomenal consciousness does not make that mistake. 
His account consists in detailing the claim that phenomenal consciousness is 
the direct apprehension or appearing of a part of mind-independent reality. 
Qualitative and classificatory aspects of phenomenal consciousness, such as 
seeing the redness of the tomato and seeing it as a tomato, are aspects of 
this relation of appearing, for Sartre. He holds that there is a single figure / 
ground structure to the whole of simultaneous conscious experience: it is not 
that there is a visual field against which a particular object stands out, and an 
audial field in which a particular sound stands out, for Sartre, but that there is 
a single field of consciousness on which a figure may stand out, and this 
figure may be detected by any of the sense modalities (see 1.2). This, then, is 
the 'phenomenal consciousness' under discussion in this thesis: the structure 
of our overall awareness of our bodies and their environments, an awareness 
that involves the various sense modalities in combination. This use of the term 
'phenomenal consciousness' to mean awareness of the body and its 
environment does not match Block's famous use of the term to mean a 
qualitative, nonrepresentational aspect of an experience (1995). Unreflective 
experience, for Sartre, always involves both representational ('thetic') and 
nonrepresentational ('nonthetic') aspects (see 1.3). 1 use the term 
'phenomenal' in its original sense to mean the appearance or appearing of 
something. As we shall see in the next section, the use of 'phenomenal' to 
denote qualitative aspects of experience is the root of much misunderstanding 
of Sartrean phenomenology. 
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0.3 Phenomenological Ontology 
The subtitle of Being and Nothingness is: An Essay in Phenomenological 
Ontology. Unlike other luminaries of the Phenomenological tradition such as 
Husserl (1982, §§ 27-75; 1950, §§ 4-9), Heidegger (1962, § 7), and Merleau- 
Ponty (1962, vii-xxi), Sartre does not provide an explicit and complete account 
of his understanding of the term 'phenomenology. But without an adequate 
understanding of Sartre's conception of phenomenology, it is impossible to 
understand exactly what Sartre is trying to achieve. It is impossible, that is, to 
understand just what his philosophical method is, and how it relates to 
ontology, the theory of being. The aim of this section is to clarify Sartre's 
notion o 'phenomenological ontologyy. 
In contemporary anglophone philosophy, the 'phenomenology' of an 
experience is generally understood (following Nagel 1974) as 'what the 
experience is like', the distinctive subjective feel or flavour of the experience. 
What it is like to navigate by echolocation, on this model, is part of bat- 
phenomenology. A similar notion is Dennett's 'heterophenomenology ', which 
denotes the way experience seems to all of us (1991,66-98 and 406-10). 
McCulloch (1993) advocates an alternative usage, according to which the 
phenomenology of an experience is not what it is like for the subject, but 
simply the way that experience presents the world as being. On this model, 
the phenomenology of echolocation is captured in descriptions of the sonar- 
detectable properties of things. The way anglophone philosophers use the 
term, then, 'phenomenology' is either the subjective feel of an experience or 
the way an experience presents the world as being. 
Sartre's recommendations of phenomenology may make it seem as if he 
takes phenomenology to be concerned with either what it is like to have 
experiences or the way experience presents the world as being. In 
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Imagination, he complains that a priori theories of experience fail to draw on 
our intimate (intime) awareness of our own experience and even the 
descriptions of introspective psychology are shaped by such theories. 
Phenomenology, on the other hand, exploits our intimacy with our own 
experience (IPC: 3,22-3,145-6). In Sketch for a Theory of Emotions, he 
makes this point in terms of '[t]he absolute proximity (proximitd absolue) of the 
investigator to the object investigated' (STE: 23): the phenomenologist studies 
that which is closest. What could be epistemically closest to us, with what 
could we have more intimate awareness, than what it is like to be us and the 
way the world seems to us? On this conception, 'phenomenology' denotes a 
subject-matter - the way experience or the world seems to us. Danto 
understands Sartre in this way, claiming that Sartre's phenomenology is 
concerned solely with how things seem and his ontology is a taxonomy of the 
kinds of beings and their interrelations that must exist 'on the assumption that 
consciousness is "true"' (1991,37). Although McCulloch appeals only to the 
Oxford English Dictionary to support his usage of 'phenomenology' (1993, 
39), he does claim that Sartrean phenomenology is concerned with 
explicating how things seem (1994,2-3) and 'what it is like' to experience 
ourselves and the world in the way in which we do (1994,39). Sartre's 'careful 
reflection' on experience is not intended to recapitulate common-sense, he 
points out (1994,21), but this is because common-sense can be wrong about 
the way human life and the world seem. 
But such readings of Sartre misrepresent his project. Sartre clearly wants to 
explicate the nature of reality itself. He opens Being and Nothingness by 
arguing that the nature of reality cannot be inferred from some aspect of 
experience unless experience is direct presentation of reality itself (see 2.3). 
Similarly, if phenomenology were just a description of what experience is like 
or the way the world seems in experience, then it would be compatible with a 
number of possible ways in which reality or the world really is. In order to 
maintain this reading of Sartre's term 'phenomenology then, it seems that 
Sartre must not be read as engaging in ontology at all. Rather than attempting 
22 
to explicate the structures of reality, on this reading, Sartre is attempting to 
explicate just the structures reality appears to have. It is not that ontology is 
his subject-matter and phenomenology his method, but rather that 
phenomenological-ontology is his subject-matter. But this reading is 
unjustified. In his earlier works, for example, Sartre is quite clear that the 
phenomenological psychology he is there engaged in is not concerned with 
the way the mind seems, but rather with the deep structures of the way 
consciousness is. He is using phenomenology as a method of psychology, a 
method of uncovering the structures of consciousness as a prior discipline to 
experimental psychology (IPC: 128-30; STE: 21-6; PI: 1-2). And in Being and 
Nothingness, Sartre is clearly concerned with ontology itself, which he 
understands as the explication of the structures of being (B&N: 620). 
Sartrean phenomenology, then, is not the way experience seems or the way it 
presents the world as being. Indeed, it is not a subject-matter to be 
investigated. It is a discipline. And its subject-matter is appearance, or 
experience. Just as sociology is a discipline, concerned with societies. This is 
the conception of phenomenology that Sartre inherited from Husserl (e. g. 
1982, § 50) and Heidegger (1962, § 7). Anglophone philosophers talk of 
experiences having phenomenology: there is a distinctive 'what it is like' to an 
experience, or a way an experience presents the world as being. But in the 
European sense of the term, an experience cannot have a phenomenology: 
an experience is a phenomenon, an appearance, and phenomenology is the 
study of that appearance; an experience cannot have a study of appearance. 
Sartrean, and indeed all European, phenomenology, that is, is the study of 
what it is for something to appear to one. While 'what it is' for something to 
appear to one may arguably include a distinctive 'what it is like' or a way 
things seem, this will not exhaust what it is for something to appear. There will 
also be an ontological structure of that appearance. It may, for example, 
involve subjective objects of awareness such as ideas, impressions, percepts, 
sensa, sensations, or sense data. Or, if Sartre is right, it may be a relation of 
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apprehension between a body and a part of that body's environment. 
Whatever the ontological structure of appearance is, or indeed even if there is 
no general structure shared by all appearances, this ontology is not outside 
the purview of European phenomenology: it is at least part of what experience 
is, and phenomenology is the study of what experience is. 
The ontology accessible to phenomenology, moreover, does not exclude the 
general ontology of reality for the European phenomenologists. If, for 
example, experience were to consist in apprehension of only a mind- 
dependent object that in some way represents a reality lying beyond it, then 
phenomenology could yield only an ontology of those mind-dependent objects 
and the apprehension of them. This, as we will see in 1.1, is a restricted 
purview of Brentano's early study of appearing. But the European 
philosophers who called the study of appearances 'phenomenology ', Husserl 
and later philosophers, all held that experience is direct apprehension of 
transcendent reality itself. As we will see in 1.1, this did not mean for Husserl 
that experience is apprehension of mind-independent reality, since Husserl 
did not construe transcendent reality to consist in being in-itself. Sartre, on 
the other hand, argues that experience is apprehension of mind-independent 
reality, that transcendent reality does consist in being in-itself. But on either 
view, general ontology, which Sartre defines as a description of the structures 
of being (B&N: 620), is not outside the purview of phenomenology. If 
appearance is the appearance of transcendent reality, of reality not entirely 
contained within the experience, or reality at large, then the study of 
appearance is the study of that reality and the apprehension of it. 
Phenomenology, on this view of experience, yields general ontology. To put 
this point another way, 'phenomenology ... does not exclude metaphysics ... 
it by no means professes to stop short of the "supreme and ultimate" 
questions' (Husserl 1950, § 64; his emphasis). 
Sartre's phenomenological ontology, then, is a description of the structures of 
reality gained by the method of describing what it is for a part of that reality 
to 
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appear to one. This method is not the same as that of either of his major 
phenomenological predecessors and influences, Husserl and Heidegger. We 
have already seen that, in Being and Nothingness, Sartre rejects the use of 
Husserl's phenomenological reduction on the grounds that it precludes 
construing experience as direct apprehension of mind-independent reality, a 
construal that Sartre holds to be correct (see 0.1). In this, he resembles 
Heidegger. But he does not follow Heidegger in abandoning Husserl's 
descriptive phenomenology for a study based on interpretation or 
hermeneutics. Having brought appearances into view by effecting the 
phenomenological reduction, for Husserl, the task of the phenomenologist is 
simply to describe the manifest structures of appearing (e. g. 1982, § 59; 1950, 
§ 15). Heidegger, on the other hand, considers phenomenology to consist in 
the drawing out (Auslegung) of what is already implicit in the appearance of 
the world. We already have an undetailed, indistinct, pre-theoretical 
understanding of reality and its appearance based on our experience of 
reality, for Heidegger, and phenomenological enquiry consists in successive 
rounds of interpretation of this pre-theoretical comprehension (1962, §§ 3,4, 
32,33). Sartre, on the other hand, retains Husserl's idea that the structures of 
appearing can simply be read off experiences when experiences are viewed 
in the right light. Phenomenology, for Sartre, is descriptive (PI: 2; B&N: xxiv). 
And the ontology it yields is a description of the structures of being (B&N: 
620). 
But the descriptive nature of Sartre's reduction-free phenomenology must be 
understood within Sartre's form of the common phenomenological aim of 
p resu pposition less philosophy. The phenomenologists are not only concerned 
with removing personal idiosyncrasies from a philosophy that is supposed to 
transcend individual differences, as Macquarrie (1972,25-6) holds, but also 
all reject our ordinary, purportedly pre-theoretical descriptions of experience 
as shaped by cultural or other prejudices often traceable back to past 
theories. It is for this reason that Husserl insists that phenomenology requires 
that 'we ... put out of action all 
the convictions we have been accepting up to 
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now, including all our sciences' (1950, § 3), and formulates the 
phenomenological reduction as a method of focusing attention on the actual 
structures of experience. For Heidegger, the main obstacle in the way of 
p res uppos ition less philosophy is inauthenticity - the usual (average 
everyday') state of humans, motivated by anxiety (Angst) about the 
contingency of existence (1962, § 40). Inauthenticity involves accepting the 
concepts, beliefs, and interests of one's social and historical community, an 
acceptance that informs common-sense descriptions of experience as well as 
the theories of inauthentic philosophers. The phenomenologist aiming to 
expose the true structures of human being ('Dasein') and the world must not 
accept uncritically the concepts, beliefs, or priorities of the community, but 
must instead offer an authentic (eigentlich = ownmost) description of Dasein 
and the world (1962, § 27). 
Sartre's rejection of common-sense is a development of those of Husserl and 
Heidegger. He agrees that common-sense and philosophical reflections on 
experience may be tainted by implicitly or explicitly held theories of 
experience, theories that are not themselves drawn from experience. In 
Imagination, he claims that the traditional understanding of the experience of 
imagining, shared by 'the man in the street' and philosophers and 
psychologists alike, is at least partly based on an a priori theory which colours 
the deliverances of introspection. The a priori theory construes thought as a 
set of atomic representations standing in causal or other associative 
connections with one another, and understands a single self-contained 
representative experience as a perception if caused by external objects and 
an imagination or hallucination otherwise (IPC: 3-6,22-3,25,56,124,145-6). 
The most pervasive theory that infects reflection on experience, for Sartre, is 
the view that thoughts and actions generally manifest character traits in the 
way that symptoms manifest a disease (STE: 91; B&N: 159). This theory 
underlies a common form of bad faith (mauvaise fol): in order to escape the 
anguish (angoisse) of my freedom of thought and action, I may consider a 
cowardly thought or an heroic action to reveal my own cowardly or heroic 
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nature (1 946a, 43). People in bad faith have false beliefs about what it is like 
to be them, and the way things seem to them is misleading. Reflection 
informed by this theory is 'impure' in that it 'affirms more than it knows, 
directing itself through the reflected consciousness upon an object situated 
outside consciousness [i. e., my underlying nature]' (TE: 64-5). As well as 
calling theory-laden reflection 'impure' (TE: 64; B&N: 155), Sartre calls it 
'constituante' (B&N: 195) on the grounds that it constitutes a character which 
the action or consciousness reflected on is taken to manifest, and 'complice'- 
variously translated as 'conniving' (TE: 64), 'accessory after the fact' (STE: 
91), and 'accessory' (B&N: 155) - due to its role in upholding bad faith. The 
basis of phenomenological certainty, on the other hand, is 'pure reflection YY 
reflection that does not view experience through any (tacit or otherwise) 
theoretical lens, or interpret experience in the light of any theory, but simply 
presents experience as it is (B&N: 155). As well as calling theory-free 
reflection 'purd (B&N: 155), Sartre describes it as 'purifying' (purifiante) due to 
its role in challenging the bad faith upheld by impure reflection (STE: 81). But 
pure reflection, he claims, 'is rare and depends on special motivations' (STE: 
91). 
The question of the possibility of such non-theoretical pure description need 
not concern us here. What is important is that Sartre does not equate 
phenomenology with common-sense description of experience, since the 
latter may already be coloured by generally accepted theories of 
consciousness and ontology. Common-sense must be suspended in the 
interests of a presupposition less description of experience that may confirm or 
confute common-sense. The descriptions of experience that Sartre offers, 
then, are not supposed to be common-sense descriptions immediately 
recognisable by all, but the result of studying consciousness and appearance 
without the common prejudices of bad faith. 
Sartre's rejection of psychological theories not based on the deliverances of 
phenomenology, such as theories based entirely on experimental 
data, does 
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not rule out the use of experimental data in phenomenology (see IPC: 127-30; 
STE: 21-31; PI: 1-2). Indeed, he uses the findings of one of Piaget's 
experiments himself in the course of arguing that ongoing pre-reflective 
awareness of consciousness must be indistinct and undetailed (B&N: xxix; 
see 1.4). Like Merleau-Ponty (1962), Sartre differs from Husserl and 
Heidegger in using experimental data. The use of such data is ruled out by 
Husserl's phenomenological reduction, which rules out all scientific claims as 
based on the natural attitude of holding the world to be mind-independent or 
at least transcendent (see 0.1). And it is ruled out by Heidegger's hermeneutic 
method of making explicit what is implicit in our comprehension of reality and 
its appearing. But since Sartre does not use the reduction and does not 
consider phenomenology to be a hermeneutic enterprise, his conception of 
phenomenology does not preclude the collection and use of experimental 
data. Moreover, the use of such data seems justified: if phenomenology is 
supposed to provide a fundamental theory of appearing, then that theory 
should underlie and unify the findings of empirical observers of phenomenal 
consciousness. The experiences studied by empirical psychologists, that is, 
are concrete instances of the structures that phenomenology is supposed to 
uncover. For this reason: 
'To the phenomenologist ... every human 
fact is of its essence 
significant. If you deprive it of its significance you rob it of its 
nature as a human fact. ' (STE: 27) 
If an observed fact of human consciousness is incompatible with 
consciousness having the structure phenomenology describes, then 
something is amiss. The experiment may need revising; but so may the 
phenomenological description. I employ this use of experimental data as a 
constraint on the findings of phenomenology in critiquing Sartre in 1.4, where I 
find that his claim that we have nonrepresentational ('nonthetic') awareness of 
the background of experience is shown to be false by certain experiments 
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which clearly indicate the representational nature of our awareness of the 
background. 
In short, then, the theory under scrutiny in this thesis is a theory of the nature 
and structures of reality based on a purportedly theory-free description of 
what it is for that reality to appear to one, without the aid of a 
phenomenological reduction. This methodology will not itself be brought into 
question: the aim is to assess the resulting ontology. This assessment will 
involve the use of experimental data, a use that Sartrean phenomenology 
does not rule out, and philosophical argumentation. It will not involve any 
phenomenological description of experience: this thesis is concerned with a 
theory arrived at by phenomenology, but is not itself a work of 
phenomenology. 
0.4 Realisms and Idealisms 
Sartre claims to be searching for a theory of reality and our awareness of it 
which is 'other than realism or idealism' (B&N: A), and describes his resulting 
position as 'a radical reversal of the idealist position' (B&N: 216). 
Commentators are divided over where to situate Sartre's ontology in the 
debate between realism and idealism. McCulloch (1994,83-120), for 
example, argues that Sartre is a realist who occasionally but insignificantly 
lapses into idealistic terminology. Sprigge (1983, xi), on the other hand, 
describes Sartre as an idealist, though as less idealistic than either Husserl or 
Heidegger. Wider (1990) is more circumspect, delineating three types of 
realism and three corresponding types of idealism, and argues that Sartre is a 
realist in one sense and an idealist in the other two senses. One of the aims 
of this thesis is to clarify the ontology Sartre arrives at through 
phenomenology in relation to forms of realism and idealism. 
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There are three ways in which theories of the relation between mind and 
world can deserve the label 'realism'. The denials of each of these forms of 
realism are the forms of 'idealism'. The first form of realism is 'ontological 
realism'. Ontological realists claim that reality is mind-independent. The 
existence of reality, on this view, is independent of our awareness of it and 
thought about it. Sartre is clearly committed to ontological realism: reality for 
him is mind-independent as it consists in 'bei ng-i n- itself' (6tre-en-soi). 
Ontological idealism construes reality as dependent on our awareness of it or 
thought about it for its existence. Reality is constructed of actual and possible 
appearances, on this view, which in turn are subjective mental entities or 
events that depend for their existence or occurrence on being experienced. 
Perception is apprehension of the world, but that world is dependent on the 
apprehension. This is Berkeley's form of idealism (1975), and is also known 
as phenomenalism. Sartre's opposition to phenomenalism, which he ascribes 
to Husserl, forms part of his argument for his claim that experience is 
apprehension of mind-independent reality, and is discussed in chapter 2. 
The second form of realism is what I call 'structural realism'. According to this 
view, the world is structured in a certain way independently of anyone's 
awareness of it or thought about it. The ancient atomists and seventeenth 
century corpuscularians, for example, held that reality consists in a void 
populated by atomic particles instantiating certain properties. Not only is the 
existence of reality mind-independent on this view, its structure is too: the 
atoms are individuated and have properties independently of any human 
thought about them. Berkeley was also a structural realist even though he 
was an ontological idealist. The actual and possible mind-dependent 
appearances that reality consists in, for Berkeley, follow rules created and 
sustained by God. The structure of the universe is independent of our 
awareness of it or thought about it, since it is held in the mind of God. Danto 
(1991, ch. 1) and Baldwin (1996,86) read Sartre as denying structural 
realism, as holding a structural idealist theory that being in-itself is 
unstructured, containing no basic entities, no natural kinds, and no natural 
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properties. The apparent structure of reality, on this reading, is a result of the 
structures of consciousness, of the ways in which reality appears. Wider 
(1990) seems to propose a variant of this reading, according to which being 
in-itself actually gains structures from the way in which I am aware of it. I will 
argue, on the contrary, that aspects of Sartre's theory of the relationship 
between consciousness and being in-itself discussed in this thesis require 
being in-itself to be structured prior to there being consciousness of it (see 
5.2). Although Danto and Baldwin are right to point out that the world of 
everyday experience gains its structure and sense partly from the ways in 
which we are aware of it and the projects we are engaged in (see 1.3), and so 
the world has to some extent an idealistic structure, Sartre's distinction 
between being in-itself and the world must be borne in mind. The world is the 
result of the ways in which we are aware of being in-itself, and its structure, as 
we will see, is partly provided by the structure of being in-itself and partly 
provided by the ways in which we are aware of it. 
The third form of realism is what I call 'semantic realism'. This view 
presupposes structural realism, and adds that statements about reality are 
true only if they adequately capture its structure. The ancient atomists and 
seventeenth-century corpuscularians, for example, claimed that the language 
of atoms and their qualities adequately mirrors the structure of reality. 
Semantic realists may differ over whether or not the basic ontology of the 
world is reflected in our ordinary experience, or whether the objects and 
properties of experience are merely apparent and no part of the real world. 
Berkeley takes the former option: the very ideas that we are aware of in 
perception are parts of the real world. Atomists and corpuscularians, on the 
other hand, take the latter option: ordinary experience does not reveal the real 
world of atoms and their properties. Although semantic realism requires 
structural realism, the converse is not the case. It is not incoherent to hold that 
reality has a structure, but due to some fact about the nature of language that 
structure cannot be codified in words. I argue that Sartre must 
be construed 
as a semantic realist with respect to being in-itself: in applying certain 
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ontological principles to mind-independent reality, I argue (5.2), he is claiming 
to have codified the structure of reality in the language in which those 
principles are expressed. This semantic realism with respect to being in-itself, 
I argue (5.2), is matched by a semantic realism with respect to the world. The 
structures of the world that result from the ways in which we are aware of 
being in-itself can be captured, and generally are captured, in the language 
we use of the world. The world, that is, really does contain blue things and red 
things and chairs and tables, so statements involving the terms 'blue', 'red', 
'chair', and 'table' can capture the structure of the world. 
Sartre, then, affirms ontological realism, the view that the world exists 
independently of consciousness of it or thought about it, rather than the 
Berkeleian view that reality is constructed out of mind-dependent 
appearances. And, as we shall see, he holds that being in-itself has some 
mind-independent structure, even though the world of everyday experience 
partly gains its structure and its sense from the ways in which we are aware of 
it and engage with it. And since he attempts to describe this structure in 
language, he must be construed as a semantic realist with respect to mind- 
independent reality. The structures of the world that is constructed from the 
interplay of consciousness and being in-itself can also be captured in 
language, for Sartre, and so Sartre should be construed as a semantic realist 
with respect to the world as well. 
0.5 An Analytical Investigation 
The investigation of Sartre's theory of phenomenal consciousness undertaken 
in this thesis is an analytical investigation, in two senses of the term 
'analytical'. First, it is a work of analytic philosophy. It draws on theories of 
experience formulated in the twentieth century anglophone analytic tradition of 
philosophy and pays close attention to argument and counterargument in the 
assessment of Sartre's theory. It does not make use of phenomenological 
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description of experience. It is also concerned with what is now the primary 
question of analytic philosophy of experience: what is experience? 
Investigating Sartre's text using analytical tools and for analytical purposes, 
however, may result in serious distortion of Sartre's claims. One error is to 
suppose that Sartre's central concerns are the same as, or overlap 
considerably with, central concerns of current or past analytic philosophy. 
Sartre is not concerned, for example, with unpacking what is implicit in our 
ordinary everyday use of the term 'experience'. Conceptual analysis is quite 
foreign to Sartre. His aim is to discover what experience itself is, not what our 
idea of it amounts to. And this is because Sartre has not taken the 'linguistic 
turn' characteristic of much twentieth century analytic philosophy. Rather than 
focus primarily on the concepts or words in which philosophical questions are 
posed, Sartre follows Husserl (1982, § 59) and Heidegger (1962, § 7) in 
focusing attention on 'the things themselves' (see STE: 21; B&N: 3-4). Failure 
to see this disparity between the concerns of conceptual analysis and the 
concerns of the Phenomenologists led one commentator to investigate 
whether Sartre held that 'descriptions of mental phenomena can be reduced 
without remainder into statements about physical objects and physical 
processes', whether 'it is logically possible that persons ... could exist 
separately from bodies ', and whether 'there is a logical connection between 
mental phenomena ... and observable states of the 
body' (Morris 1975,4). 
Sartre is not concerned with reducibility of statements, the content of 
concepts, or logical possibilities: he is concerned, in Being and Nothingness, 
with the actual structures of reality and its appearing. Similarly, Sartre's 
account of the relation between consciousness and the rest of reality is not 
the same as the analytic philosophers' concern with the relation between 
rational thought and its objects. Ellis (2000) reads Being and Nothingness in 
the light of McDowell's Mind and World (1994), which is concerned with the 
relation between normatively evaluable conceptual thought and the world 
such thought is about. But Sartre is not concerned in Being and Nothingness 
with conceptual thought. Indeed, there is very little mention of concepts in the 
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book at all. His concern with 'consciousness' is, as I have said (0.2), a 
concern with experience, with the appearing of parts of reality themselves to 
the subject. 
A second error easily made by analytic investigators of Sartre's work is to 
suppose that what Sartre means by a certain term of art is what current 
anglophone philosophers mean by the same term. As we have already seen 
(0.3), the meanings of the term 'phenomenology' in anglophone and 
European philosophy are quite distinct. In anglophone philosophy it denotes a 
certain kind of property of an experience, the property of what it is like to have 
that experience or the way that experience presents the world as being. In 
European philosophy, on the other hand, it denotes a study of what it is for 
something to appear to one, of what it is to experience something. Failure to 
see this distinction leads Danto (1991,37) and McCulloch (1994,2-3 and 39) 
to take Sartre to be primarily concerned with the way reality seems to us, 
rather than with what it is for reality to appear to us. A similar problem arises 
with the term 'intentionality'. This term is central to Sartre's theory of 
experience: the basic structure of experience, he claims, is intentionality. In 
current anglophone philosophy, 'intentionality' means representation. If Sartre 
were using the term this way, his claim would be that an experience is an 
event or state that represents the way a part of reality is or might be. In which 
case, Sartre's theory would fit well into the mainstream of current anglophone 
philosophy of experience (e. g. Searle 1983, ch. 2; Dancy 1985, ch. 11; 
McDowell 1986; McGinn 1989,58-99; Tye 1992; Dretske 1995, ch. 1). But, as 
we will see (1.1), Sartre means his talk of intentionality to be an altemative to 
representational theories of experience. The intentionality of experience, for 
Sartre, is its nature as a relation to a part of mind-independent reality. When I 
see a tree, for Sartre, the tree is not represented by my experience, but is 
present 'in person' in the experience (B&N: 172,318). The experience is not 
an event contained within my brain or body, but literally includes the tree as a 
spatiotemporal part. Sartre's conception of intentionality is clarified in more 
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detail in chapter 1. For present purposes, all that matters is that Sartrean 
intentionality is not representation, but anglophone intentionality is. 
In order to avoid these distortions of Sartre's theory, distortions based on 
reading Sartre's concerns and the meanings of certain of his key terms to be 
the same as those in current anglophone philosophy, this thesis is 'analytical' 
in a second sense. It involves detailed exegetical analysis of Being and 
Nothingness and, as part of that exegesis, historical analysis of the relation 
between Sartre's work and the works of those that most influenced him in this 
area. This exegesis and historical analysis, though, is not a quest for the 
historical Sartre. The aim is not to identify the actual thoughts had by a 
particular individual. The aim is to formulate a maximally coherent position on 
the basis of the claims made in the texts, claims which cannot be understood 
without an understanding of the terminology employed in those texts, 
terminology that had been adapted from those texts that most influenced 
Sartre. The position formulated will overlap significantly with the actual 
thoughts of the historical individual, and may well coincide with them perfectly, 
but the aim is the formulation of a position, not history. For one thing, his 
thoughts may not have been as coherent as the position that the exegesis 
aims at formulating. Exegesis, that is, involves a principle of charity: when two 
or more competing interpretations are available on the basis of all the 
evidence, the one that should be ascribed to the writer is the one that fits best 
with the rest of the text. This need not necessarily have been the writer)s 
actual thought. 
In pursuing this aim, I do not mean to imply that uses of Sartre's texts that do 
not employ such exegesis and historical analysis are invalid. It seems to me 
that reading a text as though it shared the concerns and terminology of one's 
own philosophical milieu instead of the concerns and conceptual apparatus 
that it makes most sense to ascribe to the author is a perfectly valid method of 
doing philosophy: it can lead one to consider options not previously 
considered. But such a use of the text precludes any interpretation that 
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radically challenges the concerns and conceptual apparatus of one's 
philosophical milieu. My exegesis of the text involves ascribing to Sartre a 
radical position of this sort, and one that I claim presents a distinctive and 
valuable contribution to current debates over the nature of experience. This is, 
at bottom, the view that experience is not generated within the head or body 
of the subject, but is a relation between the brain and some other part of 
mind-independent reality. Identifying this as the conception of experience set 
forth in Being and Nothingness involves analysis of the conception of 
intentionality employed by Sartre's most important influence in this area, 
Husserl, and analysis of Husserl's understanding of the term involves 
exegesis of Brentano's early works that influenced Husserl. This tracing of the 
development of the concept of intentionality (1.1), then, is not simply an 
historical tale: it is part of identifying the position to be ascribed to Sartre on 
the basis of his early works. This position, moreover, involves the similarly 
radical claims that hallucination is apprehension of part of mind-independent 
reality (see chapter 3), a claim that has been traditionally denied by 
philosophers and the denial of which has driven much theory of experience for 
the past four centuries, and that the subject of psychological theorising is not 
the brain or the body but literally includes parts of the body's physical 
environment (see 4.2). Since both of these two claims are radical with respect 
to current anglophone philosophy of mind, and indeed the tradition on which it 
draws, they are not likely to be ascribed to Sartre by a commentator who 
reads Sartre in the light of the currently dominant concerns and concepts. 
It might be objected that my analytical approach to Sartre's texts, the 
approach of finding the maximally coherent position set forth, is mistaken on 
the grounds that Sartre objects to 'analytical' reason, in a third sense of 
canalytical'. In this sense, a text is analytical if it employs concepts that it takes 
to be already delineated. The opposite is dialectical reason, which treats 
concepts as fluid and dynamic, to be refined as enquiry progresses. I treat 
Being and Nothingness and the works that preceded it as analytical in this 
third sense: the term 'intentionality ', for example, means the same thing every 
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time it is used in those texts. Sartre objected to this form of analytical reason 
in the Critique of Dialectical Reason, where he instead employed dialectical 
reason. But this use of dialectical reason was a novel development in his 
writings. As he made clear in an interview towards the end of his life, his 
discovery of the dialectic was made well after the publication of Being and 
Nothingness (1981,9). 
It might further be objected that subjecting the position identified in the text to 
analytical discussion overlooks Sartre's opposition to analytical reason in a 
fourth sense of 'analytical'. In his first book, Imagination, Sartre objected to 
analytical reason on the grounds that it tends towards reductionism. Analysis 
of the object of study into its parts and the relations between them, he argued, 
overlooks the possibility that the whole is more than the sum of its parts and 
the relations between them, but has features of its own not had by any of its 
parts. This claim, I argue, is preserved in Being and Nothingness, and helps 
to drive the ontology he there formulates (see 4.3). But there is no link 
between reason being analytical in this sense and reason being analytical in 
the sense in which my scrutiny of Sartre's position is analytical. My scrutiny is 
analytical in the sense that it subjects the position to arguments against it, and 
identifies and assesses arguments in its favour and counterarguments against 
attacks on it. This does not in any way lead to a reductionist analysis of the 
things under discussion in terms of their parts. Indeed, I argue in chapter 4 on 
the basis of arguments drawn from recent analytic philosophy of mind and 
metaphysics that the holistic form of anti reduction ism that Sartre argues for is 
preferable to any reductionist analysis of experience and the conscious 
subject (4.4). 
My investigation of the theory of phenomenal consciousness in the early 
works of Jean-Paul Sartre, then, is analytical in two senses. It aims to identify 
the maximally coherent position set forth in those texts, which involves 
identifying the meanings of the key terms in those texts in terms of the uses of 
those terms by the philosophers that most influenced Sartre as well as his 
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own uses of those terms, which I take to have been held constant in the texts 
under consideration. And it involves scrutiny of arguments for and against that 
position 
0.6 Preview 
The analytical investigation of the theory of phenomenal consciousness in 
Sartre's early works that comprises this thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 
investigates Sartre's conception of intentionality. I distinguish the current 
anglophone sense of the term 'intentionality' from the sense in which Sartre 
used the term by delineating their differing lines of descent from Brentano's 
influential discussion of it. I show that Sartre's conception is not one of 
representation, but of a direct apprehension of part of mind-independent 
reality. I assess Sartre's claim that this apprehension involves both 'thetic' or 
classificatory aspects and purely qualitative 'nonthetic' aspects. I argue that 
his claim that the determinations deployed in thetic awareness are built up on 
the basis of 'nonthetic' aspects of awareness, can be upheld given his claim 
that such a determination specifies what is inside the class by way of 
specifying what is outside the class. This construal of determinations, I claim, 
is of interest to current attempts to formulate a broadly empiricist theory of the 
acquisition of concepts in that it evades objections to such empiricism based 
on Wittgenstein's private language argument. 
Chapter 2 is concerned with Sartre's arguments for his claim that phenomenal 
consciousness of reality consists in apprehension of reality rather than 
representation of it. The chapter begins by positioning Sartre's conception of 
consciousness with respect to the major theories in classical and 
contemporary debate. This is followed by an exegesis of the tangled and 
confused introduction to Being and Nothingness, in which I argue that the 
passage is aimed at proving that phenomenal consciousness is apprehension 
of being in-itself. I identify three arguments in the passage. I argue that 
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ultimately we should grant Sartre's claim that we should construe experience 
as apprehension of mind-independent reality if we want to formulate a 
definitive ontology, and his implicit claim that such an ontology is worth aiming 
for. But this shows only that such a conception of experience is desirable, not 
that it is true. The remaining two arguments I identify aim to establish the truth 
of the position, but I argue that neither succeeds. The fact that Sartre has 
failed to establish the truth of his theory, however, does not itself mean that 
the theory is of no interest to current debate. The interest that the theory 
holds, I argue, lies in the approaches to hallucination and to the ontology of 
experience and the subject that it leads to, which are discussed in chapters 3 
and 4. 
In chapter 3,1 distinguish four forms of the argument from hallucination and 
argue that Sartre's position is immune to all of them. Arguments from 
hallucination attempt to show that the same type of experience as is involved 
in a perception could occur as an hallucination. If this is right, then the 
experience involved in a perception cannot consist in apprehension of the 
object of perception. The forms of the argument from hallucination all rest on 
one of three claims, all of which are denied by Sartre's theory. So taken as 
arguments against Sartre's theory, they all beg the question. One rests on the 
claim that subjectively indistinguishable experiences are the same type of 
experience, but Sartre's theory entails that the apprehension of one object 
may be subjectively indistinguishable from the apprehension of a very similar 
object, yet still be a different experience on the grounds that it involves a 
different object. Two forms of the argument from hallucination rest on the 
principle that perceptual experience is generated by neural stimulation, but 
Sartre's position denies this, claiming instead that perceptual experience is a 
relation between the brain or body and the object of apprehension. The final 
form of the argument from hallucination rests on the principle that there is no 
object of apprehension in hallucination. Sartre denies this. The difference 
between perceptual and hallucinatory experiences, he claims, lies in the 
attitude in which consciousness applies determinations in each type of 
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experience. Perceptual experience involves determinations attempting to 
track the qualities of the object of apprehension, whereas in hallucination the 
determinations are cued by these qualities but specify a distinct intentional 
object. So hallucination does involve an object of apprehension, even though 
it does not involve apprehension of the intentional object. 
Chapter 4 is concerned with ontological motivations for denying Sartre's claim 
that phenomenal consciousness consists in apprehension of mind- 
independent reality. One motivation is the claim that mind-independent reality 
does not have the colours we experience. I argue that Sartre's position allows 
a construal of the colours of experience as properties of the relation of 
apprehension. On this view, I argue, reality will indeed appear coloured even 
though it is not. I also argue that this view is preferable to the view dominant 
in current anglophone philosophy that colours are ways in which reality is 
represented, since this representationalism overlooks the distinctive 
qualitative nature of colour. This notion of properties of the relation of 
apprehension, or 'textures of consciousness', I add, can be used to evade all 
forms of the argument that experience cannot be direct apprehension of 
reality since reality is not always the way it seems. On Sartre's account, the 
way reality seems is not only a function of the way it is, but also of the way in 
which I am aware of it. 
The other ontological motivation for denying Sartre)s relational view of 
consciousness is the view that it is explanatorily redundant. Everything that 
needs to be explained by experience can be explained in terms of neural 
events, the argument runs, so experiences must be reducible to neural 
events, and hence contained within the skin. I argue that there is no good 
reason to accept the claim that the best explanation of behaviour will refer 
only to neural events, and claim that there are explanatory gains to be had by 
referring to experiences themselves. In the course of arguing this, I show that 
Sartre's conception of experience requires a broad construal of actions as 
including parts of the body's physical environment. And I show that this 
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requires that the subject that experiences and acts, the subject of 
psychological theorising, is not the brain or body but an environment-inclusive 
extended subject, or being-in-the-world. These Sartrean conceptions of broad 
action and the extended subject, I argue, also make explanatory gains over 
the reductionist view of the subject as the body or brain and its actions as 
bodily movements. If this is right, Sartre's position is preferable to 
reductionism. 
I conclude the thesis by summarising the key components of Sartre's theory 
and their importance for current debates over the nature of consciousness, 
and drawing out the ramifications of my exposition and assessment of Sartre 
for the nature of the phenomenology and ontology that must be ascribed to 
him and for the acceptability of the major themes of Sartrean existentialism. I 
argue that his phenomenology can be considered free of presuppositions and 
that his resulting ontology is one of ontological realism, structural realism with 
respect to being in-itself, a combination of structural realism and structural 
idealism with respect to the world, and semantic realism with respect to both 
being in-itself and the world (see 0.4). 1 argue that Sartre's ontology of 
relational consciousness and the extended subject license his claim that 
mechanistic determinism and social determinism are both false, but does not 
license the additional plank of Sartre's theory of human freedom, the claim 
that psychological determinism is false. I show how Sartre's theory of bad 
faith must be revised in the light of the shortcomings I identify in his theories 
of the relation between thetic and nonthetic awareness and of the nature of 
imagining. Most importantly, there is no reason to accept Sartre's claim that 
the play-acting involved in bad faith can never convince the actor. And finally I 
argue that Sartre's pessimistic theory of the nature of interpersonal relations 
as necessarily based on a distorting and alienating reification of the other is 
not only not supported by his theory of the ontology of phenomenal 
consciousness, but seems positively undermined by it. 
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Chapter 1 
Intentionality: Object and Aspect 
The keystone on which Sartre builds his theory of the relation between 
consciousness and reality, and as a result the rest of Being and Nothingness, 
is his conception of intentionality. Phenomenal consciousness is, for Sartre, 
an intentional direction towards something, which is the same as positing or 
having positional awareness of something. In Sartre's words: 
'All consciousness, as Husserl has shown, is consciousness of 
something. This means that there is no consciousness which is 
not a positing of a transcendent object, or if you prefer, that 
consciousness has no "content". ... The 
first procedure of a 
philosophy ought to be to expel things from consciousness and 
to reestablish its true connection with the world, to know that 
consciousness is a positional (positionelle) consciousness of the 
world. ' (B&N: xxvii). 
Positional awareness of something enables the subject to pick out that 
something by means of a demonstrative thought or utterance: to be 
positionally aware of something, Sartre tells us (B&N: 180), is to fix attention 
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on that thing and single it out as a 'this' (<<cecb+ The intentionality of 
phenomenal consciousness of the environment, of which vision is one kind, 
then, is its positionality: it is its structure as direct contact with the part of 
reality experienced, which fixes the reference of a demonstrative term that 
picks out the part of reality experienced, making it 'possible to effect a 
designation and to say this object, that object' (B&N: 139). 
This link between intentionality and demonstrative reference distinguishes 
Sartre's notion of intentionality from the current anglophone notion with the 
same name. Anglophone philosophers equate intentionality with 
representation. For most anglophone philosophers, representation is 
independent of the reality (if there is one) which is represented, so to say that 
a visual experience represents a cat on a mat at a certain distance in a certain 
direction, for example, is to say that the experience might be a perception of a 
cat on a mat at a certain distance in a certain direction, or it might be an 
hallucination occurring in the absence of any such cat. An experience that is 
intentional in this sense cannot, in and of itself, ground demonstrative 
reference to a part of reality: since the same experience could occur in the 
absence of the cat, demonstrative reference to the cat in the case of genuine 
perception can be fixed only by the experience plus some relation, such as 
causation, between the experience and the cat. Although this view of 
intentionality is dominant among current anglophone philosophers (e. g. Searle 
1983, ch. 2; Dancy 1985, ch. 11; McGinn 1989,58-99; Tye 1992; Dretske 
1995, ch. 1), it is not universal. McDowell argues for 'object-dependence as a 
feature of intentionality' (1986,167). On this view, claims McDowell, a 
perceptual experience of a cat represents that cat in such a way that the 
experience could not occur in the absence of the cat, so the experience itself 
can ground demonstrative reference to the cat. McDowell's position remains 
distinct from Sartre's, however, in that McDowell equates intentionality with 
representation and wishes to build object-dependence into the notion of 
representation (which will allow for the claim about demonstrative reference), 
whereas Sartre equates intentionality directly with positionality (and hence the 
43 
claim about demonstrative reference), and sees this intentionality as an 
altemative to representational theories of the relation between consciousness 
and the world. To say that consciousness is intentional, for Sartre, is to say 
that 'consciousness has no "content" - .. A table is not in consciousness - not 
even in the capacity of a representation' (B&N: xxvii). The difference between 
the Sartrean notion of intentionality, on the one hand, and the dominant and 
McDowellian anglophone notions, on the other, will be clarified in more detail 
in 1.1 in terms of their differing lines of descent from Brentano's work, and in 
chapter 3 we will see that Sartre's notion of intentionality succeeds in securing 
demonstrative reference to the world on the basis of experience alone but 
McDowell's notion does not (3.3). 
The Sartrean and anglophone notions of intentionality, then, differ in their 
analyses of the directedness of intentional events: anglophone philosophers 
understand this in terms of (object-dependent or object-independent) 
representation, whereas Sartre understands it in terms of some more direct 
relation that dispenses with representation altogether. But the Sartrean and 
anglophone notions of intentionality do share a central feature. In both cases, 
an intentional experience does not just present or represent an object but 
presents or represents it in a certain way, under a certain description, or to 
use Searle's (e. g. 1983,12-3) apt term, under an aspect. Intentional or 
positional awareness not only picks out a part of reality, but also makes a 
claim about that part of reality: that it is, say, a picture of a duck, a picture of a 
rabbit, or simply lines on a page. This is at least part of what Sartre means by 
the 'thetic' character of experience. In addition to this, according to Sartre, 
experience has a 'nonthetic' character. Awareness of some qualities of the 
world, such as phenomenal colours, and background awareness of parts of 
the world other than the posited figure on which attention is focused, Sartre 
claims, involve this nonthetic awareness. This view will be clarified and 
assessed in sections 1.3-1.5. 
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Sartre's discussions of the structures of intentionality occur mainly in Being 
and Nothingness part one chapter one ('The Origin of Negation') and part two 
chapters one ('Immediate Structures of the For-Itself') and three 
('Transcendence'). Although this chapter draws largely on these discussions, 
quotations and examples are taken from all over his early writings, which 
reflects the centrality of his theory of intentionality to his overall worldview. 
Identifying a philosopher's theories inevitably involves some discussion of 
their terminology, and lexicography is particularly important in this chapter. 
Towards the end of his life, Sartre claimed: 
'I never had any stylistic ambition for philosophy. Never, never. I 
tried to write clearly, that's all. ... Style is, first of all, economy: it 
is a question of making sentences in which several meanings 
co-exist and in which the words are taken as allusions, as 
objects rather than as concepts. In philosophy a word must 
signify a concept and that one only. ' (1981,11)-1 
In the philosophical writings with which this thesis is concerned, it seems to 
me, Sartre did adhere to this rule: same word -ý same concept. But the arrow 
is not double-headed: Sartre tends to use a variety of words drawn from 
different areas of philosophical tradition to indicate the same concept. The first 
three sections of this chapter aim to identify sets of Sartrean synonyms and 
near-synonyms, and their relations to their current anglophone homonyms, in 
order to clarify and situate his overall theory ready for assessment in sections 
1.4 and 1.5. On Sartre's picture, experience involves the application of 
concepts ('determinations') motivated by, and formulated in response to, 
nonrepresentational qualitative aspects of the experience ('qualities'). I argue 
that he has not shown that we have purely qualitative awareness of the 
background of awareness, and that it seems that our awareness of this 
background involves some, albeit vague, representational structure. But his 
claim that there are qualitative aspects of phenomenal consciousness of the 
object of attention does provide an explanation of the origin of the concepts or 
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categories under which the experience is organised. Since these 
nonrepresentational aspects of experience motivate the application of 
representational content, they would seem to be present in awareness of both 
figure and ground. I conclude that Sartre's theory occupies an interesting 
position in current debates over representational and qualitative aspects of 
experience, although he has not provided any strong arguments for his 
position, and that this position has ramifications for the ontology of 
consciousness and world which will be discussed in full in chapter 4. 
1.1 Intentionality and Positional Awareness 
Sartre describes perceptual experience as 'positional' and 'intentional' 
awareness of an object on which attention is focused, and as 'knowledge I 
(connaissance) and 'intuition' of that part of mind-independent reality. The aim 
of this section is to clarify the meanings of these terms in Sartre's lexicon, and 
hence to clarify further the distinction between Sartre's conception of 
intentionality and the anglophone conception. First I argue that 'intuition' and 
'connaissance' are synonyms for Sartre, and that an object is intuited or 
known only if it is itself present to consciousness, directly, without 
intermediary. Next I argue that the object posited in an experience is the 
object intuited or known only if the experience is perceptual; in imaginative 
experience the intuited or known object is used as material on the basis of 
which something else is posited. Whatever object is posited is the intentional 
object, I claim, and the object to which attention is paid. This separability of 
the object intuited or known from the intentional object posited and attended 
to forms the basis of Sartre's innovative theory of hallucination which, as we 
shall see in chapter 3, allows him to resist all forms of the argument from 
hallucination, the argument that since perception and hallucination involve the 
same kind of experience, experience cannot itself render a part of the world 
available for demonstrative reference. 
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Sartre ties intentionality to demonstrative reference, as we saw in the 
introduction to this chapter: the intentionality of experience renders a part of 
reality available for demonstrative reference. The object made 
demonstratively available - 'the thisy - may be an entity such as a chair or 
table, or a property of an entity such as its yellowness or roughness (B&N: 
186). (1 discuss the ontological status of the 'this' in 1.2. ) Picking out a present 
'this' in this way is what Sartre means by 'knowledge' (connaissance) when he 
applies it to perceptual awareness: 'knowledge (connaissance) posits the 
2 object in the face of (en face de) consciousness' (B&N: 94-5). Sartre explicitly 
links this conception of connaissance to intuition: 
'There is only intuitive knowledge (connaissance). ... intuition ... 
is the presence of the thing ... "in person" to consciousness. 
4C Knowledge therefore is of the type of being presence to 
(B&N: 172; see also TE: 35) 
Sartre's term 'intuition' (intuition) is not the same as its current anglophone 
homonym which denotes a pre-theoretical thought or feeling that may be 
elicited by a thought-experiment, or which is in play when a claim is 
considered intuitively plausible or counter-intuitive. It is, in fact, a French 
translation of the Kantian and Husserlian term 'Anschauung', usually 
translated into English as 'intuition' since its meaning is the same as the 
original meaning of that English term. The literal meanings of 'Anschauuncf 
are sight, view, perception, and contemplation, and it is a component of such 
terms as Weltanschauuncf (worldview, outlook). It is a term laden with visual 
connotations, but Sartre does not reserve it for visual perception, using it for 
all forms of phenomenal consciousness. Sartre takes the term from Kant and 
Husserl, and merely disagrees with them (as he reads them) over what we 
can intuit. Kant reserves the term for the deliverances of receptivity (1929, 
A19-21/1333-5), which on Sartre's reading of Kant means that we can intuit 
only mind-dependent appearances (see 2.2). Husserl claims that we can intuit 
parts of reality (e. g. 1982, § 1), but on Sartre's reading of Husserl as a 
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phenomenalist this is the claim that we can intuit mind-dependent objects (see 
2.2). Intuition, for Sartre, is the presence of part of being in-itself 'in person' to 
consciousness (B&N: 172,318). So perception, for Sartre, is intuition of a 
mind-independent object, precisely what he takes Kant and Husserl to deny. 
Knowledge or intuition, for Sartre, C posits the object in the face of (en face de) 
consciousness' (B&N: 94-5; see also PI: 14). Sartre makes much use of the 
term 'posit' and its cognates. Although he never defines it, it is clear that he 
has adopted it from Husserl and considers it to be part of the stock 
terminology of the phenomenological tradition in which he is keen to situate 
himself: he first uses the term in a phenomenological description of 
imagination and an exposition of Husserl's phenomenological method (IPC: 
124-5,136); his most detailed discussion of positing appears in the course of 
a phenomenological description of imagining (PI: 10-3); and the first use of 
the term in Being and Nothingness is to define Husserlys notion of 
intentionality as he understands it (B&N: xxvii). Husserl's use of the term is 
not consistent, however. In Logical Investigations, 'positing' (Setzung) 
awareness affirms the existence of its object whereas 'nonpositing' 
awareness suspends judgement about the existence or non-existence of the 
object (1970, Inv. V§ 34). In Ideas, 'positing' is used in a variety of senses, 
the widest of which encompasses the varieties of mental attitudes towards 
objects, such that judging, wishing, and perceiving, for example, are different 
forms of positing (1982, § 129). And in Carlesian Meditations, 'positing' is 
defined as 'taking a position as to being ', and there are a wide variety of such 
positions, including 'certainly existing, being possible, being probable, also 
being beautiful and being good, being useful, etc. ' (1950, § 15). 
Sartre does not use the term in any of these senses. To call a consciousness 
gpositional', for Sartre, is to say that 'it transcends itself in order to reach an 
object' (B&N: xxvii). The object posited in an experience is the object singled 
out, to which I 'direct my attention' (B&N: 95). Looking at a photograph of my 
friend Peter, for example, I may inspect the shapes and colours on the card, 
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or I may see it as an image of Peter. Only in the former case, according to 
Sartre, am I seeing the photograph: it is the object posited. In the latter case I 
am imagining Peter: he is the object posited (PI: 17-8). The positional 
character of a perceptual experience is its picking out of a part of mind- 
independent reality that is present in experience, the object intuited or known 
(connue), but in the case of imaginative experience such as imagining Peter 
with the aid of a photograph, the object posited is not the object intuited or 
known. This positional character of experience, as we saw in the introduction 
to this chapter, makes the part of the world posited (if there is one) available 
for demonstrative reference, and, as we also saw, this positionality is how 
Sartre understands intentionality. The object posited, the intentional object, is 
the object of attention, because 'attention is intentional direction towards 
objects' (B&N: 269). 3 
So where anglophone philosophers construe intentionality as representation 
and differ over whether such representation is independent of the objects 
represented, Sartre understands intentionality to be object-dependent 
because it is intuition or connaissance of an object. The object itself ('in 
person') figures in the experience (B&N: 172,318), so the experience cannot 
occur without it. But this intuited object is not necessarily the object posited. If 
attention is focused on the intuited object, as it is in perception, then that 
object is the intentional object. But if attention is directed beyond the intuited 
object, to something depicted or symbolised by it, as it is in imaginative 
experience, then that depicted or symbolised object is the intentional object. 
The difference between the Sartrean and anglophone conceptions is due to 
their differing lines of descent from Brentano's theory that the intentionality of 
'mental phenomena' distinguishes them from 'physical phenomena', 
expressed in the following famous passage: 
'Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what 
the 
Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) 
inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not 
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wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward 
an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a 
thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon 
includes something as object within itself, although they do not 
all do so in the same way. In presentation something is 
presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love 
loved, in hate hated, in desire desired, and so on. 
This intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of 
mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything 
like it. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying 
that they are those phenomena which contain an object 
intentionally within themselves. ' (Brentano 1995,88). 
There are two important facts about Brentano's Psychology from an Empirical 
Standpoint, from which this passage is taken, that must be borne in mind 
when interpreting this passage: Brentano was interested in psychology which 
he defined as 'the science of the soul', and so was concerned with mental 
states or events themselves, not with the question of their relation to the rest 
of reality (see 1995,3-5); and he claimed that 'experience alone is my 
teacher' (1995, xxvii). He uses the term 'phenomena' to refer to items within 
the mind that we directly experience (1995,78). There are two sorts of 
experience, he claims: 'inner perception' of 'mental phenomena', and 'outer 
perception' of 'physical phenomena'. Examples of mental phenomena are 
listed in the above passage: the basic form is 'presenting', which is simply 
awareness of something; more sophisticated forms involve making a 
judgement about, or taking up an attitude such as love or hate toward, the 
presented entity. Physical phenomena, on the other hand, are what are 
presented in ordinary, unreflective experience: they are mind-dependent 
appearances contained within mental phenomena .4 The mind-dependence of 
physical phenomena is most obvious from Brentano's Humean scepticism of 
the senses: 'We have no right, he writes, 'to believe that the objects of so- 
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called external perception really exist as they appear to us. indeed, they 
demonstrably do not exist outside of us. In contrast to that which really and 
truly exists, they are mere phenomena' (1995,10; see 91). Again: 'We have 
no experience of that which truly exists, in and of itself, and that which we do 
experience is not true. The truth of physical phenomena is, as they say, only a 
relative truth' (1995,19). The first sentence of this last quotation is a little 
misleading, however, since Brentano takes us to be aware of mental as well 
as physical phenomena, and mental phenomena he claims are part of reality: 
'mental phenomena ... are those phenomena which alone possess real 
existence as well as intentional existence. Knowledge, joy and desire really 
exist. Colour, sound and warmth have only a phenomenal and intentional 
existence' (1995,92). Physical phenomena, then, are mind-dependent, 'can 
exist only phenomenally' (1995, vii), which is why Brentano considers them 
present in imagination as well as perception (1995,79-80) and why he claims 
in the famous paragraph that they are always present in judgement, love, 
hate, and desire regardless of whether my judgement is true or false, or 
whether there is any part of mind-independent reality that fits my love, hate, or 
desire. 
Brentano's thesis, then, is that a mental state or event comprises a mental 
phenomenon that contains and is directed towards a physical phenomenon 
that is dependent on that mental phenomenon. 5 Physical phenomena, for 
Brentano, are not directed on anything. Whether or not they represent things 
in mind-independent reality is not an issue with which Brentano is concerned, 
and he is happy to concede on grounds of Humean scepticism that it may not 
be possible to settle it. 
Although anglophone philosophers often mention Brentano in their 
discussions of intentionality, the anglophone conception of intentionality as 
the property of representing a possible state of affairs 
is derived from 
Brentano's thesis only indirectly. The term 'intentionality' was introduced 
into 
anglophone philosophy by Chisholm, who intended 
to explain Brentano's 
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thesis but misunderstood and thereby misrepresented it. Chisholm made two 
mistakes. First, he failed to notice that mental and physical phenomena are, 
for Brentano, components of mental states or events; instead, he understood 
mental phenomena to be mental states or events, and physical phenomena to 
be mind-independent objects, states, or events. Second, he conflated 
intentionality with the logical notion of intensionality. A sentence is intensional 
only if: (i) the substitution of one of its terms with a co-referring term does not 
always preserve the statement's truth value; and (ii) we cannot infer from the 
truth of the statement that all of the terms refer to existent entities. The 
statement 'John believes that the masked man is responsible' is intensional, 
since: (i) if the masked man is John's brother, it does not follow that 'John 
believes that John's brother is responsible' (John might not believe that the 
masked man is his brother); and (ii) it does not entail that the masked man 
exists. Chisholm considered Brentano to have been most interested in the 
latter aspect of intensional. statements. Chisholm's two mistakes led him to 
read Brentano's thesis as the claim that the objects of mental states or events 
need not, exist whereas the objects of physical events must exist. 'We can 
desire or think about horses that do not exist, ' he explained, 'but we can ride 
only those that do' (1960,4; see also 1956,125; 1957,169). When I think 
about a particular horse, on Chisholm's reading of Brentano, I think about a 
really existing physical object, but when I think about a unicorn the object of 
my thought has mere 'intentional inexistence'. Where this term actually refers 
to the type of existence had by a mind-dependent entity, and Brentano 
considered all thought to involve such entities, Chisholm takes Brentano to be 
claiming that 'intentional inexistence' is the ontological status of non-existent 
objects of thought (see 1967a, 365; 1967b, 201; 1996,115-9). 6 
The conception of intentionality that Chisholm introduced into anglophone 
philosophy was, then, the conception of mental representation or reference 
by 
another name, the new name being supposed to reflect the 
intensionality of 
mental states or events. It was talk of intentionality 
in this sense that Quine 
considered to be no part of scientific attempts to 
formulate fundamental laws 
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and to illuminate the true and ultimate structure of reality, although perhaps 
useful in daily life (1960, § 43-5). And it was intentionality in this sense that 
was fiercely debated by post-Quinean anglophone philosophers for more than 
two decades (a debate well charted by Fodor (1985) and Dennett (1987)). 7 
The influence of this debate led Danto to explicate Sartre's notion of 
intentionality in terms of intensionality despite the fact that, as Danto admits, 
Sartre was not interested in the logical peculiarities of psychological state 
ascriptions (Danto 1991,39-40; first published: 1975). This confusion of 
intentionality and intensionality continued until 1983, when Searle proclaimed: 
'One of the most pervasive confusions in contemporary 
philosophy is the mistaken belief that there is some close 
connection, perhaps even an identity, between intensionality- 
with-an-s and Intentionality-with-a-t. ... [it] derives from a 
mistake that is apparently endemic to the methods of linguistic 
philosophy - confusion of features of reports with features of 
things reported' (Searle 1983,24). 
Mental events, claims Searle, are intentional because they are 
representational; reports of mental events are intensional because they do not 
commit themselves to the correctness of the representation they report. When 
the masked man is John's brother, John's thought that the masked man is 
responsible makes a claim about his brother whether he knows it or not; but 
the report 'John thinks the masked man is responsible' aims to capture the 
role John's belief plays in his mental economy and so does not entail 'John 
thinks his brother is responsible'. Similarly, John's thought about the masked 
man entails the claim that there is a masked man, since John's thought can 
be true only if there is a masked man, but the report 'John thinks that the 
masked man is responsible' entails only that John has a certain thought and 
makes no claim about the masked man. The confusion of properties of mental 
states or events with properties of reports of mental states or events is aided 
and abetted, Searle claims, by the fact that the reports need not be linguistic 
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reports: they may be second-order mental states or events (1983,22-6 and 
c h. 7). 
By separating intensionality from intentionality, Searle preserved only one part 
of Chisholm's conception of intentionality: representation. No longer 
intensional, mental states or events are taken to be intentional in the sense of 
representing entities or objects other than themselves. The problems of 
intentionality now discussed by anglophone philosophers are the problems of 
how one part of the natural world can represent another, and how we are to 
construe representation when existent and non-existent things can equally be 
represented. This conception of intentionality remains, however, significantly 
different from Brentano's on at least two counts. First, Brentano was 
concerned with an intra-mental relationship between two parts of a mental 
state or event (although he did not frame his work in those terms) whereas the 
current anglophone concern is with the extra-mental relation between a 
mental state or event and a part of reality. Second, Brentano considered 
intentionality to be one part of a mental state or event being directed toward 
the other without any mention of representation. Sartre's conception of 
intentionality is derived from this Brentanian conception via Husserl, and the 
differences between Sartre's conception and the current anglophone 
conception are due to this differing heritage. 8 
Husserl's basic innovation in the theory of intentionality was to claim that 
mental phenomena in Brentano's sense are not directed on mind-dependent 
objects at all, but on transcendent objects - entities that are not contained 
within the mental phenomena directed on them. In Logical Investigations, 
Husserl objects to the 'box-within-box structure' of Brentanian intentionality, 
claiming that the mind is directed not toward a mental entity but toward an 
extra-mental entity that may or may not exist. Husserl does not deny the 
presence of mind-dependent appearances in intentional experiences, 
but 
denies that such appearances are the objects of experiences. Mind- 
dependent appearances, he claims, 'are not themselves intended, not the 
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objects presented in the act. I do not see colour-sensations but coloured 
things' (1970, Inv. V§ 11). After the transcendental turn, from Ideas onwards, 
he presented roughly the same picture in new terminology. An experience 
consists in mind-dependent matter (hyle) and a set of intentions directed on 
the object (morphe). Some of the intentions are 'fulfilled' (Erfallo by matter, 
some are not. When I see a table, on this account, I intend many different 
aspects of the table such as its nearside and its farside. Those intentions that 
aim at the nearside of the table are fulfilled, those that aim at the farside are 
not. The single act consisting of many intentions is aimed at the table as a 
whole, and since some of the intentions are unfulfilled the table is not wholly 
contained within the act (1982, §§ 128-135; 1950, § 28). 
Sartre agrees with Husserl that mental phenomena are directed toward 
transcendent objects but rejects mind-dependent appearances. In Sartre's 
view, these appearances can only shield an external world lying beyond them 
(indirect realism) or be part of a world that is then ultimately mind-dependent 
(phenomenalism), and Sartre rejects both of these possibilities (see chapter 
2). Where Brentanian intentionality is directedness on a mind-dependent 
object and Husserlian intentionality is a surpassing of mind-dependent 
objects towards a transcendent object, Sartrean intentionality is just 
directedness towards an object without the aid of mind-dependent objects 
(see B&N: 178). In perception, the mind-independent object present to 
consciousness, intuited and known (connue), is the object of intentionality: it is 
the entity to which attention is paid, and which is posited. Perceiving a 
photograph, for example, I pay attention to the photograph itself, to its shapes 
and colours; it is the intentional object. If I surpass this object in the way the 
Husserl argues mind-dependent objects (hyle) are surpassed, and direct my 
attention to the object or person depicted in the photograph, then 
I am no 
longer perceiving: I am imagining, and that object or person is the intentional 
object of my imagination (PI: 17-8). The intentional object 
is always the object 
posited. 
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Sartrean intentionality, then, involves apprehension of a part of mind- 
independent reality that may be attended to (perception) or surpassed toward 
some absent object (imagination). The intentionality of perception is the 
positing of, the directing of attention toward, the mind-independent object 
intuited and known (connue). It is not, as it is for most current anglophone 
theorists, an entirely self-contained experience's property of representing 
something other than itself; and it is not, as it is for McDowell, an object- 
dependent representation of that object. It is not representation. As a result, 
the two problems of intentionality faced by the anglophone conception are not 
faced by Sartre's conception. These are the problems of how we are to 
understand the notion of representation when both existent and non-existent 
things can be represented, and how it is that representation can arise in the 
natural world. Sartre's conception faces instead the parallel problems of 
accounting for non-perceptual experience (e. g. hallucination) within the 
confines of this conception of intentionality, and fitting the intentional direction 
of experience into the natural world. These are the topics of chapters 3 and 4. 
1.2 Nonpositional Awareness and the Unity of Consciousness 
In addition to positional awareness of a part of the world, or intentional 
direction toward a part of the world, Sartre considers perceptual experience to 
involve what he terms 'nonpositional awareness', a form of awareness that 
does not involve attending to a specific object. A token perceptual experience, 
for Sartre, is 'a synthetic unity of a multiplicity of appearances' (PI: 7); only 
one member of this multiplicity involves positing an object, the others are 
nonpositional. The aim of this section is to clarify Sartre's theory of the relation 
between positional and nonpositional awareness in order to pave the way for 
a discussion of Sartre's closely related theory of 'thetic' and 
'nonthetic' 
awareness. Before going on to discuss positional and nonpositional 
awareness, however, it is important to clarify 
Sartre's notion of the synthetic 
unity of consciousness. 
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Sartre uses the term 'consciousness' in two different senses. In the narrow 
sense (e. g. B&N: xxvii), it is simply awareness of something. There are two 
varieties of this awareness. Positional awareness is, as we have seen (1.1), 
intentional direction towards an object, which is the same as paying attention 
to that object. Nonpositional awareness, on the other hand, does not involve 
paying attention and is awareness of something other than an intentional 
object. I am now paying attention to a computer screen, for example. In 
Sartre's terms, the screen is the intentional object that I posit, but I am also 
nonpositionally aware of various other features of the scene that contains the 
screen. In Sartre's broad sense of 'consciousness' (e. g. B&N: 317), 1 am 
conscious of the whole scene: of the screen posited and of its surroundings, 
the sounds in the street outside, the seated position of my body, and various 
other things that I am only nonpositionally aware of. Sartre's theory of pre- 
reflective self-awareness is the view that every consciousness in the broad 
sense involves a nonpositional awareness of that consciousness as well as 
other awarenesses (B&N: xxx). To avoid confusion, I use the term 
C7 awareness' for the narrow sense of Sartre's 'consciousness, and 
gconsciousness' for his broad sense of 'consciousness'. 
Sartre's discussions of the synthetic unity of consciousness involve two 
senses of 'synthetic unity'. First, there is synthesis of diverse simultaneous 
awarenesses: consciousnesses in Sartre's narrow sense (awarenesses) are 
synthesised into a consciousness in the broad sense (TE: 38; PI: 5). Second, 
there is synthesis of these consciousnesses in the broad sense with one 
another over time: consciousnesses in the broad sense are synthesised into a 
continuous flow of consciousness, an enduring mind (TE: 39; PI: 14). 
This 
second form of synthesis is not a concern of this thesis, and so will 
be 
ignored; I will use the phrase ' synthetic unity' only in the first of these senses. 
' 
Sartre's notion of the synthetic unity of consciousness should not 
be confused 
with the Cartesian notion of the indivisibility of the mental 
(Descartes 1984, 
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59). Aside from the fact that Sartre denies that there is a Cartesian, Kantian, 
or Husserlian transcendental ego responsible for unifying experience (TE: 32- 
60; B&N: 235), there is no reason to equate synthetic unity with Cartesian 
indivisibility since there is no reason to suppose that the synthetically united 
parts cannot be disconnected from one another. One popular argument 
against Cartesian indivisibility of the mental concerns so-called 'split-brain' 
cases: the severing of the corpus callosum which connects the two 
hemispheres of the brain results, under certain carefully constructed 
experimental conditions, in the prevention of communication between the two 
hemispheres and the concomitant phenomenon of a 'split-mind' - what 
seems, on behavioural evidence, to be two independent centres of 
consciousness within a single human being (Nagel 1971,392-402). Sartre's 
notion of the synthetic unity of consciousness, however, seems positively 
supported by the split-brain experiments: under certain conditions, the two 
hemispheres of the brain cannot communicate and so the diverse psychic 
elements (or awarenesses) cannot be synthesised into a single experience 
(consciousness). That is, the difference between the split brain patient under 
experimental conditions and a normal individual is that the latter, but not the 
former, can and does synthesise distinct but simultaneous awarenesses into 
one single consciousness (as Nagel (1971,409-11) suggests). The split brain 
patient under experimental conditions, it seems, synthesises awarenesses 
into two distinct consciousnesses. 10 
Sartre's claim that 'there is no consciousness which is not a positing of a 
transcendent object' (B&N: xxvii), therefore, is not contradicted by his claim 
that there are nonpositional forms of awareness (B&N: xxx). Every 
synthetically united consciousness (consciousness in the broad sense) 
involves positional awareness of an intentional object along with nonpositional 
awareness. Sartre claims that there can be only one positional awareness. 
The object of positional awareness, the 'this' (see 1.1), he claims, 
'is revealed 
as "this" by "a withdrawal into the ground of the world of all the other 
"thises 777 
(B&N: 183). Moreover: 
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'The original relation of the thises to one another can be neither 
interaction nor causality nor even the upsurge on the same 
ground of the world. If we suppose that the For-itself is present 
to one (un) this, the other thises exist at the same time "in the 
world" but by virtue of being undifferentiated; they constitute the 
ground on which the this confronted is raised in relief' (B&N: 
189) 
Every consciousness in the broad sense, then, is a synthetic unity of one 
positional awareness with nonpositional awarenesses. Sartre links this to the 
figure / ground distinction of Gestalt psychology: 
'we must observe that in perception there is always the 
construction of a figure on a ground. No one object, no group of 
objects is especially designed to be organized as specifically 
either ground or figure; all depends on the direction of my 
attention ... the ground is that which is seen only in addition, that 
which is the object of- a purely marginal attention. ' (B&N: 9-10; 
compare B&N: 332). 
I am positionally aware of a figure, the object of attention, and nonpositionally 
aware of the ground (B&N: 94-5). Where Gestalt theory typically restricts the 
figure / ground distinction to within each sensory modality (see Katz 1951, 
31), Sartre generalises it across the whole conscious range: all sensory 
modalities, imagination, mathematical thought, etc.; where Searle (1992) 
distinguishes the 'figure-ground distinction' (132-3) from the 'centre-periphery 
distinction' (137-9), Sartre construes the figure as that which is at the centre of 
consciousness, the ground is all that I am only peripherally aware of. 
The 
ground of which we are aware in this way is described 
by Sartre as an 
'evanescence', 'an undifferentiated totality', and 'the background' (B&N: 10). 
Looking for my friend Pierre, whose face is well known to me, 
in a caf6 
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requires focusing attention on each person in the caf6 to determine whether 
or not that person is Pierre: my background awareness of the caf6 
accompanying, say, my positional awareness of a newspaper cannot allow 
me to tell whether any of the faces in the caf6 is that of my friend Pierre (B&N: 
10). 11 When I become aware that another conscious being is looking at me, 
according to Sartre, I become positionally aware of the other's look and the 
whole perceivable world thereby becomes the ground on which the look 
stands as figure (B&N: 258,266). 
As well as reserving the term 'intentionality' for the directing of attention that is 
positional awareness, Sartre marks the distinction between positional and 
nonpositional awareness in Being and Nothingness by italicising the 'of' of 
intentionality in the phrase 'consciousness of... ' for positional awareness, and 
bracketing 'of' in the phrase 'consciousness (of) ... ' for nonpositional 
awareness. This bracketing is designed to emphasise the fact that the 'of' in 
reports of nonpositional awareness is not the 'of' of intentionality, but 'merely 
satisfies a grammatical requirement' (B&N: xxx). 
Sartre does not consider objects themselves to determine whether they are 
seen as the figure or as part of the ground. A figure is demarcated from its 
ground by 'a limiting cutting into being' or 'individualizing limitation' (B&N: 8) 
introduced by consciousness. This demarcation is the basic form of negation. 
To pick something out as a figure is simply to deny that it is any of the 
surrounding entities (B&N: 24); 'in perception we constitute a particular object 
as a figure by rejecting another so as to make of it a ground, and conversely' 
(B&N: 20). As a result 'this particular being can be called this only on the 
ground of the presence of all being' (B&N: 180). Positional awareness of the 
figure, therefore, requires nonpositional awareness of the ground. A figure is 
one example of what Sartre calls 'n6gatit6s'. This neologism picks out: 
4 realities which are not only objects of judgement, but which are 
experienced, opposed, feared, etc., by the human being and 
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which in their inner structure are inhabited by negation, as by a 
necessary condition of their existence' (B&N: 21). 
The figure is a ndgatitd since it is determined as a 'this' by a negation of the 
ground; 'ndgatitds ... retain negation as the condition of the sharpness of their 
outlines, as that which fixes them as what they are' (B&N: 21). When a figure 
arises on the ground, 'its determination ... is a negation' (B&N: 183). 
'Negativity ... causes a this to exist' (B&N: 180); demarcation requires 
negation. 
Scholars are divided over how to interpret this claim. Wider (1990,346), for 
example, claims that consciousness 'creates differences within being ... [it] 
pulls the figure out from the ground ... [and thereby] makes this figure not be 
the ground and not be other figures pulled out from the flat ground'. This 
sounds as though Sartre claims that being in-itself would be an 
undifferentiated mass had consciousness not arisen and organised it into 
separate entities. That is, Wider seems to ascribe to Sartre a form of 
structural idealism according to which mind-independent reality gains its 
structures from the way in which I am (or other conscious beings are) aware 
of it (see Wider 1990,338 and 343). On this reading, Sartre is not claiming 
that the apparent structures of the world are structures only of our thought and 
awareness, but that reality has become structured through being the object of 
consciousness just as a sheet of pastry is cut up by a pastry cutter. But this 
reading is incompatible with Sartre's claims that: 
4we can not imagine that the For-itself effects distorting synthetic 
negations among transcendents that it is not' (B&N: 185) 
'this negation - looking at the this - 
is wholly ideal. It adds 
nothing to being and subtracts nothing 
from it. The being 
confronted as "this" is what it is and 
does not cease being it; it 
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does not become' (B&N: 183; see also 179,186-7,191-2,197) 
217) 12 
Sartre's insistence that consciousness does not change being leads 
McCulloch to ascribe structural realism to Sartre (1994,111-7). According to 
McCulloch's reading of Sartre, when I pick out a table as a figure on the 
ground of the world I do so because the table already is a single entity distinct 
from its background, and when I focus on a property of an object, such as its 
yellowness or roughness (B&N: 186), 1 do so because that property is already 
distinct from the rest of the scene. But it is not clear how this realism is 
compatible with Sartre's claim that the demarcation of a figure 'is wholly ideal' 
(B&N: 186): on McCulloch's reading the demarcation is wholly real. Moreover, 
given Sartre's claim that there can be only one posited object in any one 
consciousness (B&N: 183,189) and his talk of a'group of objects' being seen 
as figure on a ground (B&N: 9), his discussion of seeing a number of objects 
at once (B&N: 191-2) should be understood as involving the claim that a 
number of distinct entities can be grouped together as a single figure, a single 
'this', what Husserl called 'a phenomenally unitary group' (1950, § 51). Since 
Sartre thinks that I can pick out a group of separate entities, such as three 
people engaged in a conversation, as a figure, it seems that he cannot also 
hold that picking out a figure requires that figure to be a unitary entity in any 
mind-independent sense. 
McCulloch (1994,116) seems to think his reading is necessitated by Sartre's 
repeated claim that consciousness makes no difference to being, but it is not. 
Segment S in Figure 1 below, for example, has been demarcated from an 
undifferentiated line L, was not separated from L before the dotted lines were 
drawn, and is not separated from L by the superimposition of the dotted 
line: 
neither S nor L has changed in any way by the demarcation, yet 
S is not an 
entity distinct from its background, the rest of L. 
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section S 
Figure 1 
There is a third way between McCulloch and Wider on this issue. Sartrean 
demarcation of objects, according to Danto (1991, ch. 1) and Baldwin (1996, 
86), is akin to the demarcation of segment S in Figure 1: being in-itself is 
unstructured and remains unstructured when I posit a figure since the 
demarcation of the figure is purely phenomenological or subjective, a 
demarcation-for-me and no more. This reading seems to be supported by 
Sartre's claim that since the figure is a region of being in-itself demarcated by 
a relation of negation (this is not-that) and since only consciousness is of its 
own nature relational, the figure cannot by its own nature be demarcated from 
the ground. For this reason, negation 'does not belong to the this. ... The 
determinative relation of the this therefore can neither belong to the this nor to 
the that, it enfolds them without touching them, without conferring on them the 
slightest trace of a new character; it leaves them for what they are' (B&N: 
185). This reading may, however, seem threatened by: 
'the external negation constitutive of the this can not appear as 
an objective characteristic of the thing, if we understand by 
objective that which by nature belongs to the in-itself - or that 
which in one way or another really (rdellement) constitutes the 
object as it is' (B&N: 185). 
On Danto's and Baldwin's view of Sartre, the demarcation of a 'this' does 
appear as the boundary of a singular unitary entity 
distinct from its 
surroundings. This is what it means to describe the 
demarcation as a 
dernarcation-for-me. But this reading is not, despite appearances, in conflict 
with the above quotation, for on this reading the 
demarcation appears to 
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consciousness as part of the structure of the world where Sartre is denying 
only that it appears as part of the structure of being in-itself The world is the 
environment that consciousness constructs for itself out of being in-itself (see 
1.3); the demarcation of a figure is a part of the construction this world, even 
though it is not part of the nature of being in-itself, on this reading. 
The exegetical issue of the precise nature of the relation between 'world' and 
'being in-itself' in Sartre's work is, of course, the issue of Sartre's position in 
relation to semantic and structural forms of realism and idealism. It cannot be 
settled without consideration of his theory of 'thetic' and 'nonthetic' 
components of consciousness, discussed in the rest of this chapter, or without 
consideration of the ontology underlying Sartre's whole theory of 
consciousness, discussed in chapter 4. But what is clear from the foregoing is 
that Sartre considers perception to present the perceiver with 'an 
undifferentiated totality' (B&N: 10) of being as ground, of which the perceiver 
is nonpositionally aware, and that on this ground the perceiver is positionally 
aware of a figure. If visual attention is paid to an object, then the posited figure 
is the object of this visual attention, and so vision displays the figure-ground 
structure. If, on the other hand, attention is paid through some other sensory 
modality, or to some imaginary entity or to conceptual thought, then the figure 
is not a part of the seen world, and vision provides only ground. The rest of 
this chapter is concerned with the relation between 'thetic' and 'nonthetic' 
awareness where vision displays the figure-ground structure. 
1.3 Thetic Awareness and Intentional Content 
An act of consciousness, for Sartre, has a thetic character. 
Sartre, typically, 
does not provide a definition of his term 'thetic' (thetique), simply adopting 
it 
from Husserl as part of the stock terminology of phenomenology. 
For Husserl, 
the thetischen character of a conscious act is equivalent to 
its Setzungs 
character: thetic = positional (e. g. 1982, § 129). 
But Husserl's notion of the 
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positional character of consciousness is broader than Sartre's: where for 
Sartre positing is just picking out an object of awareness, for Husserl it is 
picking out an object and understanding it in a certain way - such as existing 
or not existing, for example, or being good or beautiful (see 1.1). The thetic 
component of experience in Sartre's theory of consciousness is roughly the 
aspect of Husserl's notion of the positional character of awareness that is 
missing from Sartre's notion of positing. The thetic component of an act of 
consciousness, for Sartre, consists in a thesis or proposition (th6se) about the 
object posited (B&N: 90); it is the set of ways in which the object is 
understood. For example: 
'In the case of the perception of the chair, there is a thesis - 
that is, the apprehension and affirmation of the chair as the in- 
itself which consciousness is not' (B&N: 140). 
Perception involves, for Sartre, positing the seen object as present and 
existing; the thetic component of perception, that is, represents the object 
13 
posited as present and existing. Sartre calls the components of the thetic 
component of awareness 'determinations': determinations are the category 
headings that the thetic component of a consciousness classifies its object 
under; they are the way the object is intended (compare Husserl 1970, Inv. V 
§ 17). The thetic component of perceptual experience, according to Sartre, 
ascribes the determinations 'present' and 'existent' to its object. But the thetic 
character of perceptual experience is by no means restricted to this. There 
are, for Sartre, two further varieties of determination that can be involved in 
the thetic component of a perceptual experience. 
The first variety track what Sartre calls the 'qualities' of the object. Perceiving 
a pool, for example, involves awareness of qualities such as '[t]he 
fluidity, the 
tepidity, the bluish colour, the undulating restlessness of the water in the pool' 
(B&N: 186). Each of these qualities of the pool may or may not be referred to 
in the thetic component of my awareness of the pool. If the pool 
is seen as 
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fluid, blue, or restless, then these are the determinations ascribed to the pool 
in my experience. The various qualities of the object are undifferentiated in 
experience unless the experience contains corresponding determinations, so 
the qualities of the ground remain undifferentiated as may qualities of the 
figure (B&N: 188). Sartre often talks of the thetic component of experience in 
terms of the 'intentions' of that experience: the determinations are the way in 
which the object is intended, the way it is presented in intentional experience. 
Using this terminology, he explains that in any given visual perception there 
are intentions that are 'motivated' by the seen qualities of the object, and 
others that are not (B&N: 26-7); some thetic determinations track the object's 
qualities, others do not. 
The second variety of determination is of more interest to Sartre, for 
determinations of this sort are motivated by the aims and projects of the 
perceiver. This claim is at the heart of Sartrean existentialism, since it grounds 
the claim that an individual's project provides the lens through which that 
individual experiences being in-itself as a world of tools, obstacles, and 
values. My attempt to realise one of my possibilities is partly responsible for 
way reality seems to me: 'this projection of myself toward an original 
possibility ... causes the existence of values, appeals, expectations, and 
in 
general a world' (B&N: 39); 'perception is in no way to be distinguished from 
the practical organisation of existents into a world' (B&N: 321). The 'world', for 
Sartre, is not the mass of being in-itself but the complex of instruments and 
values that appears to consciousness (B&N: 24,139,617-8). Mere chunks of 
being in-itself are thus experienced as tools or obstacles, as themselves 
having 'potentialities' in relation to my projects: 'the order of instruments in the 
world is the image of my possibilities projected into the in-itself; that is, the 
image of what I am' (B&N: 292). If an object appears as an obstacle to 
fulfilling a project, it does not limit my freedom, for example, since it is only an 
obstacle because of the project I have freely chosen to pursue 
(B&N: 504-9). 
This is what Sartre refers to as 'the potentializing structure of perception' 
(B&N: 197): the fact that being in-itself is perceived as a world of tools, 
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obstacles, and values relating to my projects (see also B&N: 199). This 
relation between projects and the experienced structure of the world is 
captured in the key existentialist term 'situation'. Sartre introduces this term in 
his discussion of the project of looking through a keyhole to observe a scene, 
claiming that 'there is a spectacle to be seen behind the door only because I 
am jealous, but my jealousy is nothing except the simple objective fact that 
there is a sight to be seen behind the door' (B&N: 259). Being jealous and 
experiencing being in-itself as structured in this way are one and the same 
(compare STE: part 111; Husserl 1970, Inv. V§ 15). This 'situation' is the 
combination of facts about the environment, such as the existence of a door 
with a keyhole, with facts about my aims and projects, such as my wish to see 
the scene beyond the door: a situation always involves determinations 
imposed by the projects of the situated individual as well as those that track 
the qualities of the individual's immediate environment. " 
The thetic component of experience, and the two varieties of determination it 
involves, is what Sartre is alluding to when he describes seeing a figure as 
making it 'the object of a detailed attention' (B&N: 95). The term translated as 
'detailed' is 'circonstancide' which implies appropriateness to the 
circumstances. Both varieties of determination are ideally appropriate to the 
circumstances, but can fail to be. The determination 'clear' is appropriate to a 
glass of water in that it refers to a manifest quality of the object, but if I am 
thirsty the determination 'inviting' is also appropriate to the object in a way that 
it would not be if the glass was empty. So when Sartre talks of only the first 
sort of determinations being 'motivated' by the qualities of the object (B&N: 
27), he is best understood as claiming that only the first sort are motivated 
purely by the qualities of the object: the second sort are motivated by qualities 
plus the seer's aims and projects. 
Determinations of both varieties, moreover, are experienced as real parts of 
the world: 'the man who is angry sees on the face of his opponent the 
objective quality of asking for a punch on the nose' (B&N: 163; compare STE: 
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part III; B&N: 55,263). Sartre's clearest discussion of this point is in terms of 
values: although 'it is I who sustain values in being' (B&N: 39), these values 
are part of the way in which I experience reality and so part of my world: 'there 
exist concretely alarm clocks, signboards, tax forms, policemen, so many 
guard rails against anguish' (B&N: 39). These are experienced as having 
meaning and value in themselves, despite the fact that I am 'the one who 
gives its meaning to the alarm clock, the one who by a signboard forbids 
himself to walk on a flower bed or on the lawn, the one from whom the boss's 
order borrows its urgency, the one who decides the interest of the book which 
he is writing, the one finally who makes the values exist in order to determine 
his action by their demands' (B&N: 39). Refusal to recognise the centrifugal 
nature of values, their emanation from the valuer, is a major form of bad faith, 
curable only by 'pure reflection' on the nature of valuing (see 0.3). In 
unreflective experience, values are immediately experienced as real parts of 
the world; they 'are sown on my path as thousands of little real demands, like 
the signs which order us to keep off the grass' (B&N: 38). 
In short, then, Sartre's distinction between nonthetic and thetic components of 
awareness, between qualities and determinations, is similar to the distinction 
between the properties of an object and the predicates we apply to the object. 
There is one difference, however: a predicate is usually taken to be a word 
whereas Sartrean determinations are not linguistic. Linguistic meaning, for 
Sartre, exists only 'virtually and socially. It exists for the grammarian, the 
logician, the sociologist. But the psychologist need not concern himself with it 
because he will never find an equivalent, either in consciousness, or in some 
parlous unconscious invented to meet the situation' (IPC: 72). 
" 
The parallel of Sartre's distinction in current anglophone philosophy 
is not the 
distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual representational content 
(e. g. Crane 1992), but rather the distinction 
between representational 
(intentional) content and nonrepresentational qualities or qualia 
(e. g. 
Peacocke 1983, ch. 1). To say that a component of experience 
is part of the 
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representational content of that experience is to say that it makes a claim 
about the subject's immediate environment, and therefore can be correct or 
incorrect (Crane 1992,139; Peacocke 1992,105-10). Sartre's conception of 
'nonthetic' components of experience, or qualities, is not akin to the 
nonconceptual content of current anglophone philosophy: it is not a form of 
representational content. Rather, the nonthetic component of an experience is 
the set of sensory qualities of the visual field that do not represent parts of the 
world (B&N: 186). They are similar to the 'part-contents' of visual experience 
that Husserl claimed 'are neither referred to, nor intentionally objective, in the 
whole' (1970, Inv. V§ 10). They do not represent an object (are not 'objective' 
(Objectiv) in Husserl's sense), and need not be referred to by thetic 
determinations (though they may be): they are not representations and need 
not be represented, but are simply present in experience. Sartre gives the 
yellowness and sourness of a lemon as examples of qualities of which we 
have nonthetic awareness (B&N: 186): although these qualities may be 
matched by representations in the thetic component of the experience, this 
need not be the case for the qualities to be present in experience. 
The intentionality of perception, then, has two aspects for Sartre: it is intuition 
of a part of mind-independent reality which is posited and attended to; and it 
has a specifiable content which presents that part of mind-independent reality 
in a certain way, content which is 'motivated' by the manifest qualities of the 
intuited object. This intentionality is knowledge (connaissance) of an object in 
the sense of intuition of it (e. g. B&N: 333) and knowledge (savoir) that it falls 
under certain determinations (e. g. B&N: 69). 16 Most continental European 
philosophers since Kant who have considered the relation between mind and 
world have this picture of experience, differing only over two issues: whether 
appearances are mind-dependent or whether they involve mind-independent 
reality; and the nature of the determinations involved in experience. On the 
'two-object' reading of Kant's distinction between phenomenal and nournenal 
realities, Kant claims that appearances are mind-dependent, and on the 'two- 
component' reading he claims that they involve a part of mind-independent 
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reality; on either reading, he considers experience to be structured by a priori 
categories of understanding that are present in all human experience (see 
2.2). Nietzsche is unclear over the first of these issues, but is emphatic that 
the structures of experience are not a product of the structures of human 
thought. Instead, he claims, it is the will to power that 'creates the world in its 
own image' (1998, § 9). Husserl claims that the 'hyld' of experience is mind- 
dependent, and considers the 'morphd' that structures experience to be a 
function of thought about objects and reality (see 1.1 and 2.2). Sartre follows 
Heidegger in rejecting Husserl's mind-dependent hyld in favour of mind- 
independent reality as the object of acquaintance (Heidegger 1962, § 7) and 
in claiming that the morphd is to some extent a function of the perceiver's 
projects (1962, § 15). 
The issues of whether Sartre is a structural realist or idealist and of whether 
Sartre is a semantic realist or idealist (see 0.4) cannot be settled without a 
thorough investigation of the relations between thetic and nonthetic 
components of experience, and between nonthetic components of experience 
and being in-itself. But we can note two preliminary points at this stage. First, 
Sartre's view that the object has manifest qualities seems to indicate 
structural realism: how can two scenarios seem different unless they are 
different? This point does not only apply to Sartre's position: on any theory of 
perception, it must be admitted that different parts of reality appear to us 
differently, and it is not clear how this could be the case unless the parts of 
reality in question differ from one another in some way. (This seems to me to 
be the basic point underlying the intuitive appeal of structural realism. ) 
Second, the question of whether Sartre is a semantic realist or idealist should 
not be understood as a question about Sartre's view of words or of concepts, 
but as a question about the determinations of experience (be they linguistic, 
conceptual, or whatever). The question is whether determinations 
do, or at 
least can, carve reality at the joints. 
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Before returning to these two issues, the rest of this chapter is concerned with 
assessing the overall view of perceptual experience that has emerged from 
the foregoing three sections. This is the view that perception consists in an 
experience which involves paying attention to, being intentionally directed on, 
a part of the immediate environment demarcated as a figure, and a 
background awareness of the ground on which this figure stands. The thetic 
component of experience consists in a set of determinations, each of which 
makes a claim about the figure which can be assessed for appropriateness. 
The nonthetic component of the experience consists in the aspects of the 
experience of the figure that are nonrepresentational, plus the experience of 
the ground, which is entirely nonrepresentational. This picture of perception is 
highly controversial. Opposing Sartre's view are anglophone philosophers 
who claim that there is no nonconceptual component to perception at all (e. g. 
McDowell 1994, ch. 3) and those who claim that the nonconceptual 
component of experience is a form of representational content (e. g. Evans 
1982) 122-9; Crane 1992). The challenge to Sartre's theory that arises from 
the anglophone debate concerns the role nonthetic awareness is supposed to 
play in the overall mental economy of the perceiver. If the qualia of which we 
have nonthetic awareness make no difference- to us, then there is no point 
postulating them in a theory of awareness, for two reasons: first, we would 
have no way of detecting them and so there would be no reason to believe 
that they occur (see Dennett 1991,403-4; Kirk 1999, § 3); second, an 
explanatorily irrelevant postulate can be excised from a theory without 
effecting the overall explanatory power of that theory (see Kim 1998,119). 
Just specifying an explanatory role for qualia is not enough, however, if it 
allows an opponent to argue that the explanatory role in question is in fact 
occupied by some aspect of representational content (see Dennett 1988 and 
1991 , ch. 
12; Tye 1992). 
So Sartre's theory of phenomenal consciousness must be defended by 
specifying at least one explanatory role that can be filled 
by qualia and not by 
representational content, by qualities but not determinations, 
by nonthetic 
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awareness but not by thetic awareness. Sartre in fact provides two sets of 
roles: there are contributions purportedly made to mental life by nonthetic 
background awareness; and there is a contribution purportedly made by 
nonthetic awareness of aspects of the figure posited. If it can be maintained 
that either of these contributions requires nonthetic awareness, then Sartre 
will have given good reason to postulate nonthetic awareness in phenomenal 
consciousness as well as thetic awareness, qualia as well as content. The 
next two sections will investigate whether Sartre's claims about the 
explanatory roles of nonthetic awareness can be maintained, or whether 
those roles seem rather to be played by thetic awareness. This investigation 
will license conclusions about the extent to which Sartre's theory of thetic and 
nonthetic awareness is of interest to current anglophone philosophers of 
perception, and about structural and semantic realism in Sartre's philosophy. 
1.4 Nonthetic Awareness and Ground 
Sartre claims that when reading a book, 
'no matter how absorbed I am in my reading ... I do not lose 
sight of the colours, the movements which surround me, I do not 
cease to hear sounds; they are simply lost in the undifferentiated 
totality which serves as the background for my reading' (B&N: 
334). 
It is quite plausible to claim that there is always some background awareness 
of the world in addition to one's awareness of whatever it is one is attending 
to. Searle expresses this when he claims that 'it is a mistake to say that, for 
example, I am unconscious of the feeling of my shirt against my skin in the 
sense in which I am unconscious of the growth of my toenails' (1992,138). 
But the fact that I am not unaware of the ground of awareness in the way that 
I am unaware of the growth of my toenails does not entail that I have any kind 
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of awareness of the ground while focusing on the figure. The difference may 
simply lie in the fact that I can turn my attention to aspects of the visual scene 
other than the current figure whereas I cannot turn my attention to the growth 
of my toenails. Indeed, it may be that I have no awareness of the background 
of my attention, but seem to have awareness of it only because I can rapidly 
shift my attention towards any aspect of it. 'We have the sense of actualityl ) 
perhaps, 'when every question asked of our visual systems is answered so 
swiftly that it seems as though those answers were already there' (Minsky 
1985,257). 1 may simply have no awareness of the ground of experience 
while focusing on the figure. What is required to show that we do indeed have 
such awareness is a role that awareness plays in our overall mental economy. 
But simply identifying such a role is not enough for Sartre's position: there 
must also be good reason to classify any background awareness playing that 
role as nonthetic rather than a form of thetic awareness. Sartre proposes two 
such roles, which I will discuss in turn. 
Deliberately turning one's attention toward an entity to make it the object of 
positional thetic awareness, Sartre claims, requires prior nonthetic awareness 
of it. The ability to shift attention towards one's current consciousness and 
reflect on it, he claims, requires that one was already aware of it while it was 
current: deliberate thetic reflective self-awareness requires nonthetic pre- 
reflective self-awareness. Sartre couches this as a general claim about the 
relation between thetic and nonthetic awareness: deliberately turning attention 
towards something requires already having some awareness of it (PI: 188; 
B&N: xxix, 74). 17 In Sartre's favour, it is a familiar experience to catch sight of 
something out of the corner of one's eye and inquisitively to turn attention on it 
to see what it is. But that this is not best described as nonthetic awareness of 
the object is easily seen in an experiment using Figure 2, below. 
Holding the 
page about 15 cm (6 in) from your eyes, with the cross in 
front of the tip of 
your nose, and focusing attention on the cross, you can make 
the left spot 
disappear by closing your right eye and vice versa. 
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Figure 2 
The awareness you have of the spots appearing and disappearing as you 
open and close each eye is obviously awareness of the ground of experience: 
it only works so long as attention is focused on the cross as figure. Yet during 
this experiment, and without ceasing to focus on the cross, you are aware not 
of an 'undifferentiated totality' (B&N: 10,334) as background to the cross, but 
of a white background in which small black dots appear and disappear with 
the opening and closing of each eye. The awareness of the background, then, 
does not appear to be nonthetic but rather to classify it in certain ways. But 
this is not to say that our awareness of the figure is no more detailed than our 
awareness of the ground. Black dots are relatively simple to discriminate on a 
white background. More complex cases do seem to show that awareness of 
the ground is relatively vague: 
'Take a deck of playing cards and remove a card face down, so 
that you do not yet know which it is. Hold it out at the left or right 
periphery of your visual field and turn its face to you, being 
careful to keep looking straight ahead (pick a target spot and 
keep looking right at it). You will find that you cannot tell even if 
it is red or black or a face card. Notice, though, that you are 
distinctly aware of any flicker of motion of the card. ... Now start 
moving the card toward the centre of your visual field ... At what 
point can you identify the color? At what point the suit and 
number? Notice that you can tell if it is a face card long before 
you can tell if it is a jack, queen, or king. ' (Dennett 1991,53-4; 
see also 361-2). 
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What these simple experiments suggest is that we have some thetic 
awareness of entities in the ground of visual experience, but that this 
awareness is not very discriminating. Turning visual attention towards an 
object that was previously in the ground (or, indeed, moving the object into the 
position of figure) does not seem to introduce thetic awareness of that object 
but increase it. 'It is more like turning up the lights than turning them on', as 
McCulloch (1994,102) puts it. It seems that thetic awareness can be more or 
less detailed, can classify the seen entity under more or fewer determinations, 
depending on the distance from the centre of visual attention. Noticing 
whether a playing card is covered in red or black markings requires less 
discrimination than noticing which suit these markings are or how many they 
are. Moreover, if one could not at least differentiate an object in the ground of 
one's experience from the rest of that ground, it seems that one could not 
deliberately turn attention to that object. This point, it seems to me, underlies 
the plausibility of the model of selective attention, currently dominant in 
i nformation- process i ng theories of mind, as the selection of some undetailed 
, 
information for further processing (see Eilan 1998,192). It seems, then, that 
Sartre's claim that nonthetic awareness enables one to deliberately turn 
attention towards an entity is false. 
The second role Sartre ascribes to nonthetic awareness is that of affecting the 
thetic content of positional awareness: the way the figure is seen, according to 
Sartre, may be affected by nonthetic awareness of part of the background of 
awareness. He claims that if I am thirsty and see a glass of water: 'The glass 
of water appears as about-to-be-drunk; that is, as the correlate of a thirst 
grasped non-thetically' (B&N: 204). He makes a similar claim about the way 
the world is seen when I am non-thetically aware of my own projects and 
possibilities (B&N: 259). 
Sartre's claim that nonthetic awareness can affect thetic awareness 
is closely 
related to experimental psychologists' concern with what 
they call 'perception 
without awareness' or 'unconscious perception'. 
For over a hundred years 
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now (beginning with Peirce and Jastrow 1884), experimental psychologists 
have been investigating whether behaviour can be affected by perceptual 
information that cannot be reported by the subject. In one classic study (Maier 
1932) subjects were asked to tie together the ends of two pieces of string that 
hung from the ceiling sufficiently far apart that holding the end of one piece of 
string precluded the subject from reaching the other one. There were various 
objects in the room which they were allowed to use. If the subject had not 
solved the problem after a certain amount of time, the experimenter would 
drop a hint by passing the light switch cord that also dangled from the ceiling 
and setting it in motion. Nineteen of the subjects solved the problem shortly 
after this hint was dropped by tying a heavy object to one of the pieces of 
string and setting it in motion while going to get the other one and returning to 
the centre of the room to catch the first one. Of these nineteen, six claimed 
that seeing the light cord swing provided the solution; the others claimed that 
to their knowledge they had not been aware of the light cord or if they had the 
solution was not cued by this. In Sartre's terms, it seems, nonthetic 
awareness of the swinging light cord affected these thirteen subjects' thetic 
awarenesses of the problem or of the pieces of string they were trying to tie 
together. 
The Sartrean classification of the awareness these thirteen subjects had of 
the swinging lightcord as nonthetic is due to the subjects' inability to explain 
that their solution of the problem had been cued by the movement of the 
lightcord. Sartre, that is, considers the thetic structure of experience to be 
linguistically articulable. When he claims that our awareness of our own 
conscious activity is nonpositional nonthetic awareness, for example, he 
writes: 
'Proof of this is that children who are capable of making an 
addition spontaneously cannot explain subsequently how they 
set about it. Piaget's tests, which show this, constitute an 
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excellent refutation of the formula of Alain - to know is to know 
that one knows (Savoir, c'est savoir quon sait)' (B&N: xxix) 
But such experiments support the Sartrean claim that nonthetic awareness 
influences thetic awareness only given Sartre's presumption that thetic 
awareness is, at least usually, linguistically articulable. But this assumption is 
debatable. It is to avoid a parallel assumption that psychologists researching 
the possibility of unconscious perception have replaced experiments like 
Maier's with 'exclusion tasks'. Where Maier applied one test for perception 
(whether the swinging cord helped the subject to solve the puzzle) and 
another for consciousness of that perception (reportability), current 
experimenters ask subjects not to allow a certain cue to influence their 
behaviour. A subject aware of perceiving the cue will, they presume, be 
capable of obeying the instruction to ignore it; perception of the cue and lack 
of awareness of that perception are then both taken to be indicated by the 
same datum, the subject's failure to ignore the cue (Debner and Jacoby 1994; 
see Merikle and Joordens 1997,109-13). The advantage of the exclusion task 
is that it allows for the possibility of conscious but unreportable perception, 
which experiments like Maier's overlook. Sartre's assumption that thetic 
awareness is, at least usually, linguistically articulable similarly overlooks the 
possibility of unreportable representational awareness. 
This notion of unreportable thetic awareness, which Sartre overlooks, is akin 
to the notion of nonconceptual representational content discussed in current 
anglophone philosophy of mind. In this debate, concepts are taken to be the 
inferentially relevant constituents of beliefs and possessing a concept is 
understood as having a set of beliefs that are inferentially related to one 
another as a function of their contents, where the concept possessed 
is the 
constituent common to each belief in the set and responsible 
for the inferential 
relations between the beliefs. To possess the concept 
'cat ', that is, is to 
possess a set of inferentially related beliefs concerned with cats, such as 
the 
beliefs that cats are domestic pets, are tame, and are smaller than 
houses. 
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Without such a set of cat-beliefs, you cannot possess the concept 'cati. 
Philosophers who claim that experience has nonconceptual content claim that 
an experience that represents there being a cat on a mat can be had by 
someone who does not possess the concept 'cat'; without, that is, having an 
inferentially related set of beliefs about cats. If experiences are composed of 
nonconceptual representational content, that is, then experiences do not 
themselves stand in inferential relations to beliefs; to stand in such inferential 
relations to beliefs is the same as being composed of concepts (see Crane 
1992; McDowell 1994, ch. 1). 
The fact that an individual cannot report the awareness that we attribute to 
that individual on other grounds, therefore, does not entail that the awareness 
in question is not representational; it shows at most only that it is not 
conceptual. If it were conceptual, then (in non-pathological cases) it would be 
rationally linked to beliefs about the object of awareness including (among 
subjects possessing the right concepts) the belief that it is an object of 
awareness. Sartre's presumption, then, conflates representational with 
conceptual, but an unreportable awareness may be thetic though 
nonconceptual. Sartre's conflation is clear from his equation of 'non-thetic I 
with 'non-cognitive' (B&N: xxix), since cognition is a function of the inferential 
relations between beliefs. Because Sartre has mistakenly conflated thetic 
awareness with repotlable awareness, then, he has not shown that nonthetic 
awareness can infect the thetic character of consciousness. He has shown 
only that unrepoitable elements of awareness may do this, but these 
elements may be thetic (representational) nonetheless. 
Sartre's blindness to the possibility of nonconceptual representation is to 
some extent the result of his Kantian heritage. 
When Sartre writes, for 
example, that in perception 'the understanding 
determines pure being, 
isolates and fixes it in its very determinations' (B&N: 14), 
he is automatically 
taking 'determinations' to be concepts (inferentially relevant constituents of 
18 
beliefs) since these are the stock-in-trade of the understanding. 
But to some 
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extent Sartre's mistake is common to theorists prior to the recent inventions of 
exclusion tasks and nonconceptual content. Merleau-Ponty's theory of 
intentionality is partly based on the same mistake. Discussing a pathological 
patient's difficulty in tracing a circle in the air on command, he writes: 
'he can never convert the thought of a movement into actual 
movement. What he lacks is neither motility nor thought, and we 
are brought to the recognition of something between movement 
as a third person process and thought as a representation of 
movement ... a "motor intentionality" in the absence of which the 
order remains a dead letter' (1962,110) 
Merleau-Ponty's equation of thought with representation grounds his claim 
that 'motor intentionality' cannot be a form of representation. The patient's 
predicament could, however, be described as the conceptual representation 
of the action involved in understanding the command failing to trigger the 
combination of nonconceptual representations of the action involved in 
performing that action. Until recently, theorists equated representation with 
conceptual representation, thereby blinding themselves to the possibility of 
nonconceptual representation. It was this blindness that led Sartre to equate 
nonthetic awareness with non-cognitive awareness. '9 
Of the two roles that Sartre claimed to be played by nonthetic awareness of 
the ground of experience, then, it is not clear that nonthetic awareness could 
play one, and not clear that it does play the other. Deliberately turning 
attention towards an object seems to require at least some thetic awareness 
of that object, and simple experiments show that we have some, albeit 
imprecise, representational awareness of any part of the ground of experience 
that we have any awareness of. Sartre's evidence for his claim that the thetic 
content of awareness is affected by nonthetic awareness overlooks 
the 
possibility that it is unreportable thetic awareness that plays this role. 
Sartre 
has failed, therefore, to provide good reason to believe that we have nonthetic 
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awareness of the ground of visual experience. It seems that figure and ground 
are not distinguished by our having thetic awareness only of the figure, but 
rather by the thetic awareness of the figure being significantly more detailed 
than any awareness of the ground. 
1.5 Nonthetic Awareness and Figure 
In addition to our thetic awareness of the figure of experience, Sartre claims, 
we have nonthetic awareness of it. We have nonthetic awareness not only of 
the ground of experience, that is, but also of qualities of the figure. This 
nonthetic awareness has two interrelated roles: it is the basis of our 
acquisition of the determinations that are drawn on in perception and in 
understanding; and it 'motivates' the employment of determinations in 
experience. Sartre is to some extent an empiricist: he thinks that 
determinations are neither innate nor all a priori but are acquired on the basis 
of experience or traceable back to ones that are, and he thinks that the 
determinations of experience track (are 'motivated' by) the qualities of 
experience. This empiricist theory of the origin of determinations is not 
accompanied, as it is in classical empiricism, by a theory of the justification of 
beliefs in terms of experiential evidence, partly because Sartre is not 
concerned with the justification of beliefs. Neither is he concerned to argue 
against the views of determinations that oppose his own. He simply presents 
a picture of the acquisition and motivation of determinations in terms of the 
qualities of experiences. In this section, I discuss each of these purported 
roles of nonthetic awareness in the light of Wittgensteinian attacks on the 
notion that an individual can form concepts on the basis of experience. 
Sartre claims that determinations are formulated by abstraction from the 
multiple aspects of the figure of experience. The determination of something 
as a figure, he claims, 'is the origin of all determinations' (B&N: 183). A 
figure, 
or this, may be an object such as a chair or table, or it may be a manifest 
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quality of an object such as its colour or texture: the figure picked out is 
always relative to the concern of the subject (B&N: 322). Positing a quality 
differs from positing an object, though, in that when a quality is posited 
'instead of the figure's appearing on an undifferentiated ground, it is wholly 
penetrated by the ground; it holds the ground within it as its own 
undifferentiated density' (B&N: 188). That is, if the object is green and rough, 
my focusing on its greenness as a this does not make the roughness fade into 
the background, but makes the roughness an 'inner ground' which provides 
'the plenitude of being for the green' (B&N: 188). This focusing does not 
provide a pure sensation of green, then, but makes the green of the rough 
object stand out as distinct from the roughness: 'There is no abstraction here 
in the sense that abstraction separates what is united, for being always 
appears entire in its profile' (B&N: 188). Picking out the green in this way 
involves a 'polyvalent negation' (B&N: 193): to pick out the green is to pick out 
that which is not the roughness, the shape, another colour of another part of 
the entity, any other quality of the entity, or any surrounding quality. Given that 
it is a 'polyvalent negation', a determination specifies neither an extension nor 
an intension that determines an extension, but a set of negative necessary 
conditions for a quality to be the quality focused on - the conditions that it is 
not any of the other qualities of the object, nor any surrounding quality. 
But this is not the end of the story: a single event of focusing does not fix the 
set of necessary conditions of the quality once and for all. Determinations are 
refined by application. Nonthetic awareness of a quality that meets the 
conditions of an established determination 'motivates' the deployment of that 
determination. This 'motivation is not causation' (B&N: 27), but is the active 
response of consciousness to a recognised quality. The fact that we are not 
always conscious of focusing and applying determinations that fit the qualities 
of the this does not show that consciousness does not perform this act, he 
claims, but shows only that when the determinations are commonplace and 
the perceiver sufficiently experienced the focusing and categorisation occur 
so rapidly as not to be noticed (PI: 44). When a quality is recognised and a 
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determination applied, the other qualities that form its background and 'inner 
ground' may well be different from those that surrounded previous 
confrontations with the same quality. If so, they will be added to the list of 
negative necessary conditions, and the determination will be refined. If two 
phenomenally discriminable qualities are apprehended together that both 
meet the specification of a certain determination, then the determination will 
split into two: each quality will be categorised with a new determination whose 
list of negative necessary conditions comprises the original list plus the fact 
that the quality to which it applies is not the other quality to which the original 
determination applied. 
It is because of this refinement of determinations through their application that 
they have no precise meanings, but always 'mean i ng-to-come' (B&N: 193). 
The 'precision of the present negation ', that is, Js in the future' (B&N: 193). If I 
am congenitally blind but with the help of technology am made to see, for 
example, and the first thing I see is a green apple in a blue bowl, then I may 
focus on the green of the apple as opposed to its shape, texture and 
background and thereby acquire a determination whose content is just the 
negation of the apple's shape, texture, and background. If I later see another 
green object against a different background and apply my newly acquired 
determination, the determination will be modified by further negations. And so 
on ad infinitum. As Sartre puts it, 'the green never is green' (B&N: 193): the 
determination ascribed to the present quality is never identical with the 
precise definition of the word 'green, since a word has a definition which 
specifies the objects to which it applies whereas a determination is 
constructed purely of a contingent set of past experiences. Since 'every 
determination is a negation ', that is, 'the understanding in this sense is limited 
to denying that its object is other than it is' (B&N: 14). The precise meaning of 
a word, therefore, 'exists for the grammarian, the logician, the sociologist. But 
the psychologist need not concern himself with it because he will never find 
an equivalent, either in consciousness, or in some parlous unconscious 
invented to meet the situation' (IPC: 72). This account of words is patchy in 
82 
Sartre's writings and tangential to the concerns of this thesis, so I will not 
discuss it further here. His discussion of determinations, moreover, lacks a 
precise account of their development, and I will not attempt to provide one for 
him but leave the exposition with this sketch. 
Sartre's position, then, is that determinations have their meanings developed 
by repeated 'polyvalent negation ', and that this requires the ability to focus on 
and isolate qualitative aspects of perceived objects either for the purpose of 
forming skeletal determinations or motivating the application of 
representations already formed which may in turn involve fleshing them out. 
This, claims Sartre, requires nonthetic awareness of seen objects. It might be 
argued that since Sartre conflates determinations with concepts, the role 
Sartre ascribes to nonthetic awareness in the formation of determinations 
could just as easily be played by nonconceptual representations. But Sartre 
certainly wants to claim that all representations originate in experience, that 
representation is a matter of classification by polyvalent negation, and so 
determinations must be formed on the basis of nonrepresentational qualia. 
For if the experience of qualities is construed as a matter of nonconceptual 
representational content, then the whole of my experience of the world could 
be accounted for in terms of representational content, and there would be no 
room left in the account for the notion of intentionality as intuition of reality, as 
the presence of part of reality 'in person' to consciousness, as a basic relation 
independent of representation. There would be no room left, that is, for 
Sartre's notion of intentionality (see 1.1). 
The role Sartre ascribes to nonthetic awareness of qualities of the figure, or 
intentional object, of perception, then, commits him to a form of the empiricist 
claim that meanings are formulated on the basis of experience. The chief 
attacks on this empiricist claim in current anglophone philosophy are based 
on Wittgenstein's 'private language argument'. Wittgenstein asks us to 
imagine him keeping a diary in which he writes 'S' every time he has a certain 
sensation, and claims that since the sensation is private there is no 'criterion 
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of correctness' governing its use, so the term 'S' has no meaning (1953, § 
258). It is a matter of much exegetical controversy precisely what Wittgenstein 
meant by this, but the basic idea is that the kinds of constraints required for 
stability of use and hence meaningfulness are public. On the traditional 
interpretation, this is the claim that the use of a word must be governed by a 
rule, which requires a difference between following the rule correctly and 
failing to do so, but there cannot be such a difference in the case of a word 
purporting to name a private object. There is also much controversy over why 
there could not be such a difference in the case of private objects, but all that 
matters for present purposes is that Sartre's 'qualities' of experience are not 
private objects in the requisite sense. Wittgenstein's target is the notion of 
sensations or sense data, objects that are ontologically dependent on my 
awareness of them. A past token sensation cannot, by definition, be recalled 
and presented again, and neither can it be shown to someone else. Sartre 
explicitly denies that qualities of visual experience are such private objects: 
& sight does not produce visual sensations ... the senses must in 
no way be identified with subjectivity. In fact all variations which 
can be registered in a perceptive field are objective variations' 
(B&N: 319; see also 186). 
The quality of yellow that I see when I see a lemon, then, is a quality of part of 
the world and can be seen by others. And when I see another item that I 
consider to display the same quality, I can in principle go and get the lemon 
for comparison. The criteria for reapplying determinations are entirely public. 
(The temptation to suppose that colour qualia must, if they exist, be private 
and subjective is not of course unmotivated, but we will see in 4.5 how 
Sartre 
resists this motivation, allowing colour to be public in that anyone capable of 
reproducing the conditions in which I see a certain shade can see that shade. 
) 
The denial that qualities are private does not evade all versions of the private 
language argument, however: Kripke's version does not rest on the claim 
that 
84 
rules cannot be applied to private objects but on the claim that a rule cannot 
be privately formulated on the basis of experience. A rule governing the 
application of a concept (or determination) must specify whether the concept 
(determination) is correctly applied in any given situation, argues Kripke, but if 
the rule is constituted by a finite set of past experiences it cannot specify 
whether the concept is correctly applied in some novel circumstance. So long 
as there is some novel aspect of an occasion in which the concept is applied, 
the rule cannot specify whether or not that novel aspect invalidates the 
application of the concept. Kripke gives the example of addition where I have 
never added together numbers larger than 56. Intending to add 57 and 68,1 
get the result 125; but if the rule is based solely on my past experience, then 
this answer could as easily be wrong as right. For there is no fact of the 
matter whether the rule is 'add the two numbers together' or 'add the two 
numbers together unless they are above 56, in which case the answer is 5' 
(1982,8-9). Sartre's position is immune to this form of the private language 
argument, however, on the grounds that Sartre does not define 
determinations in terms of sufficient conditions for application, but in terms of 
negative necessary conditions, and so does not agree that there must be a 
rule specifying the precise extension of a determination and hence the 
correctness or incorrectness of its application in any given circumstance. A 
determination formed by picking out a quality of an experienced scene is 
thereby defined as being the quality of not being any of the other experienced 
qualities of the scene. It can subsequently be applied to any quality that is not 
any of those of the original experienced scene, but each new application will 
add further negative necessary conditions to the definition of the 
determination. Any given quality will or will not match the list of negative 
necessary conditions for application of a given determination, and so there will 
always be a fact of the matter whether or not that determination applies. 
When two or more distinct manifest qualities fit the definition of the 
determination, as mentioned above, the determination will split into two or 
more new, refined determinations. If this model were to be applied to the 
concept of addition, even though Sartre applies it only to determinations 
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applied in experience of the world, then in Kripke's example there would be no 
fact of the matter which of the two rules applied, and so the original vague 
concept of addition would split into two new concepts. Application of 
determinations, for Sartre, is not so much a matter of following rules as 
formulating them. 
But Sartre is not out of the Wittgensteinian woods yet: McDowell uses a 
variant of the private language argument to attack the idea that a 
nonconceptual 'given' can provide the sort of motivation for applying concepts 
(or, by extension, determinations) that Sartre requires. McDowell is concerned 
with the justification of empirical beliefs and points out that since concepts are 
the inferentially relevant constituents of mental states or events that stand in 
inferential relations, it is impossible for a judgement to be inferentially derived 
from a nonconceptual event or state. In McDowell's terminology, 'the space of 
reasons' cannot extend beyond 'the space of concepts' (1989; 1994, ch. 1). 
McDowell's point does not rule out Sartre's theory, however, but merely points 
up the need to resist the temptation to construe Sartre's position as claiming 
that the way an object looks is a rational ground for an inference about the 
way it is. Sartre's position is rather the claim that the qualities of experience 
are individually classified on the basis of recognition - on the basis, that is, of 
the way they are; no inference is involved. The application of a determination 
is, for Sartre, simply a matter of classifying a distinguishable quality as the 
same as some quality previously distinguished, and perhaps thereby refining 
the determination; there is simply no room for inference here. 
Sartre has, therefore, provided a role for nonthetic awareness of qualities of 
the figure of experience in the acquisition of all determinations, or 
representations, and in the motivation for employing particular 
determinations 
in experience of the world. Sartre's position does not fall foul of 
the private 
language argument for two reasons. First, Sartre denies that qualities are 
private in the requisite sense. The traditional interpretation of 
the private 
language argument threatens any claim that determinations are formed on 
the 
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basis of subjective objects of awareness, such as sense data, which are 
unique to particular experiences had by particular subjects, but qualia as 
Sartre understands them are not private in this sense. Second, Sartre's claim 
that determinations do not have precise fixed extensions, are not definable in 
terms of sufficient conditions for application, means that his position is 
immune to Kripke's form of the attack. If Searle is right to claim that linguistic 
philosophers tend to confuse features of reports with features of things 
reported (see 1.1), the fact that Sartre ignores or is ignorant of the 'linguistic 
turn' seems to have stood him in good stead here: not understanding thought 
in terms of the sentences used to express it means that the temptation to 
conflate determinations with words, which seem to have fixed extensions 
recorded in dictionaries, is less likely to arise. And the fact that Sartre does 
not hold that a claim that a certain entity is a certain way can be justified by 
the way it seems means that his position is not vulnerable to McDowell's 
attack on nonconceptual content. 
Of course, Sartre has only described this role of nonthetic awareness and has 
not argued for this theory of the relation between thought and world. But he 
has sketched out a coherent position that should be of interest to philosophers 
concerned with the relation of thought and object. Perhaps arguments of the 
sort could be provided for him. Tying the meaning of determinations to the 
thinker's experience of parts of the world does seem, for example, to provide 
the object-dependence of thought that McDowell claims is required as an 
antidote to scepticism (1986; 1994). But these further speculations take us 
way beyond the concerns of Being and Nothingness and indeed of the 
present thesis. 
1.6 Conclusions 
Intentionality, for Sartre, then, is not representational, as it is for current 
anglophone philosophers, but relational: it involves a relation of 
intuition or 
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knowledge (connaissance) of a part of mind-independent reality, to which 
attention is paid in perceptual experience, but which is surpassed towards a 
different object in imaginative experience. The object attended to, or posited, 
the object made available for demonstrative reference, is the intentional 
object. Intuiting an object involves awareness of manifest qualities of that 
object, which motivate the application of determinations, themselves built up 
through awareness of qualities of objects, which means that the object is 
experienced as falling under certain categories. It is this rich experience, 
involving both qualities and determinations, that structures the world of 
coloured and shaped entities with instrumental and other values out of mere 
being in-itself. The intentional structure of perceptual experience, then, is the 
reason why 'a world appears instead of isolated examples of In-itself. And in 
this world it is possible to effect a designation and to say this object, that 
object' (B&N: 139). In imaginative experience, on the other hand, the manifest 
qualities of the object of intuition motivate determinations that are not applied 
to the object of intuition but which specify a different intentional object. The 
colours and shapes that make up the photograph of Peter, for example, can 
motivate determinations that specify Peter as an object of attention, rather 
than simply tracking the features of the photograph. Sartre's arguments for 
the claim that consciousness is a relation to an object, a relation of intuition or 
apprehension, are the subject of chapter 2. In chapter 3, we will see how 
Sartre's distinction between the way in which determinations are motivated in 
perception and in imagination allows him to evade the objection that an 
experience cannot be a relation to an intuited object on the grounds that the 
same experience could occur as an hallucination in the absence of any 
suitable object. The ontology underpinning Sartre's relational conception of 
intentionality is the subject of chapter 4. The conception of intentionality as a 
relation to an object whose manifest qualities motivate determinations to 
be 
applied to the object or which specify another object, detailed in this chapter, 
is the central concern of this thesis, and one which, I claim, grounds the whole 
of Sartre's early philosophy. 
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Sartre's claim that phenomenal consciousness of the world involves a relation 
to mind-independent stuff through which qualities are manifested to 
consciousness as well as determinations that classify the object seen on the 
basis of its manifest qualities was presented with a challenge in this chapter: 
to specify a role for qualities to play that could not be played by 
representations. If qualities are an inessential part of the theory, then so is the 
relational conception of intentionality: if all aspects of my experience of the 
world can be accounted for in terms of representations of the world, then 
Sartre's claim that phenomenal consciousness consists in relations to mind- 
independent entities rather than representations of possible scenarios is 
unfounded. Sartre's position met this challenge, I claimed (1.5), in his claim 
that determinations, the representations employed in consciousness to 
classify the object of awareness, are formed on the basis of awareness of 
qualities. Representations, obviously, could not play the role of grounding 
representations. We have also seen that determinations, for Sartre as for 
Spinoza (1995, letter 50; see B&N: 185), have their meaning specified by 
what Sartre calls 'polyvalent negation. The meaning of a determination, that 
is, is fixed by a set of things that it does not apply to, and this understanding 
of determinations means that Sartre's claim that determinations are formed on 
the basis of experience is immune to objections based on Wittgenstein's 
private language argument (1.5). 
Sartre's theory of the role of determinations in experience may make useful 
contributions to recent debate over the epistemic role of perception. Eilan, for 
example, argues that 'for perceptions to serve as a basis for knowledge it 
must be possible for the subject to use her perceptions to answer questions 
about the environment and to incorporate the deliverances of her perceptions 
into further rational deliberation and action' (1998,189). If the answers to 
perceptual questions are to play the rational roles that Eilan mentions, then 
they must be conceptually structured. But the operation of conceptual 
capacities must be constrained in perception in a way that it is not constrained 
in pure thought if perception is to answer questions about the environment, 
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and this constraint requires the conceptual deliverances of perception to be 
based in some way on a nonconceptual component present in perceptual 
experience but not present in pure thought (1998,199). This proposal faces 
the Wittgensteinian challenges discussed in 1.5. McDowell's point that rational 
relations can hold only between conceptually structured relata precludes 
understanding the conceptual deliverances of perception as justified by, or 
inferred from, the nonconceptual component of experience. But Sartre's 
emphasis on the classification of experience instead of inference from it 
sidesteps this objection. Similarly, if the concepts employed in the 
deliverances of perception are themselves to be understood as drawn from 
perception, then Kripke's objection that a rule must have infinite content 
where experience is finite can be sidestepped only by the Sartrean 
manoeuvre of construing the determinations employed in experience not as 
fully defined concepts but as refinable sets of negative necessary conditions 
for class membership, and so denying that their application involves following 
a rule. 
Sartre also holds that purely qualitative awareness is required to explain how 
events in a person)s environment may affect the way that person is aware of 
other things without that person being able to report that those events had this 
affect. As we have seen, Sartre's claim that a linguistically inarticulable 
awareness must be one free of representations conflates the notion of 
representation with that of conceptual representation. Only conceptual 
representations must by definition be inferentially and rationally linked to one 
another, so it remains possible for a representation of an object to be 
unreportable if it is not conceptual, which is to say that it does not stand in 
inferential relations to beliefs such as the belief that the object is represented 
(1.4). And Sartre also holds that purely qualitative awareness of objects is 
required to explain how one can deliberately turn attention to those objects, 
but as we have seen this role could equally be played by vague 
representational awareness that becomes more explicit as attention is 
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focused, and simple experiments suggest that we do indeed have vague 
representational awareness of objects that we are not attending to (1.4). 
The relation between qualities and determinations in perceptual experience 
has implications for the issues of whether Sartre is to be understood as a 
structural realist or idealist, and whether he is understood as a semantic 
realist or idealist. The structural question, we saw in 1.2, is not clearly settled 
by the positionality of perceptual experience. It is unclear from this aspect of 
Sartre's theory alone, that is, whether Sartre takes being in-itself to be already 
structured as a set of mutually independent chunks, as McCulloch claims, or 
whether he takes being in-itself to be an unstructured mass whose apparent 
structure is a function of the ways in which we are aware of it, as Danto and 
Baldwin claim. But one thing is clear: since the world is formed from being in- 
itself by the intentionality of consciousness, the world is certainly made up of 
various distinguishable objects, such as chairs and tables, and these objects 
display the qualities that they seem to display. Qualities, though, bring in a 
new motivation for ascribing structure to being in-itself as well as to the world: 
if different regions of being in-itself manifest different qualities to 
consciousness, it seems that this must be due to structural differences 
between these objects. A full account of Sartre's understanding of qualities, 
though, requires an assessment of Sartre's theory in the light of the traditional 
philosophical claim that such qualities as colours cannot be construed as 
parts of mind-independent reality and so experience must be understood as 
representation of that reality rather than relation to it. This issue is discussed 
in chapter 4 (4.1 and 4.5). Sartre's understanding of determinations as built up 
from experience of manifest qualities similarly has ramifications for positioning 
Sartre in relation to various realisms and idealisms. The structure of the world, 
constructed from the interplay of consciousness and being in-itself, is two-fold: 
determinations help to structure it, on the basis of its manifest qualities. So it 
seems that Sartre must subscribe to one form of semantic realism: the world 
must really have the structure that the determinations employed in experience 
and thought ascribe to it, since that very ascription helps to structure the 
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world in the first place, and since the determinations are formed and 
motivated by the manifest qualities of the world. But this, of course, is not to 
say that determinations must or can capture the structure (if there is one) of 
being in-itself Sartre's claim that determinations have their meaning fixed by 
'polyvalent negation' may have ramifications for the issue of whether 
determinations can track the structure (if there is one) of being in-itself, for if 
negativity is essential to the meaning of a determination and negativity can 
enter into the world only by the activity of consciousness, then determinations 
cannot correspond to structures of mind-independent being. But this issue 
cannot be settled without first settling the question of whether being in-itself 
has any structure at all for Sartre, and this question cannot be answered 
without the consideration of Sartrean ontology that is central to chapter 4. 
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Chapter 2 
Apprehension: The Ontological Proofs 
Sartrean intentionality, as we saw in 1.1, involves apprehension of a part of 
mind-independent reality. The intentionality of perception is the positing of, the 
directing of attention toward, the mind-independent object intuited and known 
(connue), whereas the intentionality of imaginative consciousness involves 
surpassing the object intuited towards some other intentional object. In both 
cases, though, intentionality involves the presence 'in person' of some part of 
reality (B&N: 172,318). Because experience is intentional, for Sartre, it is not 
an event independent of the part of the world apprehended, but consists in a 
direct relation to that part of the world. Perceptual experience, for example, 
'must release to us immediately the spatial-temporal object ... it releases to 
me the object as it is, not as an empty image of some reality beyond reach' 
(B&N: 347). Consciousness is not self-contained with respect to the rest of 
reality, because as intentional it is a 'transcendence' (B&N: xxxvii), a 
movement beyond itself toward reality. More picturesquely, consciousness is 
a 'wrenching away from itself (arrachementj sol)' (B&N: 301,333; see also 
B&N: 25,343). The intentionality of perceptual experience grounds its 
positional nature: the subject can posit the seen object as a 'this 1, can 
demonstratively identify the intuited object, purely on the basis of the 
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experience because the experience is tied to the object in such a way that it 
could not have occurred in the absence of the object (see 1.1). 
To put this another way, Sartrean intentionality is acquaintance with part of 
reality in Russell's sense of 'acquaintance'. Russellian acquaintance is an 
experience of an entity that could not occur without the existence and 
presence of that entity. This is to be contrasted with 'acquaintance' as McGinn 
(1997, ch. 4) uses the term: for McGinn, to be acquainted with an entity is to 
have an experience that represents and is caused by that entity. An 
experience of the same character can, in principle, occur in the absence of 
the entity, perhaps in a dream, although if it did would not be a case of 
acquaintance any more than it would be a case of perception. Russell, on the 
other hand, explicitly draws a contrast between acquaintance with an entity 
and knowledge of an entity under a description such as 'the entity this 
experience represents' or 'the entity causing this experience' (1912,26). 
Acquaintance, for Russell, is not mediated by an experience that might occur 
in the absence of the object of acquaintance, and it is in this sense that 
Sartre's theory of intentionality is a theory of acquaintance. Sartre, however, 
does not talk of acquaintance, but uses the term 'saisW, to grasp or 
apprehend (e. g. B&N: xxxviii, 140). 'Apprehension' better expresses 
Russellian acquaintance than does cacquaintance9, since in the ordinary 
meaning of these terms I can be said to be apprehending an object only while 
it is present, but having perceived it I am for ever acquainted with it. I 
therefore follow Barnes in using 'apprehension' as a translation of Sartre's 
saisie 
The reality apprehended in phenomenal consciousness, for Sartre, is not 
dependent on that apprehension, or indeed on anything else, for its existence. 
It is being in-itself (6tre en-soi). Sartre is, in a sense, a traditional na1ve realist, 
in so far as he considers phenomenal consciousness of the environment to 
consist in apprehension of mind-independent reality. But naYve realism 
is not 
always taken simply as a claim about the ontological status of 
the object of 
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apprehension as mind-independent, but also as a claim about the structure of 
the object of apprehension. Naive realism, that is, is often taken as the claim 
that 'the actual objects of perception, the external things such as trees, tables 
and rainbows, which one can perceive, and the properties which they can 
manifest to one when perceived, partly constitute one's conscious experience' 
(Martin 1997,83; my emphasis). Such a form of naive realism can ground an 
empiricist theory of the justification of beliefs about reality, according to which 
the belief that there is a red ball in front of me can be justified by the 
phenomenal manifestation of the fact that there is a red ball in front of me 
(McDowell 1982,474). But it is not clear to what extent Sartre would assent to 
this. Sartre's central concern is not epistemology but ontology, not knowledge 
but being. The extent to which Sartre considers the 'determinations' of 
experience and thought track the structure of being in-itself (if it has a 
structure) is a central issue of this thesis. As we have seen (1.3), Sartre 
claims that some determinations track and are motivated by manifest qualities 
of the world, although others are rooted in the aims and projects of the 
subject, but the relation between these manifest qualities and being in-itself is 
far from clear in Being and Nothingness, and will be discussed in chapter 4 
(4.5). This chapter and the next are concerned only with the aspect of naYve 
realism that Sartre clearly assents to, that phenomenal awareness is 
unmediated apprehension of being in-itself. 
Sartre's introduction to Being and Nothingness, 'The Pursuit of Being', 
includes an attempt to prove this view of phenomenal consciousness, which 
Sartre calls his 'ontological proof' (B&N: xxxvi). But this passage is one of the 
most meandering and confusing of Sartre's writings. Its Proustian title, 'A la 
Recherche de Ittre', aptly reflects its Proustian prose, which gives the 
impression of an author out of control, swept along in the stream of 
consciousness. The passage evidently discusses two central themes of the 
phenomenological ontology of the book as a whole - our consciousness of 
the reality that surrounds us, and our consciousness of that consciousness - 
and is evidently meant to form the basis of the book; 
but it is far from evident 
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exactly what Sartre says about these two themes in this passage, and hence 
far from evident what philosophical foundations he takes himself to be laying. 
Like Marcel in Proust's A la Recherche du Temps Perdu (In Search of Lost 
Time), Sartre encounters and considers various views, digressing from and 
returning to a few basic themes, until, towards the end, he settles on his 
position. His reasons for his conclusion are derived from the preceding 
discussion even though his own position is not one of those discussed there. 
This discussion involves a number of distinct dialectical voices that are not 
clearly separated and labelled, so it is a mistake to assume that anything 
Sartre writes in 'The Pursuit of Being' must be Sartrean doctrine. 
This chapter is concerned with clarifying and assessing this obscure passage. 
First I situate Sartre's conception of the intentionality of consciousness, of 
phenomenal awareness as apprehension of mind-independent reality, in 
relation to traditional and current anglophone theories of consciousness (2.1). 
Next I unravel 'The Pursuit of Being', claiming that its overarching aim is to 
argue for Sartre's conception of the intentionality of consciousness, and 
separate out Sartre's arguments for that conclusion (2.2). In pursuing this aim, 
I argue, 'The Pursuit of Being' marks a key break between Being and 
Nothingness and the more Husserlian works that preceded it, a break forced 
by Sartre's shift of concern from the underpinnings of psychology to more 
general ontology. I argue that the discussion of self-awareness in this 
passage is not to be taken as expounding a view, but as describing the view 
that Sartre had held in earlier works and that he ascribes to Husserl as part of 
his argument against indirect realism and phenomenalism. Ultimately, I claim, 
he rejects the view of self-consciousness described in 'The Pursuit of Being' 
as incompatible with his relational view of phenomenal consciousness. So 
where Wider holds that the theory of self-awareness begun in 'The Pursuit of 
Being' and developed from there on 'is the foundational claim in Being and 
Nothingness, the one that grounds all the other major claims Sartre defends in 
the work' (1997,1), 1 claim that the foundational claim of 
Being and 
Nothingness is the theory of phenomenal consciousness argued for in 'The 
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Pursuit of Being', that Sartre's own theory of self-awareness is parasitic on 
this theory, and that the view of self-awareness presented in 'The Pursuit of 
Being' is not one that Sartre holds in Being and Nothingness. 
Having unravelled and mapped out 'The Pursuit of Being', I claim that Sartre 
has given three reasons in favour of his view that phenomenal consciousness 
is acquaintance with being in-itself. The first is the claim that any other theory 
of phenomenal consciousness precludes knowledge of reality beyond 
experience. The other two, which Sartre does not distinguish, are concerned 
to argue positively for Sartre's view, and either can be given the label of 
contological proof'. These three arguments are clarified and assessed in 
sections 2.3-2.5. Sartre's use of the term 'ontological proof' is an allusion to 
widely rejected arguments for the existence of God offered by Anselm and 
Descartes (namechecked in the passage: B&N: xxvi, xxxvi). Anselm argues 
that since we have the idea of God, God exists in our minds, but since the 
idea of God is the idea of the greatest conceivable being and a being existing 
in reality is greater than one existing in our minds, God must exist in reality as 
well as in our minds (1965,117). Descartes bases his argument on his 
hierarchy of realities. A kind of thing, claims Descartes, has one of four kinds 
of 'reality': it does not exist, it is a property of a substance, it is a created 
substance that is dependent for its being on the uncreated substance, or it is 
the ontologically self-sufficient uncreated substance (1984,28-30). The idea 
of God, he claims, is the idea of 'a substance that is infinite, eternal, 
immutable, independent, supremely intelligent, supremely powerful, and 
which created both myself and everything else (if anything else there be) that 
exists' (1984,31). The existence or non-existence of a thing is not usually 
contained within the idea of that thing, argues Descartes, but since ontological 
independence and being the creator of created substances are part of the 
definition of God, the definition of God is the definition of whatever is at the 
top of the hierarchy, and that entity exists. ' 
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Sartre, as an atheist, must hold that there is something wrong with these 
arguments, so in calling his own argument an 'ontological proof' he is not 
claiming that it follows the structure of the arguments of Anselm and 
Descartes too closely. Assessing Sartre's arguments will involve the question 
of whether they are vulnerable to the classic criticisms of those arguments for 
God. The first of these criticisms is that they prove too much, since their 
structure can be borrowed to prove that the idea of a perfect island or of an 
existing unicorn must correspond to such an object in reality. The second is 
that the arguments misuse the notion of being or existence. As Kant put it: 
"'Being" is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a 
concept of something which could be added to the concept of a 
thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain 
determinations, as existing in themselves. Logically, it is the 
mere copula of a judgement. ' (1929, A598/13626; see also 
Gassendi in Descartes 1984,224; Hume 1975,47-50; Frege 
1980, §§ 45-7) 
The definition of an entity is always independent of whether it exists, argues 
Kant, since otherwise we could not sensibly ask whether or not a certain type 
of thing exists: it would be a different type of thing if it existed than if it did not. 
Anselm and Descartes, then, are mistaken to claim that the existence of God 
can be inferred from the concept of God. If Sartre makes this mistake, or if his 
arguments are too general and 'prove' the existence of such non-existent 
things as unicorns, then, his arguments will be unacceptable. Before clarifying 
and assessing Sartre's arguments, though, I will situate Sartre's position in 
classical and current debate about phenomenal awareness, and then unravel 
the passage in which his arguments are well hidden. 
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2.1 Theories of Experience: Positioning Sartre 
People in streets everywhere and on buses in Clapham, philosophers have 
traditionally claimed, take their perceptual experiences to be episodes of 
immediate apprehension of parts of reality that do not depend for their 
existence on those experiences of them, although they might not put it in quite 
this way. This conception of perceptual experience, to which Sartre 
subscribes, is one aspect of direct, naYve, or common-sense realism. 
Opponents of this view traditionally argued that perceptual experiences are 
episodes of apprehension of subjective objects whose existence is dependent 
on those experiences, objects variously labelled ideas, impressions, percepts, 
sensa, sensations, and sense data. There are two forms of this classical 
philosophical view. The historically dominant form classifies an experience as 
perceptual if and only if it stands in some specified representative and / or 
causal connection with a part of reality that lies beyond it and does not 
depend for its existence on any experience of it or thought about it. This is 
indirect realism: when I see a bus, my token experience consists in 
apprehending an object that requires for its existence only my apprehension 
of it, but which is related to a mind-independent bus that lies beyond it (e. g. 
Hume 1975, § 12: Russell 1912, ch. 1). The other form of the classical view is 
phenomenalism, according to which the world and its furniture consist in 
sequences of actual and possible subjective objects of awareness. A bus, for 
phenomenalists, is not a mind-independent object lying beyond appearances, 
but a regulated sequence of subjective entities; an experience is perceptual if 
and only if the subjective object of apprehension is part of an ordered 
sequence of such entities (e. g. Berkeley 1975). 
The central target of Sartre's attack in 'The Pursuit of Being' is the classical 
view common to indirect realism and phenomenalism. 
In arguing against this 
view, Sartre takes himself to be establishing the naYve, common sense, or 
direct realist view that perceptual experience is apprehension of part of mind- 
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independent reality. But this issue is no longer that simple. The classical view 
fell out of philosophical favour in the middle of the twentieth century, 
subsequent to but not consequent on the publication of Being and 
Nothingness, and since then two distinct theories have developed which both 
claim to be direct, naive, or common-sense realism. This occurred because 
there are two ways of framing the debate between the classical and the 
purportedly common-sense views. To say that a perceptual experience is 
apprehension of a part of mind-independent reality is to deny two classical 
claims. It is to deny that experiences can be adequately specified without 
reference to parts of mind-independent reality (see Strawson 1979,43-7). And 
it is to deny that when I demonstratively identify a part of the world on the 
basis of my experience of it, the reference of that demonstrative is derived 
from another, implicit demonstrative, so that my reference to 'that bus' is in 
fact a reference to 'the entity causing or represented by this experience' or 
'the sequence of appearances of which this experience is a member' (see 
Snowdon 1992). These two denials have now come apart, and two rival 
theories of experience have developed in anglophone philosophy. 
One is intentionalism. Having an experience, on this view, consists in being in 
a state that represents a way the surrounding world might be, but being in this 
state does not require any subjective objects of awareness. If the experience 
correctly represents the way the surrounding world is, and perhaps is also 
caused in an appropriate way by the features of the surrounding world it 
represents, then it is perceptual; otherwise it is hallucinatory. So although 
there are no subjective objects either shielding or helping to constitute the 
world, intentionalists agree with the classical theorists that the experience 
involved in a perception is in principle independent of the perceiver's 
immediate environment. The lack of subjective objects means that the 
experience can be specified only in terms of what it represents, which brings 
reference to the world into the specification. But since the experience involved 
in my perception of a bus is independent of the bus, my demonstrative 
identification of the bus on the basis of my experience is a derivative 
100 
demonstrative, it has a logical form such as 'that which this experience 
represents' or 'that which is appropriately related to this experience' (e. g. 
Searle 1983, ch. 2; Dancy 1985, ch. 11; McGinn 1989,58-99; Dretske 1995, 
ch. 1). 
The other is disjunctivism. This view alone denies that there is a single type of 
experience common to perception and hallucination, claiming instead that a 
perceptual experience of a bus is a kind of event on the basis of which direct 
demonstrative reference to the bus can be made, whereas an hallucinatory 
experience of a bus is a different kind of experience as there is no bus to be 
designated 'this'. An experience is not an element in common between 
perception and hallucination, but rather any experience is itself either 
perceptual or hallucinatory. Because this theory denies that demonstrative 
reference made on the basis of perceptual experience is derived from an 
implicit demonstrative reference to the experience, claiming instead that the 
demonstrative is direct, it also denies that a perceptual experience can be 
adequately specified without reference to the seen object: my perceptual 
experience of a bus can be adequately specified only as an experience of a 
bus (see Hinton 1973,76-82; Snowdon 1981 and 1990; McDowell 1982 and 
1986; Martin 1997). 
Both intentionalism and disjunctivism are forms of direct realism: 
intentionalism claims experiences to be direct in the weak sense that there 
are no subjective entities shielding reality from the subject; disjunctivism 
agrees and adds that experiences are direct in the strong sense that they 
afford direct (non-derivative) demonstrative reference to seen objects. 
Whether intentionalism or disjunctivism deserve to inherit the titles 'naYve' and 
'common-sense', though, is not an important question here, partly because it 
is not clear what these titles indicate. There seem to be three ways of 
understanding them: as equivalent to the term 'pre-theoretical conception7, as 
indicating how experience seems to the subject taking into account no factors 
but those derived from experiences themselves, or as an understanding of 
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experience embodied in our culture. But the term 'pre-theoretical conception' 
appears to be an oxymoron, equivalent in this case to 'what we think about 
experience before we think about experience', unless it is supposed to 
indicate an innate understanding of experience. But in this case, as in the 
cases of understanding it as how experience strikes the subject or as a 
cultural notion, the question of what the naYve or common-sense idea 
amounts to is a question to be settled by qualitative social research, such as 
conducting focus groups on buses in Clapham, rather than by pure 
philosophical analysis. 
The view that Sartre is attempting to establish by attacking the classical view 
is clearly disjunctivism, not intentionalism. Intentionality is relational for Sartre, 
not representational. It involves apprehension of a mind-independent object 
and cannot occur in the absence of that object, and hence is not the same as 
the intentionality postulated by anglophone intentionalist theories of 
experience (see 1.1). And experience is 'positional' for Sartre, which means 
that a perceptual experience itself affords direct demonstrative reference to 
the object perceived (see 1.1 and 1.2). 
There are various forms of disjunctivism in current anglophone philosophy, 
but these can be construed as hues of two basic disjunctivist colours. One 
colour holds that perceptual experiences are brain states or events whose 
representational content is in some way dependent on the object of 
perception (Hinton 1973,76-82; McDowell 1986; Martin 1997,87 n1 1). The 
other distinguishes perceptual from hallucinatory experience without 
commitment to the claim that perceptual experiences occur within the skin 
(Snowdon 1981 and 1990). Sartre's disjunctivism is a hue of the second 
colour. He considers intentionality to be an alternative to representation 
(see 
B&N: xxvii), and does not consider the possibility of obj ect-depen 
dent 
representation. The notion of object-dependent representation grew out of 
the 
work of Frege and Russell on the meanings of names and 
descriptions and 
the relations between them (see McCulloch 
1989), and it is against this 
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background that the notion is applied to perceptual experiences (e. g. 
McDowell 1986). It is quite foreign to Sartre, as it is a product of an analytic 
approach to philosophy resulting from a linguistic turn that Sartre never took. 
To say that perceptual experience is intentional, for Sartre, is to say that it 
literally (spatiotemporally) includes the object as a part, and so does not occur 
within the skin. 
The details of Sartrean disjunctivism are the subject of chapter 3.1 argue 
there that Sartre evades all forms of the argument from hallucination, which 
concludes that perceptual experience cannot ground direct demonstrative 
reference to the seen object on the grounds that the same experience could 
occur as an hallucination, where the form of disjunctivism that holds 
perceptual experiences to be generated within the skin cannot evade all forms 
of this argument (3.3). For the purposes of this chapter, though, all that 
matters is that Sartre's position is a form of disjunctivism, and hence opposed 
to indirect realism, phenomenalism, and intentionalism. The concern of this 
chapter, that is, is whether Sartre succeeds in establishing the disjunctivist 
claim that perceptual experience requires the existence of its object, that in 
perceptual experience 'consciousness is born supported by a being which is 
not itself' (B&N: xxxvii). 
Sartre attempts to establish this conclusion by arguing against the view 
common to indirect realism, which he labels simply 'realism', and 
phenomenalism or ontological idealism, which he often calls simply 'idealism). 
These theories have in common the view that perceptual experience consists 
in apprehension of objects that are dependent for their existence on that 
apprehension. This view is the target of Sartre's attack. If Sartre's arguments 
are to establish his conclusion, however, they must also rule out 
intentionalism, which does not postulate subjective objects of apprehension 
but which denies that perceptual experiences themselves ground 
direct 
demonstrative reference to seen objects. But the question of whether Sartre 
has succeeded in establishing his position cannot 
be answered without first 
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extricating the arguments he uses from the tangled passage they are bound 
up in. 
2.2 In Pursuit of 'The Pursuit of Being' 
'The Pursuit of Being' is an ever-digressing series of fits and starts that does 
not contain a single quotation, book title, reference, or any other part of the 
scholarly apparatus that philosophers usually employ and that Sartre employs 
elsewhere. This anarchic style not only confuses readers: it also seems to 
have confused Sartre at a crucial stage, obscuring for him the distinction 
between the claim that appearances are mind-dependent events or entities 
and the claim that reality consists in such events or entities. The first is 
common to indirect realism and phenomenalism, and is the central target of 
the passage, whereas the second is peculiar to phenomenalism. In this 
section, I aim to lay bare the structure of this passage in order to expose the 
arguments embedded in it. This project is not so much one of unweaving a 
rainbow as filtering a glaring beam of white light into its constituent spectrum 
of colours. Before this filtering, though, it is crucial to delineate sharply 
Sartre's target. 
Sartre is attempting to show both indirect realism and phenomenalism to be 
untenable, as a recommendation of his form of direct realism. McCulloch 
(1994,84-8) presents Sartre's aim as steering a course between Descartes 
and Berkeley. But this is misleading. Descartes is not the representative of 
indirect realism that McCulloch makes him out to be. Phenomenal 
consciousness does not, for Descartes, involve awareness of a subjective 
mental entity that purports to represent extra-mental reality: it involves instead 
awareness of a brain state that purports to represent extra-cranial reality 
(1985,209). Although, as McCulloch points out, Descartes does believe that 
in principle a mind can exist without a world or a body, 
Descartes also 
believes that a mind that did exist in this way would be severely restricted 
in 
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its activities. Perception, imagination, and emotion all require 'the close and 
intimate union of our mind with the body' (1985,209): a mind without a body is 
restricted to pure thought. And Sartre's concern is not pure thought but 
phenomenal consciousness of the world, precisely the kinds of mental event 
that Descartes considered to require the 'close and intimate union of our mind 
with the body'. 
Sartre's own examples of an indirect realist and a phenomenalist are Kant 
and Husserl respectively. Both of these thinkers subscribe to transcendental 
idealism, the belief that the application of concepts in experience shapes the 
world we experience, and our knowledge of the world is possible only 
because of this conceptual structure of experience. In classifying Kant as a 
'realist' and Husserl as an 'idealist', Sartre is entirely ignoring this idealistic 
theory of knowledge common to the two thinkers. Sartre is concerned in this 
passage with being, not knowledge. He is not primarily concerned with the 
ways in which or the extent to which we know the world around us, or whether 
reality really has the structures it-seems to have. He is, rather, concerned with 
whether the object of apprehension in experience of the world is a mind- 
dependent subjective private entity, as indirect realists and phenomenalists 
hold, or whether it is mind-independent objective being in-itself. The question 
of the ways in which or the extent to which our awareness of that object of 
apprehension is a distorting medium is not a question Sartre addresses in this 
passage. Later in Being and Nothingness, as we have seen (1.3), Sartre 
endorses the claim that consciousness is active in structuring the world of 
experience, claiming that the way things appear is partly due to 
determinations applied by consciousness on the basis of past experience and 
in the light of current projects. By casting Descartes and Berkeley instead of 
Kant and Husserl as the indirect realist and phenomenalist that Sartre attacks, 
McCulloch blinds himself to Sartre's adaptation of a claim common to Kant 
and Husserl but unknown to Descartes and Berkeley: that our way of being 
aware of the objects of apprehension helps to structure the world. McCulloch 
takes the form of direct realism that Sartre is recommending to hold that 
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consciousness reveals a pre-existent world without distortion, that the world is 
just mind-independent reality (1994,111-7). Couching the attack in terms of 
Kant and Husserl rather than Descartes and Berkeley emphasises the 
distinction between the ontological realism and idealism that Sartre takes Kant 
and Husserl to differ over and the epistemological idealism on which they 
broadly agree. 
The key difference between the two transcendental idealists, as Sartre reads 
them, concerns the ontological relation of experience to objective reality. 
Ultimately, he argues, neither Kant nor Husserl has a tenable position, 
because they share an untenable presumption. Kant famously draws a 
distinction between appearances ('phenomena') and things-in-themselves 
('noumena'), claiming that the world which we experience is the phenomenal 
realm, but that experience is in some way grounded in mind-independent 
nournenal reality, reality as it is in-itself. Scholars are divided between two 
main readings of this distinction, which (following Gardner 1999,289-98) we 
can label the 'two-object' and the 'two-conception' readings. According to the 
'two-object' reading, phenomena comprise a set of immediate objects of 
awareness, reality in-itself being an ontologically distinct realm lying beyond 
and somehow regulating the series of mind-dependent appearances. On this 
reading, 'appearances are nothing but representations' which are 'merely in 
us' (Kant 1929, A250 and A129). According to the 'two-conception' reading, 
on the other hand, Kant is drawing a distinction between two ways in which 
the same ontological reality can be considered. On this reading, the 'object as 
appearance is to be distinguished from itself as object in itself (1929, B69); 
whilst 'the senses represent to us something merely as it appears, this 
something must also in itself be a thing' (1929, A249). Kant's discussion of his 
distinction seems ambivalent between these two readings, and it is irrelevant 
to present purposes to attempt to resolve this ambivalence. What is clear is 
that Sartre subscribes to the 'two-object' reading of Kant: 'Kant's Erscheinung 
[appearance] ... point[s] over 
its shoulder to a true being which [is], for it, 
absolute' (B&N: xxii; see xxiv). For Sartre, Kant's claim is that we have direct 
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awareness only of mind-dependent appearances: reality as it exists in-itself 
lies beyond appearances. And it is this indirect realist claim, that mind- 
independent reality lies shielded behind mind-dependent objects, that Sartre 
objects to. ' 
Where Kant, in Sartre's eyes, hides mind-independent reality behind a wall of 
subjective objects, Husserl's brand of transcendental idealism demurs only to 
do away with mind-independent reality altogether. '[L]est any 
misunderstanding arise ), wrote Husserl in Cartesian Meditations, 
'phenomenology indeed excludes every nai've metaphysics that operates with 
absurd things in themselves, but does not exclude metaphysics as such. ... it 
by no means professes to stop short of the "supreme and ultimate" questions' 
(1950, §64). Sartre reads Husserl to be attempting to answer the supreme 
and ultimate questions while retaining the traditional notion of mind-dependent 
appearance by denouncing as 'absurd' the 'naive' notion of mind-independent 
reality that must lie inaccessible and unknowable beyond appearances (see 
also Husserl 1950, §41; 1982, §§ 40,47,52). This move can be made only if 
reality is construed to be ultimately constructed out of mind-dependent 
appearances. Husserl seems to endorse this construal of reality even as he 
attempts to distance himself from Berkeley. 'If anyone reading our statements 
objects that they mean changing all the world into a subjective illusion and 
committing oneself to a "Berkeleian idealism ... , he wrote, 
'we can only answer 
that he has not seized upon the sense of those statements. They take nothing 
away from the fully valid being of the world ... The real actuality 
is not 
"reinterpreted 11, to say nothing of its being denied; it is rather that a 
countersensical interpretation of the real actuality ... is removed' 
(1982, § 55). 
Berkeleian idealism is not the claim that reality is an illusion, but that the 
conception of reality as mind-independent is incoherent. 'That the things I see 
with mine eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist, I make not the 
least questiony, wrote Berkeley. 'The only thing whose existence we deny, is 
that which philosophers call matter or corporeal substance. 
And in doing of 
this, there is no damage done to the rest of mankind, who, I dare say, will 
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never miss it. ... If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or reality of 
things, he is very far from understanding what hath been premised in the 
plainest terms I could think of' (1975, §§ 35-6). If Husserl does construe reality 
to be constructed out of mind-dependent appearances, if his position is as 
close to Berkeley's as these two quotations suggest, then Sartre is right to 
claim that 'Husserl deserves ... to be called a phenomenalist' (B&N: 73; see 
also xxvi). ' 
On these readings, regardless of their exegetical accuracy, Kant and Husserl 
both hold appearances to be mind-dependent entities. They also both hold 
that the application of determinations in experience shapes the way the world 
appears to us, but Sartre does not attack this point, as he agrees with it 
himself. Reserving 'world' for the world as we experience it, rather than being 
in-itself in itself, he writes later in Being and Nothingness: 'it is through human 
reality that there is a world' (13M 307). The point of agreement between Kant 
and Husserl that Sartre attacks is the claim that appearances are mind- 
dependent. Such appearances can be related to reality in only one of two 
ways. Either reality is mind-independent and lies beyond them, as Sartre 
reads Kant to hold. Or reality is constructed out of mind-dependent 
appearances, so that in the case of perceptual experience at least the object 
of apprehension is part of objective reality even though it is mind-dependent, 
as Sartre takes Husserl to hold. Sartre's aim is to show that neither theory is 
tenable, and that we must therefore deny mind-dependent appearances 
altogether in favour of allowing mind-independent reality to be the direct 
object of apprehension. The rest of this section maps out the passage in 
which Sartre attempts to show this. 
Sartre opens the passage praising 'modern thought' for 'reducing the existent 
(Pexistant) to the series of appearances (apparitions) which manifest ity, in an 
attempt to govercome a certain number of dualisms which have embarrassed 
philosophy' (B&N: xxi). By divorcing the subjective world of appearance from 
reality as it is in itself, Sartre argues, indirect realists such as Kant have 
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generated dualisms that give rise to scepticism about the nature and structure 
of reality. The embarrassing dualisms are the dualisms of interior and exterior, 
being and appearance, and essence and appearance (B&N: XXi_XXii). 4 What is 
embarrassing about these dualisms is not simply that they challenge us to 
'explain how these realities are related to each other and why they are each 
considered "reality"' (Catalano 1974,22), but that they preclude a 
comprehensive and grounded account of the interior, true being, and essence 
of the world and its denizens. If reality itself does not appear, then it must 
remain 'secret', 'hidden', out of cognitive reach (B&N: xxi-xxii). If reality itself is 
manifest in experience, on the other hand, then there nothing is secret or 
hidden: the being and essence of an object or of reality in general are 
themselves present in experience, and so cognitively available. 
The progress made by 'modern thought' is the abandonment of the root of 
these dualisms. As Sartre puts it later in the passage, '[t]he first procedure of 
a philosophy ought to be to expel things from consciousness and to 
reestablish its true connection with the world' (B&N: xxvii). The 'modern' 
philosophers Sartre has in mind are Husserl and Heidegger. Perception, for 
Husserl, is direct awareness of reality itself, not of a mental representation of 
reality. We have 'evidence' (Evidenz) of reality, reality appears 'in person) 7 
even though knowledge of the existence and nature of reality requires 
phenomenological reflection on this evidence (see 1950, §§ 4-7). Heidegger 
claims that the central problems of philosophy arise from divorcing mind or 
self from reality at the outset, from 'an ontologically inadequate way of starting 
with something of such a character that independently of it and "outside" of it 
a "world" is to be proved' (Heidegger 1962, § 43a). Experience is not 
independent of reality, for Heidegger, but requires it; mind is not separable 
from world, but is being-in-the-world. 
Heidegger soon drops out of §I of 'The Pursuit of Being', however, as Sartre 
raises the question of whether abandoning indirect realism is sufficient for 
avoiding the embarrassing dualisms, or only necessary. 'Does this mean that 
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by reducing the existent to its manifestations we have succeeded in 
overcoming all dualisms? It seems rather that we have converted them all into 
a new dualism: that of the finite and the infinite' (B&N: xxii-xxiii). Since a thing 
can be viewed in infinitely many ways and repeatedly across time, there 
remains the problem of the relation between a single finite appearance of an 
object and the infinite sequence of appearances of which it is a member. One 
option is to claim that appearances are mind-dependent, and that reality 
consists in infinite sequences of actual and possible appearances. Given that 
Husserl claims us to apprehend reality directly, and considers the notion of 
mind-independent existence 'absurd', Sartre ascribes this phenomenalist 
conception of the relation between appearance and reality to Husserl. But the 
embarrassing dualisms seem to reappear within this framework: the interior, 
being, and essence of an object now pertain to the infinite series of 
appearances, and so are not contained in any one appearance. 'In thus 
replacing a variety of oppositions by a single dualism on which they are all 
based, have we gained or lostT (B&N: xxiv). 
Sartre approaches this question from an oblique angle. § 11 of 'The Pursuit of 
Being' raises a question about the notion of mind-dependent appearances 
common to indirect realism and phenomenalism. There is, he claims, a 
'legitimate problem of the being of this appearing' (B&N: xxiv). We do 
apprehend being, he claims, tsince we can speak of it and since we have a 
certain comprehension of it' (B&N: xxiv). This claim is based on Heidegger's 
hermeneutic conception of enquiry, according to which any enquiry requires 
prior understanding or comprehension (Verstehen) of the subject-matter 
enquired into. Without such an understanding, we would have neither the 
motivation nor the ability to undertake the enquiry: we could not formulate or 
understand the question. Enquiry consists in 'interpretation' (Auslegung), 
which makes explicit what is already implicitly understood. 
Ontology, or 
enquiry into being, therefore requires a pre-ontological comprehension of 
being (Heidegger 1962, §§ 2,4,32,33). Sartre follows Heidegger (1962, § 1) 
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in claiming that we do not understand the term 'being' by associating it with a 
description or definition, and so must understand it by apprehension. 
Sartre's discussion in § 11 focuses on the way in which we apprehend being. 
There are two options: either there are particular sorts of experience, such as 
nausea or boredom, which exclusively reveal being, or we apprehend being in 
experience in general. Either, that is, there is a special 'phenomenon of 
being', a kind of appearance that reveals being, or the being we apprehend is 
'the being of the phenomenon', the being of every appearance. Sartre rejects 
the claim that there is a 'phenomenon of being' manifest in certain 
experiences such as boredom or nausea: his description of that claim is not to 
be taken, as Catalano (1974,29) and Wider (1997,42) take it, as an 
endorsement, but as the presentation of the way '[i]t seems ... at first' (B&N: 
xxiv). ' Sartre dismisses the idea that our comprehension of being is rooted in 
a special type of appearance on the grounds that appearances themselves 
must be. Being, he argues, is not a quality of an object like colour or smell, 
and neither is it signified by appearances in the way a sign signifies its object. 
One apprehends objects exhibiting qualities in experience, and these objects 
and qualities have being, or are: their being itself cannot be apprehended 
except in apprehending them. 'Being is simply the condition of all revelation. It 
is bei ng-for- revealing (6tre-pour-ddvoileo and not revealed being (6tre 
ddvoi16)' (B&N: xxv). 
The problem that this poses, if it is right, is how the relation between 
appearance and being is to be construed if appearances are to be mind- 
dependent. Given that being is the condition of revelation, that appearance 
requires being, the being that appears cannot 'exist only insofar as it reveals 
itself' but is 'transphenomenal' (B&N: xxvi). This conclusion is, of course, the 
target conclusion of the passage as a whole: that we apprehend being which 
does not depend for its existence on our apprehension of it. But, even 
granting Sartre his premises in § 11, his conclusion is not warranted because 
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he has not ruled out the possibility that although being is necessary for 
appearance, appearance is also necessary for being. 
Sartre is aware that he has left this option open, and begins § III by pointing it 
out. 'Why not say that the being of the appearing is its appearance? This is 
simply a way of choosing new words to clothe the old "Esse est percipP of 
Berkeley. And it is in fact what Husserl and his followers are doing' (B&N: 
xxvi). It is at this point that Sartre's dialectical style causes most confusion. 
Although attacking the shared claim of indirect realism and phenomenalism 
that appearances are mind-dependent, the consideration of being has led to 
the question of whether being is mind-dependent, and this includes the being 
of objects and of the world, and so is the claim peculiar to phenomenalism. 
From here on, Sartre couches most of the passage as an attack on 
phenomenalism, and by the time he comes to summarise the whole 
argument, he seems to have lost sight of indirect realism altogether. The 
focus on phenomenalism, moreover, leads to an exposition of a theory of the 
, relation between consciousness and self-consciousness widely read as being 
an affirmation of that theory, but which I claim to be an exposition of a view 
-that Sartre considers a part of phenomenalism. The purpose of the exposition 
is to provide the background for an argument against phenomenalism on 
grounds of incoherence. The focus on phenomenalism serves two rhetorical 
purposes as well as playing a role in the dialectic of Sartre's argument. It is an 
attempt to distance Sartre's phenomenology from Husserl's at the very outset. 
And it is an attempt to distance Being and Nothingness from an aspect of the 
view of consciousness advocated in Sartre's earliest works (IPC: 115; TE: 
402). This is the view that Sartre ascribes to Husserl, that consciousness is 
ontologically independent of reality, requiring only its consciousness of itself in 
order to exist. It is partly because Sartre advocated this view in his earliest 
works that § III of 'The Pursuit of Being' is often read as an affirmation of that 
view (see e. g. McCulloch 1994,101). But as Sartre's works developed, he 
became less enthusiastic about this claim: in Sketch for a Theoly of Emotions 
he ascribed it to Husserl without affirming it himself, and it is notably absent 
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from the short discussion of self-awareness in The Psychology of Imagination 
(STE: 23,25; Pl: 13-4). 'The Pursuit of Being' marks the final break with this 
aspect of Sartre's earliest works. Facing ontological questions for the first 
time, Sartre is forced to relinquish this aspect of his earlier phenomenological 
psychology on the grounds that, as I will show, it is in conflict with the 
dependence of consciousness on its objects. 
The confusion of § III is worsened by Sartre claiming early on that the mind- 
dependence of reality can be ruled out 'for two essential reasons, one 
concerning the nature of the percipi, the other that of the percipere', and then 
subtitling the rest of the section "The nature of the percipere' (B&N: xxvi). This 
makes it seem as though he is addressing the second mentioned problem 
with phenomenalism in the rest of the section, when in fact he saves both 
problems for § IV (confusingly named after the first mentioned problem, 'The 
Being of the Percipi'). In fact, he spends the rest of § III discussing the 
ontology of consciousness required for the claim that reality is mind- 
dependent, since 'an idealism intent on reducing being to the knowledge 
(connaissance) we have of it, oughtfirst to give some kind of guarantee for 
the being of knowledge' (B&N: xxvi). The rest of the section is devoted to 
answering this question on behalf of Berkeley and Husserl. 
As a result, most of § III is not in Sartre's own voice, as most commentators 
take it to be, but in the voice of a phenomenalist. It ends, for example, with the 
claim that 'it is because of this identity of appearance and existence within 
[consciousness] that it can be considered as the absolute' (B&N: xxxii). But an 
'absolute' is something that is ontologically self-contained, that requires no 
other thing in order to exist, and Sartre holds that consciousness is a relation 
to mind-independent reality and hence requires that reality in order to exist 
(B&N: xxxvii). And Sartre does not hold, as Caws (1979,55), Hammond, 
Howarth, and Keat (1991,104), Neu (1988,80), Whitford (1982,30), and 
Wood (1988,211) claim that he does, that consciousness is entirely 
transparent to the subject - that its 'appearance and existence' are identical. 
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Instead, Sartre holds that self-awareness is 'nonpositional' and 'nonthetic', 
and as we have seen (1.4) this means that it does not include the focusing of 
attention required for detailed awareness. In Sketch for a Theory of the 
Emotions and The Psychology of Imagination, as he is moving away from his 
earlier view that consciousness is absolute, Sartre proposes that self- 
awareness may be a matter of degree, and calls self-awareness 'a diffuse 
light', 'vague', and 'fugitive', which strongly suggests that he no longer 
considered consciousness to be transparent to itself (STE: 79; PI: 14). In 
Being and Nothingness, Sartre does not call consciousness transparent, but 
'translucent' (translucide). The difference between transparency and 
translucency is best illustrated by the difference between an ordinary window 
and one made of frosted glass; as Larousse puts it, a translucide body 
diffuses light so that objects 'are not clearly visible' (ne sont pas visible avec 
nettete) through it. 6 Since Sartre does not consider consciousness to be 
transparent, he does not believe that there can be no hidden or 
unacknowledged aspects of a conscious episode, and so does not accept the 
'identity of appearance and existence' that he discusses in § 111. Had Sartre 
believed in the transparency of consciousness, he would not have been able 
to deny the validity of common-sense as a guide to consciousness (see 0.3), 
and he would not have been able to agree with Freud's denial that the 
individual is in a privileged position when it comes to understanding his or her 
own conscious life (see B&N: 560). 
The view of consciousness that Sartre ascribes to phenomenalism, then, is 
that consciousness is the foundation of its own being, a self-contained 
absolute. This is necessary, he claims, following Husserl (1982, §§ 55,76), in 
order that consciousness be the 'foundation-of-being' (1'6tre-fondement) for 
appearances. For some reason, Sartre considers this ontological 
independence of consciousness to require intimate self-awareness. That is, 
he considers it obvious that if consciousness contains everything required for 
its existence, it must be founded on its awareness of itself. It is in the context 
of ascribing this view to phenomenalism that Sartre writes: 
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'the necessary ... condition for a knowing consciousness to be 
knowledge of its object, is that it be consciousness of itself as 
being that knowledge. This is a necessary condition, for if my 
consciousness were not consciousness of being consciousness 
of the table ... it would be a consciousness ignorant of itself, an 
unconscious - which is absurd' (B&N: xxviii). 
This paragraph is often decried as a bad argument for the claim that all states 
of consciousness must be states of self-consciousness (Caws 1979,63; 
Danto 1991,46; Hammond, Howarth, and Keat 1991,105-6; McCulloch 1994, 
99; Rosenberg 1981,258; Webber 1997,18). Taken as an argument for that 
claim, it is indeed useless: the claim that 'a consciousness ignorant of itself ... 
is absurd' would be true only if it is a necessary condition of a consciousness 
that it is not ignorant of itself, which is precisely the conclusion of this 
purported argument. 7 But in the context of ascribing a theory of 
consciousness to Berkeley and Husserl, the paragraph makes better sense: it 
would be absurd for anyone who agreed that consciousness is ontologically 
founded on self-consciousness to deny that self-consciousness is necessary 
for consciousness; this would be 'absurd' in the straightforward sense of 
'contradictory'. Sartre adds that self-consciousness is also a sufficient 
condition of consciousness, 'for my being conscious of being conscious of that 
table suffices in fact for me to be conscious of it. That is of course not 
sufficient to permit me to affirm that this table exists in itself - but rather that it 
exists for me' (B&N: xxviii). This claim tends to be ignored, presumably 
because it adds nothing to the purported argument for self-awareness. What 
this overlooks, however, is that if Sartre is here writing in his own voice, then 
he has claimed that in order to be conscious of a table it is not necessary that 
the table exists, which directly contradicts his view that 'consciousness is born 
supported by a being which is not itself' (B&N: xxxvii). Reading the paragraph 
as ascribing a view to Sartre's opponents resolves the apparent contradiction. 
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Sartre goes on to argue that the second-order consciousness required for the 
existence of the first-order consciousness cannot be a separate conscious 
event, since if it were the second-order consciousness would require for its 
existence a third-order consciousness, and so on ad infinitum. McCulloch 
(1994,100) suggests that this regress might not be vicious, since there is no 
need to claim that every consciousness is accompanied by a higher-order 
consciousness, but merely that we can become conscious of our own states 
or episodes of consciousness. But reading the passage as clarification of the 
phenomenalist view that consciousness is founded entirely on self- 
consciousness shows why the regress is vicious: every postulated 
consciousness would require a higher-order consciousness as a necessary 
condition. In order to avoid the impending regress, Sartre correctly concludes, 
the second-order consciousness which is necessary for the existence of the 
first-order consciousness must in some way be that first-order consciousness. 
Here, Sartre inserts a couple of paragraphs in his own voice that add his own 
reasons for believing in the self-awareness of consciousness. Using the 
example of counting cigarettes, he argues that the self-awareness of 
consciousness is necessary for the execution of goal-directed activities and 
for our ability to reflect on our own consciousnesses (B&N: xxix). This second 
point is an application of his more general claim that deliberately turning 
attention towards something requires prior nonpositional or nonthetic 
awareness of that thing. As we saw in chapter 1 (1.4), however, it seems 
rather that some form of positional, thetic awareness is required to motivate a 
shift of attention. I will discuss the first point, that nonthetic awareness is 
required for a sequence of consciousness to be united in a project motivated 
by an overarching goal, in the conclusions to this chapter, where I will argue 
that his claim can be retained while the view of self-awareness put forward in 
§ III is rejected (2.6). But the key point to notice here is that these two claims 
about the role of nonthetic awareness are not sufficient for the claim that 
every consciousness must be self-aware: perhaps there are consciousnesses 
that are not parts of activities and cannot be reflected on. This paragraph, 
116 
then, is logically independent of the view he is ascribing to Husserl, the view 
that an episode of consciousness cannot be without being self-aware. ' 
After this digression, Sartre returns to the plot. He concludes that his 
opponents are committed to the claim that consciousness contains in itself the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of its existence: 
'consciousness is consciousness through and through. It can be 
limited only by itself. ... Consciousness is a plenum of existence, 
and this determination of itself by itself is an essential 
characteristic' (B&N: xxxi). ' 
He also describes it as the view that consciousness is a 'non-substantial 
absolute' (xxxii). To call consciousness 'absolute' is to say that it does not 
require the existence of anything else. Sartre's use of the term 'non- 
substantial' here, it seems, should be taken as indicating that consciousness 
should not be identified with its set of properties, or its set of essential 
properties. He writes: 'the ontological error of Cartesian rationalism is not to 
have seen that if the absolute is defined by the primacy of existence over 
essence, it cannot be conceived as a substance' (B&N: xxxii). Sartre later 
defined being for-itself as a 'non-substantial absolute' (B&N: 619) and defined 
cexistentialism' as the view that for the human 'existence precedes essence' 
(1946a, 27). This may be why McCulloch (1994,101) takes this final 
paragraph of § 111, and with it the rest of § 111, to be affirming the view that 
Sartre is ascribing to Husserl. But the human individual that exists 'for-itself' 
(pour-sol) must be distinguished from consciousness. The for-itself, the 
subject of psychological theorising, as we shall see in 4.2, is for Sartre a 
larger entity of which consciousness is a dependent part. The question of 
what it means to call the for-itself a non-substantial absolute will be 
considered at the end of the thesis (5.3). All that matters for present purposes 
is that consciousness is not the same as the for-itself, so predicates true of 
the for-itself are not thereby to be applied to consciousness. Consciousness is 
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'not ... the totality of human being, but ... the instantaneous nucleus of this 
being' (B&N: 70). 
Having spelled out the view of consciousness he considers his phenomenalist 
opponents to be committed to, Sartre finally presses on, in § IV, with the 
problems raised at the beginning of § 111. The first concerns the notion of 
'being perceived'. This is a passive notion, something that befalls something. 
If it were to be identical with the being of the appearance, then the being of 
the appearance would itself be passive. Appearances would exist passively. 
Sartre's objection is that this is a category mistake: existence cannot be 
passive or active. The claim that any thing's esse is percipi, says Sartre, is 
'nonsense' (B&N: xxxv). In his summary of this objection in § V, he couches it 
in terms of the being of objects, of reality at large, rather than in terms of 
appearances (B&N: xxxvii). But the point can be applied to either the 
phenomenalist claim that a world made out of mind-dependent appearances 
or the claim common to phenomenalism and indirect realism that 
appearances are mind-dependent in the first place: both claims involve mind- 
dependent existence. 
The second problem Sartre raises is based on the account of consciousness 
that Sartre ascribed to Berkeley and Husserl in § 111. Even if appearances 
could exist passively, Sartre claims, they could only be passive in relation to 
consciousness if consciousness was capable of being passive in relation to 
them. If a can act on b, then b can act on a. He then claims that this is 
incompatible with the claim that consciousness is absolute. An absolute 
consciousness, he claims, is pure spontaneity, entirely self-directed, and so 
cannot be acted on from without (B&N: xxxv). It is not clear why Sartre 
considers an absolute consciousness founded on self-consciousness to be 
incapable of being acted on from without, as we shall see (2.5). In his first 
book, Sartre affirmed that consciousness is incapable of being affected from 
without on the grounds that it is an absolute spontaneity grounded on self- 
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awareness, but he did not argue for the connection between these claims 
there either (I PC: 115). 
Sartre attempts to distil the foregoing discussion into an 'ontological proof' of 
his position in § V. He glosses his own position as a reversal of 
phenomenalism: reality is not dependent on an ontologically independent 
consciousness, but consciousness is dependent on an ontologically 
independent reality. The purported proof of this position is: 
'All consciousness is consciousness of something. This 
definition of consciousness can be taken in two very distinct 
senses: either we understand by this that consciousness is 
constitutive of the being of its object, or it means that 
consciousness in its inmost nature is a relation to a 
transcendent being. But the first. interpretation of the formula 
destroys itself' (B&N: xxxvi). 
Sartre's attack on phenomenalism following this paragraph oscillates between 
the claim that mind-dependent appearances would 'dissolve in the subjective' 
(B&N: xxxvii) and the claim that reality could not be constructed out of mind- 
dependent appearances even if such things could exist, since 'this subjectivity 
cannot go out of itself to posit a transcendent object in such a way as to 
endow it with a plenitude of impressions' (B&N: xxxvi). Disambiguating this 
section leads to two separate ontological proofs, following the two problems 
raised in § IV, one to do with the nature of the perceived, the other to do with 
the nature of the perceiving. On both interpretations, '[a]ll consciousness is 
consciousness of something' is the claim that consciousness is apprehension 
of existent objects. According to one interpretation, consciousness cannot be 
constitutive of the being of its object because the notion of mind-dependent 
being involves a category mistake. According to the second, consciousness 
cannot be constitutive of the being of its object because the notion of mind- 
dependent appearance both requires and is inconsistent with the conception 
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of consciousness formulated in § 111. Both these interpretations preserve 
Sartre's claim that the argument is concerned with the structure of 
consciousness, since on both interpretations the argument is concerned to 
show that, as apprehension of being, consciousness must be apprehension of 
being in-itself. 'We are here on the ground of being, not knowledge', Sartre 
writes; 'consciousness implies in its being a non-conscious and 
transphenomenal being' (B&N: xxxviii). 
In § VI, Sartre gives a different summary of the preceding sections (echoed at 
B&N: 171). Indirect realism, he claims, has been ruled out on the grounds that 
there cannot be mind-dependent appearances. Phenomenalism has been 
ruled out on the same grounds, but also because it cannot coherently allow 
consciousness to 'act upon transcendent being' and because 'consciousness 
cannot get out of its subjectivity if the latter has been initially given' (B&N: A). 
The claim that both indirect realism and phenomenalism are ruled out by the 
impossibility of mind-dependent appearances conforms to the first 
interpretation of the ontological proof delineated above: consciousness must 
be apprehension of being, and being cannot be mind-dependent; therefore, 
consciousness is apprehension of mind-independent being. The further claims 
about phenomenalism, however, suggest the second interpretation: mind- 
dependent appearances would require an absolute consciousness founded 
on self-consciousness, but since such a consciousness cannot be affected 
from without, the principle of inertia shows that it cannot affect other beings 
either, and so cannot construct reality from appearances. 
The rest of § VI is devoted to a preliminary characterisation of being in-itself. 
He repeats his conclusion of § 11 that ontology is the study of 'the meaning of 
being' (le sens de P6tre). Because phenomenal consciousness is 
apprehension of being, he claims, the 'meaning' of being is implicit in every 
appearance: I 'have at each instant what Heidegger calls a pre-ontological 
comprehension of it; that is, one which is not accompanied by a fixing in 
concepts and elucidation' (B&N: xxxix). This upshot of his preferred theory of 
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consciousness suggests the first interpretation of his ontological proof of that 
theory: we understand 'being' not by definition, by fixing in concepts and 
elucidation, but only because we apprehend it. Sartre's aim in the rest of 
Being and Nothingness is to lay bare the 'meaningy, or 'sense' (sens), of 
being: to explicate its structures. He begins this task in § VI, discussing 
aspects of its mind-independence, but emphasises that this is only 
preliminary. The ontology Sartre develops will be discussed in chapter 4. 
Sartre ends the passage with some questions. The discussion of 'The Pursuit 
of Being', he tells us, has identified two regions of being - consciousness and 
the in-itself - but what are the 'meanings' (structures) of these two regions of 
being, in what sense are they both 'being', and how can these two regions be 
united when each seems to be ontologically self-sufficient? This last question, 
however, is disingenuous. Sartre's § III does not show consciousness to be 
self-sufficient. It shows at most that some types of consciousness must be 
self-aware and that Husserl is committed to consciousness being self- 
sufficient in virtue of this self-awareness. Sartre's own ontological proof 
attempts to show that consciousness is not self-sufficient. As a result, this last 
problem is resolved fairly swiftly in Being and Nothingness: consciousness is 
an abstraction that cannot exist on its own; it is not an entity, but a 'moment' 
of 'being-in-the-world' (B&N: 3). As Sartre later puts it, 'consciousness of 
being is the being of consciousness' (B&N: 31). If pre-reflective 
consciousness is to be a part of consciousness, it must be a consequence of 
consciousness of being in-itself. 
Sartre's repeated reformulations of his proof in the closing sections of 'The 
Pursuit of Being', which are not obviously equivalent to one another, along 
with his conflation of objections to the notion of mind-dependent appearance 
with objections to the claim that reality is constructed out of such 
appearances, strongly suggest that he failed to separate out the strands of his 
thought sufficiently to recognise that he actually has two attempted proofs 
here. In addition to these arguments, the consideration of the sceptical 
problems raised by dualistic theories of the relation between appearance and 
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reality seem to provide a third motivation for agreeing with Sartre that 
consciousness is apprehension of mind-independent reality. Before going on 
to assess the two forms of the ontological proof, I will investigate this anti- 
sceptical claim. 
2.3 Against Humean Scepticism 
The kind of scepticism that Sartre finds an objectionable upshot of indirect 
realism is Humean, not Cartesian, scepticism. It is not, that is, the general 
worry that unless I can prove the reliability of belief in general, unless I can 
prove that I am not the dupe of a demon no less powerful than cunning and 
intent on deceiving me, then I cannot have any claim to knowledge. If Sartre 
had been aiming to overcome Cartesian scepticism by affirming a certain 
theory of experience, he would have failed: that theory itself could be a 
demon-induced false belief. It is rather the problem that if experience veils 
reality, then I cannot have knowledge of reality. " If this problem is to provide a 
motivation for embracing a Sartrean conception of experience as dependent 
on the mind-independent reality it is an apprehension of, as Sartre implies it 
does, then there are four questions that must be answered. First, exactly what 
is wrong with following Hume (1978, book 1§ 7) and simply embracing the 
scepticism? Second, if the scepticism is intolerable, why does that force an 
abandonment of mind-dependent appearances rather than, as Berkeley 
(1975,108) suggests, an abandonment of reality beyond appearances in 
favour of a phenomenalist reality constructed out of mind-dependent 
appearances? Third, do current anglophone intentionalist theories of 
experience, which deny the existence of mind-dependent objects but 
nonetheless construe experience as independent of the reality it represents, 
succeed in overcoming the dualism? Fourth, does the Sartrean construal of 
experience as apprehension of mind-dependent reality avoid this scepticism? 
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Sartre's answer to the first question is that the scepticism in question is 
embarrassing because it precludes the provision of a conclusive ontology of 
reality and our place in it. This point, it seems, is right. If reality is beyond 
experience, then the whole of the experiences we have are compatible with 
any number of alternative realities, and in the limiting case there may be no 
mind-independent reality at all. Since any claim about the nature of reality 
made on the basis of experience will be based on inference, and since 
inference is defeasible, it is difficult to see how one could be confident about 
any such claim. The evidence will be compatible with an alternative construal 
of reality (see McDowell 1982, § 11). " But this point in itself does not explain 
quite what is wrong with Humean scepticism. Why should the lack of a 
conclusive ontology be so objectionable as to motivate the rejection of a 
philosophical theory that leads to it? After all, so long as we can discern 
regularities in experience, we can predict and hence learn to control these 
regularities, and thereby develop all the science we need to enhance our 
lives. Medicine and technology have improved the human lot (in the West, at 
least) without a conclusive ontology of reality, so why should we be 
embarrassed by the lack of such an ontology? 
There are three reasons why scientific success does not undermine Sartre's 
claim that the lack of a conclusive ontology is an embarrassment to 
philosophy. First, Sartre is only worried about an embarrassment to 
philosophy: he does not go as far as Kant's claim that it is 'a scandal to 
philosophy and to human reason in general' (1929, Bxxxix). Philosophy is that 
exercise of human reason that aims to provide an overall account of reality 
and our place in it, and so would clearly be embarrassed by an inability to do 
so. Moreover, a philosophical theory that provides such a theory would clearly 
be superior to any that does not, on the grounds that it would have a greater 
explanatory value, and this provides a pragmatic reason to avoid all theories 
that preclude conclusive ontology. Second, as Kim (1998,59-60) points out, 
if 
a system of thought precludes our providing an account of some types of 
object or event - or, indeed, of reality in general - 
then there is clearly 
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something wrong with our system of thought. Overhauling it may lead to a 
deeper and more useful understanding of ourselves and our environment, and 
so lead to even greater scientific success. Third, many branches of science 
are - as their practitioners admit - young, in progress, and areas of much 
controversy. Science is far from complete, and perhaps revising our system of 
thought is necessary for its completion. Most artificial intelligence research, for 
example, is premised on the functionalist view that all mentality is 
manipulation of representations. If Sartre's conception of experience is 
correct, and consciousness is not simply a matter of hosting a representation 
that may or may not accurately reflect the seer's environment, then the 
computers built in mainstream artificial intelligence research will never be 
conscious. The benefits for psychology of investigating the relations between 
mind and reality are even more obvious. We can agree with Sartre, then, that 
an inability to provide a conclusive ontology is an embarrassment to 
philosophy, and we can add that human reason in general may gain from the 
advancement of philosophy. 
I 
The answer to the second question is that phenomenalism must ultimately 
postulate some kind of reality beyond experience or it will fail to account for 
the fact that reality does not necessarily do what I want it to. Struggling with 
objects in order to bring about a desired end, Sartre claims, reveals 'the 
resistance of things' and the 'coefficient of adversity' in the world (B&N: 304, 
324,327). In action, I discover that the world can be manipulated only in 
accordance with certain laws that govern it and 'does not depend on my whim' 
(B&N: xxiii; see IPC: 1; STE: 62). The reality that I act on has some 'principle 
of being' (B&N: xxiii) that is responsible for its resistance to some of my efforts 
(see IPC: 1,115; STE: 62-6; B&N: 1797 191,197,217). 12 This point is 
reminiscent of Johnson's attempt to refute Berkeleian idealism by kicking a 
stone: if the stone does not move, then it has some nature or being that 
is not 
dependent on my whim. Johnson's point fails against Berkeley, however, 
because Berkeley claimed that the sequence of actual and possible 
appearances that makes up reality is regulated by 
God (1975,85-6). The 
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stone does not move because God does not want it to. So ultimately Berkeley 
does not avoid the scepticism engendered by indirect realism, because 
Berkeley does not avoid postulating a reality that lies beyond and regulates 
experience. Berkeley's God, in fact, is just one more postulate alongside 
Cartesian extended substance and Lockean atoms in a void, which together 
with other possibilities make up the list of possible extra-experiential realities 
between which we cannot definitively decide precisely because they are 
extra-experiential. But Husserl, according to Sartre, is vulnerable to Johnson's 
critique, because Husserl, according to Sartre, is a phenomenalist who does 
not postulate any reality beyond appearance to account for their regularity and 
13 resistance to my efforts (B&N: 324). Given this resistance, phenomenalism 
must postulate some extra-experientiai reality. 
Given that both indirect realism and phenomenalism generate Humean 
scepticism by postulating an extra-experiential reality required to account for 
the regularity of experience, the third question asked above remains: does 
anglophone intentionalism fare any better? This intentionalism is the view that 
experience consists in representation of reality which may or may not be 
accurate. The experience is independent of the reality it purports to represent 
on this view, since the same kind of experience may occur as either a 
perception or an hallucination. It is for this reason that intentionalism fares no 
better than indirect realism and phenomenalism. The scepticism engendered 
by indirect realism and phenomenalism is not an upshot of the fact that they 
postulate subjective objects of awareness, such as sense data or sensations. 
It is an upshot of the fact that the experience itself is independent of reality, 
and so is compatible with any of a list of possible realities. And this 
characteristic is preserved in current anglophone intentionalist theories. 
Although intentionalist theories all postulate a mind-independent reality that 
causes and is represented by perceptual experience, it remains that since the 
experience does not itself include this reality the nature of the reality cannot 
be discovered on the basis of experience. It remains possible, that is, that the 
reality in question is a Cartesian extended substance or a Lockean system of 
125 
atoms in a void. It even remains possible that the distinction between a 
perception and an hallucination is not due to some causal connection 
between the experience and reality being present only in the perceptual case, 
but is due to only perceptual experiences being parts of sequences of actual 
and possible experiences regulated by a Berkeleian God. The fact that this 
Berkeleian option is not currently taken by any intentionalists does not matter: 
it remains a possibility given the nature of experience as they construe it. 
What is required to rule out this scepticism while preserving the construal of 
experience as representation of reality is the denial that perceptual 
experience is independent of reality, the denial that the same experience can 
occur as either a perception or an hallucination. We have seen that this denial 
is made by some current anglophone theorists who wish to preserve the claim 
that all experiences are representations generated within the skin, rather than 
embrace the Sartrean claim that perceptual experience is not generated 
within the skin but includes the object as a spatiotemporal part (2.1). But this 
form of disjunctivism agrees with Sartre that perceptual experience at least is 
direct apprehension of mind-independent reality, and the purpose of the 
present chapter is to ascertain whether Sartre has provided solid grounds for 
this claim. An argument in favour of Sartre's disjunctivism as opposed to this 
anglophone disjunctivism will be provided in 3.3, but for present purposes it is 
sufficient to categorise the two theories together. 
Given that Humean scepticism results from indirect realism, phenomenalism, 
and intentionalism, then, it remains to see whether construing experience as 
apprehension of mind-independent reality is sufficient to overcome this 
scepticism. For if it is not, the charge of scepticism can hardly be taken as a 
reason to reject these other theories in favour of this construal. It might be 
argued, following Nagel (1974), that unmediated access to reality is not 
sufficient for understanding all the facts that there are, on the grounds that 
there are subjective facts (such as those that describe what it is like to be a 
bat) that are available only from a viewpoint that we can neither occupy nor 
126 
imagine (such as that of a bat). But there is no need to engage with such 
claims in order to defend Sartre's claim that construing experience as 
apprehension of mind-independent reality is sufficient to overcome Humean 
scepticism, for two reasons. First, if it is true that there are such 
unestablishable facts as what it is like to be a bat, such facts are not objective 
ontological facts: bat-ontology is exhausted in descriptions of the objective 
nature and structure of bats. Second, if it is true that there are such 
unestablishable facts as what it is like to be a bat, then this will impose a 
limitation on all attempts to delineate the structure of reality, including indirect 
realism, phenomenalism, and intentionalism. The construal of experience as 
apprehension of mind-independent reality would still allow a philosophical 
system superior to those premised on other conceptions of experience if it 
allows a delineation of the objective ontological facts when those other 
systems do not. 
A more important challenge to Sartre's anti-sceptical claim is that it might not 
go far-enough. Overcoming Humean scepticism might require not only the 
claim that experience is apprehension of. mind-independent reality, but the 
additional claim that experience is apprehension of the mind-independent 
structures of reality. This seems to be McDowell's claim when he 
recommends construing perceptual experience as apprehension of mind- 
independent facts, such as the fact that it is raining, as required to avoid 
Humean scepticism (1982). We have not yet decided the issues of whether 
Sartre considers reality to have a mind-independent structure, as opposed to 
mind-independent existence, and if so whether he considers it possible to 
capture that structure in thought and language. But it might seem nonetheless 
that his emphasis on the role of consciousness in constructing the world of 
ordinary experience will preclude him from understanding experience as the 
manifestation of mind-independent facts. But even if experience is not the 
manifestation of mind-independent facts, but only a manifestation of mind- 
independent being, this would not preclude the formulation of a definitive 
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ontology on the basis of experience. The nature of reality could be derived 
from the nature of experience by a combination of two approaches. 
Because all perceptual experience, for Sartre, reveals mind-independent 
reality even though it distorts it, one approach would be to compare the 
experiences of a single subject over time and of different subjects in order to 
identify the features common to those experiences. The determinations 
applied by consciousness in experience are partly a result of experience and 
of the aims and projects of the perceiver, for Sartre, and so are not all 
universal among subjects. Sartre comes close to making this claim when he 
writes of objectivity as 'the result of experimental measures and of the 
agreement of minds with each other' (B&N: 311). The only difficulty with this 
move would be if there were some necessary distortion common to all minds. 
But even so, this problem could be removed by the second way of identifying 
the nature of reality on the basis of distorting experiences: so long as the 
structures of experience can be identified, the ways in which it distorts the 
appearance of mind-independent reality can be identified, and hence the 
nature of reality can be identified by subtracting these distorting influences 
from the way reality seems. Sartre certainly does hold that the structures of 
experience can be identified: that is the aim of phenomenology. The extent to 
which they distort the appearance of reality could in principle be assessed by 
attempting to identify the structures of reality required for consciousness to 
have the structures it has. 
I return to this point in the conclusions to the thesis (5.2), where I argue for a 
certain ontology to be ascribed to Sartre. All that matters for current purposes, 
however, is that McDowell's claim that Humean scepticism can be overcome 
only by understanding experience as the manifestation of mind-independent 
facts is too strong. So long as experience is manifestation of mind- 
independent reality, so that nothing is in principle hidden from consciousness, 
Humean scepticism need not be engendered by allowing consciousness to be 
a distorting lens, so long as the ways in which it distorts can 
be ascertained. 
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Given that Sartre is right to claim that Humean scepticism can be avoided 
only by construing experience as apprehension of mind-independent reality, 
and given that the avoidance of Humean scepticism does, as Sartre points 
out, aid philosophy in its enterprise and may perhaps aid the advancement of 
human understanding in general, we can conclude that the avoidance of 
Humean scepticism does indeed provide a powerful motivation for embracing 
that conception of experience. The next two sections of this chapter are 
concerned with whether Sartre has also proven that we should embrace that 
conception of experience. 
2.4 Ontological Proof 1: The Meaning of 'Being' 
One way to read Sartre's statement of his 'ontological proof' is to draw on the 
discussions of the notion of 'being' in sections 11 and IV of 'The Pursuit of 
Being' (see 2.2). 'All consciousness is consciousness of something', on this 
reading, is an affirmation of the claim of section 11 that all experience involves 
apprehension of being, on the grounds that there is no other way to account 
for our comprehension of the concept 'being'. Given this, we must apprehend 
either mind-dependent being or mind-independent being. The 'first 
interpretation' 'destroys itself', on this reading, because mind-dependence is a 
passive notion, but our concept 'being' is not the concept of something 
passive, as pointed out in section IV. Thus, the being we comprehend and 
hence apprehend cannot be mind-dependent: we must apprehend mind- 
independent being. 
This argument, if it works, would obviously succeed in disproving both indirect 
realism and phenomenalism. Both of these theories claim that we apprehend 
only mind-dependent being: indirect realism claims that mind-independent 
being lies beyond the beings we apprehend, and phenomenalism denies the 
existence of mind-independent being altogether. Moreover, as we shall see, 
the second premise of the argument, that mind-dependent 
being is an 
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incoherent notion, is sufficient on its own to disprove forms of indirect realism 
and phenomenalism that claim that we are aware of mind-dependent entities. 
The argument would also disprove intentionalism, on the grounds that 
experience is not, for intentionalists, itself an apprehension of mind- 
independent being. Perceptual experience is independent of the reality it 
represents, on this view, because the same experience could occur as an 
hallucination. For this reason, the intentionalist construal of experience is 
compatible with a phenomenalist construal of reality, as mentioned in 2.3. But 
the argument, as we shall see, does not go through, since we need not accept 
the first premise, that we understand 'being' by apprehending being. Before 
assessing the first premise of this form of the ontological proof, however, I will 
assess the second. 
This is the claim that the notion of passive existence is 'nonsense' (B&N: 
xxxv) because it involves a category mistake: passivity cannot be literally 
ascribed to existence any more than flight can be literally ascribed to time; 
'passivity can not concern (concemeo the actual being of the passive existent' 
(B&N: xxxiv). It is undeniable that if the existence of a thing consists in being 
perceived, then that thing exists passively. Being perceived is a passive 
notion: it is something that happens to a thing. Of course, being perceived 
does not involve any change in the intrinsic properties of a thing, in the way 
that changing from red to green does, but it does nevertheless involve a 
change in the thing's relational properties: when something is perceived, it 
enters into the relation of being perceived. And this relational property is 
conferred on it by the perceiving of it. If a thing's existence consists in being 
perceived, then, its existence is something that happens to it. 
Sartre's claim that passivity cannot be ascribed to existence hinges on his 
analysis of the notion of passivity. 'I am passive', he argues, 'when I undergo 
a modification of which I am not the origin; that is, neither the source nor the 
creator' (B&N: xxxiv). Passivity is a notion that applies to changes in a thing 
that do not originate in that thing. 'Thus passivity is a doubly relative 
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phenomenon, relative to the activity of the one who acts and to the existence 
of the one who suffers' (B&N: xxiv). In order to undergo change, passively or 
otherwise, a thing must already exist, so a thing's existence cannot itself be 
passive. The existence of an entity cannot be something that happens to it, 
since before the entity's existence there is no 'it' for something to happen to. 
Passivity 'is a relation of one being to another being and not of one being to a 
nothingness' (B&N: xxxiv). Since an object cannot perform an action on 
nothing but can only act on an existing thing, the passivity involved in being 
acted on requires already existing. Sartre re-iterates this point later in terms of 
action: since only existing things can act on other things, to be active similarly 
requires already existing: 
'Being ... is neither passivity nor activity. ... being is not active; 
in order for there to be an end and means, there must be being; 
... it can not be passive, for in order to be passive, it must be' 
(B&N: A-Ai). 
The trouble with this analysis is that the claim that appearances are mind- 
dependent need not be the claim that we are acquainted only with passive 
beings. It might be that I am only ever acquainted with my own substantial 
mind, the appearances which I take to reveal reality are not entities but 
properties of my mind. Although Sartre follows Hume (1978,252) in denying 
that we are ever aware of any such entity as a mind or self (TE: 48-9), 
Sartre's argument, like Hume's, is that we are never aware of a mind or self 
distinct from the experiences that purport to reveal the world. Both Sartre and 
Hume fail to engage with the thought that there are no special experiences 
that reveal a bare self or ego, but all of our experience is in fact experience of 
that ego in various states. Sartre also rejects this notion of a substantial mind, 
however, on the grounds that it leads to a fourth 'embarrassing dualism' that I 
have so far ignored: 'the dualism of potency and act' (B&N: xxii). If we allow 
this dualism, he later argues, we cannot escape the reef of solipsism. If minds 
are entities distinct from the rest of reality, that is, then it is impossible to 
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prove that any part of reality except my own body is controlled by a mind, and 
so impossible to prove that there are other minds (B&N: 235). 14 This 
observation seems patently true: if minds are distinct from bodies and only 
contingently connected to them, then we can postulate other minds only by 
analogies between the behaviour of other bodies and the behaviour of our 
own body, but such analogies are defeasible and all other bodies might be 
mindless robots. Aside from the problem of how such minds are to interact 
with physical bodies in a world seemingly governed by physical laws, a 
problem that arises for this type of indirect realism but not for phenomenalism, 
these minds must not be postulated if we are to have any hope of avoiding 
solipsism. 
Ignoring the possibility of substantial minds, which generates seemingly 
insoluble problems of other minds and mental causation and is hence 'no 
longer a live philosophical option' (Kim 1998,29), we have the argument that 
the notion of mind-dependent being is incoherent on the grounds that 'being' 
is not a passive notion: passivity characterises a way in which already existing 
things can change. Any form of indirect realism or phenomenalism that 
postulates passive, mind-dependent beings, then, is incoherent. Indirect 
realism and phenomenalism must be understood as involving the claim that 
appearances are properties or modifications of a substantial mind, and may 
be rejected along with this construal of mind. If the argument is to have any 
impact on intentionalism, though, the first premise will also have to be proven. 
Sartre argues for the first premise by claiming that 'being manifests itself to all 
in some way, since we can speak of it and since we have a certain 
comprehension of it' (B&N: XXiV). 15 At first, this seems plainly false: we can 
understand and use the concept 'unicorn % but do not apprehend unicorns. 
If 
his ontological proof aims purely to prove the existence of 
things 
corresponding to terms that we understand, then 
it will be subject to the 
criticism of the Anselmian and Cartesian ontological arguments 
for the 
existence of God that they prove too much. 
Sartre need not, however, make 
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the general claim that all terms that we can understand must have their 
senses conferred on them by experience: he need only claim this of the term 
'being', or of a certain class of terms of which 'being' is a member. As a result, 
his argument can be understood in terms of Russell's (1905) distinction 
between object-dependent and object- i ndepen dent terms. We understand the 
term 'unicorn' by associating it with a description (say, horse with magical 
powers and a horn on its head). The meanings of descriptions, and hence the 
terms associated with them, are object- i nd ependent - the fact that such a 
term has meaning and can be understood does not entail anything about 
whether or not anything exists answering the description. Terms that cannot 
be associated with such descriptions, on the other hand, can only gain their 
sense from the objects and entities to which they apply and hence can be 
understood only on the basis of apprehension of the entities to which they 
apply. If they apply to no entities, they are senseless and hence cannot be 
understood. 
Accepting the first premise, then, requires a reason to deny that 'being' is a 
16 descriptive term. Sartre does not provide such a denial, but his use of 
Heidegger's notion of a pre-theoretical comprehension of being here implies 
that he subscribes to Heidegger's affirmation that 'being' cannot be given a 
descriptive definition (1962, § 1). Heidegger bases this claim on the maximally 
universal nature of the term 'being' - it applies to everything that is. 
As Sartre 
puts it: 'Being is everywhere' (B&N: xxxviii). Notice, however, that this 
observation does not itself provide a non-circular definition of 'being', since 
'being' is contained in the notion of everything that is. The maximally universal 
nature of 'being' is related to its not being a real predicate: being 
is not a 
property that some entities possess and others lack. As Sartre puts 
it: 
'being is [not] one of the object's qualities capable of being 
apprehended among others ... the object 
does not possess 
being ... 
It is. That is the only way to define its manner of being' 
(B&N: xxv). 
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This is why 'beingy cannot be defined. If definition is to be given by genus and 
species, then 'being' cannot be given a definition: the difference between 
things that are and things that are not does not depend on the kinds of things 
in question - any kind of thing might or might not be instantiated. And if 
definition is to be given by necessary (and perhaps also sufficient) conditions 
of membership of the class defined, then again a non-circular definition of 
'being' cannot be given: the class of 'being' can be defined only as the set of 
everything that is. Thus, it seems that our comprehension of being cannot rest 
on our (implicitly or explicitly) associating it with a description: there is no 
description that applies to all and only things that are, but which does not 
include the notion of being; the only description that fits them all is 'things that 
are'. There is no intelligible vocabulary in which to define 'being' which does 
not include that term. Since the term 'being' does not gain its sense from a 
description, it might seem, it must gain its sense from the objects to which it 
applies, so if we are to understand this term, we must be acquainted with 
those entities to which it applies. 
This form of the ontological proof, then, is not subject to the criticism that it 
proves too much: it can be applied only to terms that we comprehend yet 
cannot define. And the link between the indefinability of 'being' and the fact 
that 'being' is neither a subject term nor a real predicate restricts the scope of 
the argument to such terms. Since the argument hinges on recognising that 
'being' is not a real predicate, moreover, it is not subject to the Kantian 
criticism of the ontological arguments of Anselm and Descartes either. Those 
arguments employ 'being' as a predicate involved in the definition of God, but 
this form of Sartre's ontological proof hinges on recognising that 'being' is not 
a real predicate. 
The flaw in the argument, however, is that it is not clear that the indefinability 
of 'being' forces us to accept that our comprehension of 'being' is rooted in 
apprehension of being. We might, rather, embrace Quine's view that for 
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something to be or exist is for it to be the value of a bound variable in a 
theoretical sentence. On this view, experience is not apprehension of being, 
but simply experience of a varied scene. Observation reports do not pick out 
entities, but pick out aspects of a field of experience. Reference to objects 
allows one to pick out the same stimulus of an observation report, as when 
one says that 'of all the dogs, the one called "Fido" is the one that belongs to 
Mr Jones'. Individual objects are thus picked out by existential quantification, 
and types of objects by universal quantification (see Quine 1960, § 49; Quine 
1981). Quantified sentences are not observation sentences, but theoretical 
sentences aimed at predicting future experience in the light of past 
experience. Since 'being' or 'existence' enters our conceptual scheme only 
with the formulation of these theoretical sentences, it is a theoretical postulate 
whose sense is gained from its theoretical role of picking out the same 
stimulus at different times and places. If this is right, we do not need 
apprehension of being in order to comprehend 'being': any sort of experience 
will do, so long as we need to pick out the same stimulus at different times 
and places. 
This point can be adapted to a more Sartrean claim that 'being' is just a 
theoretical postulate designed to differentiate those aspects of experience that 
exhibit a certain regularity and resistance to our efforts from those that do not. 
Imaginative experiences are malleable: the way a thing is imagined to be is 
dependent on my imagining of it, and can be varied at will (PI: 5-10). A 
perceptual experience, on the other hand, is not so malleable: although I can 
see a duck-rabbit picture as a picture of a duck or a picture of a rabbit, I 
cannot see it as red lines on paper instead of black lines on paper at will. In 
Sartre's terms, the seen object has 'qualities' which cannot be varied just by 
will (see 1.3), and has a 'principle of being' which accounts for its resistance 
to my efforts to change it by action (see 2.3). We can account 
for the 
comprehension of 'being', therefore, in terms of this resistance: we 
understand what it is for an experienced object to be rather than 
be simply 
imagined because we encounter the resistance of existent objects to our will. 
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This resistance is compatible with indirect realism, phenomenalism, and 
intentionalism. No matter how experience is construed, so long as there is 
resistance, there can be comprehension of 'being'. This Sartrean reworking of 
Quine's theory of the comprehension of 'being' allows us to criticise Sartre's 
argument from within his own philosophy. We do not need to embrace 
Quinean, or any other, principles that might be controversial on other grounds 
in order to conclude that we do not need to apprehend being in order to 
comprehend 'being'. We need only encounter resistance. 
Sartre has not shown, therefore, that experience must be construed as 
apprehension of mind-independent being in order to account for our 
comprehension of 'being'. On the contrary, his own emphasis on the 
importance of the resistance of things to our will, a resistance which can 
hardly be denied, provides an alternative explanation of our comprehension of 
'being'. And this alternative explanation is entirely independent of the theory of 
the nature of experience itself. Sartre's observation that being is not a passive 
notion, however, does provide grounds for rejecting both indirect realism and 
phenomenalism: as we have seen, Sartre's observation that 'mind-dependent 
being' is an incoherent notion forces indirect realism and phenomenalism to 
construe experiences as modifications of a substantial mind, and postulating 
this substantial mind leads inexorably to solipsism. So if solipsism is to be 
avoided, so are substantial minds, and so therefore are indirect realism and 
phenomenalism. But this argument on Sartre's behalf still fails to show that 
perceptual experience is apprehension of mind-independent reality rather 
than a representation of it that involves no subjective objects of awareness. It 
fails to rule out, that is, current anglophone intentionalism. This form of the 
ontological proof, then, fails to establish Sartre's conclusion. 
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2.5 Ontological Proof 2: The Nature of Consciousness 
The second way to read Sartre's statement of his 'ontological proof' in section 
V of 'The Pursuit of Being' is to draw on the discussions, in sections III and IV, 
of the ontology of consciousness required by the claim that appearances are 
mind-dependent (see 2.2). 'All consciousness is consciousness of somethingy 7 
on this interpretation, means just that consciousness is apprehension of 
objects. The claim that these objects are mind-dependent 'destroys itself' 
because the notion of mind-dependent objects both requires and is 
incompatible with a certain ontology of consciousness. This argument, if it 
worked, would disprove both indirect realism and phenomenalism, which 
postulate mind-dependent objects, but it would leave intentionalism 
untouched, because intentionalism postulates no such entities. As we shall 
see, however, the argument is multiply flawed, and Sartre has shown neither 
that mind-dependent objects require a certain ontology of consciousness nor 
that they are incompatible with it. 
The argument has five stages. First, if appearances are mind-dependent, then 
the consciousness on which they depend must be ontologically independent 
or self-sufficient. Second, this independence must be grounded on 
transparent self-awareness: consciousness is independent, on this view, 
because the necessary and sufficient condition of consciousness is that it is 
conscious of itself. Third, in order for appearances to depend on 
consciousness, consciousness must act on them to 'give being'to them (B&N: 
xxxv). Fourth, 'the principle of action and reaction' requires that if 
consciousness can act on anything, then consciousness can itself be acted on 
(B&N: xxxv). But, fifth, an ontologically independent consciousness founded 
entirely on its own transparent self-awareness, as required by mind- 
dependent being, cannot be acted on from outside. Therefore, it cannot act on 
anything. Therefore, it cannot 'give being' to anything. Therefore, there cannot 
be mind-dependent being. This argument is not subject to either of the classic 
criticisms of the Anselmian and Cartesian ontological arguments 
for the 
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existence of God. It is not concerned with showing that the fact that we have 
an idea of being requires the mind-independent existence of being, but rather 
with showing that the notion of mind-dependent being has contradictory 
ontological consequences. The argument, moreover, does not rely on treating 
'being' as a real predicate that can be included in the definitions of some 
things, and so is not subject to the Kantian criticism of the Anselmian and 
Cartesian arguments. But, as we shall see, the argument fails because only 
one of the five stages of the argument is convincing. 
The first claim, that consciousness must be self-dependent if it is to serve as 
the 'foundation-of-being' for appearances (B&N: xxvii) is not obviously true. 
There seems no reason to rule out the possibility of the mutual dependence of 
consciousness and appearance. This circular ontological dependence would 
not be like a circular causal dependence, which is objectionable because it 
seems that a later effect cannot cause its earlier cause. Ontological 
interdependence would not involve temporality. In fact, to say that a is 
ontologically dependent on b is to say no more than that there is no possible 
world that contains just a (a is not ontologically independent), minimal 
possible worlds containing a always contain an entity from a certain list of 
which b is a member, and in the actual world it is b that accompanies a. So it 
seems that there is no reason why b should not be dependent on a as well as 
a on b. 
The second claim, moreover, seems arbitrary: why say that the self- 
sufficiency of consciousness requires its total transparency? Why indeed say 
that it requires anything? The first and second claims seem to be drawn from 
Husserl's claim that appearances are immanent in consciousness, that 
consciousness is self-sufficient, and that consciousness is transparent (1982, 
§ 49). But Sartre is ostensibly not simply describing Husserl's view, but 
describing a view required by the claim that appearances are mind- 
dependent, and he has not shown this requirement. Indeed, it seems that the 
requirement runs the other way: if consciousness is self-sufficient, then 
it 
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cannot require the existence of anything that is independent of it. So if 
consciousness is always consciousness of something, the something that it is 
consciousness of must be dependent on it. This point supports the 
phenomenalist reading of Husserl as holding that the transcendent objects of 
consciousness are constructed out of immanent appearances: if they were not 
so constructed, consciousness could not be both essentially directed towards 
them and ontologically self-suff icient. 
The third claim, that consciousness must be able to act on appearances if 
appearances are to depend on consciousness just seems patently false. The 
notion of dependence involved in the postulation of mind-dependent 
appearances is not causal dependence. The claim that for an appearance to 
be is to be perceived, that is, is not the claim that being perceived somehow 
causes the appearance to come into being. It is the claim that being perceived 
is the being of the appearance: the relation is identity, not causation. We have 
seen in 2.4 that Sartre rightly objects to this identity claim on the grounds that 
being perceived is a passive notion but being, or existence, is not. But in this 
argument, he has switched to the false claim that mind-dependent 
appearance requires the being of the appearance to be caused by awareness 
of it. 
The one convincing stage of the argument is the fourth. The principle of action 
and reaction itself seems sound. Sartre writes 'it is because my hand can be 
crushed, grasped, cut, that my hand can crush, cut, grasp' (B&N: xxv). But 
this example is misleading: my hand's abilities do not require that precisely 
the same abilities can be exercised on my hand. The point is rather that if my 
hand can act on anything, it must be possible to act on the hand. Ghosts are a 
better example: if a ghost can move through walls, if when you reach out to 
touch a ghost your hand moves right through it as if through empty space, 
then ghosts cannot harm you physically - if one attempts to touch you or 
to 
pick up a weapon, it will fail for the same reason that you cannot touch 
it. 
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But the application of this principle to the relation between consciousness and 
appearance, in the fifth and final stage of the argument, is unjustified. Even if 
we were to grant that consciousness is self-sufficient, and that this self- 
sufficiency is grounded on its transparency, and that it must be able to act on 
appearances if appearances are mind-dependent, the argument would still fail 
at this stage, for three reasons. The claim is that an ontologically self- 
sufficient consciousness must be spontaneous, and this spontaneity rules out 
the possibility of consciousness being acted on from outside. The first 
problem with this claim is the move from ontological self-sufficiency to 
spontaneity. Given a realist view of the existence of objects, for example, the 
table in front of me does not depend on me for its existence - indeed, it does 
not depend on anything; there is a possible world containing just this table. 
But this independence does not entail that the future states of the table are 
entirely dictated by its own internal states. Although the table's natural change 
and decay is partly dependent on its internal constitution, it is also partly 
dependent on the make-up of the table's immediate environment: the same 
table will last longer in a vat of liquid nitrogen than in a vat of sulphuric acid. 
On Sartre's own view in Being and Nothingness, moreover, being in-itself is 
ontologically self-dependent (hence its name) but does not exhibit 
spontaneity. Rather, the world formed out of it is governed by predictable 
deterministic causal relations (e. g. B&N: 445). 
The second problem is that Sartre's claim that the spontaneity of 
consciousness precludes its being acted on from outside is equally 
unwarranted. The common-sense conception of humans, for example, 
construes the behaviour of humans as self-directed in a way that the 
behaviour of billiard balls is not: a billiard ball must be impacted on from 
outside if it is to begin to move or change its course, whereas humans are 
more pro-active. But humans can still be impacted on from outside: 
they can 
be (literally) pushed around, or worse. The third problem is that 
Sartre 
assumes without argument that principles drawn 
from our experience of 
interacting entities, principles we take to govern the interaction of entities 
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which we observe, should also govern interaction between entities we 
observe and our observation of them. Strawson (1979,52), for example, 
argues that the principle that a cause and its effect should be distinct entities 
is applicable only to causal relations between observable entities, so is not 
applicable to the relation (which he takes to be causal) between an entity 
observed and the observation of that entity. Sartre has not ruled out the 
parallel claim that although the principle 'the passivity of the recipient 
demands an equal passivity on the part of the agent' is true of observable 
entities, it may not be true of the relation between such entities and 
consciousness. 
Sartre seems to have based this final stage of the argument on Husserl's 
claim that a transparent and ontologically independent consciousness 'cannot 
be affected by any physical thing and cannot exercise causation upon any 
physical thing' (1982, § 49). This silent reliance on Husserl's position as 
representative of the claim that appearances are mind-dependent is 
responsible for many of the flaws of the argument. Sartre presents aspects of 
Husserl's position as though there were inexorable links between them, and 
so must be assented to by anyone affirming the mind-dependence of 
appearances. But there are no inexorable links between these claims, so the 
argument fails. Sartre's strategy of simultaneously attempting to both distance 
himself from Husserl and establish his own position, without explicitly stating 
the former aim, is not only responsible for much misreading of the discussion 
of consciousness in 'The Pursuit of Being', then, it is also partly responsible 
for the failure of this form of his ontological proof. 
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2.6 Conclusions 
We have seen that much misunderstanding of 'The Pursuit of Being' results 
from understanding it as a linear argument comprising only claims that Sartre 
himself agrees with. It is rather a complex dialectic whose protagonists are not 
clearly distinguished. The major misunderstanding results from reading the 
discussion of consciousness in section III as an exposition of Sartre's own 
view rather than a discussion of a view ascribed to Husserl, a view that Sartre 
himself had previously held, for the purposes of arguing against it. The overall 
aim of the passage is to argue that phenomenal consciousness of the 
environment consists in experience which is a relation to, and hence 
dependent on, mind-independent reality. Since this is the aim of the 
introduction, this theory of experience is the foundational claim of Being and 
Nothingness. The proposal that consciousness be construed as self-sufficient 
is incompatible with this reliance of consciousness on being in-itself, and is 
part of an argument against the view that experience is entirely independent 
of being in-itself. 
Within that discussion, Sartre does present a paragraph in his own voice in 
which he argues that there must be some awareness of consciousness if we 
are to be able to reflect on consciousness and if a sequence of conscious acts 
is to be motivated by a single overarching goal such as counting cigarettes. If 
the foundational theory of Being and Nothingness is the claim that 
consciousness consists in apprehension of mind-independent reality, Sartre's 
own view of (pre-reflective) self-consciousness must be parasitic on this view 
of phenomenal consciousness. If the nature of consciousness is its direction 
on being in-itself, that is, and all consciousness involves a form of self- 
consciousness, then that form of self-consciousness must be a result of 
the 
nature of consciousness, a result of the apprehension of being 
in-itself. As 
Sartre puts it towards the end of 'The Pursuit of Being': 
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cconsciousness (of) consciousness ... must be qualified in some 
way, and it can be qualified only as a revealing intuition of 
something or it is nothing ... subjectivity can be established only 
in the face of something revealed; immanence can be defined 
only within the apprehension of a transcendent' (B&N: xxxvii) 
Rather than construe the nonthetic awareness of pre-reflective self- 
awareness as a relation to the awareness of reality, then, akin to the nonthetic 
awareness I have of qualitative aspects of the figure of my positional 
awareness and the nonthetic awareness I have of the ground of that figure, 
this nonthetic awareness must be construed as resulting from phenomenal 
consciousness. This can result from phenomenal consciousness by that 
consciousness being implied by the way in which it presents objects. Positing 
an object as 'this' or 'that ', for example, implies that the object posited is other 
than the act of positing it (see B&N: 122,174). The thetic character of 
experience, moreover, implies the aims of consciousness by classifying 
objects in certain ways: 'the order of instruments in the world is the image of 
my possibilities projected into the in-itself; that is, the image of what I am' 
(B&N: 292; see also B&N: 200,263). Seeing something as a chair implies the 
possibility of sitting on it. Sartre's claim that 'things ... offer to me their 
potentialities as a replica of my non-thetic consciousness (of) my own 
7 17 possibilities , then, is misleading. His position is not that the determinations 
applied in experience replicate prior self-awareness, but that they imply 
structures of consciousness and pre-reflective self-awareness consists in the 
implication. Such an implication is sufficient to motivate a shift of attention 
toward that which is implied, to focus on it and make it explicit (see PI: 188; 
B&N: xxix, 74,156). If joy is 'presence to a laughing and open world full of 
happy perspectives' (B&N: 173), recognition of these happy perspectives can 
motivate reflection on the experience of them. 
Understanding pre-reflective self-awareness in this way resolves an apparent 
contradiction in the paragraph of 'The Pursuit of Being' in which Sartre claims 
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(in his own voice) that pre-reflective awareness accounts for the fact that 'if 
anyone should ask "What are you doing there? " I should reply at once, I am 
counting"' (B&N: xxix). This appears to contradict the claim preceding it that 
pre-reflective awareness does not deliver knowledge of consciousness, since 
'children who are capable of making an addition spontaneously cannot explain 
subsequently how they set about it' (B&N: xxix). The contradiction is resolved 
if the ability to reply without reflection 'I am counting' is due to the presentation 
of the twelfth cigarette to be counted as the twelfth cigarette, which implies the 
action of counting the cigarettes. '[A]t the moment when these cigarettes are 
revealed to me as a dozen, I have a non-thetic consciousness of my adding 
activity' (B&N: xxix). The implication of the structures of consciousness by the 
way in which the world is presented is not sufficient, however, for knowledge 
about the way in which conscious operations, such as counting or addition, 
are performed; it implies only which operations are being performed. 
Sartre's claim that pre-reflective self-awareness accompanies all 
consciousness, then, can be accounted for without ascribing to him the claim 
that consciousness is founded on self-awareness: it can be construed as an 
upshot of the way in which consciousness presents objects. The nature of 
consciousness, then, is revelation of being; self-awareness is a result of this 
revelation. 
'The Pursuit of Being' is concerned to establish this basic structure of 
phenomenal consciousness as revelation of being in-itself. We have seen that 
Sartre provides three arguments for this conclusion. Sartre fails to distinguish 
two of these, and runs them together as a single 'ontological proof'. As we 
have seen, both of these ontological proofs are sufficiently different from the 
ontological arguments for the existence of God provided by Anselm and 
Descartes, after which they are named, to avoid being subject to the classic 
criticisms of those arguments. But we have also seen that these arguments 
fail anyway. The first, that apprehension of being in-itself is required to 
account for our comprehension of 'being' overlooks the possibility that our 
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comprehension of 'being' is based on our experience of the regularity and 
resistance of objects. This argument involves the observation that existence 
cannot be passive, and so cannot be mind-dependent, which forces indirect 
realists and phenomenalists to postulate a substantial mind of which 
experiences are properties, and this substantial mind may be rejected on 
other grounds. But even this argument, built from part of one of Sartre's, fails 
to show that perceptual experience is apprehension of mind-independent 
reality rather than representation of it that does not involve mind-dependent 
objects. The second, that mind-dependent appearances both require and are 
inconsistent with a certain conception of consciousness, is flawed at just 
about every stage, and anyway could not rule out intentionalism as a theory of 
experience even if it was not flawed. So neither of Sartre's 'proofs' of his 
conception of experience succeed in proving it. And, ironically, the 
troublesome § III that appears to present Sartre's own theory of self- 
awareness but does not, is involved only in the most flawed version of the 
ontological proof, and so could be excised from the introduction to Being and 
Nothingness without that introduction suffering any important loss of content 
or force. 
The third argument is that conceiving of phenomenal consciousness as 
apprehension of mind-independent reality is necessary to avoid Humean 
scepticism. We have seen that this conception of consciousness is indeed 
necessary for this aim, and that this aim should be pursued (2.3). But this is 
not the same as agreeing that Sartre has established his conception of 
consciousness. In particular, there are powerful motivations for denying 
it, 
motivations that have driven much of the philosophy of mind for the past 
four 
centuries against such a construal. These are the problems of 
how 
hallucination is to be accounted for without construing experience as 
independent of reality that lies beyond it, and how to fit this notion of 
experience into our scientific conception of reality. 
These problems are the 
subjects of chapters 3 and 4. 
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Chapter 3 
Disjunctivism: Perception and Hallucination 
Sartre, as we have seen in chapter 1, holds that perceptual experience 
consists in direct apprehension of or acquaintance with a part of mind- 
independent reality, 'direct' in the sense that the experience itself renders a 
part of mi nd- independent reality available for non-dependent demonstrative 
reference. The subject of the experience, that is, can pick out the perceived 
object by the use of such terms as 'this' and 'that' purely on the basis of the 
experience alone. Indirect realists, phenomenalists, and intentionalists all deny 
this. They all claim that the experience involved in a perception is in principle 
independent of the object perceived, so that any demonstrative reference made 
to a part of the world is a dependent demonstrative reference, dependent on 
the part of the world being connected in some way to a demonstratively 
identifiable experience. In the case of indirect realism and intentionalism, this is 
the claim that the perceived object can only be referred to as 'that which 
caused this experience' or 'that which this experience represents', and in the 
case of phenomenalism it is 'that part of the world that this experience partly 
constitutes' (see 2-1). 
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The most popular argument against construing perceptual experience as 
direct apprehension is the argument from hallucination. This argument 
attempts to establish that the experience involved in a perception is an 
experience that could in principle have occurred in the absence of the 
perceived object and so is in principle independent of that object. The 
experience itself is a 'highest common factor' or'single common element'that 
forms part of a perception but may also occur as an hallucination. The kind of 
hallucinations postulated in this argument are not simple misperceptions of 
parts of the world. A dehydrated desert traveller, for example, may ordinarily 
be said to hallucinate an oasis, but if this is a misperception of the hazy air 
above the hot sand in the distance, this kind of experience is classified as an 
illusion rather than an hallucination by philosophers of perception. The kind of 
hallucination that the argument is based on is the kind where there is no 
obvious object of misperception in the subject's environment, as when a 
schizophrenic, someone in a drug-induced state, or someone who has spent 
a prolonged period with little or no changing sensory stimulation such as an 
astronaut in a single-handed space flight, has an experience whose content is 
radically at odds with the surrounding environment, such as seeming to see 
dragons (see Gregory 1998,199). More mundanely, the visual experiences 
involved in dreaming cannot be considered to be misperception of the 
immediate environment not only because of the incongruity of the dream 
content with the environment but also because the dreamer's eyes are closed. 
The argument from hallucination aims to show, by one route or another, that 
any perceptual experience could in principle occur as an hallucination and 
hence occur in the absence of the object actually perceived. If this is true, 
then the experience involved in a perception is indeed a factor or element 
common to perceptual and hallucinatory states, and so the experience itself 
cannot ground nondependent demonstrative reference to the perceived 
object. If an hallucination does not afford direct demonstrative reference 
to 
part of the world, and the experience involved in a perception could occur as 
an hallucination, then that experience does not 
itself ground direct 
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demonstrative reference to part of the world. In order to maintain the view that 
perceptual experience affords direct demonstrative reference to the perceived 
object, then, the argument from hallucination must be blocked. Sartre's work 
in this area has been overlooked in the secondary literature, to the extent that 
the only commentator who refers to the issue writes: 
'How does [Sartre] cope with ... hallucination? The short and 
extraordinary answer is that he does not. Despite the absolute 
centrality of this issue to the truth or even coherence of his view, 
Sartre says next to nothing about it' (McCulloch 1994,107). 
On the contrary, I argue in this chapter not only that Sartre provides a way of 
understanding hallucinations that allows him to resist the argument from 
hallucination, but also that Sartre's way of resisting this argument is the only 
viable way of doing so, even though most current defenders of the claim that 
perceptual experience is apprehension of mind-independent reality do not 
choose this way. Since the argument from hallucination is aimed at showing 
that the same experience can occur as either perceptual or hallucinatory, 
resisting the argument requires the claim that there are two fundamentally 
distinct types of experience, perceptual and hallucinatory, and so a perceptual 
experience could not occur as an hallucinatory one. This response has 
become known as disjunctivism: an experience is either perceptual or 
hallucinatory; there is no experience common to the two kinds of event. What 
may have confused Sartre scholars is that he couches his unique form of 
disjunctivism in terms of a distinction between perception and imagination 
rather than perception and hallucination (IPC: throughout; PI: throughout; 
B&N: 258,600). But he does clearly class hallucinations and dreams as 
forms of imaginative experience (PI: 171-206). 
The argument Sartre uses to establish the distinction between perceptual and 
imaginative experiences is a neat reversal of one traditional form of the 
argument from hallucination. He argues that if an imaginative experience were 
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not a distinct kind of experience from a perceptual one, then we would have 
no reliable way of telling when we are imagining or indeed when we are 
perceiving. Of course, many theorists have proposed criteria for distinguishing 
between them, but no such criterion could ever be adequate to the task. Since 
we can and do tell when we are imagining and when we are perceiving, he 
argues, these experiences must be distinct (IPC: throughout; reaffirmed at PI: 
11; B&N: 26,108). The trouble with this argument is that a proponent of the 
argument from hallucination can accept that most uses of mental imagery 
involve a type of experience distinct from that involved in a perception while 
still insisting that at least some hallucinations and dreams involve the same 
kind of experience as is involved in perception. And they can support this 
claim by appeal to the fact that hallucinations and dreams can mislead the 
subject so that the subject behaves as though the hallucinated or dreamed 
scenario were a real, perceived scenario. Even though other forms of non- 
perceptual experience are not misleading in this way, they can insist, some 
are, and that is all that matters. For this reason, this chapter is concerned not 
with, Sartre's theories of imagination as such, but more narrowly with his 
theories concerning hallucinations and dreams. Indeed, we will see in 3.5 that 
Sartre's strategy of construing hallucinations and dreams as involving the 
same kind of experience as is involved in the deliberate and non-misleading 
use of mental imagery means that a central plank of his theory of hallucinating 
and dreaming is irrelevant for present purposes. But, as the chapter as a 
whole is intended to show, the other central plank of his theory provides just 
what is needed to resist the argument from hallucination. 
Before turning to Sartre's work considered as a response to the argument 
from hallucination, it is crucial to ascertain just what is and is not required in 
order to block that argument. In the first section of this chapter I distinguish 
two forms of the argument and isolate the central challenge presented. I also 
consider Sartre's claim in Being and Nothingness that the argument 
from 
hallucination is self-defeating and find that it misses the point of the argument. 
In section 3.2 1 distinguish two forms of disjunctivist response 
to the argument 
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from hallucination, the strong and weak forms. Anglophone opponents of the 
argument from hallucination tend to embrace the weak form, but Sartre's 
position in The Psychology of Imagination is, I argue, a form of strong 
disjunctivism. On this view, a token perceptual experience should not be 
understood as an event lying at the end of a causal chain linking object to 
brain, but should be identified with that causal chain. In 3.3 1 argue that there 
is a form of the argument from hallucination concerned with token 
experiences, much overlooked by anglophone philosophers primarily 
interested in types of event, which shows ultimately that weak disjunctivism is 
explanatorily inadequate: it precludes any explanation of why a perceptual 
rather than hallucinatory experience (or vice versa) occurred on any given 
occasion. If this is right, then the strong disjunctivism that Sartre subscribes to 
is the only form of disjunctivism that resists all forms of the argument from 
hallucination. 
But the unpopularity of strong disjunctivism is not unmotivated, and the rest of 
the chapter is concerned with whether Sartre's position can resist the 
motivation for the generative theory based on the behaviour of hallucinating 
subjects:. if a subject hallucinating a glass of water goes through the same 
resulting bodily movements as a subject seeing one, and if hallucination is 
experience in the absence of a real object that is experienced, then the 
experience that explains the same behaviour in both cases is independent of 
any real object of experience. And this, of course, is exactly what Sartre must 
deny. So long as hallucination is considered to be an experience in the 
absence of any experienced object, this argument will be devastating 
to 
strong disjunctivism. Sartre, however, makes the radical move of 
denying this 
traditional account of hallucination. Sartre claims to have provided an 
'ontological proof' of his conception of perceptual experience (although, as we 
saw in chapter 2, neither of the two 'proofs' he provides and 
fails to distinguish 
succeed in establishing this conclusion), and 
further claims that 'there is one 
ontological proof valid for the whole domain of consciousness' 
(B&N: xxxix). 
He takes his proof to show, that is, that 'consciousness 
is born supported by a 
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being which is not itself' (B&N: xxxvii). So Sartre holds that even hallucinatory 
experience is a form of apprehension of part of mind-independent reality. By 
distinguishing the object of apprehension from the intentional object in 
hallucinatory cases, and relatedly distinguishing perceptual from hallucinatory 
experiences not in terms of the presence or absence of objects but in terms of 
the attitude of consciousness involved, Sartre provides a coherent account of 
how hallucination can involve an object of apprehension and hence blocks 
this second motivation for denying strong disjunctivism. These issues are 
discussed in 3.4 and 3.5.1 conclude that Sartre's work on imaginative 
experience makes a highly original and valuable contribution to current 
debates over perceptual consciousness, providing precisely the theoretical 
framework required to defend the view of perceptual experience as 
apprehension of mind-independent reality against all objections based on the 
occurrence of hallucinations and dreams. 
3.1 Hallucination and Types of Experience 
The argument from hallucination has traditionally been the mainstay of 
opposition to the claim that perceptual experience itself is apprehension of 
mind-independent reality. Construing hallucinatory experiences as 
phenomenally or episternically indistinguishable from perceptual experiences 
but occurring in the absence of the object that must be present in genuine 
perception, the argument from hallucination attempts to show that the 
experience involved in a perception is an event of the same type as occurs in 
a matching hallucination. The experience I have when I see the Eiffel Tower, 
hallucination arguments attempt to show, is an experience that I could have 
had in the absence of the Eiffel Tower, an experience I could have had as an 
hallucination, and so does not require the presence of the actual Eiffel Tower. 
The experience is a 'highest common factor' or 'single common elementy 
involved in both a perception of the Eiffel Tower and its matching 
hallucination; the difference between perception and hallucination is 
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extraneous to the experience itself, and is a matter of the relation between the 
experience and the rest of the world. This conclusion is, in other words, the 
'two-component' view of perception held by indirect realists, phenomenalists, 
and intentionalists. Sartre and other proponents of the view that perceptual 
experience itself is apprehension of mind-independent reality are opposed to 
this 'two-component' view, and hence must resist the conclusion of the 
argument from hallucination. 
There are two common forms of argument from hallucination. The first is 
based on the claim that for any perceptual experience there is an 
hallucinatory experience that is episternically or phenomenally 
indistinguishable from it. Since there is no more to an experience than the 
experiencing of it, the argument runs, phenomenally or epistemically 
indistinguishable experiences must be metaphysically indistinguishable. You 
are now perceiving this page, but if you were hallucinating you would not be 
able to tell that you were hallucinating, and so, this argument claims, the 
visual experience you are-now having is one you could be having even if you 
were hallucinating. There is, therefore, a single type of experience common to 
a perception and its matching hallucination (e. g. Davies 1992,25-6; McGinn 
19977 49-52). 
This argument relies on a contentious characterisation of hallucinatory 
experience: why should we think of hallucinations as experiences that are 
phenomenally or epistemically indistinguishable from perceptions? Of course, 
we all know that we can be taken in by dreams and hallucinations, be carried 
away with them and act, feel, and later remember in ways appropriate to the 
dreamed or hallucinated events actually having happened. But the same is 
true of films and even novels, so does not seem to establish phenomenal or 
epistemic indistinguishability. Unless, of course, phenomenal or epistemic 
indistinguishability is defined so broadly as to take in these cases, in which 
case it will not be strong enough to support the claim 
that phenomenally 
indistinguishable experiences are experiences of the same kind. 
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But even granting this somewhat arbitrary characterisation of hallucination, 
commonly accepted by philosophers, this argument will still fail to disprove 
Sartre's view of perceptual experience as apprehension of an object that can 
be singled out by direct demonstrative reference in virtue of the experience. 
The reason for this failure is that the crucial principle on which the argument 
turns, the principle that connects the epistemic or phenomenal 
indistinguishability of a pair of experiences to the claim that they are 
experiences of the same type, begs the question against Sartre's view. The 
principle is that the experience just is the way the world seems to the subject, 
from which it follows that the experience will be the same whether the subject 
is perceiving or hallucinating: the world seems the same way in either case. 
But since Sartre holds that a perceptual experience affords direct 
demonstrative reference to the seen object as 'this' (see 1.1), Sartre holds 
that an experience is not exhausted by the way the world seems: when I am 
perceiving the Eiffel Tower, my experience grounds my ability to single out 
and demonstratively identify the Eiffel Tower; when I am hallucinating the 
Eiffel Tower I have no such ability (see Martin 1997,94). 
Opponents of Sartre's position will, of course, describe this ability to 
demonstratively identify parts of reality on the basis of an experience as the 
ability to refer to whatever part of the world is appropriately related to that 
experience, if there is such a part of reality. But the fact that Sartre's 
opponents have an alternative story to tell about this ability does not in itself 
undermine Sartre's story. The contrast between these two stories, moreover, 
is just a manifestation of the basic distinction between Sartre's position and 
the theories that oppose it: only the view of perceptual experience as 
apprehension of mind-independent reality construes perceptual experience 
in 
such a way that the subject can single out perceived objects 
by direct (non- 
dependent) demonstrative reference rather than as some correlate of a 
demonstratively identifiable experience (see 2.1). And Sartre's construal of 
perceptual experience allows that two episternically or 
phenomenally 
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indistinguishable experiences will be different experiences if they ground 
demonstrative reference to different entities or objects. If James and John are 
identical twins, then seeing James may be episternically or phenomenally 
indistinguishable from seeing John, but on Sartre's conception of experience 
the two experiences will differ in that one is an experience of James, affording 
direct demonstrative reference to James, and the other is an experience of 
John. So Sartre's position is incompatible with the principle that episternically 
or phenomenally indistinguishable experiences are metaphysically 
indistinguishable, even when the episternically indistinguishable experiences 
are both perceptual. Therefore any argument against Sartre's position that 
employs that principle begs the question. 
The second common form of the argument from hallucination does not 
employ that offending principle. Instead of hinging on an a priori principle 
about the nature of experiences, this form of the argument from hallucination 
is based on a claim about-the causal aetiology of perceptual experiences and 
a general principle about the nature -of causation. When I see a bus, for 
example, light that is reflected from the bus travels in a straight line to my 
eyes where it forms images on my retinas, which in turn excite my optic 
nerves, which in turn cause certain events to occur in the visual cortex of my 
brain. Given this, the argument has two premises. First, the causal story that 
links seer to object seen is an account of the causal aetiology of experience: 
the experience itseff is caused by neural stimulation. Second, causal relations 
hold between events in virtue of the types of events they are, so the type of 
brain event or state that generates a certain type of experience will bring 
about that type of experience regardless of how the brain event or state itself 
was brought about. When I see a bus, then, there is a certain type of 
excitation of my visual cortex. Since this type of neural activity is sufficient for 
me to have an experience of the type I have when I see a bus, it is sufficient 
for me to have that type of experience even in the absence of any 
bus. Since 
the type of neural activity involved may be brought about by artificial 
stimulation of my retinas or visual cortex, the type of experience 
involved 
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when I see a bus might also occur as an artificially stimulated hallucination. A 
single type of experience, therefore, may occur as either a perception or an 
hallucination (see Malebranche 1997,10-11; Berkeley 1975,147-8; 
O'Shaughnessy 1980, vol. 2,142; Foster 1985,148-9; Robinson 1985,170-7). 
Sartre recognises that philosophical opposition to the conception of 
experience as apprehension of mind-independent reality is often motivated by 
a picture of perception according to which a causal chain of events linking the 
perceived object to the brain ends with an experience or sensation which is 
separate and isolated from other events and which is a perceptual experience 
only in virtue of it being correctly linked up to the object (see B&N: 312-4). But 
Sartre attacks the idea that this picture provides good grounds for 
philosophical opposition to his conception of perceptual experience. His attack 
echoes the opening pages of Being and Nothingness: unless perceptual 
experience is construed as apprehension of mind-independent reality, we 
cannot confidently assert any empirical claims about the structure of reality, 
including the causal processes involved in experience. So any argument 
based on those causal processes which aims to show that perceptual 
experience is not itself apprehension of reality will undermine its own 
premises (compare Price 1932, ch. 2). 1 will spell out Sartre's argument in 
detail in order to show just what is wrong with it. 
Sartre's argument is in two stages. First, the picture of perception that arises 
from observing the physical processes involved in perception is a form of 
indirect realism (or, we may add, intentional ism). But this theory of perception 
does not allow the proponent of the argument from hallucination to confidently 
assert knowledge of physical processes, since it precludes knowledge of 
reality beyond the veil of experience. In order to claim knowledge of the 
causal processes involved in perception, the proponent of this 
form of the 
argument from hallucination must drop the commitment to a mind- 
independent reality beyond the veil of experience, and instead embrace the 
phenomenalist construal of reality as constructed out of mind-dependent 
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experience (see also Bennett 1971,68-70). Second, this phenomenalist 
construal of our empirical knowledge is incompatible with the claim that 
experiences are events that occur at the end of a causal chain of physical 
events leading back to the object perceived. Therefore, the proponent of this 
form of the argument from hallucination must accept a theory that undermines 
the motivation for holding it. As Sartre summarises it: 
'My perception of the Other's senses serves me as a foundation 
for an explanation of sensations and in particular of my 
sensations, but reciprocally my sensations thus conceived 
constitute the only reality of my perception of the Other's 
senses. In this circle the same object - the Other's sense organ 
- maintains neither the same nature nor the same truth 
throughout each of its appearances. It is at first reality, and then 
because it is reality it founds a doctrine that contradicts it. ' (B&N: 
315; compare 320-1) 
Sartre's argument, however, fails to show that this form of the argument from 
hallucination is invalid. To show just what is wrong with Sartre's argument, I 
will deal with its two stages in reverse order. It has been argued that the 
picture of perception as involving a causal chain of events leading up to an 
experience is not incompatible with phenomenalism. Robinson claims that 
there is no reason why phenomenalists cannot reinterpret this claim in terms 
of actual and possible experiences, just as they must reinterpret every claim 
about the nature of reality (1985,172). Valberg goes further and argues that 
since phenomenalism can accept this picture, phenomenalism is vulnerable to 
this form of the argument from hallucination: the whole argument can be 
rewritten in phenomenalist terms to show that we are never directly aware of 
reality in the way that the phenomenalist claims we are (1992,162-4). But 
what these two claims overlook is that since phenomenalism construes reality 
as a sequence of actual and possible experiences regulated by some 
principle or set of principles, a phenomenalist reinterpretation of the claim that 
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experience is an event lying at the end of a causal chain of events observable 
by a third party will be the claim that the regular covariance between one 
person's experiences and another person's observation of the first person's 
environment and neural system will be due to the basic principles governing 
the sequences of actual and possible experiences that make up reality: there 
will be no relation of dependence, causal or otherwise, between the first 
person's experience and the other's observation of the first person's 
environment and neural system; each set of experiences will be solely 
dependent on the underlying rules of reality. Although it will remain true that if 
the subject has a perceptual experience, then a causal chain of events linking 
the perceived object to that subject's neural system could have been 
observed, there is no reason to construe the subject's experience as an event 
at the end of this causal chain, generated by the neural stimulation. Yet this is 
the claim required for this form of the argument from hallucination. So Sartre 
is right to claim that phenomenalists cannot assert a relation of causal 
dependence between an experience and the sequence of physical events that 
precedes it. 
But the fact that a phenomenalist cannot confidently assert this causal relation 
does not prevent a phenomenalist from using it as a premise in an argument 
against the view that perceptual experience consists in apprehension of 
reality. And the fact that indirect realists and intentionalists cannot confidently 
assert facts about the reality beyond experience does not prevent them from 
using this causal claim in such an argument either, and for this reason the first 
stage of Sartre's argument is flawed: the indirect realists' use of a claim about 
reality in an argument against opponents does not force them to abandon the 
claim that reality lies beyond appearances. This is because the use of 
premises in an argument against a particular position does not require the 
proponent of the argument to have good reason to assert those premises. It 
requires only that the proponents of the position being argued against agree 
with those premises. If the target position leads to affirmation of the premises, 
and the conclusion which follows from those premises is incompatible with 
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that target position, then the argument functions as a reductio of that target 
position. The target position, that is, will have been shown to undermine itself, 
regardless of what proponents of rival theories think of the premises (see 
Russell 1915,401). If perceptual experience is apprehension of mind- 
independent reality, and perceptual experience reveals a certain causal chain 
of events to be involved in perception, then that causal chain of events must 
be involved in perception. Proponents of the claim that perceptual experience 
is apprehension of mind-independent reality, such as Sartre, must therefore 
accept this scientific picture of perception. Given this picture of perception, 
this form of the argument from hallucination has just two premises, and is 
valid. So proponents of the view that perceptual experience is apprehension 
of mind-independent reality must reject at least one of those premises, on 
pain of undermining their own position. 
Proponents of this view of perceptual experience, such as Sartre, must 
therefore either deny that the experience is generated by neural stimulation, 
or deny that the same type of neural stimulation will generate the same type 
of experience regardless of how that neural stimulation was itself brought 
about. As we shall see in the next section, either rejection leads to a 
disjunctivist theory of the relation between perceptual experience and 
hallucinatory experience, the theory that perception and hallucination involve 
different types of experience. The most common form of disjunctivism 
involves rejection of the second premise, concerned with the nature of 
causation in general. Sartre's form involves rejection of the first. 
3.2 Strong and Weak Disjunctivism 
Disjunctivism is available in a variety of flavours, but the common ingredient is 
the thought that two experiences can be phenomenally or episternically 
indistinguishable without being metaphysically indistinguishable. If it seems to 
Clare as if the bus is approaching, on the non-disjunctivist view of experience, 
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then Clare is having a certain type of experience which is either perceptual or 
hallucinatory depending on its relation to her environment. On the disjunctivist 
picture, on the other hand, Clare is having either a perceptual experience or 
an hallucinatory experience: there is no single type of experience common to 
the two states. (If Clare is subject to an illusion, mistaking a lorry for a bus, for 
example, then she is still having a perceptual experience of a lorry. ) In 
response to the second form of the argument from hallucination, disjunctivists 
must of course deny that a certain type of excitation of my neural system is 
sufficient for me to have a certain type of experience: that type of excitation 
will, according to the disjunctivist, yield a perception if it is caused in the 
normal way, and an hallucination otherwise. Disjunctivists must, that is, deny 
that there are true universally quantified conditionals whose antecedents are 
certain types of neural event and whose consequents are certain types of 
experience. There are two forms of this denial. 
The most common form is weak disjunctivism. This view affirms that a 
perceptual experience is caused by stimulation of-the neural system, but 
denies that artificial stimulation can bring about the same type of experience 
as is brought about by ordinary stimulation. The type of experience had is 
individuated with reference to objects outside the skin of the experiencer, 
although the experience itself is spatio-temporally located within the skin or 
skull (see Macdonald 1990). This is Hinton's view: if one's visual cortex is 
stimulated in the way it would be if one is seeing a flash of light, then 'one 
visually perceives a flash of light or has the illusion of doing so, according to 
the nature of the initial stimulus' (1973,75). The same type of neural event or 
state will not necessarily bring about the same type of mental event or state; 
the type of mental event or state that results from a certain type of activity in 
the visual cortex depends partly on the causal aetiology of that activity 
(see 
Hinton 1973,76-82; Martin 1997,87 n1 1). This also appears to be McDowell's 
view: a perceptual experience is a brain event whose representational content 
is tied to the seen object or state of affairs in such a way that an experience 
with that content could not have occurred in the absence of 
that object or 
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state of affairs. The content of a perceptual experience 'Can present us with 
the appearance that it is raining only because when we have [it] as the upshot 
(in a suitable way) of the fact that it is raining, the fact itself is [its] object' 
(1982,474). 1 
The strong form of disjunctivism, on the other hand, denies that a perceptual 
experience is generated by excitation of the neural system, claiming instead 
that the perceptual experience is identical with the causal chain of events 
between brain and object or state of affairs perceived. Snowdon subscribes to 
this view when he describes his form of disjunctivism as a denial of 'the effect 
thesis' that seeing involves an experience within the subject caused by events 
involving the seen object (1981,191; see 176). Snowdon suggests that we 
instead 'treat the seeing as the affecting', identify the perceptual experience 
with the causal chain of events linking object and brain (1981,191). Instead of 
taking experience and causal chain to be two things, that is, Snowdon 
recommends we take them to be one: 'The parsimonious naturalist will incline 
to the latter' position (Snowdon 1981,191). Seeing, on this view, is 'a relation 
to a certain object, a non-inner experience (which does not involve ... an inner 
experience)' (Snowdon 1990,130). 2 
There are three reasons why Sartre's disjunctivism should be construed as a 
form of strong rather than weak disjunctivism. First, he considers intentionality 
to be an alternative to representation (see B&N: xxvii), and does not consider 
the possibility of object-dependent representation. The notion of object- 
dependent representation, as mentioned in 2.1, is quite foreign to Sartre, as it 
is a product of an analytic approach to philosophy resulting from a linguistic 
turn that Sartre never took. To say that perceptual experience is intentional, 
for Sartre, is to say that it literally (spatiotemporally) includes the object as a 
part, and so does not occur within the skin. It is to say that perceptual 
experience is intuition or connaissance of an object, apprehension of an 
object not represented but present 'in person' in experience (see 1.1). 
Second, weak disjunctivism is just the denial that a certain type of stimulation 
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of the neural system will always cause a certain type of experience. Sartre 
does not provide a theory of the nature of causal relations anywhere, and 
does not discuss the nature of perception and hallucination in terms of causal 
laws. He recommends, moreover, that we do not approach philosophical 
questions in terms of types or kinds of event, in abstract terms, but rather in 
terms of token or concrete events (B&N: 3-4). Sartre is therefore not 
concerned to deny that there are causal laws linking types of neural events to 
types of experience. 
Third, if Sartre were a weak disjunctivist then the discussion of the nature of 
hallucinations and dreams in The Psychology of Imagination would be out of 
place. Weak disjunctivists, that is, should classify the type of experience 
involved in an hallucination purely in terms of phenomenal or epistemic 
indistinguishability from perceptual experience. The weak disjunctivist agrees 
that a certain type of neural stimulation will result in it seeming to the subject 
as if, for example, a bus is coming. The weak disjunctivist differs from indirect 
realists, intentionalists, and phenomenalists in that the weak disjunctivist 
denies that this seeming has a basic explanatory role in understanding one's 
mental economy, and so denies that it is a basic type of experience. Instead, 
the weak disjunctivist assigns a fundamental explanatory role to perceptual 
experience, and defines hallucinatory ones parasitically, in terms of their 
indistinguishability from perceptual ones. If Clare's visual cortex is stimulated 
in the way in which it would be if Clare saw a bus coming, for the weak 
disjunctivist, then it seems to Clare as if a bus is coming, and it seems this 
way either because Clare is having a perceptual experience of a bus or 
because Clare is having an experience indistinguishable from a perceptual 
visual experience of a bus. In order to assign the fundamental explanatory 
role to perceptual experiences, that is, the weak disjunctivist must define the 
hallucinatory type of experience purely relationally, in terms of the perceptual 
experience that the hallucination is indistinguishable from (see Martin 1997, 
89-90). The complex account of the nature of hallucination that Sartre offers, 
and which is discussed in 3.5, characterises hallucinatory experience in terms 
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of the attitude consciousness takes up towards the object of apprehension, an 
attitude that differs from that involved in perception. Because this is not a 
classification of hallucinatory experience in terms of the perceptual experience 
it is purportedly phenomenally or epistemically indistinguishable from, it is not 
available to the weak disjunctivist. ' 
Sartre should therefore be construed as a strong disjunctivist. He rejects the 
view that perceptual experiences are generated by brain events or states, the 
view that an experiencer is a closed box and '[s]ensation is inside the box' 
(B&N: 314). Denying this view is often overlooked as an option by 
philosophers on the grounds that they take the view in question to be a 
scientifically established empirical fact (e. g. Price 1932,67; Grice 1961,121; 
Lewis 1980,242; Valberg 1992,10 and 143). But the only empirical facts 
about perception are those concerned with physical, physiological, and neural 
processes that occur during perception, the stimulation of those processes, 
and the behavioural effects of those processes. Any claim about the relation 
between those empirical facts and the experience to which they are related is 
a theoretical claim. The view that Sartre rejects, therefore, is the theoretical 
claim that a token perceptual experience is an event generated by neural 
stimulation, a claim that I shall refer to as 'the generative theory' (following 
Hirst 1959,64-6). It is often pointed out in favour of the generative theory that 
if I close my eyes, I cease to see, that altering my brain events in other ways 
alters my experiences, and that if activity in my neural system were to cease I 
would cease to have experiences altogether (e. g. Valberg 1992,37 and 146; 
Dretske 1995,35-6; Coates 1998,26). But these considerations do nothing to 
support the generative theory since they show at most that certain types of 
neural event are necessary for certain types of experience. 4 The generative 
theory claims that certain token neural events are sufficient for certain 
perceptual experiences, and this is all that Sartre denies. 
All disjunctivists, then, deny that there is a single type of experience common 
to perception and hallucination. The second 
form of the argument from 
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hallucination that we considered in 3.1 thereby forces them to deny that the 
type of event that happens in my brain suffices for the type of experience I 
have. But this still leaves open the question of whether my token brain event 
generates my token experience, the question of whether the generative theory 
is true. The two forms of disjunctivism differ in their answers to this question: 
weak disjunctivists accept the generative theory, but deny that the same type 
of brain event always generates the same type of experience; strong 
disjunctivists such as Sartre deny the generative theory. Philosophical 
pressure to accept the generative theory, and hence deny strong 
disjunctivism, is exerted from the claim that since a perception and its 
matching hallucination can result in the same behaviour, and the experience 
that explains this behaviour in the case of hallucination is generated by events 
within the subject's body, the experience that explains the behaviour in the 
case of perception must also be generated by events within the subject's 
body. In 3.4 1 explain why this argument for the generative theory can be 
resisted only by denying that hallucination does not involve apprehension of a 
part of mind-independent reality, and in 3.5 1 explain how Sartre's distinction 
between the object of apprehension and the intentional object in hallucinatory 
(and other imaginative) experience allows him to make this denial. Before 
turning to these issues, though, I argue in the next section that disjunctivists 
must reject the generative theory: weak disjunctivism is inadequate to deal 
with a much overlooked form of the argument from hallucination, but strong 
disjunctivism is not. Given this, the issue of whether the generative theory can 
be denied is the issue of whether disjunctivism is tenable. 
3.3 Token Experiences and Token Externalism 
There is a much overlooked form of the argument from hallucination 
concerned not with types of experience but with the token experience involved 
in a token perception: it aims to show that this token experience could have 
occurred in the absence of the object perceived and so cannot be sufficient to 
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ground direct demonstrative reference to the object perceived. Establishing 
this conclusion, of course, is establishing the falsity of Sartre's conception of 
perceptual experience as apprehension of mind-independent reality. The 
argument is based on the generative theory: if a token experience is caused 
by the excitation of the neural system, then even if there is no causal or other 
law connecting the two events qua events of certain types, there is still the 
token relation of causation between the events considered as tokens. Given 
the generative theory, then, the token neural stimulation is alone sufficient for 
the occurrence of the token experience involved in a perception, and since the 
object seen is no part of the token neural stimulation, the token experience 
could have occurred in the absence of the object seen. If the token 
experience is independent of the object in this way, if it could have occurred 
as an hallucination, the argument runs, then it cannot ground the perceiverys 
ability to demonstratively identify the object (see Malebranche 1997,10-11; 
Valberg 1992, ch. 1). 
More formally, this argument adds just one premise to the generative theory 
to reach its conclusion. This second premise, which I shall re fer to as 'the 
causal claimy, states that a token event could counterfactually have been 
caused by an event other than the event which in fact caused it. If el caused 
e2, according to this premise, e2 could have occurred without el so long as 
some other event occurred in the place of el and that other event caused e2- 
Although, when I see a table, certain disturbances in my visual cortex are 
traceable along an actual causal chain back to the event of light bouncing off 
the table, the same token disturbances could counterfactually have been 
brought about even if the table had never existed - perhaps by the direct 
stimulation of my retina by electrodes, or by the agency of God. 
The generative theory and the causal claim form the premises of what 
I shall 
refer to as 'the casual argument': a token perceptual experience 
is generated 
by a token neural stimulation; that token neural stimulation could 
cou nterf actually have been brought about in the absence of 
the object 
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actually perceived; therefore a token perceptual experience could 
cou nterf actually have been brought about in the absence of the object 
actually perceived. Strong disjunctivists such as Sartre are immune to this 
argument since they reject the generative theory. But weak disjunctivists 
accept the generative theory, and so must do one of three things: deny the 
causal claim; deny that the conclusion follows from the conjunction of the 
generative theory and the causal claim; or accept the conclusion but deny that 
it presents any threat to weak disjunctivism. 
In order to reject the causal claim, weak disjunctivists must claim that there is 
a class of token events such that no member of the class could have occurred 
in the absence of its actual causal aetiology and this class includes token 
perceptual experiences. In order to make this claim, it is not sufficient to point 
out that a perception - like a footprint or a photograph - must by definition be 
caused in a certain way (e. g. Pitcher 1971,50-7), since this obviously allows 
that the same token experience could occur as a perception or as an 
hallucination depending on its causal aetiology, which is precisely what all 
disjunctivists reject. 
What is required to deny that any token experience could have occurred in the 
absence of its actual causal aetiology is a form of causal essentialism 
according to which there is a class of token events such that it is essential to 
each member of the class being the event it is that it has as an immediate 
cause the token event that in fact caused it. So long as token event e2 is in 
this class, it is simply not true to claim that e2 could have occurred in the 
absence of its actual cause el . 
Since e2was caused by el, e2 is essentially 
caused by el, so unless el had occurred, e2 could not have occurred. If this 
causal essentialism is to protect weak disjunctivism from the causal argument, 
the class of token events that have their causes essentially must include 
token perceptual experiences and all the token events involved in linking 
token experiences to perceived objects in perception. If any event in the 
causal chain reaching from a token perceptual experience of a table back to 
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the table is outside the class of events that have their causes essentially, then 
bringing about that e vent in the absence of the table will bring about the rest 
of the actual causal chain including the resulting experience. Given suitable 
membership of the class of events that have their causes essentially, then, 
this causal essentialism would allow weak disjunctivism to resist the causal 
argument: an experience actually caused by a chain of events leading back to 
light bouncing off a table could not have been brought about in any other way. 
The problem with this causal essentialism, though, is that unless a sufficient 
motivation can be provided for embracing it an opponent can simply deny it, 
and it seems that there is no available motivation for it. The motivation, it 
seems, must be based on an adaptation of Fine's (1994) conception of the 
relation between essence and definition, so that the properties mentioned in 
or entailed by the definition of a token event are essential to that token event. 
The cause of a token event will be essential to it, then, if it is mentioned in or 
entailed by the identity and individuation criteria that single out that token 
event in the actual world. Since the cause of a token event is not entailed by 
any definition of that event except one that explicitly mentions the cause, this 
form of causal essentialism must embrace the view that there is a class of 
token events that are identified and individuated (at least partly) by reference 
to their causes. And herein lies the problem: since the cause of a token event 
is another token event, as Quine (1985,166) has pointed out, any definition of 
token events in terms of their causes already quantifies over token events and 
hence presupposes a prior individuation criterion for the token events over 
which it quantifies. Once this prior criterion is in place, there is no room for a 
second, causal criterion for any token events. It is this problem of circularity 
that underlies Davidson's rejection of his former view that events are to be 
identified and individuated by reference to their causal roles (see Davidson 
1969,231; 1985,175). 
it is impossible, therefore, to define a token event by reference to its cause, 
and in the absence of such a definition it is difficult to see how one could 
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motivate the claim that the events involved in perception have their causes 
essentially. Weak disjunctivists cannot, it seems, deny the causal claim by 
claiming that there is a class of token events such that no member of the 
class could have occurred in the absence of its actual causal aetiology. This 
failure to deny the causal claim leaves the weak disjunctivist with two options: 
deny that the conclusion of the causal argument follows from its premises, or 
deny that the conclusion is incompatible with weak disjunctivism. 
In order to claim that the conclusion of this argument does not in fact follow 
from the conjunction of the generative theory and the causal claim, weak 
disjunctivists might exploit the argument's presumption that when I see an 
object in ordinary ambient light, for example, the object I see is necessarily 
the one that last reflected or significantly refracted the light that entered my 
eyes, or in the case of silhouettes and back-lit objects the object that blocked 
light otherwise heading for my eyes, or in the absence of reflection, significant 
refraction, or blocking, the one that emitted light directly into my eyes. The 
argument presumes, that is, that an experience brought about by an object 
transmitting light into my eyes or blocking light otherwise heading for my eyes 
is thereby a perception of that object. ' The weak disjunctivist might try to deny 
this assumption, and thereby maintain both the generative theory and the 
causal claim while resisting the conclusion of the argument, by construing 
perception as a relation between perceiver and perceived that is distinct from 
but brought about by the causal relation. Optical stimulation, to take seeing as 
an example, delivers information to the visual system, on the basis of which 
the seer's mind directs its attention to some part of the immediate 
environment and the ensuing experience consists in a direct relation to the 
part of the environment attention is directed towards. The experience is 
brought about by the causal relation between an object and the seer's eyes 
but is not thereby a perception of that object; rather, the experience is a 
perception of that object in virtue of the experience itself being a separate 
relation between seer and object. This form of weak disjunctivism, then, 
agrees that a perceptual visual experience results from the excitation of the 
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visual cortex but denies that the same experience could occur in the absence 
of its object (see Coates 1998,20-5). 
In order to avoid collapsing into intentionalism, of course, this form of weak 
disjunctivism must deny that experience consists in having information 
encoded in a brain state. Instead the information encoded in the brain state 
must be taken to determine the direction and range of some sort of mental 
glance and the experience consists in this glance. The information must 
determine which object in the perceiver's environment is to be glanced at, 
however, and herein lies the problem with this conception of perception. In the 
case of visual perception, the object at the centre of visual attention is always 
the object transmitting light onto the foveal regions of the retinas, or blocking 
light otherwise heading there. Any theory of vision must allow for this fact. The 
form of weak disjunctivism under consideration, then, must claim that in such 
cases the information encoded in the brain state uniquely specifies the object 
transmitting light onto the foveal regions. Since there may be two objects 
equidistant from the perceiver and alike in all respects except spatial location, 
the information encoded in the brain state can single out which object to 
glance at only by (egocentric or objective) spatial co-ordinates. 
But this view, that seeing a part of the world consists in a relation independent 
of any causal relation but determined by spatial co-ordinates encoded in a 
brain state, is clearly falsified by experiments involving displacing glasses. 
Such glasses alter the angle at which light enters the eyes, so that (for 
example) light deflected from a table to my left will enter my eyes at the angle 
it would normally have entered at had the table been straight in front of me. 
The form of weak disjunctivism that we are considering predicts that in such a 
case (wearing the glasses for the first time, so that my brain has not had time 
to adjust), I will cast my mental gaze ahead of me toward the location 
indicated by the message received from my retinas and see whatever is there 
(not the table, which is to my left). In such a situation, however, I do in fact 
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see and can describe the table, but I mislocate it in space - it is my behaviour 
that misfires, not my perception (see Gregory 1998,138-43). 
Only (egocentric or objective) spatial co-ordinates can be relied upon to single 
out a specific object, then, but experiments involving displacing glasses have 
shown that visual perception does not consist in an experience directed 
toward an object in virtue of a set of spatial co-ordinates. Visual perception, 
therefore, does not consist in a mental glance directed toward an object 
specified by information encoded in a brain state. This form of weak 
disjunctivism, therefore, is false. In order to guarantee that an experience 
brought about by an object transmitting light onto the foveal regions of my 
retinas, or blocking light otherwise heading for the foveal regions of my 
retinas, is a perception of that object, we must agree with the presumption of 
the causal argument that the experience is a perception of that object in virtue 
of that causal relation between the object and the brain. Given this 
presumption, the causal argument is valid, so the weak disjunctivist is left with 
the option of denying that the causal argument presents any significant threat. 
Weak disjunctivists might argue that the conclusion of the causal argument is 
incompatible with weak disjunctivism only if it is understood in terms of a 
conception of token experiences, of experiences as particulars or datable 
occurrences, that includes reference to experiential type. On a conception of 
token experiences inspired by Kim's (1973) conception of a token event as 
the exemplification of a property by an object at a time, a token experience is 
the having of an experience of a certain type by a particular experiencer at a 
particular time. If this is what a token experience is, then having the same 
token experience involves having an experience of the same type, so if an 
actual token perceptual experience could counterf actually occur in the 
absence of the seen object, then an experience of the same type as occurs in 
a perception could occur as an hallucination, which is precisely the 'single 
common element' or 'highest common factor' view of the relation between 
perception and hallucination that is denied by all forms of disjunctivism. But 
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this just shows that the Kimesque conception of token experiences is 
incompatible with weak disjunctivism, given the causal claim and the 
presumption of the causal argument. Weak disjunctivists need not be troubled 
by this, since they can deny that identity and individuation criteria for token 
experiences make reference to experiential type. They may, for example, 
appeal to conception of token experiences based on Davidson's (1985,175) 
conception of token events as unstructured particulars picked out by their 
spatiotemporal co-ordinates. On this conception, the same token experience 
can occur actually as a perceptual experience and cou nterf actually as an 
hallucinatory experience: all that matters for sameness of token experience is 
sameness of spatiotemporal co-ordinates. So the fact that the token 
perceptual experience could counterfactually have occurred in the absence of 
the seen object is no threat to weak disjunctivism: had it so occurred, it would 
not have been a perceptual experience affording direct demonstrative 
reference to a part of the world, but instead the same token experience would 
have been an experience of the hallucinatory type. 
This response to the conclusion of the causal argument on behalf of weak 
disjunctivism is, so far as it goes, entirely correct. The conclusion of the 
causal argument is strictly incompatible with weak disjunctivism only given a 
Kimesque conception of token experiences, a conception that weak 
disjunctivists can reject. But the response does not go far enough, because 
the threat posed to weak disjunctivism by the causal argument need not be 
construed as the establishing of a conclusion incompatible with weak 
disjunctivism. The causal argument might rather be construed as highlighting 
an explanatory deficiency of weak disjunctivism. If a token neural stimulation, 
whose spatiotemporal co-ordinates are all within the subject's body, causes a 
token experience which might occur as either perceptual or hallucinatory, then 
what explains whether the experience is perceptual or hallucinatory? What 
explains the difference in type between the actual perceptual experience and 
the counterfactual hallucinatory experience when both are claimed to have 
been generated by the same token neural stimulation? 
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We have seen in discussing the possibility of causal essentialism that it would 
be simply arbitrary to deny that the same token neural stimulation could occur 
with a different causal aetiology, so if there is any possible world in which the 
token neural stimulation involved in my actual perception of the London Eye 
generates an hallucinatory experience, then there is no reason to rule out 
there being a possible world like the actual world in all respects (including 
causal aetiology of the neural stimulation) except that on that occasion I have 
an hallucinatory rather than a perceptual experience. I am now perceiving, 
that is, but if it is possible for my actual token neural stimulation to cause an 
hallucination, then it is possible for my actual token neural stimulation with its 
actual causal aetiology to cause an hallucination, so there is no reason why I 
am not hallucinating. 
In appealing to the claim that the same token neural stimulation causes the 
same token experience but sameness of token experience is independent of 
whether the experience falls under the perceptual or hallucinatory type, then, 
weak disjunctivism is hoist by its own petard: it rules out the possibility of any 
general account of why people have perceptual and hallucinatory experiences 
when they do. Providing an account of the relation between perceptual and 
hallucinatory experience that explains why one has the experiences one has 
is the key aim of theories of experience; any theory that rules out such an 
account is missing the main course. 
So the view that a perceptual experience involves the perceived object in 
such a way as to ground direct demonstrative reference to it cannot be 
satisfactorily defended against the causal argument by weak disjunctivism. It 
allows that the token neural excitation that actually generated a perceptual 
experience might cou nterf actually have been the same in all respects but 
have generated an hallucinatory experience. If the token event that generated 
a token perceptual experience might just as well have generated an 
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hallucinatory one, we are left without any possible explanation of why it 
generated a perceptual as opposed to hallucinatory experience. 
What is required to block the causal argument satisfactorily is not the type- 
externalism of weak disjunctivism, but a token-externalist conception of 
experiences. What is required is the claim that a token perceptual experience 
is not generated by excitation of the neural system, but has spatiotemporal 
co-ordinates that reach beyond the skull and skin right out to the object seen. 
The object is in the perceptual experience, for the token-externalist, in a 
spatiotemporal sense of 'in' rather than in the logical sense appealed to by the 
notions of object-dependent representation and identity and individuation 
criteria. 6 This conception of experience, that is, is the conception of an event 
that is intentional in the sense of the term shared by Brentano, Husserl, and 
Sartre. It is a conception of perceptual experience as intuition or 
connaissance of an object, as acquaintance with or apprehension of an object 
not represented but present'in person' in experience (see 1.1). 
We have already considered the form of token-externalism that affirms the 
generative theory, according to which a perceptual visual experience is a 
direct mental relation to the seen object which is independent of but brought 
about by the causal relation between object and brain, and found it to be 
incompatible with the results of experiments involving displacing glasses. As 
token-externalism cannot appeal to a mental relation independent of the 
causal relation, then, it must identify the perceptual experience with that 
causal chain. ' What is required to block the causal argument, that is, is a form 
of token-externalism that denies the generative theory. What is required, in 
other words, is the strong disjunctivist construal of a perceptual experience as 
a relational event identical with the causal chain of events linking the seen 
object with the brain. 
As we saw in 3.2, Sartre's form of disjunctivism should be construed as a form 
of strong disjunctivism. His opposition to the generative theory of perceptual 
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experience (B&N: 314-5), presented above as a way of resisting the second 
form of the argument from hallucination we considered (3.1), may in fact have 
been motivated by the considerations involved in the causal argument. The 
difference between the common forms of the argument from hallucination and 
the causal argument is that the former are concerned with types of experience 
and their relations to other types of event, whereas the latter is concerned 
with the occurrences of token experiences. Sartre does not consider causal or 
other principles linking types of events in his discussion of the generative 
theory, and recommends that we do not approach philosophical questions in 
terms of types or kinds of event, in abstract terms, but rather in terms of token 
or concrete events (see B&N: 3-4). But whatever the root of Sartre's 
opposition to the generative theory, it provides him with the only way of 
resisting both the second form of the argument from hallucination we 
considered and the causal argument, a strong disjunctivism that identifies 
perceptual experiences with the causal chains of events linking perceived 
objects to brains (although Sartre does not put it this way) rather than 
construing them as events at the ends of such chains. 
It might be objected that this identification of a conscious experience with a 
causal chain of events is unavailable to Sartre due to his distinction between 
being and nothingness: since nothingness is the absence of being, the 
objection might run, Sartre's characterisation of consciousness as 
nothingness (e. g. B&N: 28) is incompatible with the claim that episodes of 
phenomenal consciousness are identical with causal sequences of events 
involving beings; nothingness is distinct from being in-itself, and so an event 
of consciousness cannot be identical with a region of being in-itself. But this 
objection trades on a dualistic reading of Sartre's ontology that construes 
being and nothingness as a pair of mutually exclusive regions of reality (see 
e. g. McCann 1993,112). 1 argue in chapter 4 that this dualistic reading runs 
counter to the spirit of Sartre's work, particularly to the hope expressed in the 
opening paragraph of Being and Nothingness for an ontology free of 
embarrassing dualisms (see 2.2), and that Sartre's ontology is best construed 
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as form of nonreductionist monism. Sartre's ontology is, I argue, derived from 
Husserl's discussion of mereological relations in Logical Investigations. This 
ontology allows Sartre to construe a perceptual experience as an event 
whose proper parts are the events in the causal chain linking object and brain. 
Sartre's talk of the nothingness of consciousness, on this reading, is meant to 
highlight the fact that the conscious properties of this higher-level event are 
not themselves beings, entities that could continue to exist even if they were 
not parts of the higher-level event, but are what Husserl calls 'dependent 
parts' of the higher-level event. On this reading, defended in chapter 4, then, 
Sartre's talk of the nothingness of consciousness is compatible with my claim 
that he identifies perceptual experiences with causal chains of events. 
The remainder of this chapter is concerned with the motivation for the 
common acceptance of the generative theory based on the role of 
experiences in explaining behaviour. Since the behaviour that is explained by 
a perceptual experience could in principle have occurred as a result of 
hallucination, the thought runs, it seems that the experience that explains the 
behaviour is independent of the existence of the object perceived and must be 
generated within the body of the perceiver. In 3.4,1 argue that this motivation 
for the generative theory can be resisted only by denying, as Sartre does, that 
hallucination does not involve apprehension of a part of mind-independent 
reality, and in 3.5 1 explain Sartre's account of the relation between the object 
of apprehension and the intentional object in an hallucination or dream, an 
account which I claim allows him to distinguish perception from hallucination 
without denying that hallucination involves apprehension of mind-independent 
reality. 
3.4 Hallucination and Apprehension 
So far in this chapter, the primary concern has been forms of the argument 
from hallucination that are concerned with the relation between experience 
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and the causal chain linking object to brain. In this section, we are concerned 
with arguments from hallucination concerned with the behavioural effects of 
experience. The problem arises from comparing seeing and drinking water, 
for example, with hallucinating the presence of water and behaving as though 
there were water present. If the states of or events within the hallucinating 
subject's body are sufficient to cause a certain kind of bodily movement, the 
objection runs, then these states or events are sufficient to cause the 
perceiving subject to perform those bodily movements. The fact that 'in 
hallucination the external object is dispensed with altogether' (Price 1932,30), 
the objection runs, shows that the same bodily movements as may result from 
perception may also occur when no part of the material environment is 
apprehended. So the experiences that explain these bodily movements, it 
seems, do not include any part of the material environment. This thought may 
underlie the common claim that since hallucinatory experiences are generated 
by neural activity, perceptual experiences must also be (e. g. Broad 1952,10; 
Robinson 1994,152-8; Coates 1998,26). The experience generated by 
neural activity, on this view, is sufficient to explain the resulting bodily 
movements regardless of context, so perceptual experiences that explain 
successful action are also generated by neural activity and hence do not 
involve parts of the physical environment. 
Resisting this argument requires an account of hallucinatory experience that 
shows how an hallucination may result in the same bodily movements as its 
matching perception without undermining the claim that a perceptual 
experience includes an object that is simply not present in its matching 
hallucination. This point may underlie Sturgeon's complaint that disjunctivism 
fails to explain the similarity between a perceptual experience and its 
matching hallucination because it fails to provide an account of the nature of 
hallucination (1998,182-6). Taken as an attack on weak disjunctivism, 
Sturgeon's point fails to understand the nature of its target: as we saw in 3.2, 
the weak disjunctivist agrees that a certain type of neural stimulation will result 
in it seeming to the subject as if, for example, a bus is coming, but must deny 
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that this seeming has a basic explanatory role in understanding one7s mental 
economy. The weak disjunctivist must assign a fundamental explanatory role 
to perceptual experiences, and define hallucinatory ones purely in terms of 
their indistinguishability from perceptual ones. Weak disjunctivism is 
unsatisfactory, though, because it precludes explanation of why one kind of 
experience occurs rather than another on any given occasion (see 3.3). As an 
attack on strong disjunctivism, however, Sturgeon's point is correct: strong 
disjunctivists must deny the claim that since an hallucinatory experience can 
result in the same bodily movements as a matching perceptual experience but 
in the absence of the object required for perception, perceptual experiences 
are independent of their objects and can occur as hallucinatory experiences; 
and in order to deny this claim it is necessary to give an account of 
hallucinatory experience that shows how it can result in the same bodily 
movements as a matching perceptual experience without undermining the 
claim that perceptual experience literally (spatio-temporally) includes its 
object. ' 
The problem, moreover, cannot be evaded simply by denying that 
hallucinations are experienced. Such a refusal might be based on Malcolm's 
denial that dreams are experienced, or on Dennett's sceptical claim that 
dreams might not be experienced. Malcolm claims that to say'l dreamt so and 
so' is to say just that it seemed to me on waking as though 'so and so' had 
occurred, and that 'so and so' did not occur (1959,66). This second criterion, 
though, is not necessary for dreaming: 'a well-known Duke of Devonshire ... 
once dreamt that he was speaking in the House of Lords and, when he woke 
up, found that he was speaking in the House of Lords' (Moore 1959,241). 
The central point to be taken from Malcolm is that there might not be any 
experiences had while asleep. It might rather be that it merely seems to the 
awakened person as though they had undergone certain experiences? This 
point is taken up by Dennett, who argues that all the empirical data we have 
concerning dreams is as compatible with the Malcolmian view that 'it is not 
like anything to dream, although it is like something to have dreamed 
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(Dennett 1976,161) as it is with the 'received view' of dreams as experiences 
had while asleep. As a result, no empirical data can decide the issue, so it is 
can open and theoretical question whether dreams fall inside or outside the 
boundary of experience' (1976,170-1). 
Adopting this, it might be argued that an hallucination is not an experience, 
but is an event or state that leaves memories that make it seem as if there 
had been an experience. The problem with this construal of hallucinations as 
a defence of strong disjunctivism arises from the relation between such 
hallucinations and the behaviour or bodily movements exhibited by the subject 
while the hallucination is taking place. There are two options. First, the 
movements could be construed as meaningless motor activity rather than full- 
blown action, perhaps spasms and / or reflex actions in response to 
environmental stimuli, and the memory traces that make it seem as though 
there had been experience are attempts to make sense of these movements. 
In this case, the hallucination would not cause the movement, so the claim 
that the same movements explained by a perceptual experience can be 
explained by an hallucinatory one would be false. The problem with this 
construal of the behaviour of the hallucinator is that the behaviour exhibited 
during hallucination can include speech behaviour, and it is implausible to 
suggest that seeming coherent sentences are in fact nothing but spasms of 
the speech box, however irrelevant those sentences are to the actual 
(externally observable) situation of the hallucinator. So the speech behaviour 
occurring during, and appropriate to the content of, an hallucination must be 
explained by reference to the hallucination itself, in which case it is difficult to 
see why this explanation should be restricted to the speech behaviour: if an 
hallucinatory experience can cause relevant speech behaviour, then there 
seems no reason why it should not cause other relevant behaviour. 
This brings us to the second option: the behaviour is caused by whatever is 
going on in the hallucinator that also formulates the memories that make it 
seem as if there had been experience. But this option will not help the strong 
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disjunctivist to block the argument that whatever explains the hallucinator's 
behaviour also explains the perceiver's: if an hallucination is construed as an 
event that does not involve an experienced object and that issues in 
behaviour, then the opponent of strong disjunctivism can insist that this type 
of event is common to hallucination and perception and is the event that 
explains behaviour in both cases. Insisting that hallucination and perception 
differ in that the subject experiences perceptual experiences as they occur 
whereas hallucinatory events can only be remembered as though they had 
been experienced does not provide the strong disjunctivist with the required 
distinction: it merely renders the experiential aspects of experience 
epiphenomena, irrelevant to the behaviour that issues from experience, and 
then claims these epiphenomena to be present in only one case. What is 
crucial to the objection to strong disjunctivism we are here considering is the 
claim that the event that explains the perceiver's behaviour also explains the 
hallucinator's behaviour, and since it does not involve apprehension of a part 
of the world in the case of hallucination it does not involve apprehension of a 
part of -the world in the case of perception. Faced with this account of 
hallucination as not being experienced, the opponent of strong disjunctivism 
can reply that if it is correct then the experiential aspects of experiences are 
not relevant to their explanatory role, but all experience remains object- 
independent nonetheless. 
It is for this reason that a Sartrean response to the problem based on Sartre's 
distinction between the conceptual and nonconceptual aspects of experience 
(see 1.3) is not available. Such a response would argue that where perceptual 
experience is a matter of the conceptual or 'thetic' component of the 
experience tracking the nonconceptual, 'nonthetic', given aspects of the world 
confronted, an hallucinatory experience is one in which the thetic component 
is merely caused by bodily stimuli and itself causes the behaviour. The 
problem with this response is that it leaves open the claim that the account 
given of hallucination should in fact be applied to both cases: in perception, 
the thetic component is caused by appropriate stimuli and causes the 
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behaviour, whereas in hallucination the thetic experience that causes the 
behaviour is not appropriate to the stimuli. This serves to sharpen the point of 
the objection: what is crucial is the claim that in hallucination, behaviour is to 
be explained by reference to an experience that does not make reference to 
an object or part of the world that the experience is dependent on. Given this, 
and given that the same bodily movements can be manifested as a result of 
hallucinatory experience as can be manifested as a result of perceptual 
experience, it seems that the experience that explains the movements of the 
perceiver need make no reference to the object seen: it all could have 
happened in the absence of that object. 
What is required to block this move is a more radical approach, one which 
challenges the traditional philosophical construal of hallucination as 
experience in the absence of any object. Although hallucinations occur in the 
absence of any appropriate object, so that the hallucinator may act as though 
confronted with a dragon when there is no dragon, this should not be taken as 
evidence that hallucinations can occur in the absence of all objects. We have 
no evidence, moreover, of disembodied and unenvironed experiences actually 
taking place, and neither could we have. The consideration of hallucination, 
that is, traditionally 'urges us to admit that in the case of extreme 
hallucination there is no external object present at all' (Dancy 1985,169; see 
also Snowdon 1990,128), but this is an urge which might be resisted. If an 
alternative account of hallucination can be given so that hallucinations do 
involve objects of direct apprehension, then the current objection to strong 
disjunctivism can be blocked. On such a construal of hallucination, it would 
not be true to say that when Fred hallucinates a glass of water and behaves 
as though there were a glass of water present, Fred's behaviour must be 
explained by reference to an experience that does not involve an object. Of 
course, the object involved would not be a glass of water, for there is no glass 
of water present, but if there is some other object present then the explanation 
of the behaviour can refer to that object: the apprehension of that object as a 
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glass of water, or as indicating one, explains why Fred behaved as though 
there were a glass of water. 
This is exactly the move Sartre makes in The Psychology of Imagination. 
Visual hallucinations and dreams are, according to Sartre, the imaginative 
apprehension of entoptic lights or phosphenes within the eyes themselves, 
photons that have penetrated the semi-permeable eyelids. These entoptic 
spots are not objects of visual attention, and neither can they be: visual 
attention requires a physiological orientation to the object and 'since entoptic 
lights are in the eyes, it is not possible for the eyeballs to assume a position in 
relation to them' (PI: 51; see 49). Instead, the subject attempts to focus on the 
object of visual apprehension, and this attempt to focus involves rapid 
movement of the eyes, just as in perception. But since the lights move with 
the eyes, '[t]hese movements give rise to indefinite and indefinable 
phosphorescent crossings. Then, all of a sudden, there appear forms with 
clear contours' (PI: 51). These forms are then apprehended as something 
other than themselves: 'Nothing new has appeared, no image is projected on 
the entoptic lights, but, in apprehending them, they are apprehended as the 
teeth of a saw' (PI: 52). The apprehension of the entoptic spots as other than 
they are is similar to seeing visions a crystal ball. In both cases, there are only 
vague and shifting shapes, so there is no definite object on which the eye can 
focus, but the eye movements made to attempt to track these movements 
help to give rise to shapes and patterns which, in a subject favourably 
inclined, may be apprehended as something they are not (PI: 56-7). Sartre's 
emphasis on entoptic lights in The Psychology of Imagination is replaced in 
Being and Nothingness by reference to patterns on the inside of the eyelids 
caused by the penetration of some light. '[T]he eyelid, in fact, is merely one 
object perceived among other objects', he writes. 'No longer to see the 
objects in my room because I have closed my eyes is to see the curtain of my 
eyelids' (B&N: 319). The precise physiology of this apprehension is 
unimportant for present purposes, however. All that matters is that 
180 
hallucination and dreaming may involve apprehension of disturbances in the 
visual system, and hence apprehension of part of mind-independent reality. 
Hallucination and dream are forms of imaginative awareness for Sartre and, 
as we saw in 1.1 , the characteristic of imaginative awareness is that the 
object of apprehension is not the same as the intentional object, the object of 
attention, the posited object. I can look at a photograph of Peter as a piece of 
card covered in coloured shapes, in which case I am perceiving the object of 
apprehension and that object is the intentional object posited and attended to. 
Or I can apprehend it as an image of Peter, in which case I am imagining 
Peter and he is the intentional object posited and attended to (PI: 17-8). In 
hallucinations and dreams, disturbances in the visual system are surpassed in 
just the way that the photograph is surpassed when it is taken as an image of 
Peter: although they are the objects present in experience, the objects of 
visual apprehension, they are not the intentional objects, the objects posited, 
the objects of attention. So when Fred hallucinates a glass of water, he is 
apprehending an object (e. g. entoptic lights) but is surpassing this object of 
apprehension and positing a glass of water. The fact that this intentional 
object does not correspond to anything in Fred's immediate environment does 
not entail that Fred's experience does not include a part of the world as an 
object of apprehension: it does include an object of apprehension even 
though this object does not match, or even closely resemble, the intentional 
object. As Sartre puts it: 'in the hallucination, in the dream, nothing can 
destroy the unreality of the [intentional] object as image as an immediate 
correlative of the imaginative consciousness' (PI: 175-6), even though this 
imaginative consciousness is founded on apprehension of a part of reality. 
Sartre's clearest exposition of his distinction between the role played by the 
object of apprehension in hallucination and dreams, on the one hand, and the 
role it plays in perception, on the other, is in terms of an auditory example: 
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'the noise of the alarm clock is at first experienced as an 
analogue of the noise of a fountain, the ringing of bells, the 
rolling of a drum, etc. But if we wake up we pass precisely to the 
perception of the noise of daytime. This does not mean that we 
make judgements like: "this is the striking of an alarm clock", it 
only means that we suddenly apprehend the striking for what it 
is (that is, a succession of shrill and vibrant sounds) and for 
nothing else than itself. It matters little whether we do or do not 
realize later the origin and cause of the noise: I can be aroused 
by a noise of whose true cause I am still ignorant. ' (PI: 192) 
The key difference between the auditory component of a dream and the visual 
component is that we close our eyes to sleep but we do not close our ears: 
objects beyond the body may be objects of auditory apprehension in dreams, 
but objects of visual apprehension cannot lie beyond the eyelids. The noise of 
the alarm clock does not disappear when I awake, but entoptic lights do 
disappear when I focus on the world around me. But the basic point remains 
the same: in hallucinations and dreams, the object of apprehension is 
experienced as an canalogue' (analogon) of something else (the intentional 
object of the experience), just as a photograph of Peter may be apprehended 
imaginatively as an analogue of Peter, whereas in perception it is 
apprehended as itself, just as a photograph of Peter may be apprehended as 
a piece of card covered in coloured shapes. 
Sartre, then, presents an alternative to the traditional philosophical conception 
of hallucination as experience in the absence of any object, arguing that 
although it is experience in the absence of its intentional object it involves an 
object of apprehension nonetheless. This move blocks the objection to strong 
disjunctivism based on behaviour resulting from hallucination. That objection 
claimed that Fred's perceptual experience of a glass of water required to 
explain his action of drinking the water does not include the glass of water as 
an object of apprehension since in the case of hallucination the same bodily 
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movements are to be explained by an experience that does not include a part 
of the world as an object of apprehension. The hallucination, according to 
Sartre, merely involves a different part of the world as object of apprehension. 
When Fred hallucinates or dreams water, his behaviour is to be explained by 
reference to his 'imaginative apprehension of phosphenes [entoptic lights]' 
(PI: 191), or other disturbances in the visual system, rather than perceptual 
apprehension of a glass of water. The hallucinator's behaviour is 
inappropriate to the actual nature of the object of apprehension, since it is 
appropriate to the nature of the intentional object which is not the object of 
apprehension, but there is such an object nonetheless, and this object is not 
apprehended in the perceptual case. 
Perceptual experience, on Sartre's account, involves the object of 
apprehension being the intentional object, and this involves the 'thetic' 
(conceptual) component of the experience tracking (or, at least, attempting to 
track) the manifest qualities of the object of acquaintance (see 1.3). 
Hallucinatory experiences, on the other hand, do not: they involve the positing 
of an intentional object other than the object of apprehension, although as 
with the case of the photograph of Peter the thetic component of this 
experience may be cued to some extent by the manifest qualities of the object 
of apprehension. So far, however, this is only a rather schematic account of 
this form of disjunctivism. It lacks an account of how the intentional object of 
an experience may be distinct from the object of apprehension, of what it 
means to say that in imaginative experiences such as hallucinations and 
dreams the object of apprehension is treated as an 'analogue' and is 
surpassed towards some other thing which is not present yet is the kind of 
thing to which the ensuing behaviour is appropriate. The next section is 
concerned with Sartre's answer to these questions. 
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3.5 Sartrean Disjunctivism 
Sartre's account of hallucination and dreaming is part of his overall account of 
imaginative experience, and his disjunctivism is thereby a disjunctivism of 
perception on the one hand and all imaginative experience on the other. The 
details of this disjunctivism are outlined in the opening pages of The 
Psychology of Imagination, where he provides four 'characteristics' of 
imaginative experience. Two of these characteristics are common to 
perceptual experience within his theory, however, and so are unimportant for 
the present purpose of distinguishing perceptual from hallucinatory 
experience. These two characteristics are that 'images' are experiences 
rather than objects of experience (Pl: 2-5; see IPC: 146), and that such 
experiences always involve nonthetic awareness of the act of awareness as 
well as thetic awareness of the intentional object (Pl: 13-14). The acceptability 
of Sartre's theory of pre-reflective self -awareness, which is expressed in this 
latter characteristic of imagination, is unimportant for present purposes. 
The remaining two characteristics, however, present a problem for present 
purposes: we only need one. Drawing a distinction within the class of 
experiences between those that are and those that are not perceptual, that is, 
should involve only one criterion which divides the one type from the other. 
Sartre's claim that he is attempting to 'determine and classify [the] distinctive 
characteristics' of imaginary experiences (PI: 2) may make it seem as though 
he is not attempting to draw a rigid line between perceptual and imaginative 
experience, but rather attempting to understand the concept of imagination as 
a family resemblance concept by ascertaining the characteristics of 'the image 
family' (see PI: 16). If this were the case, then it would be a mistake to attempt 
to derive a disjunctive account of experience from this work, since the work 
would not be attempting to distinguish imaginative from perceptual 
experiences. But this reads too much into Sartre's use of the term 
i characteristics ': he also claims to be attempting to ascertain 'the essence of 
the image' (PI: 1), writes throughout the work of 'essential' characteristics 
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(e. g. PI: 16,61), and claims that phenomenology 'is an eidetic science', a 
science of essences (PI: 187), which along with the work's leitmotif that all 
experiences are either perceptual or imaginative strongly suggests that he is 
attempting to provide a sharp distinction between the two kinds of experience 
(see also PI: 11). So in order to formulate Sartrean disjunctivism as an 
account of the distinction between perceptual and hallucinatory experience, it 
is necessary either to choose between the two 'distinctive characteristics' that 
Sartre proposes or to show that at least one is the necessary corollary of the 
other so that the two characteristics can both be accepted as different aspects 
of the same essential trait, although one may be basic and the other derived 
from it. This section is concerned with examining each of the two 
characteristics in turn in order to decide how Sartrean disjunctivism is best 
formulated. 
The first distinguishing characteristic of imaginative experiences that Sartre 
proposes is 'quasi-observation' (PI: 5-10). Imaginative experiences share with 
perceptual ones the trait of presenting the intentional object in profile rather 
than all at once: if I imagine the Eiffel Tower, I must imagine it as it would be 
seen from some particular angle, whereas if I just think of it then I need not 
think of it as seen from anywhere in particular. To this extent, imagination 
seems like a form of observation. But the intentional object of my imaginative 
experience as I imagine it does not have aspects that are hidden from me or 
that I may learn about from inspecting it, whereas the intentional object of my 
perceptual experience as I experience it does have aspects that are hidden 
from view. When I see a tomato, for example, I only see it from a certain angle 
and presume that it really is a tomato, that is has a farside and an inside, and 
may later find out that it was in fact only a part of the outside of a tomato 
turned towards me at a certain angle. When I imagine a tomato, on the other 
hand, it is certain that it is a tomato that I imagine. I cannot, moreover, 
discover anything about the imagined tomato by turning it around in my mind: 
if the farside turns out to be green rather than red, this is because I make it 
that way, not because it was already that way. As Sartre puts it: 
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'the object of the perception overflows consciousness 
constantly; the object of the image is never more than the 
consciousness one has of it; it is limited by that consciousness: 
nothing can be learned from the image that is not already known 
... it reveals immediately what it is' (PI: 8). 
In perceptual experience, 'judgement corrects, organises, and stabilizes 
perception' (PI: 44): the thetic component of the experience tracks the 
manifest qualities of the object, and may misconstrue these qualities and so 
misrepresent the object. In imaginative experience, on the other hand, the 
object is specified by the thetic component of the experience; it is 
'contemporaneous with the consciousness I have of it, and it is determined 
exactly by that consciousness: it includes nothing in itself but what I am 
conscious of; but, inversely, everything that constitutes my consciousness has 
its counterpart in the object' (PI: 9-10). The thetic component of the 
experience cannot misrepresent the nature of the intentional object, nor fail to 
capture the whole nature of it, since the nature of the intentional object is 
whatever the thetic component of the experience construes it as. 'A hare 
vaguely perceived is nevertheless a specific hare. But a hare which is the 
object of a vague image is a vague hare' (PI: 15). It might be objected to this 
that it is a common enough experience to imagine a certain person when 
trying to remember whether or not that person wears glasses, for example, 
but in such a case the image constructed of that person will either be 
indeterminate with respect to the presence or absence of eyewear or will 
simply be a method of recalling whether or not that person wears glasses: the 
feat could not be performed by someone who had never met that person nor 
read or heard a description of them. 
Sartre claims that this characteristic is true of all imaginative experience. If I 
hallucinate or dream a dragon, as opposed to simply imagining one, then still 
that dragon has neither a back nor an underside, nor a past or a future, nor a 
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name, nor any other characteristic that I am unaware of (PI: 42-5,179-807 
198). In the case of the deliberate use of mental imagery, such as imagining 
someone's face, the knowledge that specifies the object is 'knowledge' in a 
fairly straightforward sense: my previous experience furnishes the details. In 
the case of hallucinations and dreams, however, the intentional object may be 
quite novel. Imaginative experiences based on the patterns formed by 
entoptic spots during rapid eye movement, Sartre claims, involves 
'knowledge' (savoir) based on feedback from the motor system. 'It is not 
because the unreal object appears close to me that my eyes are going to 
converge, but it is the convergence of my eyes that mimics the proximity of 
the object he writes (PI: 157). He takes this to be equivalent to the claim that 
'the entire body participates in the make-up of the image' (PI: 157), an aspect 
of his account of experience that Morris (1975) and Wider (1997) emphasise 
in claiming that he takes the body rather than the brain or the visual system to 
be the subject of experience, but the point need not entail this claim. It might 
rather be that the motor feedback from such bodily movements as the 
convergence of the eyes has effects on the neural system which thereby 
effect the experience without the bodily movements themselves being 
included within the experience. Whether or not 'the entire body participates in 
the make-up of the image', however, is unimportant for present purposes. The 
key point is that Sartre's emphasis on 'knowledge' as constituting the 
structure of the imagined object in hallucination and dream is not equivalent to 
the obviously false claim that we can only hallucinate or dream objects that 
we have previously perceived or had described to us: some of the 'knowledge' 
may be constituted or caused by bodily movement. 
The characteristic of quasi-observation, then, is the characteristic that the 
intentional object of imaginative experience is not independent of the 
experience and tracked by the thetic component of it, but rather the thetic 
component ('knowledge') is derived from other sources and specifies the 
object. 
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The second distinguishing characteristic of imaginative experience that Sartre 
proposes concerns the way in which the experience posits its object. 
Perceptual experience, he claims, L posits its object as existing', whereas 
imaginative experience 'can posit the object as non-existent, or as absent, or 
as existing elsewhere; it can also "neutralize" itself, that is, not posit its object 
as existing' (PI: 11-12). This last form of positing, he adds in a footnote, 
'remains a positional act' it is equivalent to merely entertaining the possibility 
of the existence of the object without commitment to its actual existence or 
non-existence, presence or absence (PI: 12 n). 10 The intentional object of 
imaginative experience, that is, is not constituted with the characteristic of 
being a present existing thing. Rather, the intentional object of the image is 
specified by the thetic component of the experience, and hence presented, as 
not being a present existent to which attention is being paid: 'we can pretend 
for a second but we cannot destroy the immediate awareness of its 
nothingness' (PI: 13). 
This claim seems obviously false when applied to hallucinations and dreams. 
Many philosophers oppose the claim that perceptual experience is 
apprehension of mind-independent reality precisely because an hallucination 
may seem to the subject as though it is a perception, and the subject may 
behave as though it is a perception (see 3.1 and 3.4). Some hallucinations 
and dreams, that is, seem to involve positing the intentional object as both 
existent and present. Sartre's inclusion of this characteristic as part of the 
nature of imaginative consciousness is a result of his project of attempting to 
provide a single unified account of nonperceptual experience under the 
general heading of 'imagination', and so including in this account the 
deliberate use of mental imagery (IPC: 108; PI: 57-61) and the 'willing 
suspension of disbelief' involved in watching an actor or an impressionist (PI: 
26-31) and in reading fiction (PI: 70-4,197). In all these cases, it is plausible 
to say that the intentional object is presented as unreal or not present, but this 
does not seem so plausible in the case of hallucinations and dreams. 
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Sartre maintains, however, that this characteristic applies equally to 
hallucinations and dreams as to other forms of imagination. Hallucinations 
and dreams do not, he tells us, involve mistaking the images based on 
entoptic lights for perceptions: 'This we pronounce as impossible de facto. ' 
(PI: 192). It is rather that the attitude consciousness has towards the unreal 
objects it posits has changed (PI: 191). Sartre compares the images based on 
entoptic lights in hypnagogic dreaming (a state that precedes full-blown 
dreaming) with dreaming itself, and argues that the transition from one state 
to the other involves the images acquiring 'the characteristic of being 
interesting (PI: 193). In more detail: 
'the hypnagogic image was the sudden conviction into which 
consciousness suddenly dropped; I was suddenly persuaded 
that such and such an entoptic blot was a fish as an image. Now 
I am dreaming and this sudden belief becomes heavy and 
enriched: I am suddenly persuaded that this fish has a story, 
that he was caught in that river, that he will appear on the table 
of the archbishop, etc. River, fish, archbishop, are all imaginary 
but they constitute a world. ' (PI: 196). 
With the introduction of this narrative element, which may also be present in 
hallucination, consciousness becomes 'fascinated' (PI: 197), 'spellbound' (PI: 
198), 'obsessive' (PI: 198), 'enchanted' (PI: 204); 'it cannot emerge from the 
imaginative attitude in which it has enclosed itself' (PI: 192); it is 'imprisoned 
in the imaginary' (PI: 193). The basic claim is that consciousness becomes 
reorientated with respect to the imaginary reality it is positing as imaginary or 
unreal. The 'me' that might appear in the dream, and the bodily movements I 
make as this 'me' reacts to situations in the dream, is can imaginary me' (PI: 
200), an 'object-me' (PI: 202), whose behaviour I control partly by my 
movements since the content of the dream is partly constituted by my bodily 
movements. My mode of being becomes 'be i ng-i n-the-u n real -world' (PI: 202). 
Sartre argues, that is, that his claim that imagination never posits its objects 
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as existent and present is compatible with the behaviour and later reports of 
hallucinating or dreaming subjects because in such a situation the subject 
posits objects as unreal but enters into a kind of play-acting engagement with 
the unreal (PI: 171-206). A dream, he summarises, 
'is primarily a story and our strong interest in it is of the same 
sort as that of the naIve reader in a novel. ... Only it is a "spell- 
binding" fiction ... Just as King Midas turned everything he 
touched into gold, so consciousness is itself determined to 
transform into the imaginary everything it gets hold of. ... The 
dream is not fiction taken for reality, it is the Odyssey of a 
consciousness dedicated by itself, and in spite of itself, to build 
only an unreal world' (PI: 205-6) 
The second characteristic of imaginative experience, then, is that it never 
posits its intentional -object as existent and present, but always posits it as 
non-existent, absent, existing elsewhere, or remains neutral on this issue. It 
does not posit its object as a present being, that is, but 'as a nothingness' (PI: 
10). Cases that may seem to require construing the imaginative experience as 
positing a real and present object are rather to be construed as involving a 
reorientation of consciousness towards the unreal, as consciousness entering 
into a kind of make-believe. 
The acceptability of this second characteristic, however, is unimportant for the 
purposes of providing a criterion for distinguishing perceptual from 
hallucinatory or dream experience, since it would be inadequate for the task 
without appeal to the first characteristic, that of quasi-observation, and the first 
characteristic does not entail or presuppose the second. The first 
characteristic, that is, is the characteristic that the nature of the intentional 
object is stipulated by consciousness rather than being an attempt to track 
some pre-existing nature, and the second is that the set of determinations of 
the intentional object, the specification provided by the thetic component of 
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the experience, does not include the determination of being a real and present 
entity. There is no a priori reason why a consciousness that specifies its 
intentional object should be limited in this way: there seems no reason why 
the determination of being a present real entity should not be among the 
determinations specified by consciousness. So the characteristic of quasi- 
observation does not require the characteristic of positing as a nothingness. 
The characteristic of positing as a nothingness, moreover, cannot provide the 
sole criterion for distinguishing perceptual from hallucinatory or dreamed 
experience, since without the characteristic of quasi-observation this 
characteristic would claim that hallucinatory and dreamed experiences involve 
determinations that attempt to track the manifest qualities of an object of 
apprehension, as in perceptual experience, even though the experience does 
not posit this object as real. It is difficult to understand how an experience 
could involve tracking the qualities of a present real object of apprehension 
without taking that object to be present and real, which is why Sartre claims 
that the second characteristic of imaginative experience 'can occur only on 
the level of quasi-observation' (PI: 12). In addition to this, there is the further 
problem of understanding quite what entity consciousness is supposed to be 
tracking when, for example, someone hallucinates a dragon. The entity is 
obviously not a dragon, and since there need not be any entity in the 
hallucinator's immediate vicinity that even remotely resembles a dragon, it 
cannot be an ordinary object in the hallucinator's vicinity. The entity would 
then have to be some kind of private entity, such as a sense datum. Sartre of 
course would not countenance introducing such entities since he would 
consider it a return to 'the illusion of immanence', the picture of consciousness 
as 'a place peopled by small likenesses' (PI: 2), whereas he considers 
consciousness to be a 'nothingness' (e. g. B&N: 28): 'If, impossible though it 
be, you could enter "into" a consciousness you would be seized by a 
whirlwind and thrown back outside, in the thick of the dust, near the tree, for 
consciousness has no "inside"' (1939,4-5). But aside from Sartre's own 
opposition to sense data and their kin, no disjunctivist should construe 
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hallucination as observation of private entities where perception is observation 
of public ones, since '[ilt is not as if sense-data are there anyway, waiting for 
the subject to alight on' (Martin 1997,96). Bringing about the hallucination of a 
dragon is sufficient to bring about the intentional object of that experience, the 
intended dragon, whereas the perception of a dragon would require the 
existence of a dragon. In hallucination, unlike perception, there is no logically 
prior object for the experience to track. 
Of the two characteristics of imaginative as opposed to perceptual experience 
that Sartre provides, then, the second taken alone is inadequate to provide a 
criterion for distinguishing hallucinatory from perceptual experience, and the 
first neither entails nor presupposes the second. The first characteristic, that 
of quasi-observation, then, should be taken as the criterion of distinguishing 
hallucinatory from perceptual experience, the criterion of Sartrean 
disjunctivism. The second characteristic should be taken as a contingent 
claim about all the experiences delimited as a class by the first criterion, a 
claim which may be of interest in other areas of the philosophy and 
psychology of consciousness or imagination but which is irrelevant to the 
present task of delimiting the class of non-perceptual experiences. 
Sartrean disjunctivism, then, refuses to accept the traditional claim that 
hallucinatory experience does not involve apprehension of a part of mind- 
independent reality, and instead distinguishes between perceptual and 
hallucinatory experience in terms of the role played by the object of 
apprehension in each. In perception, the object of apprehension is also the 
intentional object: the thetic component of the experience attempts to track 
the manifest qualities of the object, and so attempts to take it for what it is. In 
hallucination, on the other hand, the intentional object is distinct from the 
object of apprehension, the dreamed dragon is not the entoptic patterns 
formed during REM sleep that serve as the object of acquaintance and as the 
ganalogue' of the dragon. In hallucinations and dreams, that is, the intentional 
object is stipulated or specified by consciousness on the basis of the 
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character of the patterns or shapes that serve as the 'material' for the 
experience (PI: 17-18 and throughout). To serve as 'material' or 'analogue' is 
to be shaped or patterned in a way that suggests to the subject of experience 
a certain thing or type of thing, be it the subject's friend Peter or something in 
general like a fish or a dragon, and on the basis of this suggestion, perhaps 
also with bodily movements or motor feedback from them, the subject 
formulates the structure of the intentional object. A visual hallucination or 
dream 'is a synthetic act which unites a concrete, non-imagined, knowledge 
(savoir) to elements which are more actually representative' (PI: 7). 
The material or analogue is not itself observed as in perception, it is not 
'contemplated' (PI: 49), which would require the thetic component of the 
experience to be concerned only with tracking its qualities. Instead, it forms 
the intuitive basis for the 'quasi-observed' intentional object. Quasi- 
observation involves the intentional object being experienced 'in profile), as it 
would be seen from an angle, rather than being thought of with all its aspects 
at once as when an object is conceived, as well as having its determinations 
stipulated by consciousness (PI: 6-7). This experiencing 'in profile' is a result 
of the intuitive basis of the experience being the shapes or patterns 
apprehended: these shapes or patterns form the shape of the intentional 
object as experienced. To serve as the intuitive basis, the material or 
analogue, for an hallucination or dream, then, is to be experienced as the 
intentional object where the 'experiencing as' is a result of consciousness not 
attempting to track the manifest qualities of the material but projecting prior 
'knowledge' (savoio as characteristics of the intended object suggested by the 
intuited material. These characteristics may be wildly inappropriate: 'A coach 
appeared before me which was the categorical imperative' (PI: 50). Sartre's 
further claim that in hallucination and dreams consciousness cannot help but 
apprehend entities as analogues of other things, cannot escape the attitude of 
quasi-observation, is part of his theory of imaginative experience not positing 
its objects as present, which as we have seen is unimportant for present 
purposes. Rather than claiming that consciousness cannot observe the 
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analogue for what it is, we need only claim that in hallucination and dreams 
consciousness does not observe the material for what it is: the coach which is 
the categorical imperative would disappear if the subject were to observe the 
entoptic lights as entoptic lights (see PI: 51). 
3.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, then, we have seen that Sartre provides a strong disjunctivist 
account of experience which is immune to arguments from hallucination 
against his view that perceptual experience consists in apprehension of mind- 
independent reality. Sartre's strong disjunctivism does not have weak 
disjunctivism's flaw of precluding the possibility of explaining why a perceptual 
rather than hallucinatory experience occurred on a specific occasion. Sartrean 
disjunctivism, then, is explanatorily superior to the weak forms of disjunctivism 
prevalent in current anglophone philosophy. A perceptual experience, on 
Sartre's strong disjunctivist view, includes the perceived part of the world not 
just logically but spatiotemporally: the experience itself goes right out the 
object. This helps to clarify Sartre's notion of intentionality: an intentional 
event or state includes an object in that the object is partly constitutive of that 
event or state. 
Sartre's construal of intentional events and states as literally 
(spatiotemporally) containing objects, however, should not be taken as the 
claim that they literally (spatiotemporally) include their intentional objects. 
They include objects of acquaintance or apprehension, on his account, but 
these objects are identified with intentional objects only in cases of perceptual 
experience: in imaginative experience the intentional object is distinct from the 
object of apprehension. Sartre's classification of dreams and hallucinations as 
imaginative experiences, hence as experiences involving an object of 
apprehension which is surpassed towards an imagined intentional object, 
allows him to evade objections to his strong disjunctivism that claim that the 
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kind of experience involved in a perception may also occur as an hallucination 
but in the absence of any object. In this way, Sartre bucks the philosophical 
trend of construing hallucinations and dreams as involving no objects of 
apprehension, claiming instead that they do not involve objects of 
apprehension as intentional objects. Denying the claim that hallucination does 
not involve an object of apprehension is required for upholding strong 
disjunctivism, which if the argument of 3.3 is right means that denying this 
claim is necessary for upholding the conception of perceptual experience as 
apprehension of part of mind-independent reality. By denying it in favour of 
the weak claim that hallucination does not involve an object of apprehension 
as intentional object, Sartre effectively points up the fact that the stronger 
claim is unwarranted. 
Claiming that hallucination involves an object of acquaintance that plays a 
different role to that of its counterpart in perception requires drawing a 
distinction between the two kinds of experience in terms of the structures of 
consciousness involved, in terms of the way in which the object of 
apprehension is apprehended. Sartre provides, as we have seen, two 
candidate criteria for this task, but the only one that is adequate to the task is 
the claim that perception is 'observation', tracking the manifest qualities of the 
object of acquaintance, whereas imaginative experience is 'quasi- 
observation', stipulating the nature of the intentional object on the basis of 
cues provided by the object of apprehension, and perhaps coenaesthetic 
awareness of bodily movements. The other criterion Sartre provides, that 
perception involves positing the object as existent and present whereas 
imaginative experience does not, is a major plank of his work on imagination 
and may be of interest to other areas of philosophy and psychology, but since 
it cannot be the criterion for distinguishing perceptual from hallucinatory 
experiences and it is not entailed by the first candidate criterion, it forms no 
essential part of Sartrean disjunctivism. 
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The investigation of the first criterion has clarified the relation between 
Sartre's two terms translated as 'knowledge': connaissance is the 
apprehension or intuition of something, or acquaintance with it; savoir is the 
understanding involved in structuring experience, which may attempt to track 
the object of connaissance or may stipulate another intentional object on the 
basis of cues provided by the object of connaissance. In the terminology 
discussed in chapter 1, the object of connaissance manifests qualities of 
which the subject is nonthetically aware, and the thetic component of the 
experience is provided by savoir that either tracks or is simply cued by these 
qualities. This criterion, and the relation between thetic and nonthetic 
components of experience on which it is based, also preserves the 
philosophical distinction between illusion and hallucination. The dehydrated 
desert traveller who mistakes the hazy air above distant hot sand for water, 
for example, or the person who mistakes a distant tree for a person, is 
perceiving rather than hallucinating: the thetic component of the experience 
attempts and fails to track the manifest qualities of experience, mistakenly 
seeing the haze as water or the branches and trunk as arms and torso. This 
failure to track qualities is a feature of illusion but not hallucination: 'My 
perception can deceive me, but not my image' (PI: 9). 
The reference to objects of apprehension in hallucinations and dreams at the 
heart of this disjunctivism, finally, allows Sartre to show how these 
phenomena pose no threat to his central claim that: 'Nothing of what I see 
comes from me; there is nothing outside what I see or what I could see. ... 
representation, as a psychic event, is a pure invention of philosophers' (B&N: 
217) 
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Chapter 4 
Holism: Science and Ontology 
Sartre, as we have seen, 'holds a relational view of phenomenal 
consciousness as direct apprehension of an object or part of the world that is 
not dependent for its existence on that apprehension. This view, which I have 
also called 'strong disjunctivism', denies that experience is generated by 
stimulation of the neural system, claiming instead that the experience is 
identical with the causal relation between brain and object apprehended (see 
3.2). This relational view of experience, as we shall see (4.2), requires the 
Heideggerian view of the subject as an environmentally embedded embodied 
being, a 'being-in-the-world' whose actions as well as experiences involve 
both the body and its immediate environment, a view to which Sartre 
emphatically subscribes. These claims can be attacked on ontological 
grounds, particularly on the grounds of ontological claims purportedly 
grounded in science, and hence must be defended from these attacks. In this 
chapter, I present both the classical grounds for attack (4.1) and the 
contemporary naturalist grounds for attack (4-2), before going on to 
reconstruct the principles underlying Sartre's ontology of experience and of 
the subject from the discussions of ontology scattered throughout his early 
works (4.3). 1 argue that Sartre's ontology is immune to the contemporary 
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naturalist attacks and, moreover, that there is good philosophical reason to 
prefer Sartre's ontology to contemporary anglophone forms of naturalism 
(4.4). Finally, I argue that Sartre's ontology provides a new and innovative 
framework for a theory of colour that allows it to resist the classical attack on 
the view that experience is direct apprehension of part of mind-independent 
reality (4.5). 
In the course of this, I argue that, despite Sartre's use of the terms 'being' and 
'nothingness', it is wrong to claim of his ontology that: 
'one could do no better than to call it a "dualist ontology", an 
ontology which, in this sense, moves against the spirit of 
Heideggerian ontology and harks back to Descartes' (McCann 
1993,112) 
I argue that Sartre's ontology should rather be taken as a form of monism, 
and that such a monism is compatible with. his central existentialist claim that 
the nothingness of consciousness is the source of human freedom. Sartre's 
self-professed Cartesianism, I claim, is not an assent to dualism but a 
retention of the Cartesian identification of freedom with the autonomy of 
consciousness within a monistic framework. 
4.1 Science and Colour 
The claim that a perceptual experience is not contained within the head or 
body of the perceiver is classically challenged on the grounds that the part of 
the world perceived does not possess all the properties it is experienced as 
having. Since, for example, reality is not really coloured, the thought runs, a 
visual experience that presents a coloured object must be generated within 
the body of the perceiver, which is precisely what Sartre's position denies 
(see 3.2). Descartes, for example, argued that since 'nothing whatever 
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belongs to the concept of body except the fact that it is something which has 
length, breadth and depth and is capable of various shapes and motions', we 
must accept that 'colours, tastes, smells, and so on, are ... merely certain 
sensations which exist in my thought, and are as different from bodies as pain 
is different from the shape and motion of the weapon which produces it' 
(1984,297). This distinction between primary qualities of shape and motion 
and secondary qualities of colour, taste, and smell was common to the 
Cartesian geometrical view of physics and the Newtonian corpuscularian, or 
atomist, view. The classical corpuscularian statement of the view is Locke's: 
'The particular Bulk, Number, Figure, and Motion of the parts of 
Fire, or Snow, are really in them, whether anyone senses them 
or no: and therefore they may be called real Qualities, because 
they really exist in those Bodies. But ... let not the Eyes see 
Light, or Colours, nor the ears hear Sounds, let the Palate not 
Taste, nor the Nose Smell, and all Colours, Tastes, Odours, and 
Sounds, as they are such particular Ideas, vanish and cease, 
and are reduced to their causes, i. e. Bulk, Figure, and Motion of 
Parts' (1975, ll. viii. 17) 
Although this is a general claim about phenomenal consciousness, I will 
restrict discussion of it to the case of colour in visual experience, for the sakes 
of simplicity and clarity, returning to the more general claim at the end (4.5). 
The Cartesian and Lockean point, then, is that phenomenal colours, colours 
as we experience them, form no part of the scientific accounts of reality, and 
so are no part of that reality. The basic scientific account of mind-independent 
reality operates only with the concepts of length, breadth, depth, shape, and 
motion, claim Descartes and Locke, and so phenomenal colours are no part 
of that reality. They are, rather, effects produced by neural stimulation. This 
point is not restricted to the Cartesian and Lockean views of basic science as 
dealing only with geometrical relations or the interaction of basic particles 
respectively. No form of basic science, whether it includes fields of force or 
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action at a distance, for example, includes reference to phenomenal colour in 
mapping out the nature of reality. 
We can add to this point that phenomenal colours experienced are dependent 
on the structures of the subject's eyes. No mammals lower than primates, it 
seems, have colour vision, or if any do it is very rudimentary. The world looks 
very different to dogs than it does to us. Birds, fish, reptiles, and some insects, 
on the other hand, do have colour vision (Gregory 1998,121). Bees, for 
example, have good colour vision, but the spectrum they see is shifted 
relative to the one we see. They cannot see red, but they can see from yellow 
all the way across the spectrum and beyond our limit of violet into ultra-violet. 
Ultra-violet photographs of flowers that ordinarily look white or yellow to us 
show them to be decorated with ultra-violet patterns, and these serve as 
markers that guide bees to the flowers' nectaries (Dawkins 1995,99). 
Colour perception in humans, moreover, depends on only three kinds of 
receptor in the eyes, three kinds of 'cones', each responding to a particular 
range of light wavelength. Cones are on-off switches, they either fire or do 
not, and so are insensitive to the differences between the wavelengths that 
switch them on and to the differences between those that switch them off. 
Quite different sets of light wavelengths can thereby have the same effect, 
resulting in the same colour experience, even in standard lighting conditions. 
Objects with quite different surfaces can therefore look to be the same colour. 
In addition to this, the colour a thing appears to be also depends to some 
extent on contextual features such as which other colours are being 
experienced, which other cones are firing, at the same time. A patch of red, 
for example, makes the adjacent area look greener than it would otherwise 
look (Hardin 1990,558-60). Deficiency in the sensitivity of at least one type of 
cone, or the complete absence of at least one type of cone, is the usual cause 
of colour-blindness (Gregory 1998,130). 
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In perceptual visual experience, then, we are aware of shaped expanses of 
colour. Our best theory of mind-independent reality does not refer to colours 
of objects, and so it seems that colours cannot be construed as properties of 
mind-independent reality. Campbell (1993,263) suggests that we can 
construe colours as properties of objects nonetheless: they supervene on the 
microphysical structures of the surfaces of properties, and their explanatory 
role is to explain why things look a certain colour in ordinary light. An object 
that looks red in ordinary light, that is, looks that way because it is red. But 
colours construed in this way are not the same as the phenomena[ colours of 
experience. The phenomenal colours of experience vary with the types and 
sensitivities of cones present in the eye, and with which other colours are 
being experienced at the same time, and Campbell's objective colours do not. 
Our perceptual visual experiences of coloured expanses, therefore, cannot be 
construed simply as apprehension of the surfaces of mind-independent 
objects. We need some other explanation of colour, and once this explanation 
has been given there may be no room left for Campbell's proposed 
explanatory role for objective colours: the phenomenal colours things seem to 
have in ordinary light may already have been accounted for. Moreover, since 
the experience of phenomenal colour is not simply apprehension of the 
surfaces of objects, it seems that they are generated within the skin, at some 
point after the firing of the optical cones. 
Notice that this argument does not rest on the idea that if my experience 
seems to present a red object, then it must present a red object of some sort, 
such as an idea, impression, percept, sensation, sense-datum, or sensum. 
Although this presumption has been employed in forms of the argument (e. g. 
Russell 1912,2-4), it is not crucial to it. All that matters is the claim that our 
awareness of colours cannot be construed as direct awareness of coloured 
parts of reality. Whether it is instead to be construed as awareness of 
coloured subjective entities, or as neural representations of aspects of mind- 
independent reality (e. g. Tye 1992), or as an association of sensory 
stimulation with previous sensory stimulations and other mental processes 
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associated with them (e. g. Dennett 1991, ch. 12), is beside the point. On any 
of these views, perceptual visual experience is generated by neural 
stimulation and hence Sartre's relational view of visual consciousness is false. 
4.2 Explanation and Ontology 
In addition to these classical grounds for attack on the related claims that an 
experience is not contained within the head or body, a further challenge is 
presented by the naturalistic approaches to ontology prevalent in 
contemporary anglophone philosophy. The challenge arises from the principle 
that ontology is dictated by best explanatory practice. In conjunction with the 
claim that the physical or natural sciences provide the best explanatory 
framework, this principle drives an argument for the reductionist conclusion 
that experiences, and other mental events, are to be identified with internal 
states of the brain or body caused by impacts on the organism from outside 
and causing behaviour. If this reductionism is right, then phenomenal 
-. consciousness cannot be understood as a relation between body or brain and 
object apprehended. In this section, I explain this reductionist challenge to 
Sartre's position in more detail. In the next section, I explain Sartre's ontology 
and the Husserlian principles underlying it, and in 4.4 1 argue that Sartre's 
ontology is immune to the naturalistic arguments for reductionism and 
preferable to reductionism. 
The claim that ontology is dictated by explanatory practice is the claim that all 
and only the objects, events, states, properties, tropes, or whatever, that are 
quantified over in our most simple and explanatorily and predictively powerful 
theory of the nature of the universe are to be admitted into the ontology of the 
universe. Any purported object, event, state, property, trope, or whatever, that 
is not included in this system of explanation must be either reducible to 
something or a set of things that is included in it or eliminated altogether. 
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There are at least two roots of this claim in twentieth century anglophone 
philosophy. One is an updating of Ockham's Razor, and is the claim that an 
idle wheel must be excised from an ontological system in the name of 
simplicity. Any irreducible postulate that 'has nothing to do, no purpose to 
serve ... might as well, and undoubtedly would in time, be abolished' 
(Alexander 1920,8). This is the basis of the widespread rejection of 
epi phenomenalist theories of consciousness: since epiphenomena by 
definition have no explanatory role to play, they cannot be counted as part of 
reality (e. g. Kim 1998,119). If something has no explanatory role to play, 
moreover, then there can be no evidence for its existence, for if there were 
then it would explain that evidence (Dennett 1991,403-4). If our perceptual 
experiences, in particular, were epiphenomenal, then they could have no 
effect on us: they would make no difference to how we feel, think, or talk 
about our mental lives; everything would happen as if they did not exist, so 
again there could be no reason to believe that they do exist (Kirk 1999, § 3). 
The other root of the claim that ontology is dictated by explanatory practice, 
owing to Quine, is to do with the nature of linguistic reference to objects. 
Quine argues that observation reports do not themselves require reference to 
entities, but are coccasion sentences' made true by some portion of the visual 
scene. To report that there is a dog present, he claims, does not require 
picking out an object as such, but only recognising the distinctively doggy 
appearance of part of the visual scene. Reference to objects emerges by 
degrees, but is not complete until one needs to pick out the same stimulus of 
an occasion sentence, as when one says that 'of all the dogs, the one called 
"Fido" is the one that belongs to Mr Jones'. Individual objects are thus picked 
out by existential quantification, and types of objects by universal 
quantification (see Quine 1960, § 49). Quantified sentences are not 
observation sentences, but theoretical sentences aimed at predicting future 
experience in the light of past experience, and so individual objects and types 
of objects are just theoretical postulates. A theory that fails in some or all of its 
predictions is in need of improvement, and continual improvement will tend 
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towards an ideal theory that never fails. The values of the bound variables of 
this ideal theory, the entities and types of entities quantified over in the 
predictively adequate theory, will be all the entities there are. (For a complete 
statement of all this, see Quine 1981. ) Thus, no entity can find its way into our 
ontology, or the future perfect ontology, without a role in the overall theory 
designed to predict future experiences in the light of past ones. 
Given these motivations, it would be, to say the least, dogmatic and 
unconvincing to maintain that a certain entity or type of entity exists when it 
has no explanatory role to play. The demand that the relational experiences 
that Sartre postulates play an explanatory role, then, is not simply the claim 
that experiences explain behaviour (used in 3.4). Neither is it the strong and 
highly controversial claim that experiences are defined by their role in 
explaining behaviour (used by Lewis 1966, § 111). It is the claim that unless 
relational experiences have a genuine explanatory role, they cannot be 
included as genuine events in our ontology and so must either be reduced to 
something that does have such a causal role or be eliminated altogether. 
This does not present a problem for indirect realists, intentional ists, or weak 
disjunctivists, for they all agree that experiences are generated by neural 
stimulation (see 2.1 and 3.1) and so can happily reduce token experiences to 
token neural events or states. But there is no similar option open to Sartre. 
The relational view of experiences that identifies them with causal chains of 
events linking objects or states of affairs to brains, that is, must not be 
understood as the claim that experiences can be reduced to such causal 
chains. Since the effects of a token event are independent of its own causal 
aetiology (see 3.3), such a reduction would entail that had the token neural 
event or state involved in the experience been artificially stimulated in the 
absence of the object actually apprehended, it would have caused the same 
bodily movements (including the production of speech). This is precisely what 
adherents of the relational view of experience need to avoid: if there is an 
event in common between an actual perception and a counterfactual 
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hallucination which issues in all the behaviour appropriate to the experience, 
then that event must be counted as the experience. Reducing the experience, 
then, means reducing it to the neural event or state at the end of the causal 
chain, which means denying the relational view of experience in favour of the 
generative theory that experiences are generated by neural stimulation. The 
Sartrean construal of an experience as identical with a causal chain linking 
object to brain, then, must be understood as the claim that our best 
explanatory practice must quantify over the whole experience or causal chain 
as a genuine entity or event in its own right, rather than simply quantifying 
over the parts of that whole causal chain. 
This ontological problem is not restricted to the relational view of phenomenal 
consciousness. The relational view of phenomenal consciousness requires a 
broad conception of action, and correlatively a broad construal of the subject 
of psychological theorising as not simply the brain or body but as literally 
including parts of the body's material environment. And the ontological 
problem that arises for the relational view of phenomenal consciousness also 
arises for the broad view of action, and hence for the notion of the extended 
subject. Imagine a counterfactual world that resembles our own in all respects 
except that the stuff that falls from the sky, fills rivers, lakes, and oceans, 
comes out of taps, and quenches thirst is not H20 but XYZ. ' In the actual 
world, at time t, I am thirsty and so reach out for the glass of water (1-120) 1 see 
in front of me; in the counterfactual world, I reach out at time t for a glass of 
some other substance (XYZ). In actual and counterfactual worlds, I perform 
different broad actions - in one I drink H20, in the other I drink XYZ. If, as 
Fodor (1987,34-7) claims, these broad action specifications are simply the 
result of describing an action in terms of its environmental consequences, and 
the action itself is just the bodily movement involved, then I perform the same 
action in both situations. If experiences are supposed to explain actions 
construed as bodily movements, then since the movement is independent of 
the differences between the actual and counterfactual situations, so is the 
experience that explains it. Otherwise part of the specification of the 
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experience would be explanatorily redundant. But if the action to be explained 
is drinking H, O as opposed to drinking XYZ, then it can be explained by 
reference to a perceptual experience of H, O as opposed to one of XYZ (see 
Evans 1982,203), and this allows the object apprehended into the 
specification of the experience in just the right way for experience to be a 
relation of apprehension. If the subject is just the body or something therein, 
then the actions of that subject cannot include anything outside the body. But 
if the subject is an environment-inclusive being-in-the-world, then the actions 
of that subject can include parts of the body's material environment, such as 
glasses of water. 
Sartre clearly understands this link between his relational view of perceptual 
experiences and his conception of the extended subject. Indeed, he treats the 
claim that the subject is being-in-the-world as equivalent to his relational 
conception of consciousness, as when he writes: 'when we say that the for- 
itself is in-the-world, that consciousness is consciousness of the world, we 
must ... ' (B&N: 306). And he claims that 'the senses are our being-in-the- 
world in so far as we have to be it in the form of being-in-the-midst-of-the- 
world' (B&N: 320,325). Being-in-the-midst-of-the-world, or finding oneself 
surrounded by the world, is, for Sartre, perceptual awareness, of which vision 
is one variety. Human perceptual experience 'occurs within the limits of' 
being- i n-the-world and 'takes it for granted' (B&N: 4). It both requires and 
signifies the basic structure of human being (see STE: 26-7). 
Psychological explanation, on this Sartrean view, is explanation of actions 
broadly construed, since it is explanation of the behaviour of an extended 
subject. But this does not in itself explain why my bodily movements are the 
same in the actual and counterfactual circumstances, when I reach out for 
H20 and when I reach out for XYZ. Simply appealing to the claim that it is not 
my body which acts is not sufficient to evade this problem: the problem arises 
of explaining how it is that a body performs one action or another depending 
not on its internal constitution but on its environmental location (see Crane 
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1991 1 7). If behaviour is construed narrowly as bodily movement, we can say 
that the body moves the same way in both situations because it is constituted 
the same way in both situations. But on the Sartrean picture, this order of 
explanation must be reversed: the body moves in a certain way not because 
of its internal constitution but because the subject (broadly construed) is 
performing a certain action (broadly construed); bodily movements involved in 
actions are to be explained only in terms of those larger actions. In Sartre's 
words, 'it is the whole which determines the order and the movements of its 
parts' (B&N: 326). 
The crucial principle here is the claim that the same entity (in this case, my 
body) can move the same way in different contexts for different reasons. In 
the actual world over time-slice t, my hand traces a certain trajectory as I 
reach out for water. If we specify a collection of the sub-atomic particles that 
are actually part of my hand, we can imagine a counterfactual reality where 
over time-slice t those same particles trace precisely the same trajectory for 
some other reason - perhaps they are part not of my hand in that case, but 
of a butterfly caught on the breeze. If we wish to explain the trajectory of those 
particles, then we must take into account their context. We must take into 
account the behaviour of the larger entity of which they form proper parts. 
Similarly, for Sartre, some bodily movements are explained in terms of the 
environment-involving action that they are part of, and this action is explained 
in terms of environment-involving experience. Just as the movements of the 
sub-atomic particles are to be explained by reference to whether they are part 
of my hand or part of a butterfly, the movements of my body when I reach out 
for water are to be explained in terms of a larger entity of which my body is a 
part, the environment-involving T or being-in-the-world that reaches out for 
water. 
The ontological problem faced by broad actions and extended subjects is the 
same as that faced by the relational conception of experiences: unless they 
are quantified over in the best explanatory system, then they are not 
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ontologically genuine events or objects. In which case, bodily movements 
cannot be explained in terms of the broad action of the extended subject of 
which the body is a part. If broad actions and extended subjects are not 
ontologically genuine, action can only be construed narrowly as bodily 
movement, and this leads back to the denial of the relational view of 
experiences in favour of the view that experiences are generated within the 
body. The claim that ontology is dictated by explanatory practice, then, means 
that if there is no good reason to believe that the best system of explanation 
and hence prediction will quantify over experiences understood in Sartre's 
relational sense and quantify over extended subjects whose behaviour is 
explained by these relational experiences, or if there is good reason to 
suppose that the best system of explanation will not quantify over these 
things, then the subject will have to be identified with the body or brain and 
experiences will have to be construed as independent of the body's material 
environment. Section 4.4 is concerned with contemporary anglophone 
arguments for reductionism, which attempt to show that the best system of 
explanation will not employ psychological vocabulary. If these arguments 
work, then the best system of explanation will not quantify over relational 
experiences, broad actions, or extended subjects. I argue there that Sartre's 
position is not vulnerable to these attacks, and moreover that Sartre's position 
is positively preferable to reductionism. But that discussion requires 
understanding the basic ontological principles underlying Sartre's whole 
system, which is the subject of the next section. 
4.3 Sartrean Holism 
Sartre's ontological principles have two sources: the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century French and German critiques of associationist psychology, 
and the ontological structures delineated by Husserl in Logical Investigations. 
The resulting principles are best expressed in the slogan that, in the case of 
psychological events and the structure of the subject, the whole is more than 
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the sum of its parts. This means that the explanatory role of a whole 
psychological event or a whole extended subject cannot be reduced to 
explanations in terms of the parts of that whole, their properties, and causal 
laws governing them. In order to explain the events to be explained by 
reference to experiences and extended subjects, that is, it is necessary to 
refer to experiences and extended subjects: reference to these entities cannot 
be replaced by reference to the parts that make them up. 
In his first book, Imagination, Sartre is clearly opposed to any 'reductive 
analysis' that he equates with 'sheer mechanism' (IPC: 22). Reductionism is 
the product of 'the analytic spirit', he claims, which 'attempts to resolve a 
system into its elements and implicitly accepts the postulate that these remain 
strictly the same whether in isolation or in combination' (IPC: 20). Analytic 
thought, for Sartre, is not, as it is for twentieth century anglophone 
philosophers, a kind of thought that aims to clarify and resolve philosophical 
problems by analysing the language or concepts in which they are posed. It is 
rather the belief 'prior to all investigation, that the object in question is a 
combination of inert invariants in external relations' (IPC: 20). To understand a 
water molecule analytically, in this sense, is to hold that its behaviour can be 
explained purely in terms of the behaviour of two hydrogen atoms and one 
oxygen atom, where these behave exactly as they would had they not been 
part of a water molecule. The atoms are understood to be 'invariant' in that 
their behaviour is not affected by being part of a larger molecule; and the 
relations between them are understood to be 'external' in that they do not 
affect the behaviour of the atoms. Adopting this method leads inexorably to a 
certain ontology, in this example an ontology of water molecules that reduces 
them to collections of atoms: 'adopting a method ... [is] at the same time 
fashioning the object' since given the analytic method 'one is bound to explain 
the higher by the lower (1a supdrieur par Nnfdrioo' (I PC: 77). 
This method is taken by those who adopt it to be the method of science, and 
hence to be recommended on the grounds of the successes of science, but, 
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Sartre argues, 'science "on the march" is neither pure analysis nor pure 
synthesis, adapting its methods to the nature of the object' (IPC: 20). Sartre 
follows the Gestalt and WOrzburg schools of psychology, and those influenced 
by them, in arguing against applying this reductive analysis to psychological 
events. Abandoning analysis is 'progress' (IPC: 119), he claims, because 
'[e]very psychic fact is a synthesis' (IPC: 145). Synthetic, as opposed to 
analytic, thought recognises 'the predominance of the whole over its 
component elements' (IPC: 80). The synthetic approach to an object or event 
supposes that 'the whole gives the parts their sense and value' (IPC: 113). 2 
The term I have translated as 'value' here is 'valeue, which does not 
exclusively mean moral or aesthetic value or worth, but also economic worth 
(or buying power) and, as I suggest it should be taken here, explanatory 
value. 3 
The Gestalt and WOrzburg schools of psychology criticised associationism, a 
psychological theory which follows Hume (1975, § 3) in attempting to explain 
all thought and experience in terms of relations. such as contiguity and 
resemblance between 'ideas, on the grounds that thought and experience are 
syntheses of their parts and so cannot be understood in this analytic way. 
Although Sartre agrees with this critique, he does not assimilate himself to this 
anti -association ist movement in psychology. There are at least three reasons 
for this. First, he claims that one of the motivations of the turn to synthetic 
principles was to combat individualism which was taken to lead to 'anarchy in 
politics, and to materialism and atheism'. This could be combated only by the 
positing of 'synthetic realities' above the individual, such as 'the family, the 
nation, the society' (IPC: 26). Sartrean existentialism, as we shall see in 5.3, 
is opposed to postulating any synthetic entities above the level of the 
individual. Second, and more importantly, Sartre criticises the movement of 
synthetic psychology for not taking the idea of synthesis seriously enough, but 
instead inheriting the notion of the mental image as an inert element from its 
analytic predecessors (IPC: 19-36) 79-83,113). Sartre blames the decline of 
synthetic psychology by the beginning of the 1930s on this incoherent 
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combination of products of analytic thought with synthetic principles (IPC: 
145). Third, by the end of Imagination, Sartre has come to the conclusion that 
the results of empirical psychology are of no use in the construction of 
philosophical theories of mind, because they always presuppose some 
philosophical theory or other. Although psychological events must manifest 
and hence not be incompatible with the structures uncovered by 
phenomenology, therefore, empirical psychological claims cannot be taken as 
a ground for such findings. Imagination quietly traces Sartre's philosophical 
development very well in this respect. When he first discovered philosophy, 
he thought it a branch of psychology, a subjective description of 
consciousness (1981,6 and 8), so that philosophy and empirical psychology 
could support and influence one another. But after reading Husserl he came 
to the opinion that psychology requires phenomenology as its foundation: 
phenomenology delimits the structures of consciousness, which will be 
exemplified by any actual psychological events and states, and so underpins 
empirical psychology in the same way that mathematics underpins physics 
OPC: 129; STE: 25-6; Pl: 1-2). 
So although Sartre agrees with the synthetic psychologists' claim that 
reductive, analytic theories such as associationism are flawed by their failure 
to recognise the role a whole may play in explaining the behaviour of its parts, 
he does not derive his ontology of consciousness from the considerations of 
these psychologists. Instead, he derives it from the third investigation of 
Husserl's Logical Investigations. One anglophone philosopher has recently 
described this passage as 'perhaps the most significant treatise on the 
concept of part to be found in the philosophical literature' (Fine 1995,463). In 
this passage, Husserl delineates his notions of whole and part, ontological 
dependence and independence, and abstract and concrete. This delineation 
is relevant here only insofar as it bears on Sartre's ontology. Husserl' s 
distinction between wholes and parts is a relative distinction: a part is a part 
relative to the whole of which it is a part; if this part itself has parts, then it is a 
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whole in relation to them; and the whole of which it is a part may be a part of a 
larger whole. Every whole, though, has parts. 
Husserl's distinction between abstract and concrete is coextensive with that 
between ontological dependence and ontological independence. A part of a 
whole may either be ontologically dependent on that whole, or ontologically 
independent of it. An ontologically dependent part can exist only as part of a 
whole. Husserl's example is colour (§ 7), but as the ontology of colour is part 
of the issue in this chapter, we can substitute shape: a shape is dependent on 
the whole of which it is a shape because there cannot be just shape without it 
being the shape of something. Shape is dependent (Abhjngig) because it is 
not self-standing (Selbstjndig), it cannot exist on its own (§ 5). Husserl dubs 
dependent parts 'moments' (Momente) and claims that they are abstract on 
the grounds that they cannot exist except as parts of a whole (§ 17). ' 
Independent parts, by contrast, are entities whose existence is not dependent 
on a larger whole of which they are parts: 'they may, but need not, enter into 
more comprehensive wholes' (§ 7). In contrast to abstract moments, 
independent parts are concrete entities that Husserl dubs 'pieces' (StOcke). A 
whole entity, then, such as a table, is made up of parts. Some parts are 
dependent on being parts of the table (e. g. shape) and these are abstract 
moments of the table. The others are independent of their role in table- 
construction (e. g. atoms) and these are concrete pieces of the table (see also 
Husserl 1982, §15). 
Husserl's ontology of parts and wholes makes no reference to explanation. In 
Logical Investigations, at least, he does not think of theory construction and 
evaluation in terms of explanatory and predictive value, but in terms of a priori 
laws, because his paradigm of reliable scientific theory is not experimental 
science but mathematics (see 1970, Prolegomena, §§ 67-71). By the time of 
writing Ideas, this use of mathematics as a paradigm had a new rationale: 
mathematics is the 'eidetic' science, the science of the essences of structures, 
which underpins physics (1982, § 9). Just as physics applies the 
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mathematical possibilities to the actual world, on this view, the formal ontology 
of Logical Investigations provides the structural possibilities that are to be 
applied to reality in ontology itself. 
And this is precisely what Sartre does in Being and Nothingness: he applies 
the structures of Husserlian formal ontology to the ontology of consciousness 
and being-in-the-world. He criticises Descartes's inability to explain fully his 
notion of 'the substantial union of mind and body', and his related inability to 
account for mental causation, on the grounds that 'it is not profitable first to 
separate the two terms of a relation in order to try to join them together again 
later. The relation is a synthesis. Consequently, the results of analysis cannot 
coincide with the moments of this synthesis' (B&N: 3). ' Analysing a whole into 
parts that function just as they would if they were not parts of a whole, 
applying the 'analytic' method, presupposes that all the parts of the whole are 
independent parts, or pieces. Dependent parts, or moments, cannot exist 
except as parts of a whole, and hence cannot feature among the results of 
such analysis. So if the whole is a synthetic whole rather than a mere 
aggregate of genuine entities, if the whole in question has moments as well as 
pieces, this fact about the whole will be missed by those employing the 
analytic method. Sartre is here claiming that the relation between 
consciousness and being in-itself is a synthetic relation involving abstract 
parts or moments, and which therefore cannot be completely captured by 
'analytic' thought. ' 
He goes on to explain the relation between consciousness and what he 
shortly afterwards calls 'the synthetic relation which we call being-in-the-world' 
(B&N: 4). He begins by affirming Husserl's distinction between abstract and 
concrete entities: 'an abstraction is made when something not capable of 
existing in isolation is thought of as in an isolated state. The concrete by 
contrast is a totality which can exist by itself alone' (B&N: 3). This distinction 
between concrete and abstract is the traditional metaphysical distinction 
between substance and attribute, rather than the traditional logical distinction 
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between subject and predicate. The logical distinction is between a term 
which picks something out and a term which describes something already 
picked out, so to say that the ball is red is to predicate redness of the ball. But 
the fact that redness is a predicate here does not preclude it from being a 
subject elsewhere, as in the claim that the red is vibrant. To say that red is 
abstract, as Sartre does, then, is not to say that red is a predicate: whether or 
not red is a predicate depends on the context and is not a fact about redness 
itself - What is a fact about redness, though, is that it cannot occur except as a 
property of something else: if redness is postulated at all, then it must be as 
the red of something. The notion of a substance, on the other hand, is the 
notion of a thing to which predicates might be applied but which cannot itself 
be predicated of anything else. It is an item that can exist without depending 
on another item, or in Sartre's words, 'a totality which can exist by itself 
alone ). 7 
Since phenomenal consciousness cannot exist without an object of 
apprehension (see 1.1 and 2.1), an episode of consciousness is an abstract 
part of some larger totality which includes the object of apprehension as a 
part. The appearance, or phenomenon, is also abstract because it is the 
phenomenal consciousness: to be aware of an apple is for an apple to appear 
to one. And this requires, as Sartre points out (B&N: 3), someone for the 
apple to appear to, so the consciousness or appearance cannot be a property 
of the apple but must be a property of some larger object that includes that 
apple as a part. This concrete entity, 'the synthetic totality of which 
consciousness, like the phenomenon, constitutes only moments', he tells us, 
'is man within the world in that specific union of man with the world which 
Heidegger, for example, calls "being-in-the-world"' (B&N: 3). Although 
Heidegger's term 'being-in-the-world' indicates being embedded in a social as 
well as a physical environment, and also indicates a certain essential relation 
to temporality (e. g. 1962, § 41), Sartre's conception of consciousness does 
not require assent to these aspects of Heidegger's analysis of the human way 
of being, requiring only the denial that the subject is contained within the skin 
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and in principle separable from its environment (see also Clark and Chalmers 
1998, particularly p. 16). 
A perceptual visual experience of a table, an episode of visual consciousness 
of a table, then, is the relation between the brain and the object seen, 
including all the physical events in between. But it is not a relation between 
the subject of psychological theorising and an object: the relation is internal to 
the subject. The part of this relation that makes it an experience is not an 
ontologically independent piece of the relation, such as a neural event, but an 
ontologically dependent abstract part or moment of the whole relation. The 
relation is to be taken as a synthetic whole event, and the talk of 
consciousness and appearance are to be taken as adverting to attributes of 
the synthetic whole. Similarly, the notion of being-in-the-world is meant to pick 
out a synthetic whole made up of being in-itself, centred on but not identical 
with the human body (the'man'which is united with the world). 
This does not mean that consciousness should be pictured as some ethereal 
substance floating above the chunk of being-in-itself that is the human body 
and its environment any more than the mass or shape of a table is an ethereal 
substance floating above its wood. And it does not mean that being-in-the- 
world is some ghostly entity binding various elements of being in-itself 
together, but that it is a region of being in-itself understood as a synthetic 
whole with attributes or properties that are not attributes or properties of its 
parts. Sartre is quite clear on this point: talk of a synthetic whole made up of 
being in-itself does not introduce entities that are not part of being in-itself, but 
rather classifies regions of being in-itself as wholes. Sartre calls these regions 
'body' even though they extend beyond the flesh-and-blood animal bodies 
that they include: 
'The body is nothing other than the for-itself ... it is the 
fact that 
the for-itself is not its own foundation ... As such, the 
body is not 
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distinct from the situation of the for-itself since for the for-itself, 
o exist and to be situated are one and the same' (B&N: 309) 
The being for-itself, which exists in situation as being-in-the-world, then, is 
identical with a region of 'body': 'the body is a necessary characteristic of the 
for-itself 
... the very nature of the for-itself demands that it be body' (B&N: 
309); 'the soul is the body' (B&N: 310). And 'body' must be understood in the 
extended, environment-involving sense of situation: 
'my body is everywhere in the world; it is over there in the fact 
that the lamp-post hides the bush which grows along the path, 
as well as in the fact that the roof up there is above the windows 
of the sixth floor ... My body is coextensive with the world, 
spread across all things' (B&N: 318). 
Consciousness of the world, such as perceptual visual experience of it, must 
be predicated of this extended body. When Sartre claims that this body is 
'coextensive with the world', 'world' here does not mean the totality of being 
in-itself but the world as experienced by me, which includes my human body 
and the objects of apprehension as they are apprehended rather than as they 
are in themselves (see 1.3). This body 'is a permanent structure of my being 
and the permanent condition of possibility for my consciousness as 
consciousness of the world' (B&N: 328): it is the subject that I am, and is 
required by the claim that my experience is apprehension of the world. The 
monism of Sartre's account is clearest when he writes: 'the body is what this 
consciousness is; it is not even anything except body' (B&N: 330). 
Sartre's talk of the 'nothingness' of consciousness, as opposed to the being of 
being in-itself, then, should not be taken as a claim that a conscious event is 
something other than the region of being in-itself that makes it up. It is 
precisely that region of being in-itself. The term 'nothingness' should rather be 
taken as an alternative name for an abstract part, a moment, of such a region. 
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Calling consciousness a nothingness, that is, is meant to highlight the fact that 
the conscious aspect of a conscious event is not a proper part, a piece, of 
being in-itself but rather an attribute of a piece of being in-itself, a piece which 
itself can be broken down into pieces. In the case of vision, a perceptual 
experience is a region of being in-itself linking the object seen to the brain of 
the perceiver via lightwaves, retinas, and optic nerves. The conscious or 
experiential aspect of this event is not a piece of it, such as a neural event, 
but is an attribute of the event as a whole. Because it cannot exist on its own, 
because it is not a being, it is a nothingness. This is why consciousness 'is not 
even anything except body': it is not a thing, but an attribute of a region of 
body. We must, therefore, agree with Catalano (1974,67; 1986,41 and 45) 
that Sartre's ontology is not dualistic but monistic. 
In order to maintain the claim that relational experiences and extended 
subjects are ontologically genuine entities, as we have seen (4-2), these 
entities must be postulated in the best system of explanation and prediction. 
This requires, in turn, that attributes be predicated of these entities in the best 
system of explanation. If everything there is to be explained can be explained 
without reference to properties of social groups, for example, then social 
groups are to be construed as no more than collections of individuals. And if 
the best system of explanation does not need to predicate of whole causal 
chains linking the brain to the object seen, then these causal chains are to be 
construed as a collection of individual events in sequence rather than 
ontologically respectable wholes. And, further, if the best system of 
explanation does not need to predicate attributes of extended subjects, 
attributes such as broad actions, then extended subjects are to be construed 
as mere aggregates of ontologically respectable entities, such as human 
brains or bodies and items in their environment. 
Sartre argues that the nothingness of consciousness, the status of the 
conscious or experiential aspects of conscious or experiential events as 
attributes to be predicated of the whole event, is necessary to explain the 
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appearance of nothingnesses within the world. Entering the caf6 where I have 
arranged to meet my friend Pierre and finding that he is not there, he claims, 
ccause[s] the absence of Pierre to happen as a real event concerning this 
caf6' (B&N: 10). He goes on to argue that this absence in the world, this 
nothingness, cannot be produced by being in-itself, and so must be 
introduced by a being which is itself nothingness. Hence the experiential 
aspect of a conscious event must be a nothingness capable of introducing 
other nothingnesses into the world (B&N: 22-4). He goes on to argue that all 
the negations of the world, those that separate a figure from its ground (see 
1.2), and that present the possibility of a negative answer to any question and 
the fragility and destructibility of objects (B&N: 5-9) are introduced by the 
nothingness of consciousness, and that this nothingness is itself experienced 
in anguish (B&N: 29-34). 
But this argument is, to say the least, extremely problematic. One problem is 
that there seem to be plenty of other ways of construing the negative 
judgements involved in some experiences of the world without claiming that 
nothingness is itself experienced. Given Sartre's own notion of the 
intentionality of experience as presenling an object under an aspect, it would 
seem that all that is necessary is possession of the concept of negation or 
absence and its application in experience. Sartre claims that understanding of 
negation can only be grounded in direct experience of nothingness in the 
world, just as understanding of being can only be grounded in direct 
apprehension of being (B&N: 17). But there seem to be plenty of alternative 
theories of the comprehension of logical constants, and Sartre has not 
considered them. Moreover, it does not seem that Sartre can insist that our 
comprehension of being and of nothingness are both founded on 
acquaintance with instances of them: since one is merely the absence or 
opposite of the other, it seems that acquaintance with either will suffice for 
understanding both. As we saw in 2.4, for example, Sartre's claim that 'being' 
can be understood only by apprehension of it is undermined by the possibility 
that 'being' is understood through the experience of things resisting my will, 
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an experience that can be had on any conception of consciousness. So 
'nothingness' could be understood, by contrast, through the responsiveness of 
imagined objects to my will. 
This is not to say that Sartre is wrong to deny that the experience of Pierre's 
absence from the caf6 is to be understood in terms of experiencing what is 
present in the caf6 and judging that Pierre is not there (B&N: 10): his claim 
that Pierre's absence is experienced as part of the world can be conceded 
without also conceding that nothingness must be apprehended in order to be 
understood, since it may be that the concept of nothingness is prior to 
experience but one of the determinations that may be applied in experience 
(see 1.3). 
Besides these problems with Sartre's somewhat glib assertion of a theory of 
the comprehension of 'nothingness', it is difficult to see how his claim that the 
nothingnesses which we apprehend must be founded on the nothingness of 
consciousness is to be reconciled with his claim that consciousness, and 
hence being for-itself, 'is not its own foundation' but is founded on being in- 
itself (e. g. B&N: 309). If the nothingness of consciousness can arise from an 
organised region of being in-itself, why must the nothingness of Pierre's 
absence be founded on a nothingness rather than on being in-itself? Sartre 
has no answer to this, partly because he does not attempt to explain the 
'upsurge' of the nothingness of consciousness from being in-itself: his 
concern, he tells us, is with ontology, or what there is, and not with 
metaphysics, or how what there is came to be (B&N: 619-21). 
Instead of attempting to plug the numerous holes in this argument, I will 
ignore it. This is for two reasons. First, the claim that a perceptual experience 
is an ontologically respectable whole event linking the brain of the subject to 
the object perceived, and the concomitant theory of the extended subject, are 
necessary aspects of Sartre's relational view of consciousness, as we have 
seen (4.2). And this relational view of consciousness, as we have also seen 
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is the only theory that ties experiences to mind-independent reality in a 
way that precludes the possibility of experiences occurring in the absence of 
mind-independent reality, and a theory that precludes this, as we have also 
seen and as Sartre points out (2.3), is to be recommended on the grounds 
that it avoids Humean scepticism about the nature of reality. (Sartre also has 
two positive arguments for his relational conception of consciousness, but 
these fail to establish their conclusion (see 2.4 and 2.5). ) So the leaky 
argument that the experiential aspect of a conscious event must be 
considered a nothingness, an abstract moment of the event, on the grounds 
that we experience nothingness in the world, is superfluous for present 
purposes: its conclusion is required by the relational view of experiences 
which is recommended on other grounds. Second, the aim of this discussion 
is to assess whether Sartre's position, rather than his arguments for it, can 
survive the contemporary naturalistic attack on anti reduction ist approaches to 
consciousness. The attack is based on the claim that consciousness cannot 
have a role in the best explanatory system, and hence cannot be ontologically 
respectable, without being reduced to neural activity. In the next section, I 
spell out the arguments for this reductionist conclusion and argue not only that 
Sartre's position can be defended against them, but also that Sartre's holistic 
form of anti reductionism is actually preferable to reductionism: there are 
explanatory gains to be had by agreeing with Sartre that experiences are 
identical with (but not reducible to) causal chains linking brains to objects of 
apprehension and construing the subject of such experiences as an 
environment-inclusive being-in-the-world. 
4.4 Naturalism and Reductionism 
Current arguments for the reduction of psychological states, events, 
properties, or whatever, to physical (usually neural) ones are based on the 
combination of the claim that ontology is dictated by explanatory practice with 
some version of the claim that the best explanatory system is natural science 
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and this system does not quantify over psychological entities. The first of 
these claims, detailed in 4.2, seems incontrovertible. If something has no 
explanatory role to play, then there can be no evidence for it, for if there were 
then it would explain that evidence. Sartre, moreover, claims that irreducible 
experiences of an irreducible extended subject do have an explanatory role, 
that in these cases 'it is the whole which determines the order and the 
movements of its parts' (B&N: 326). So the debate over reductionism hinges 
on the issue of whether the best explanatory system quantifies over relational 
experiences and extended subjects. 
Quine argues that natural science is the best theory we have for predicting 
future observations on the basis of past ones, and so on pragmatic grounds 
we should accept as ontologically respectable only those entities quantified 
over in natural science (1981,20-1). But this is not, of course, to say that the 
future best system of explanation, a completed natural science, will not 
quantify over relational experiences and extended subjects, and so leaves 
open the possibility that these are ontologically genuine entities. A more 
robust argument for reductionism is premised on the belief that natural 
science is explanatorily adequate, causally closed, or complete: every 
physical event that admits of causal explanation can be provided with a 
physical causal explanation (Lewis 1966, § IV; Kim 1989b, 43; Papineau 
2000,183-4). This claim gives rise to the problem of explanatory exclusion, 
the problem that a single type of event should not be systematically ascribed 
more than one complete and independent type of causal explanation. If a 
complete physical explanation of any physical event that admits of 
explanation, such as an action, can be given, it is argued, then there will be 
no room left for an explanation in any other terms unless that explanation is 
reducible to the physical one: it is implausible to claim that all actions have 
two complete and independent causal explanations, one physical and the 
other mental, either of which would have sufficed to bring about the action on 
its own. ' 
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One problem with this argument is that it is not clear what 'physical' means in 
the claim that every physical event has a complete physical explanation. If it 
means the events picked out by current natural science, then it is simply not 
true to say that current natural science can explain every physical event. And 
if it means the events picked out by some future perfected natural science, 
then there seems no good reason to be confident that this future science will 
not include reference to mental events such as experiences (Crane and 
Mellor 1990,188). But this problem is easily avoided. We can replace 
reference to physical or naturalistic explanations with reference to non-mental 
explanations. Any event that can be specified without using mentalistic 
vocabulary, according to this version of the argument, can be given a 
complete explanation in terms of events that can be picked out without using 
mentalistic vocabulary. So a human action can be explained without reference 
to experiences, beliefs, and desires. There are two ways to support the claim 
that a complete non-mental explanation can be given of any event specifiable 
in non-mental vocabulary. One is to appeal to the development of natural 
science: over the last couple of centuries, explanations in terms of the 
influence of forces have generally either been reduced to explanations in 
terms of the basic physical forces, or eliminated from explanations altogether, 
so that explanations of non-mental events need not make reference to any 
forces but the basic ones (Papineau 2000). The other is to point out that 
mental events or properties are not independent of non-mental events but are 
accompanied by them and in some way founded upon them. So any event 
that can be explained by reference to mental events or properties, such as a 
human action, can also be explained with reference to the non-mental events 
that the mental events or properties are founded on (Kim 1993,203-10; 1997, 
282-7; 1998,38-47). 
In this way, the problem of explanatory exclusion certainly arises for Sartre's 
theory of phenomenal consciousness. An experience, for Sartre, is not a free- 
floating event over and above the causal chain linking the brain to the object 
of apprehension, but is identical with that causal chain (see 4.3), and the 
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causal chain can be specified without the term 'experience' or any other 
mentalistic vocabulary. An action that can be explained with reference to this 
mental event, then, can be given a complete explanation in terms of the non- 
mental specification of that event, the causal chain. Since the causal chain is 
the mental event, that is, one explanation entails the other. The only way to 
defend Sartre's position against this argument is to deny the claim that we 
should deal with the problem of explanatory exclusion by including only the 
non-mental explanation in our best explanatory system. What needs to be 
denied, that is, is the claim that the explanation in non-mental terms, in terms 
of the causal chain, is to be considered as the complete and independent 
explanation, and the mental explanation that refers to the experience is 
thereby to be reduced to it. As we have seen (4.2), this reduction would be 
disastrous for Sartre's position. 
Kim has given two related reasons for this claim that only the non-mental 
explanation should be included in our best explanatory system, but neither is 
convincing. At one time he argued that explanatory priority is to be given to 
the lower-level explanation on the grounds that science progresses when 
higher-level explanations are replaced by lower-level ones (1989a, 84-5). A 
similar claim is that when one entity is ontologically dependent on another, 
any explanation in terms of the first must be dependent on an explanation in 
terms of the second (1989a, 90). This claim is similar because higher-level 
events are ontologically dependent on lower-level ones, so again higher-level 
explanations are in principle to be replaced with lower-level ones. The 
problem with this claim that higher-level explanations must be reducible to 
lower-level ones is not simply that it would remove genuine causal 
explanation from the realms of such respectable sciences as geology, biology 
and neurophysiology (Baker 1993,77). Perhaps genuine causal explanation 
must seep down away from these sciences, even though, as Burge (1993, 
102) points out, it has never been shown to. The more important problem with 
the principle that explanation must seep downwards to ever lower levels of 
science is that it simply does not seem true even in the case of the 
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incontestably respectable science of chemistry. Explanations of events in 
terms of the properties of water molecules cannot be replaced with 
explanations in terms of hydrogen and oxygen atoms: water molecules have 
properties that neither hydrogen nor oxygen atoms have. Of course, there is 
no more to a water molecule than two hydrogen atoms and an oxygen atom 
standing in a certain bonding relation, but the behaviour of these atoms is to 
be explained by reference to their place in this structure, and hence this 
structure, this water molecule, must be quantified over in the best system of 
explanation. And this point is not restricted to chemistry. If we want to explain 
why an ice-skater, to change the example, fell through the ice, we must 
quantify over the ice-skater. The ice-skater had a certain mass that put more 
pressure on the ice than the ice could take. No part of the ice-skater had that 
mass: the explanation must quantify over the whole ice-skater, the whole 
collection of ice-skater parts held together in a certain way. 
It is for this reason that Kim rightly abandoned the principle that all 
explanation seeps downwards in favour of a picture of explanation which, like 
Sartre's ontology, allows for genuine, non-reducible explanations in terms of 
wholes made up of parts. Rather than embrace the 'excessively narrow' and 
'groundless' conception of genuine causal explanation that his original 
principle leads to (Kim 1998,113), he argues that genuine physical 
explanations can be given in terms of two sorts of properties in addition to 
those that feature in basic physics. The first sort are functional properties, 
second-order properties defined over physical properties. Such a property is 
the property of having a physical property with a certain causal role. The 
dormativity of a sleeping-pill is such a functional property, as it is the property 
of having some physical property that makes people go to sleep. Different 
physical properties can play this functional role. Moreover, since it is the first- 
order, physical property that plays the causal role, functional properties do not 
introduce new causal powers into the world: the pill does not put you to sleep 
because of its dormativity, but rather it has dormativity because it puts you to 
sleep. Thus, explanations in terms of functional properties reduce 
to 
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explanations in terms of the first-order properties they are defined over (see 
Lewis 1966; Kim 1998,97-106). 
The second sort of property that is not mentioned in basic physics but which 
can feature in a genuine causal explanation nonetheless is a 'micro-based' 
property (Kim 1998,84), the kind of property which Armstrong terms a 
'structural' property (Armstrong 1978, vol. 2, ch. 18). This is the property of 
having proper parts of certain kinds and standing in certain relations. Being a 
water-molecule is the micro-based property of being composed of two 
hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom in a certain bonding relation. Such a 
property counts as physical only if the constituents are physical and the 
relation is physical. But the micro-based property is not identical with the 
properties of its parts since it is a property of the higher-level entity of which 
they are parts, and it features in explanations that the constituent parts cannot 
feature in: water molecules do things that neither hydrogen nor oxygen atoms 
can (Kim 1998,85 and 116-7). Explanations in terms of micro-based 
properties, then, are not reducible. The higher-level entity is what Sartre calls 
a 'synthetic whole'. Analysing it into its proper parts, or pieces, overlooks its 
micro-based properties, which are abstract parts or moments of the whole that 
explain things that cannot be explained just by reference to the pieces. The 
whole with a micro-based property is greater than the sum of its independent 
parts. 
Kim argues that mental events and properties must be reduced to other 
properties by being understood as functional properties on the grounds that 
they cannot be understood as micro-based properties of a larger whole. The 
reason he gives for this is that neural properties are not properties of parts of 
entities that have mental properties. Rather, neural and mental properties 'are 
at the same level ... they are 
both had by human beings and other sentient 
creatures' (1998,117). But this begs the question against Sartre's form of 
holism, according to which mental properties are had by extended subjects 
and neural properties are had by neural systems which are parts of subjects. 
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So long as the subject of psychological theorising is not identified with the 
neural system, there is no reason why mental properties should not be 
thought of as properties of subjects, properties defined in terms of the 
constituent parts of subjects, and since Sartre does not identify the subject 
with the neural system, his position is immune to this objection. So long as my 
perceptual visual experience of a table, for example, is not predicated of my 
brain but is predicated of the extended subject of which my brain, the table, 
and other events connecting them are parts, that is, there seems no reason 
why the experience cannot be understood as a micro-based property defined 
in terms of those parts. 
It might be thought that the variable realisability of mental properties 
precludes understanding them as micro-based properties of subjects defined 
over the properties of parts of subjects. The micro-based property of water, for 
example, is defined in terms of hydrogen and oxygen particles, but there is no 
such simple definition of the neural state required by a particular mental 
property. Any one of a number of possible neural states or events might be 
present when the subject is undergoing a certain experience (see Putnam 
1968). But there seems no reason why we cannot construe mental properties 
as variably realisable micro-based properties, defined as properties of entities 
having proper parts meeting one of the specifications from a certain list. 
The argument for reductionism, therefore, fails to show that mental events 
such as experiences must be reduced to the non-mental events that help to 
constitute them. But in addition to this, there seems to be positively good 
reason not to reduce them but rather to include them in the best system of 
explanation and prediction. The reason for this stems from the variable 
realisability of mental events. My token perceptual visual experience of a 
glass of water is in fact identical with a set of non-mental events of type P, but 
an experience of the same kind might have been identical with a set of non- 
mental events of the different type Q, or R, or S ... etc. 
To reduce the 
explanation of my reaching out for the glass of water from an explanation in 
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terms of my experience to an explanation in terms of the non-mental events it 
is identical with, then, is to claim that the basic system of explanation includes 
not just one explanation for my behaviour, but a whole set of them: the 
behaviour could be explained by any of P, Q, R, S, etc. Aside from the 
simplicity of including just a single type of explanation in the best system, that 
in terms of the mental property related to each of P, Q, R, S etc., including the 
single explanation represents an explanatory gain over reduction: it explains 
why each of P, Q, R, and S all produce the same effect; it explains that each 
of these distinct types of event produces the same effect because each is the 
foundation of the same type of experience and the effect is to be explained in 
terms of that type of experience. 
It seems, then, that an experience should not be reduced to the non-mental 
events that help to constitute it, but should rather be quantified over in the 
basic system of explanation as an ontologically genuine event with a distinct 
explanatory role. But this does not yet show that the relational conception of 
an experience as identical with the causal chain linking apprehended object to 
brain, rather than as generated by neural stimulation, is ontologically 
acceptable, for it does not yet show that the extended subject required by 
such a conception of perceptual visual experience is acceptable. Kim's claim 
that mental properties must be reduced to neural ones since they are 
properties of the same entities fails to impugn Sartre's holistic 
anti reductionism on the grounds that Sartre's position denies that the subject 
is the neural system, but Sartre's conception of the extended subject is not 
the only conception of the subject that evades Kim's objection: simply 
identifying the subject with the whole body of which the neural system is a 
part will suffice. 
The foregoing argument, however, can be adapted to show that the subject 
should be construed as the environment-dependent being-in-the-world rather 
than simply the body, by showing that there is an explanatory gain to be had 
by construing the actions that experiences explain as environment-involving 
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behaviour rather than mere bodily movement. This explanatory gain stems 
from the fact that environment-involving behaviour, like the experience that 
explains it, is multiply realisable: there are even more ways to pick up a glass 
of water than there are to skin a cat. If action is construed simply as bodily 
movement, then the experience that explains the action will explain each of 
the possible overall bodily movements that could have occurred, each of 
movement-types P, Q, R, S, etc. But if action is construed broadly, as 
environment-involving, then this explains why each of P, Q, R, and S can be 
explained in terms of the same kind of experience: each of P, Q, R, and S are 
the foundations of the same type of environment-involving action, and this 
environment-involving action is to be explained in terms of a certain kind of 
experience. There is, therefore, an explanatory gain to be had by construing 
action broadly. This, in turn, requires that the entity that acts, the subject of 
psychological theorising, be construed broadly as being-in-the-world: 
quantifying over broad actions involves quantifying over extended subjects 
that perform them. 
Sartre's ontology of experience and subject, then, is both immune to the 
contemporary physicalist arguments for reductionism and preferable to 
reductionism. Sartre's position agrees with one premise of the argument for 
reduction, that any non-mental event that can be given a complete 
explanation can be given a complete non-mental explanation, so any event 
explainable in mental terms is also explainable in non-mental terms. But it 
denies that the mental explanation is thereby to be reduced to the non-mental 
one, claiming instead that the mental explanation has a place in the best 
explanatory system and the non-mental explanation can be given only 
because the non-mental events it specifies are parts of the mental event 
specified in the mental explanation. Kim's claim that the reduction must be 
made since explanations always seep downwards seems false in the light of 
the irreducibility of water molecules to the atoms and relations that make them 
up: the best system of explanation will quantify over water molecules in order 
to explain things that cannot be explained in terms of hydrogen and oxygen 
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atoms themselves. Kim's attempt to disallow applying the water molecule 
model to psychological explanations presupposes that psychological 
predicates are applied to the same entities as certain physical predicates. But 
on Sartre's model, this is simply not true: psychological predicates are applied 
to the subject understood broadly as being-in-the-world, where physical 
predicates are applied to parts of this broad subject, including brains and 
parts of the environment. 
Sartre's model is holistic: the relation between an experience and the causal 
chain of events that it involves is a mereological relation; the experience is a 
whole of which the events in the causal chain are (independent) parts. And 
this requires his holistic model of the extended subject: the subject is a whole 
of which brain, body, objects of apprehension, and everything linking such 
objects to the brain, are (independent) parts. It is this holistic character of 
Sartrean anti reduction ism that renders it immune to the argument for 
reductionism. Current anglophone forms of anti reduction ism do not have this 
holistic character, holding that mental properties are properties of brains 
supervening on their neural properties (e. g. Searle 1983, ix; Nagel, 1986,32; 
Honderich 1988,165), and are for that very reason vulnerable to the 
argument for reductionism. These theories cannot resist Kim's argument 
because they predicate both neural and mental properties of the same 
entities: brains. And this leads to the problem of causal-explanatory exclusion: 
non-holistic anti reduction isms either lead to the systematic postulation of two 
complete and independent explanations of every deliberate action, or must 
deny that a complete neural explanation can be given of action without 
providing a framework for understanding how it is that the mental properties 
can make a difference to the causal powers of the neural properties. 
Understanding experience as a property of an entity of which the brain (with 
its properties) is a part evades this problem: the behaviour of the part is 
explained by the behaviour of the whole of which it is a part, just as the motion 
of a hydrogen particle that is part of a river is explained in terms of the 
movement of the river. Anti reduction ism, then, requires holism. 
29a 29 
Holistic antireductionism, moreover, makes positive explanatory gains over 
reductionism: it explains why diverse types of physical event can all result in 
the same kind of bodily movement and, conversely, why diverse kinds of 
bodily movements can issue from the same physical or experiential event. 
Diverse physical events can issue in the same bodily movement because they 
all underpin the same mental event, such as an experience, and this mental 
event explains the bodily movement; diverse bodily movements can be 
explained in terms of the same mental event because those movements 
underpin the same kind of broad action and it is this broad action that is 
explained in terms of the mental event. In the next section, I will argue that 
this holistic framework has a further advantage over reductionism: it can block 
the classical attack on the claim that phenomenal consciousness is 
apprehension of mind-independent reality outlined in 4.1 whilst doing justice 
to both the fact that the colours of experience are only ever experienced as 
aspects of the world and the fact that the colours of experience have a 
particular phenomenal, qualitative nature that cannot be analysed purely in 
terms of representational content. 
4.5 Colour and Qualia 
Sartre's relational view of experience, as we have seen (4.1), seems 
vulnerable to the classical attack on naYve realist theories of vision which 
points out that the familiar phenomenal colours of everyday visual experience 
cannot be construed as aspects of the mind-independent reality seen. 
Descartes and Locke base their forms of this argument on the claim that 
natural science is the best guide to mind-independent reality and does not 
quantify over colours. Since the colour a surface seems depends on the 
structures of the eyes of the beholder and on the colours of adjacent and 
nearby surfaces, moreover, it simply does not seem that the phenomenal 
colours of experience are aspects of the mind-independent objects we see. 
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Even if, as Campbell (1993,263) suggests, we can understand colours as 
properties of objects supervening on the microphysical structure of their 
surfaces, these colours are not the same as the phenomenal colours of 
experience. These colours, if there are such things, remain constant while the 
phenomenal colours we experience vary with lighting conditions, retinal 
structures, coloured lenses, and the proximity of objects with different 
reflectance properties. Phenomenal colours of experience, then, are not 
properties of the surfaces of objects. What are they? 
The challenge to Sartre's relational conception of experience is to explain 
apparent phenomenal colour without predicating colours of the regions of 
being in-itself seen and without undermining the claim that experience as not 
generated by neural stimulation but is identical with (but not reducible to) a 
causal chain of events linking object to brain. In order to preserve the 
relational conception of experience, that is, phenomenal colour must be 
analysed in terms of some aspect of visual experiences themselves in a way 
that does not lead back to the claim that perceptual visual experiences are 
generated within the skin. There are two ways to analyse colour in terms of an 
aspect of visual experience. One is to claim that the apparent colours of 
objects are a result of the representational content of the experience: 
apparent colours are representations of some aspect of mind-independent 
reality. The other is to claim that apparent colours are not representational at 
all, but are simply qualities of the experience itself, or iqualia). 
The first of these options is not available to Sartre, for two reasons. First, the 
notion that colour is a matter of the representational content of some 
experiential state leads to a denial of Sartre's strong disjunctivism in favour of 
the view that perceptual visual experiences are generated within the skin. 
Since all perceptual visual experience presents objects (or appears to) that 
are coloured, if my experience of colour is a matter of being in a state that 
represents a mosaic of coloured patches around me, then there is no room 
left for a relational component of the experience. My entire experience could 
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be understood in terms of this representation, perhaps with some additional 
representational content, without any need to postulate in addition any relation 
other than representation between my brain or body and the seen object. If 
this representation can be specified independently of environmental 
conditions, this position would be one of intentionalism, indirect realism, or 
phenomenalism (see 2.1). If, on the other hand, the representation of 
coloured expanses is in some way dependent on conditions in my immediate 
environment, then this position would be the weak form of disjunctivism that 
postulates object-dependent representations (see 3.2). Either way, construing 
colour experience in terms of representing the environment leads to a 
construal of perceptual visual experience itself as representation of the 
environment whereas Sartre claims that a perceptual visual experience is not 
a representation of an object but is apprehension of it. 
The second reason why Sartre must construe colour experience in terms of 
qualia rather than representational content is his broadly empiricist theory of 
the acquisition and application of the concepts (or 'determinations) under 
which we classify objects in thought and perception. These representations, 
he claims, are built up from repeated exposure to the qualities of objects that 
surround us, and their employment as part of the structure of experience is 
motivated by the presence of the relevant qualities in the visual field (see 2.5). 
If this theory of the acquisition and application of classificatory 
representations, such as 'red', is not to be circular, the presentation of 
qualities involved must not itself be a presentation of representations. Instead, 
the representations must be built up and applied on the basis of some non- 
representational aspect of experiences. 
So in order for Sartre's theory of visual awareness to be acceptable, it must 
be possible to explain the appearance of phenomenal colour in terms of 
nonrepresentational aspects, or qualia, of relational perceptual experiences. 
Sartre says very little about colour in this connection, but I will show that his 
theories of the felt qualities of emotion and pain provide a framework that can 
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equally be applied to colour qualia within his theory of relational perceptual 
visual experiences, and that he intended this framework to apply to colours 
and other qualitative aspects of experience. 
The central claim of Sartre's Sketch for a Theory of Emotions is that emotion 
'is a specific manner of apprehending the world' (STE: 57). This should not be 
taken to mean, as Crane (1998) takes it to mean, that emotion is a mode of, 
or a family of modes of, intentional awareness of the world, just as vision and 
hearing are modes of intentional awareness. Loving or hating something, on 
this reading, are manners of apprehending the object just as seeing or 
hearing it are. It should rather be taken as the claim that emotions are 
modifications of modes of intentional awareness of objects, so that love and 
hate are not intentional relations to objects themselves but are ways in which 
intentional relations to objects are coloured or textured. The loved object, on 
this reading, literally looks loveable to the lover. Sartre claims that the 
instrumental ('hodological') values and structures of objects as tools or 
obstacles in relation to my aims and projects are values and structures 'of the 
world given to perception' (STE: 63). Instrumentality is a feature of the world 
in ordinary phenomenal consciousness (see 1.3), and it is precisely this 
instrumentality that is lost when consciousness is subject to emotions such as 
anger (STE: 58) and fear (STE: 88-9). Emotion is a manner of apprehending 
the world, then, in that it alters the way in which the world is seen and 
otherwise experienced (see also STE: 64-5). This view is retained in Being 
and Nothingness. Sartre there claims that 'affective qualities', or qualia of 
emotion, such as shame, are 6simply a matter of the way in which 
consciousness exists its contingency; it is the very texture of consciousness 
... it is the manner in which consciousness exists' 
(13M 331). Shame is not a 
kind of consciousness of the world, then, but the 'texture' of conscious nesses; 
it is not a kind of conscious event alongside vision but a modification of 
conscious events such as vision, a way in which awareness of the world is 
'lived' (vdcu) by consciousness (13M 331). 
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Sartre's account of the qualia of emotion is sketchy to say the least, but he is 
most explicit on the subject of pain. Pain, he tells us, is not an intentional 
event in itself: 'pain is totally void of intentionality' (B&N: 332). The pain in my 
eyes as I read a text, he claims, 'is not distinguished from my way of 
apprehending transcendent words' (B&N: 332-3). Of course, if I turn my 
attention from the book to the pain in my eyes itself, then the intentional object 
of my awareness, the figure posited on the ground, will be my eyes, and the 
pain will be a modification of my coenaesthetic awareness of my eyes. But 
while attention remains focused on the book, the pain is a modification of my 
visual awareness of the book. If attention is focused on the book and the pain 
is in my finger or back, so that it does not affect my vision, then 'the pain in my 
finger or back is [part of] the apprehension of the world as ground' (B&N: 
335). My nonthetic awareness of the world as ground on which the book 
stands as figure can be as affected by the qualitative feel of pain as can my 
awareness of the book. Pain, then, is 'the translucent matter of 
consciousness, its being-there, its attachment to the world' (B&N: 333); to be 
in pain is to be the subject of conscious relations to the world 'whose 
contexture, whose being-there [is] painful' (B&N: 333). To be in pain is to 
apprehend the world painfully. 
Sartre applies this model of qualia to vision only once. 'Blindness, Daltonism 
[colour-blindness], and myopia [short-sightedness]', he claims, 'originally 
represent the way in which there is a world for me; that is, they define my 
visual sense in so far as this is the facticity of my upsurge' (B&N: 319; my 
emphasis). If we are to take 'blindness' here in its usual sense as a catch-all 
term for a wide variety of sight deficiencies, rather than in its narrow sense of 
the rare condition of a total lack of eyesight, Sartre is here claiming that these 
conditions are modifications of seeing, conditions which affect the ways in 
which the world is seen. To the short-sighted, for example, the world is seen 
vaguely and fuzzily; to the colour-blind it is seen monochromatically or 
according to some other nonstandard colour scheme. Colours, along with the 
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relative vagueness or sharpness of the entities seen, are a matter of the ways 
in which objects are seen. Colour terms are adverbs of seeing. 
This adverbial theory of qualia terms does not assimilate Sartre's position to 
the adverbial theories of perception. According to those theories, to say that 
Jones sees a red ball is to say that Jones experiences redly and roundly. 
Experiences, on this view, are modifications of the subject, and do not involve 
the apprehension of any (mind-independent or mind-dependent) object (e. g. 
Chisholm 1957,120-5). The claim that qualia terms are adverbs of 
experience, on the other hand, is compatible with Sartre's relational view of 
experience as apprehension of part of mind-independent reality: qualia are 
simply modifications of those relational events. 
Sartre's theory, then, can meet the challenge presented by the arguments 
outlined in 4.1: it can provide an account of the appearance of phenomenal 
. colour without predicating colours of regions of being in-itself or undermining 
the relational conception of perceptual visual experience by claiming that our 
experience of colour is generated within the skin. The experience that is 
identical with but not reducible to a certain causal chain linking object to brain 
can have qualia predicated of it. The fact that the colours of visual experience 
are dependent on the structures of the eyes of the beholder as well as on 
environmental factors such as lighting conditions and the surface reflectance 
of objects does not show that colour experience itself is in or behind the eyes 
of the beholder. The dependency need not be causal, but may be one of 
supervenience. The adverbs used of the whole event of awareness may, in 
the terminology introduced in 4.4, be considered to pick out variably realisable 
micro-based properties: given certain surface reflectance structures, lighting 
conditions, and retinal structures, as well as structures of the optic nerves and 
brain, a whole event made up of a causal chain linking object to brain via 
reflection of light into the eyes of a subject will have the property of revealing 
that object to the subject redly. 
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It might be thought that the fact that such conditions as short-sightedness and 
colour-blindness can be traced to defective retinal structures shows that visual 
experience occurs within the skin, but such a thought would confuse two 
questions. The medical question is concerned with the differences between 
those who are and those who are not short-sighted or colour-blind. And this 
question is answered by the fact about retinal structures. The philosophical 
question is concerned with what it is to see objects in one way or another, and 
the Sartrean answer to this question is that seeing is a relational event whose 
parts involve neural patterns, retinal structures, lightwaves, and the surface 
reflectances of the objects seen, and seeing an object a certain way is a 
matter of the phenomenal character of this whole relational event, a 
phenomenal character which will supervene on the structure of the relational 
event. This is quite compatible with the medical facts: the structure of the 
event can be altered by altering the surface of the object, the lighting 
conditions, the structures of the retinas, or the chemicals present in the brain; 
and altering the structure of the relational event in any of these ways can alter 
its phenomenal character, because the phenomenal character supervenes on 
the whole lower-level structure of the event. Such a supervenience of the 
phenomenal character of experience grounds its nature as an objective event: 
anyone capable of reproducing the conditions in which the experience 
occurred will have an experience of the same phenomenal character; anyone 
with a visual system relevantly similar to mine can see the colours I see in the 
conditions in which I see them. 
The central objection to qualia, voiced by those who prefer to construe colour 
experience in terms of representational content, concerns the transparency of 
experience, the fact that in order to describe an experience of the world it is 
necessary to describe the world as it seems (see Strawson 1979,43-4; 
Evans 1982,227-8; Valberg 1992, ch. 2). Colours appear to be properties of 
things, not of experiences. In seeing the deep blue of the ocean, the objection 
runs, I am aware of just that - the deep blue of the ocean: my experience 
represents the ocean as deep blue; my experience is not an awareness of the 
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ocean coupled with a blueness that is the property of the experience. The 
experience of the ocean, then, is transparent: we cannot separate out in our 
experience properties of the experience from properties the object is 
experienced as having. And this, the objection runs, shows that colour 
experience must be analysed not in terms of properties of experiences as 
such but in terms of properties that objects are represented as having, in 
terms of content, not qualia (Harman 1990; Tye 1992; Crane forthcoming, § 
4). Sartre does not base his view of qualia on a claim that we can experience 
qualia separately from the objects of experience. Phenomenology, for Sartre, 
is not about what it is like to have a certain kind of experience or the way the 
world seems in a certain kind of experience: it is a study of what it is for 
something to appear to us (see 0-3). And he readily admits, in fact, that colour 
qualia cannot be experienced except as seeming to be properties of objects: 
Lwe never in ourselves encounter that phantom and strictly 
subjective impression which is sensation. One will admit that I 
apprehend only the green of this notebook, of this foliage and 
never the sensation of green nor even the "quasi-green" which 
Husserl posits as the hyletic material which the intention 
animates into the green-as-object ... I never encounter anything 
but objects in the world' (B&N: 315-6). 
And the same goes for the qualia of emotions and pain: 
ga joy, apprehended on the unreflective level, is only the 
"reflected" presence to a laughing and open world full of happy 
perspectives' (B&N: 173) 
'Neither must we say that the pain is an "overprint" or that it is 
like a harmony "superimposed" on the things which I see' (B&N: 
333) 
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If qualia can occur only as modifications of conscious relations, if colour qualia 
can occur only as modifications of perceptual visual relations to objects, then 
colour qualia cannot be experienced separately from awareness of objects. 
And if, moreover, colour qualia are modifications of visual relations to objects, 
if the appearance of phenomenal red is to be analysed as the appearance of 
an object redly to a subject, then the phenomenal red will always appear to be 
a property of the object seen: if the object appears redly to me, then the object 
looks red to me. Looking at a white wall with ordinary eyesight in ordinary 
lighting conditions, the wall looks white to me, but if I modify the relation 
between the wall and my brain by donning rose-tinted spectacles, then the 
wall will look rose to me. Or, to switch examples, we can say that I am always 
aware of my foot in proprioception and kinaesthesia, but that sometimes I am 
aware of my foot painfully, which is to say that the foot appears to me 
painfully, which is why the pain is felt to be located in the foot (compare Crane 
forthcoming, § 6). Switching examples again, 'the man who is angry sees on 
the face of his opponent the objective quality of asking for a punch on the 
nose' (B&N: 163; my emphases). If qualia are modifications of relational 
events linking objects to brains, then it is impossible to separate qualia from 
objects of experience and qualia will be experienced as properties of the 
objects: they will be properties of the world, where this is taken to mean the 
world of experience rather than being in-itself (see 1.3). These facts can 
hardly be used to mount an objection to qualia when qualia are understood as 
modifications of the apprehension of reality. 
Analysing colour experience in terms of qualia rather than representational 
content, moreover, seems to be the only way to do justice to the nature of our 
colour experience. The first problem encountered by representational theories 
of colour concerns the correctness conditions for the representations: just 
what does the experience of a certain shade of blue represent? There are two 
possible answers to this question. One is that they represent the mind- 
independent structures that cause them. Each colour-representation, on this 
view, has a disjunctive set of correctness conditions, matching different sets 
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of surface reflectances, lighting conditions, and proximities to other types of 
surface and lighting (Dretske 1995,88-93). The other is that they represent 
objects as actually having phenomenal colours. An experience that represents 
a tomato as red, on this view, represents the tomato as having the property of 
being red. There are two variants on this view. One is to claim that since 
colours are not properties of mind-independent reality, colour representations 
are always misrepresentations: their correctness conditions are never fulfilled, 
so they never represent reality correctly (see Mackie 1976,14). The other is 
to claim that colours really are properties of mind-independent objects: they 
supervene on the physical structures of objects, and explain why objects look 
the way they do in ordinary light (Campbell 1993,263). 
The problem with representationalism about colours, however, is that 
whatever it is that the phenomenal colours of experience represent, it seems 
that they do so in a particular way. In which case, they cannot be analysed 
purely in terms of what they represent. The way in which they represent, if 
,. they do, moreover, seems to be a particularly qualitative way. If the 
phenomenal colours of experience represent objects to be coloured, as 
Mackie and Campbell claim, then this could be represented by co-ordinates 
that specify locations on a three-dimensional colour chart, for example. And if 
they represent the physical conditions that give rise to them, as Dretske 
claims, then these could similarly be encoded in numerical formulations. 
Experience could represent precisely what these theories claim it represents, 
then, without there being phenomenal colours of experience. The world could 
look like a complex colour-by-numbers picture. But it does not. So the 
phenomenal colours of experience cannot be accounted for purely in terms of 
what they represent. The phenomenal colours of experience, that is, can be 
understood as representational only if it is allowed that they represent in a 
certain way. And the difference between this way of representing and other 
ways of representing the same facts seems to be qualitative. It seems to be a 
matter, that is, of the qualitative nature of the representations, which brings 
the notion of colour qualia back into the account. But given that the Sartrean 
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account provides an explanation of how it is that objects appear coloured 
without making reference to representations of colours, it seems that since 
qualia cannot be removed from the account, the talk of representation is 
redundant. The phenomenal colours of experience, then, are best construed 
simply as qualitative modifications of the visual experience of objects. 
The Sartrean view of colour, then, is that reality appears coloured because of 
the way in which it is apprehended in vision. The colours of experience are 
modifications of relational visual experiences of objects and supervene on the 
physical structures of those experiences. Once this move has been made, 
Campbell's (1993,263) claim that colours can be considered as objective 
properties of objects supervening on the physical structures of their surfaces 
which explain why things look certain colours in ordinary conditions is 
redundant. Things look to be coloured in certain ways in ordinary conditions, if 
indeed ordinary conditions can be specified, for precisely the same reason 
that they appear coloured in other conditions: because given a certain 
physical structure of a relational experience, the experience will have a certain 
qualitative property in virtue of which the object looks to be a certain colour. 
And if qualia are construed as modifications of relational events linking seen 
objects to bodies or brains, then the transparency objection to qualia is no 
objection: the Sartrean view entails that we cannot see pure colours but only 
parts of the world as coloured. So Sartre's relational view of perceptual visual 
experiences, together with his remarks on the qualia of emotion, pain, and 
vision, provide a framework for analysing colour that does justice both to the 
transparency of experience and to the apparent fact that the colours of 
experience have a particular phenomenal, qualitative nature that cannot be 
analysed purely in terms of representational content without needing to claim 
that colours really are properties of the objects of experience. 
Crane (forthcoming) advocates a different relational theory of intentionality, 
according to which the phenomenal character of an intentional state is given 
by the combination of its content and the mode in which that content is 
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presented. Seeing an aeroplane is different from hearing one. Pain, he 
argues, can be construed as a mode of awareness: English grammar aside, 
you can pain your foot just as you can see it. The distinctive feeling of pain, on 
this view, is like the distinctive nature of seeing as opposed to hearing: it is a 
result of the mode of awareness. This account, however, has a principal 
shortcoming that the Sartrean account of qualia does not have. Treating pain 
as a sense modality like vision fails to take account of the qualitative 
differences between varieties of pain. Moreover, since colours are to be 
accounted for within a theory of vision, Crane's account of pain qualia cannot 
be extended to colour qualia, and so cannot rival the representationalist 
account of colour. This latter theory seems not to do justice to the fact that the 
same set of aspects of the environment could be represented by different 
experiences, the fact that the world does not look like a colour-by-numbers 
picture. The Sartrean theory, on the other hand, provides a single type of 
account for all qualia of experience while leaving the different modes of 
intentionality as the generally accepted senses: sight, hearing, smell, taste, 
touch, proprioception, kinaesthesia. 
4.6 Conclusions 
In this chapter, then, we have seen that the ontological principles of part- 
whole relations that Sartre has adopted from Husserl provide him with a 
framework for his relational theory of phenomenal consciousness and his 
related view of the extended subject that is immune to both the classical and 
the contemporary naturalist arguments against naive realist theories of visual 
awareness. Sartrean holism, as we have seen, is the view that a conscious 
relation to an object is identical with but not reducible to a causal chain linking 
object and brain or body. In the case of visual experience, this is a causal 
chain involving lightwaves, retinas, and optic nerves. This relational event is 
identical with but not reducible to the causal chain in that the best system of 
explanation and prediction of events will, on Sartre's view, quantify over the 
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whole relational event, not just over the parts that make up the causal chain. 
This is because the whole relational event has properties, such as colour 
qualia in the case of vision, which must be mentioned in an explanation of the 
behaviour that issues from the experience. 
We have seen (4.4) that Sartrean holism is preferable to its central rival, 
reductionism, on the grounds that Sartrean holism has explanatory gains to 
make over reductionism, and hence a greater contribution to make to the 
future predictively perfect system. It can explain, where reductionism cannot, 
why diverse types of physical event can all result in the same kind of bodily 
movement (because they all underpin the same mental event, which in turn 
explains the bodily movement) and why diverse kinds of bodily movement can 
issue from the same physical or experiential event (because they underpin the 
same kind of broad action, which is explained in terms of the mental event). 
We can now add to this that holism is preferable to reductionism on the 
grounds that holism can account for the qualia of experience as properties of 
conscious relations. Reductionism is caught on the horns of a dilemma when 
it comes to qualia: either admit that qualia are epiphenomena of experience or 
analyse them as representations in order to reduce them to their causal roles. 
The problem with the first horn is that there do not seem to be any 
epiphenomena, so this is tantamount to denying colour experience altogether 
(4.2), and the problem with the second is that it does not seem possible to 
analyse colour experience purely in terms of representation (4.5). So long as 
colour experiences are considered to have distinctive qualitative aspects, 
reductionism will lose out to the Sartrean holist view of these qualia as 
properties of the larger irreducible event. 
Together with his distinction between 'world' and 'being in-itself', this theory of 
colour allows Sartre to affirm that the world we experience is coloured while 
the mind-independent reality out of which it is formed is not. The world, for 
Sartre, is formed by the interplay of consciousness and being in-itself. More 
accurately, my world is the way being in-itself appears to me (see 1.3). So my 
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world contains all the colours it seems to, along with other instrumental 
properties linked to my projects, such as the property of being a table, even 
though the appearance of these colours is dependent on the structures of my 
retinas. And the fact that these colours are not properties of being in-itself 
does not preclude my perceptual visual experiences being direct relations to 
chunks of being in-itself: the direct relations have properties, which we can 
think of as filters, which ensure that mind-independent reality appears 
coloured to me even if it is not so. 
The considerations of this chapter also ground the fact that Sartre's theory of 
phenomenal consciousness is immune to the group of classical arguments 
against nalve realist theories of vision that has not yet been considered. 
These are the arguments from illusion. These arguments are based on a 
mismatch between the way reality seems in experience and the way it really 
is. One form of the argument claims that reality is not really coloured, and we 
have seen that the Sartrean construal of colour qualia as modifications of 
experiential relations means that reality will look coloured even if experience 
consists in apprehension of a non-coloured reality. Another form is based on 
science: a table, according to Eddington (1928, xi-xii), is mostly empty space 
pervaded by fields of force, but it looks like a solid object. Still another form is 
based on perspective: a table appears to grow larger as we approach it, but 
the table of course does not change in size (Hume 1975,152). Snowdon 
(1992) has pointed out that these arguments do not force us to conclude that 
the object of apprehension in perceptual experience is not a part of mind- 
independent reality, such as a table, since to say that something looks solid or 
looks to diminish in size is not to say that anything really is solid or really does 
diminish. Given the Sartrean view of modifications of visual experience, we 
can explain how the way something looks may differ from the way it is. The 
way it looks, that is, is not simply a function of the way it is, but also of the 
structures of our awareness of it. It is the 'texture' or 'translucent matter' 
(B&N: 331,333) of consciousness that accounts for the fact that a certain 
region of space pervaded by force fields, if that is the correct way of 
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describing mind-independent reality, looks solid. And perspective is similarly a 
function of the relation of apprehension: the size something looks to be is 
partly due to facts about the relation of apprehension, such as the length of 
the causal chain involved. 
Sartre's ontology of the subject as not the brain or body but an environment- 
including being-in-the-world, furthermore, means that his position is immune 
to an argument against externalist theories of mental events that we have not 
yet considered. This argument is based on the principle that events and states 
can feature in an explanation of the behaviour of a certain entity only if they 
occur within or are states of that entity or their influence on the behaviour is 
mediated by some event occurring within or state of that entity. Character 
traits of your parents are relevant to explaining your behaviour only if those 
character traits are genetically encoded or socially transmitted and are now 
also traits of yours; raising the temperature around the fuel will cause the fuel 
to ignite only if it first causes a raise in the temperature of the fuel. The 
thought that scientific psychology must obey this principle underlies the 
argument that a relation between subject and object cannot explain a piece of 
behaviour unless it explains an event within the subject that issues in that 
behaviour, but since the causal aetiology of this inner event is irrelevant to its 
issuing in that behaviour and since the behaviour in question includes the 
speech-behaviour that describes the experience or other mental event, the 
inner event that issues in this behaviour is the experience or other mental 
event in question (e. g. Fodor 1987, ch. 2; Crane 1991,8-9). As Dretske puts 
it: 'The itch I feel has to be in me to explain why I scratch' (1995,35; see also 
McDowell 1986,152-3). It is for this reason that many philosophers believe 
that 'mental phenomena are to be located where the persons that undergo 
them are' (Macdonald 1990,399). And since the persons that undergo mental 
phenomena are usually identified with brains or bodies, the argument 
concludes that mental phenomena such as experiences must occur within the 
brain or body and so do not involve parts of the body's material environment. 
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This argument has not previously been considered in this thesis because the 
status of the principle that it rests on is unclear. Although there seem to be no 
counterexamples to it (see Webber 2000), the principle is usually assumed 
rather than argued for. But we can now see that Sartre's position is immune to 
this argument even granting this principle. Sartre's relational conception of 
experience, that is, does not hold experience to be a relation between the 
subject of psychological theorising and the object: it is a relation between 
brain or body and object, and this relation is wholly within the subject. The 
subject, for Sartre, transcends the body and includes parts of the bodyls 
physical environment. And this allows him to agree that the experience is an 
event within or state of the subject even though it is not an event within or 
state of the body. 
Wider's (1997) error, in claiming that Sartre treats the human body as the 
subject of consciousness, is either not to notice that although Sartre does use 
the term 'body' in this sense of the-skin-and-within in some discussions, he 
claims that the subject of psychological theorising is 'body' in the Cartesian 
sense of region of mind-independent reality (see 4.3), or to confuse two 
senses of 'subject': the body in the sense of the-skin-and-within is indeed at 
the subject-end of an intentional relation, but the whole relation including the 
entities at the subject and object ends are all within the subject of 
psychological theorising, the entity that perceives and acts, the being-in-the- 
world. Sartre does hold, that is, that 'the human body is the subject term of 
conscious relations' (Morris 1975,31), but it does not follow from this that 
gconsciousness ... can 
be ascribed to the human body itself' (Morris 1975, 
47). Rather, the two claims are incompatible: as Sartre is aware, the former 
requires that the subject of psychological theorising, the entity to which 
conscious events are ascribed, must be a being-in-the-world whose 'body' 
extends beyond the skin and includes the entities that lie at the object ends of 
its conscious relations. 
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The ontological structures that underpin Sartre's conceptions of the relational 
nature of consciousness and the extended nature of the subject show that 
Sartre's theory of reality is not one of structural idealism, but of structural 
realism. Being in-itself, within Sartre's system, must have mind-independent 
ontological structures, for the emergence of conscious subjects requires these 
structures. The fact that some regions of being in-itself (such as human 
bodies or brains) can be at the subject-end of intentional relations where 
others (trees, tables) cannot further shows a commitment to structural realism: 
there must be some structural difference between those chunks of being in- 
itself that can be at the subject-end of intentional relations and those that 
cannot. The analysis of colour qualia in terms of the structures of the different 
types of causal chains linking objects to brains via lightwaves and retinas 
provides further evidence of structural realism underpinning Sartre's system: if 
the causal chains did not (of their own nature) have different structures, 
whence the different colours? Sartre's comments that appear to commit him 
to structural idealism, to the claim that being in-itself is in itself 
undifferentiated, must be taken as a commitment to the claim that the 
structures of the world as it appears to us and as we live in it do not purely 
reflect the structures of being in-itself, but also of our projects and concerns. 
The ontological structures underpinning Sartre's system, moreover, form a 
monistic framework. There is, for Sartre, one single hierarchy of structures of 
one single type of substance: being in-itself. Some chunks of being in-itself 
are made up of smaller proper parts, and some are proper parts of 
ontologically genuine larger wholes. The 'moments' predicated of wholes, on 
which their ontological genuineness rests, are not ethereal entities made of 
some other substance, but simply properties that must be predicated of the 
larger whole entity. Sartre, then, is not a Cartesian dualist. Being and 
nothingness are not two substances. A nothingness is a part of an entity that 
cannot exist on its own, an 'abstract' part or 'moment', whereas a being is a 
proper part, a 'concrete' part or piece, that can exist on its own. The extended 
subject, or being-in-the-world, is made up of various proper parts (all regions 
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of being in-itself, which Sartre calls 'body') bound together by the 
nothingnesses of consciousness, such as qualia. 
Sartre's Cartesianism comes to this: because the behaviour of the extended 
subject must be explained by reference to the intentional conscious relations 
between body and object that help to make it up, because being-in-the-world 
and its mental life and behaviour cannot be reduced to a mechanistic 
interaction of the subject's proper parts, the behaviour of the subject is 
explained only by conscious events. The immediate explanation of my action, 
on the Sartrean holist account, makes ineliminable reference to a conscious 
event: such an explanation cannot be replaced by a mechanistic neurological 
explanation. Sartre is Cartesian because he equates human freedom with the 
ineliminable explanatory role of consciousness (see B&N: 24-5). 
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Conclusion 
Existentialism and Mind 
This thesis has investigated four central aspects of the theory of phenomenal 
consciousness in the early works of Jean-Paul Sartre: his understanding of 
experience as an intentional relation, his arguments for his claim that 
experience is direct apprehension of a part of mind-independent reality, his 
theory of the difference between perceptual and hallucinatory experience, and 
his ontology of experience and the subject of experience. In this conclusion, I 
summarise my exposition and assessment of these aspects of his theory 
(5.1), before drawing out its ramifications for the conception of 
phenomenology and general ontological principles that should be ascribed to 
Sartre (5.2) and for central aspects of his existentialist theory of human nature 
(5.3). 
5.1 Review 
The theory of phenomenal consciousness in the early works of Jean-Paul 
Sartre, then, holds that experience is a relation between the brain or body of 
the subject and an object of apprehension, and that awareness of the 
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qualitative aspects of this object motivates the application of classificatory 
'determinations'. In the case of perceptual experience, these determinations 
aim to track the manifest qualities of the object of apprehension, classifying 
that object both in terms of its own properties and in terms of the aims and 
projects of the subject. Because the determinations aim to classify the object 
of apprehension in perceptual experience, this object of apprehension is the 
intentional object. In imaginative experience, such as hallucination, on the 
other hand, the determinations are cued by the qualities of the object of 
apprehension but do not aim to classify that object itself. Rather, they stipulate 
an imagined object. This is the intentional object, the object posited and to 
which attention is paid. The determinations applied on the basis of the 
manifest qualities of the object of apprehension are themselves acquired from 
previous experience. These determinations are built up through a process of 
6polyvalent negation ), and so pick out objects and qualities by picking out what 
they are not. This approach to determinations saves the broadly empiricist 
claims that these determinations are acquired on the basis of experience and 
deployed in experience on the basis of qualitative awareness of the object 
from objections based on Wittgenstein's private language argument. This 
structure of experience as involving qualities and determinations, for Sartre, 
means that the world of everyday experience is constructed by the interplay of 
consciousness and being in-itself. 
This theory of the structure of experience was detailed and discussed in 
chapter 1. Sartre's arguments in favour of a relational conception of 
intentionality, of experience as literally including the parts of mind- 
independent reality experienced, was the subject of chapter 2. There we saw 
that the introduction to Being and Nothingness, 'The Pursuit of Being', aims to 
establish this conception of experience. Sartre provides three arguments for it, 
two of which he runs together and presents as a single 'ontological proof' of 
his claim. Neither of these two arguments, however, succeeds in establishing 
its conclusion. The third argument, that Sartre does not emphasise, is that 
unless we consider experience to literally include parts of reality, unless we 
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deny that experience is ontologically independent of the surrounding 
environment, we will be encumbered with the impossibility of providing a 
definitive and conclusive ontology of reality. Given that the relational 
conception of experience is the only conception that guarantees that an 
experience cannot occur in the absence of a mind-independent object of 
apprehension (3.3), we can agree that Sartre's conception of experience is 
the only conception that does not foreclose the project of providing a definitive 
and conclusive ontology. But this does not show that conception to be correct, 
only desirable. Sartre's failure to establish his position, however, does not 
mean that the position is of no interest to current debate. 
The importance of Sartre's position to current debate became clear in the 
remainder of the thesis, which discussed the motivations for denying such a 
relational conception of experience in favour of the view that an experience is 
ontologically independent of the environment. The same experience can 
occur as either perceptual or hallucinatory, on this 'two-component' view of 
-perception, and is perceptual only if it accurately represents and / or is caused 
by part of the environment. The first set of motivations for the two-component 
view concern the phenomenon of hallucination. In chapter 3, we saw how 
Sartre's position is immune to all four versions of this motivation. Sartre holds 
that both perception and hallucination involve apprehension of a mind- 
independent object, and the deployment of determinations. The difference lies 
in the attitude in which the determinations are deployed: in perception, they 
aim to track the qualities of the object apprehended; in hallucination, they 
specify a distinct, intentional object. The four forms of the argument from 
hallucination for the two-component view of perception all rest on one of three 
principles that Sartre's position already denies. Since subjectively 
indistinguishable experiences may involve different objects of apprehension, 
and hence be different experiences, Sartre's position denies that the 
subjective indistinguishability of perceptual and hallucinatory experiences 
means that they are the same type of experience. Since Sartre holds 
experience to consist in a relation of apprehension rather than a 
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representation generated by neural stimulation, his position is immune to the 
objection that the same type or token experience as is involved in a 
perception could be brought about by artificial neural stimulation in the 
absence of the object actually perceived. And since Sartre holds there to be 
an object of apprehension in hallucination, his position is immune to the 
objection that the experience that explains the hallucinator's behaviour does 
not involve an object of apprehension and so neither does the experience that 
explains the perceiver's behaviour. In the course of this chapter, we also saw 
that current anglophone attempts to evade the arguments from hallucination 
can provide no satisfactory response to the argument that the same token 
experience can be brought about as either a perception or an hallucination. 
The problem with these attempts lies in their affirmation of the claim that 
perceptual experiences are brought about by neural stimulation. The 
argument from hallucination cannot be evaded except by following Sartre in 
denying this claim (3.3). 
The second set of motivations for denying the relational conception of 
experience in favour of the two-component theory of perception is based on 
ontology. There are two such motivations, which were discussed in detail in 
chapter 4. First, since phenomenal colours, colours as we experience them, 
are not features of mind-independent reality, it is argued, visual perceptual 
experience cannot be considered a direct apprehension of mind-independent 
reality. The Sartrean construal of the colours of experience as qualitative 
properties of experience, we saw, can account for the distinctive qualitative 
nature of colour experience where its representationalist rival cannot, and 
allows for the fact that the colours we experience are not experienced as 
properties of the experience but as properties of the world. And we also saw 
that Sartre's appeal to modifications of relational experiences allows him to 
evade all forms of the argument from illusion, which claims that reality is not 
the way it seems in experience so experience cannot be direct apprehension 
of reality. The way reality seems, for Sartre, is partly due to facts about the 
way in which it is apprehended. 
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The second ontological motivation for denying the relational view of 
experiences is presented by the principle that ontology is best dictated by 
explanatory practice. Whatever can be explained by an experience, moreover, 
can also be explained by the non-mental events involved in that experience. 
Many current anglophone philosophers conclude from this that experiences 
must be reduced to neural states or events. But, as we have seen, there is no 
good reason to accept the claim that the best explanation of behaviour will 
refer only to neural events. There are, moreover, explanatory gains to be had 
by explaining behaviour in terms of experiences themselves: it explains why 
each of a set of distinct types of neural event may result in the same type of 
action. Experiences should not, if this is right, be reduced to neural states or 
events. In the course of this discussion, we saw that Sartre's relational 
conception of experience requires a broad construal of actions as including 
parts of the body's physical environment as well as the movement of the 
body. And we saw that this requires that the subject that experiences and 
acts, the subject of psychological theorising, is not the brain or body but an 
environment-inclusive extended subject, or being-in-the-world. These 
Sartrean conceptions of broad action and the extended subject, I argued, also 
make explanatory gains over the reductionist view of the subject as the body 
or brain and its actions as bodily movements. They explain why distinct types 
of bodily movement may be explained by the same experience: because they 
are different ways of performing the same broad action, and this is explained 
by the experience. If this is right, Sartre's holistic position is preferable to the 
reductionist claim that the subject is the brain or body, its actions are simply 
movements of the body, and the experiences that explain them occur within 
the body. 
The theory of phenomenal consciousness in the early works of Jean-Paul 
Sartre, then, occupies a distinctive and challenging position in debates over 
consciousness. The radically challenging nature of the theory is due to its 
denial of some of the basic tenets of theories of experience. First, it denies 
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that experience is basically a matter of representation, claiming that an 
experience itself includes the experienced object. Second, and relatedly, it 
denies that experience is generated by neural stimulation, claiming that an 
experience is a relation between brain and object. And, third, it denies that 
hallucination is experience in the absence of a mind-independent object of 
apprehension. These three denials, together with a theory of the different 
application of determinations in perceptual and hallucinatory experience, are 
sufficiently robust to withstand the motivations for the standard view that an 
experience is generated by neural stimulation and may occur as either 
perceptual or hallucinatory, and so is ontologically independent of extra- 
cranial reality. The mainstream anglophone attempt to resist these 
motivations retains the claim that experience is a form of representation 
generated by neural stimulation, and as we saw in 3.3 this attempt fails. In 
conjunction with the denial of the traditional belief that the subject of 
psychological theorising is an entity in principle separable from the physical 
environment, such as the body, - brain, or soul, in favour of the claim that it is a 
being-in-the-world comprising the body and parts of the body's environment, 
Sartre's position provides an ontology of experience and the subject that 
resists arguments for reductionism and is preferable to it, and which provides 
an innovative approach to the experience of colour and other qualitative 
aspects of experience such as pain. In extricating this detailed and robust 
position from Sartre's texts, I hope to have vindicated my claim in the 
introduction to this thesis (0.5) that careful exegesis involving historical 
analysis may yield positions more challenging to contemporary thought, and 
hence of more interest to contemporary debate, than will be yielded if it is 
presumed that the text shares the concerns and conceptual apparatus 
dominant in one's current philosophical milieu. Two key parts of this exegesis 
in the present case, for example, are recognising that for Sartre 
phenomenology' is the study of what appearing is, and hence includes 
ontology within its purview, and that for Sartre 'intentionality' is not 
representation. 
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Having summarised the major claims of this thesis and their importance to 
current debates over consciousness, the rest of this conclusion is concerned 
with the ramifications of my exegesis and assessment for the phenomenology 
and ontology that should be ascribed to Sartre (5.2) and for the distinctive 
claims of existentialism that Sartre builds on his theory of consciousness 
(5.3). 
5.2 Phenomenology and Ontology 
In the introduction to this thesis (0.3), we saw that phenomenology, for Sartre 
as for Husserl and Heidegger, is a study of what it is for something to appear 
to one, and that the ontology of appearance is thus within the purview of 
phenomenology. And we also saw that since Sartre holds that appearance is 
always the appearance or apprehension of a part of mind-independent reality, 
the ontology of appearance includes within it the ontology of mind- 
independent reality, and hence phenomenology includes general ontology 
within its purview. We also saw that, like Husserl and Heidegger, Sartre aims 
to pursue phenomenology without relying on any presuppositions embodied in 
the culture or otherwise imported from other theories and without the 
colouring of idiosyncratic prejudices. But, as we saw, his phenomenological 
method is not the same as either Husserl's or Heidegger's. Sartre, like 
Heidegger, rejects Husserl's method of phenomenological reduction, but 
unlike Heidegger he retains Husserl's belief that the structures of appearing, 
once viewed without presuppositions about their nature, can simply be 
described. Having studied in detail Sartrean phenomenology in action, we are 
now in a position to delineate more sharply the kind of phenomenology Sartre 
is engaged in. And we can situate the resulting ontology, Sartre's conception 
of the relation between consciousness and reality, more precisely in relation 
to the forms of realism and idealism delineated in 0.4. This section discusses 
theseissues. 
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It may seem that there is a contradiction at the heart of Sartre's 
phenomenology. We saw in chapter 3 that Sartre recommends approaching 
ontology not in abstract terms, in terms of types of event, but in concrete 
terms, in terms of token events (3.3). But we also saw that he considers his 
phenomenology to be an eidetic science, aimed at identifying the essences of 
the events under discussion (3.5). The apparent contradiction arises from the 
fact that it is only as a certain type of event that an event could have the kind 
of essence Sartre aims to identify. He aims to identify, for example, the 
essence of perceptual experience and the essence of imaginative experience, 
but a token event could only have such an essence given that it is an event of 
the perceptual experience or imaginative experience type. Sartre himself 
does not seem to have seen any contradiction in this. In Sketch for a Theory 
of the Emotions, he characterises phenomenology as being concerned with 
concrete events and essences in the same sentence: 'the principle of 
phenomenology is to g6go to the things themselves", and its method is founded 
upon the eidetic intuition' (STE: 21). The apparent contradiction is resolved by 
the facts that by a 'concrete' object or event, Sartre means to include the 
types that the token falls under - 'a spatial-temporal thing, with all its 
determinations, is an example of the concrete' (B&N: 3; my emphasis) - and 
that he does not object to discussing types of object or event as such, but only 
to discussing them without consideration of their instantiations. He objects to 
discussing appearance, for example, without consideration of concrete events 
that fall under the type 'appearance), on the grounds that such a discussion is 
liable to overlook aspects of those concrete events other than the aspect of 
being an appearance. Some of these aspects may turn out to be essential to 
the event's being an appearance. An appearance, Sartre points out, is an 
appearance of something to something, and so an event can fall under the 
type 'appearance' only if it includes a thing which appears and a thing to 
which it appears (B&N: 3). It is essential, that is, to an appearance that it is a 
concrete event involving a thing which appears and a thing to which it 
appears. This essence of appearance is liable to be overlooked, Sartre 
claims, by any philosophy that studies the abstract notion of 'appearance' 
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without consideration of concrete appearances (B&N: 3-4). Such a 
philosophy, that is, is liable to reify appearance rather than treat it, correctly, 
as the appearing of something (compare B&N: xxxvi). Sartre's 
phenomenology is based on consideration of concrete events, then, on the 
grounds that the essences of types of events are not likely to be correctly 
identified if we consider only those types themselves and not the conditions 
required for their instantiation. 
A second question about Sartre's phenomenology is whether it is 
presupposition less. Whether, that is, Sartre adheres to Husserl's 
methodological principle that we should 'avail ourselves of nothing but what 
we can make essentially evident by observing consciousness itself' (1982, § 
59). We saw in chapter 1 that Sartre's first step in pursuing his 
phenomenological ontology is to point out that unless we allow consciousness 
to be direct apprehension of reality, it will be impossible to formulate a 
definitive ontology. So it may seem that the first step of Sartre's 
phenomenological ontology is based on the presupposition that a definitive 
ontology can be formulated or that a definitive ontology should be formulated. 
But these are not the sort of presuppositions that phenomenology aims to 
preclude. They are not theoretical claims imported implicitly or explicitly from 
previous theoretical work or idiosyncratic or cultural prejudices concerned with 
the nature of the object of investigation. They are rather part and parcel of the 
enterprise that Sartre is engaged in: the aim of attempting to provide a 
detailed and justified general ontology requires a starting point that allows the 
formulation of that ontology. 
The formal ontological structures that Sartre imports from the work of Husserl 
and on which he bases his own ontology (see 4.3), however, seem more like 
a presupposition. After all, Sartre employs these structures without defending 
their use: he simply acknowledges his debt to Husserl (e. g. B&N: 3). But this 
does not mean that these formal ontological structures can only be 
considered a presupposition of Sartrean phenomenology. The study of 
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appearance can itself, without presupposing these structures, reveal them as 
possibilities instantiated in the regions of reality that appear to one. The 
notions of wholes and their abstract dependent parts (moments) and concrete 
independent parts (pieces), that is, can be derived from consideration of the 
appearing of reality. There are, as Sartre points out, two ways in which a 
region of the world can be focused on and picked out as a figure, as an object 
of attention. It can be picked out in contrast to the rest of the world outside of 
its borders, picked out against a background, in which case it is identified as a 
whole entity. A table, for example, can be picked out in contrast to all that 
surrounds it (see 1.2). Or it can be picked out not only in contrast to the world 
beyond its borders, but also in contrast to other aspects of the world within its 
borders. The colour of a table, for example, can be picked out in contrast to all 
that surrounds it and in contrast to the shape and texture of the table, neither 
of which lie beyond the borders of the colour (see 1.5). On the basis of this 
difference in the way figures can be picked out, against a background or 
against a background and an 'inner ground' (B&N: 188), the distinction 
between a whole and a dependent part of a whole can be made. A whole can 
be picked out only in the first way; a dependent part of a whole (which cannot 
occur except as part of a whole) can be picked out only in the second way. An 
independent part of the table, such as a leg, is a part that can exist apart from 
being part of the table, and hence is in itself a whole, so the notion of an 
independent part can be derived from the notion of a whole. Thus, the part- 
whole formal ontology that Sartre imported from Husserl could have been 
developed purely on the basis of a phenomenological distinction that Sartre 
himself makes, the distinction between background and inner ground, and 
hence should not be taken as a presupposition necessary to Sartrean 
phenomenological ontology. 
We have not found in the course of this thesis, then, any cases of 
presuppositions on which Sartre's theory of phenomenal consciousness is 
based, except the presupposition of Husserl's formal ontological framework, 
and it turned out on closer inspection that this framework need not have been 
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imported from Husserl but could have been formulated on the basis of 
Sartre's own phenomenological observations. We have found, then, no 
important way in which Sartre's phenomenology fails to be 
presu ppos ition less: the only presupposition we have found need not have 
been one. The ontology of experience and its objects delineated and 
defended in this thesis, then, was formulated by Sartre on the basis of a 
descriptive phenomenology without the aid of a phenomenological reduction, 
a phenomenology which seems to have been genuinely presupposition less, 
and which proceeded by describing concrete instantiations of the types of 
appearance, perceptual and hallucinatory, under consideration. 
The resulting ontology, as we have seen, is one of ontological realism: the 
reality in which we live, and which we apprehend directly, is independent of 
our awareness of it and thought about it for its existence. Indeed, its existence 
is independent of all conditions: it is being in-itself. In addition to this 
ontological realism, we must ascribe to Sartre a structural realism according 
to which being in-itself is structured in a certain way independently of our 
awareness of it or thought about it. This is for three reasons. First, Sartre's 
application of Husserlian formal ontology to his conception of being in-itself is 
a claim about the structure of being in-itself. Being in-itself, that is, consists of 
whole entities which have independent parts (themselves wholes), and 
dependent parts which cannot exist except as parts of wholes. Sartre's claim 
that experience is direct apprehension of mind-independent reality together 
with the fact that the formal ontological distinction between independent parts 
and dependent parts can be gained from the distinction between background 
and inner ground in experience, moreover, licenses the application of this 
formal distinction to the structures of reality, and so vindicates Sartre's claim 
that Humean scepticism about the structures of reality can be overcome by 
allowing that experience is direct apprehension of reality (see 2.3). Second, 
we have seen that qualitative, phenomenal colour is to be accounted for 
within Sartre's ontology as a modification of the awareness we have of 
regions of being in-itself. Different parts of reality appear to us in different 
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ways, that is, and there does not seem to be any way of accounting for this 
difference except in terms of structural differences between those parts of 
reality. Third, phenomenal consciousness is a relation that arises between 
regions of being in-itself, a relation that can arise for example between my 
brain and a table that I can see, but only certain regions of being in-itself can 
be at the subject-end of these intentional relations. A table cannot be 
conscious of me. There must, therefore, be some structural difference 
between my brain and the table. It seems, then, that for these three reasons 
we cannot agree with Wider (1990) that Sartre holds being in-itself to be an 
unstructured mass before it gains structures from the consciousness I have of 
it, or with Danto (199 1, ch. 1) and Baldwin (1996,86) that Sartre holds being 
in-itself to be unstructured but appear structured to me (see 1.2). We must 
rather agree with McCulloch (1994,111-7) that Sartre holds being in-itself to 
be already structured in itself, and that this structure is to some extent 
responsible for the ways in which I can be aware of it: I can pick something 
out as a figure against a background and an inner ground only if it is a 
dependent part of some whole, and I can pick something out as a figure 
against a background but no inner ground only if it is a whole or a collection of 
wholes. 
But Sartre's distinction between being in-itself and the world must be borne in 
mind: his structural realism with respect to being in-itself does not preclude 
elements of transcendental idealism with respect to the world. In fact, his 
position is a third way between transcendental realism and transcendental 
idealism: although some of the structure of the world is provided by the 
structure of being in-itself, and hence is independent of the way in which we 
are aware of it, this is not true of all of the world's structure. The world 
includes colours that result from the way in which we are aware of being in- 
itself (see 4.5), and tools, obstacles, and values that result from our being 
aware of being in-itself through lenses cast by our aims and projects (see 
1.3). The structure of the world, then, is neither wholly mind-independent nor 
wholly mind-dependent, but a combination of the two. 
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Given that Sartre holds mind-independent reality to be structured in itself, 
then, he can also hold that this structure can be captured in the linguistic net. 
He can also, that is, be a semantic realist with respect to being in-itself. On 
the one hand, it seems that Sartre must be a semantic realist: his ontology is 
specified in language and can only be considered an attempt to capture the 
structure of reality. On the other hand, though, it may seem as though his 
claim that 'every determination is a negation ', that 'the understanding in this 
sense is limited to denying that its object is otherthan it is' (B&N: 14; see 1.5) 
may preclude the possibility of language picking out the actual structures of 
reality. This is because the claim that something can be picked out only in 
terms of what it is not seems very close to the claim that words can only be 
defined in terms of other words and so cannot refer to parts of extra-linguistic 
reality (see Hegel 1977, §§ 96-99). But to say that a determination's reference 
to an object or type of object is fixed by distinguishing that referent from 
everything that it is not is not to say that the determination refers only to other 
determinations. Just because the report of the way in which the determination 
refers will make use of other determinations, it does not follow that the 
reference of the determination itself depends on other determinations. 
Features of a report should not be confused for features of the thing reported 
(see 1.1). So we can allow Sartre the claim that the determinations under 
which we can think of mind-independent reality can capture the structure of 
that reality, and so the words used to express those determinations can 
express that structure too. 
This semantic realism with respect to being in-itself is matched by one with 
respect to the world. The structures of the world provided by the way in which 
we are aware of being in-itself are structures of the world. The world really 
does consist of blue things and red things, chairs and tables, tools and 
obstacles, and values, and so our language that reports these things can 
capture the structure of the world. Sartre, like Kant, is an empirical realist: the 
world of experience may be partly mind-dependent, but that does not mean 
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that we cannot capture its structure in language. Unlike Kant, however, Sartre 
does not consider the contribution the mind makes to the construction of the 
world to be a matter of the application of determinations that are innate and a 
priori and hence universal. If my visual system is structured differently from 
yours, our worlds will contain different colours. If my aims and projects differ 
from yours, then our worlds will differ over the tools, obstacles, and values 
they contain. A distinction must be drawn, then, between the world each 
individual inhabits and the shared world inhabited by all. Of course, these are 
not ontologically distinct regions, since we are all aware of the same being in- 
itself, but they have distinct manifest structures since the same being in-itself 
appears (to some extent) differently to each of us. So although my world 
contains the structures it appears to have, and so my reports can capture the 
structures of my world, it does not follow that the shared world contains these 
structures. The shared world contains the structures that we all agree on. 
There follows from this, then, a certain pragmatism about truth that Sartre 
mentions occasionally in Being and Nothingness: we should 'not ... confuse 
the objectivity of the world-for-me with a stricter objectivity, which is the result 
of experimental measures and the agreement of minds with each other' (B&N: 
311; compare B&N: 51). The precise formulation of this pragmatist theory of 
truth was to occupy Sartre for some years after the publication of Being and 
Nothingness, but the project was eventually abandoned. His notebooks on the 
matter, which never reach a conclusion that satisfies their author, were 
published posthumously (1989), and have been translated as Truth and 
Existence. But the issue of formulating this theory of truth is not important for 
classifying Sartre as a semantic realist with respect to the world. The fact that 
statements true of my world need not be true of yours or of the shared world 
does not entail that statements cannot be made of the shared world: the terms 
used of my world can in principle succeed in capturing aspects of your world 
or of the shared world, and so Sartre should be considered a semantic realist 
about the shared world and worlds of others as well as our own individual 
worlds. 
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The ontology that Sartre formulates on the basis of his phenomenology, then, 
is one of ontological realism combined with structural and semantic realism 
about this mind-independent reality: being in-itself is structured independently 
of our awareness of it or thought about it, and this structure can be specified 
in thought and language. The structure of the world I experience, though, is 
only partly provided by the structure of mind-independent reality. The rest of 
the structure of my world is provided by the ways in which I am aware of it and 
my aims and projects. In this sense, my world differs in its structure from 
yours. Sartre holds a combination of structural realism and structural idealism 
with respect to the world. But the language I use of parts of my world 
succeeds in picking out aspects of that world, and could in principle succeed 
in picking out aspects of your world and of the shared world, so Sartre should 
be considered a semantic realist with respect to the world as well as a 
semantic realist with respect to being in-itself. 
5.3 Existentialism: Freedom, Bad Faith, The Look 
The theory of phenomenal awareness that Sartre formulates in his early 
works is the basis of his existentialist theory of the nature of human existence. 
Through the application in experience of determinations based on our aims 
and projects, as we have seen (1.3), we form our individual worlds of tools, 
obstacles, and values out of the shared environment of being in-itself. We are, 
for Sartre, in this way responsible for the situations we find ourselves in: the 
situation is partly a function of our aims and projects; the same region of being 
in-itself would ground a different situation if we had different aims and 
projects. But this is not the only aspect of Sartrean existentialism that is based 
on his theory of phenomenal awareness. In this section, I aim to show the 
extent to which the major themes of Sartrean literature - freedom, self- 
awareness, bad faith, and the alienation and conflict of interpersonal relations 
- are built on Sartre's theory of phenomenal consciousness. 
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Sartre's theory of freedom, as we saw in 4.6, is partly a result of the related 
theories of relational consciousness and the extended subject. The behaviour 
of the subject must be understood not as mere bodily movement, but as the 
environment-including actions of the extended subject, and can only be 
explained with reference to episodes of relational consciousness. The 
movements of the body involved in an action are to be explained by reference 
to their place in that larger action. In this way, Sartre secures freedom from 
mechanism: human bodies are not fleshy machines whose movements are to 
be explained by internal processing of electrical signals initially stimulated by 
aspects of the environment; the best explanations of human behaviour make 
ineliminable reference to consciousness. But there is more to Sartrean 
freedom than this. Sartre defines freedom as 'the unconditioned power of 
modifying situations' (B&N: 350), and this requires not just that consciousness 
cannot be reduced to or understood as caused by a lower-level mechanism, 
but also that consciousness is independent of the social world. And Sartre's 
ontology of relational consciousness and the extended subject underpin this 
aspect of his existentialism too. Sartrean holism extends no higher than 
individual extended subjects. Groups of individuals do not form higher 
synthetic wholes; there are no irreducible properties to be predicated of them. 
They are mere aggregates of wholes whose behaviour can be explained in 
terms of the properties of the individual members: 'the "we" is not an inter- 
subjective consciousness nor a new being which surpasses and encircles its 
parts as a synthetic whole' (B&N: 414; see 233-252). This insistence on the 
autonomy of the individual within the society is a distinguishing feature 
marking out Sartre's later Marxism from that of his contemporaries. 
Structuralist Marxists, such as Althusser (1990), understood social groups 
such as classes as genuine wholes, so that the behaviour of individual 
members of the groups is to be explained by reference to their membership of 
the group. The first volume of Sartre's Critique of Dialectical Reason, subtitled 
Theory of Practical Ensembles, by contrast, is largely concerned with 
reconciling apparent group dynamics with the autonomy of the individual by 
showing how various types of group behaviour can be reduced to individual 
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psychology by reductive analysis in terms of the common purposes of the 
members of the group. The group is not a synthetic whole; it is not a 'hyper- 
organism' (Sartre 1960,398-410). A basic feature of Sartre's existentialism is 
thus preserved in his Marxist theory. Sartre's existentialism and Marxism are 
individualistic and humanistic because of Sartre's ontology: the individual 
exists as an ontologically genuine entity over and above the body and its 
parts, and hence is free from physiological determinism, and yet the society of 
which the individual is a part is not an ontologically genuine entity over and 
above the individuals that are its components, but is instead a mere 
aggregate of individuals, which means that the individual is free from social 
determinism. Despite the death of God, the individual conscious subject 
remains the pinnacle of creation. This can also be expressed by saying that 
psychology can operate only at an individual level: it is not reducible to 
physiology, neuroscience, or any other lower-level discipline, but the higher- 
level disciplines, the social sciences such as sociology and economics, are 
reducible to individual psychology. 
There is one further element to Sartre's theory of freedom, and this does not 
seem to be based on his ontology of relational consciousness and extended 
subjects. It is his claim that consciousness, like Parliament, cannot bind its 
successors. A decision not to gamble again cannot, claims Sartre, prevent 
one from gambling again: the decision must be remade whenever temptation 
arises (B&N: 32-3). He claims that explanations of one conscious event in 
terms of a previous conscious event are explanations of 'motivation' not 
'causation' (B&N: 27). It is unclear what he means by this, since he never 
defines either 'motivation' or 'causation'. As his ontology rests on allowing 
conscious events genuine explanatory roles, however, it seems that he must 
mean that a conscious event can explain another conscious event, but this 
explanation should not be taken as one of causal determination. If the 
explanations were deterministic, then a consciousness would be able to bind 
its successors. This element of the theory of radical freedom, then, adds a 
claim to the ontology of relational experiences and extended subjects: it adds 
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the claim that the explanations that involve ineliminable reference to episodes 
of consciousness cannot be understood as deterministic. 
This aspect of Sartre's theory of radical freedom is at the heart of his 
characterisation of existents that have the mode of being 'being for-itself' (6tre 
pour-sol) as 'non-substantial absolute[s]' (B&N: 619). The for-itself is an 
absolute because it contains within itself everything required for its existence: 
even the regions of mind-independent reality required for its existence are 
literally parts of it. This is Sartre's 'radical reversal of the idealist position' 
(B&N: 216), a radical reversal of Berkeleian idealism, or phenomenalism: 
where Berkeley held the world we experience to be contained within and 
dependent on an ontologically independent mind, Sartre held reality to be 
ontologically independent yet still contained within a mind that is dependent 
on it. But the for-itself is not a substance because it cannot be identified with a 
set of essential properties (see B&N: xxxii). In addition to all its properties, all 
the facts true of it, its facticity, a being for-itself possesses a freedom which 
precludes any deterministic explanation of its behaviour in terms of those 
properties. In this sense, a for-itself is not what it is: it is not simply the sum of 
facts true of it in terms of which psychological explanations can be given (see 
B&N: 67). My demythologisation of Sartre's use of the term 'nothingness' to 
describe consciousness, then, may have missed out an aspect of nothingness 
as Sartre understood it. I claimed that to call consciousness a nothingness, for 
Sartre, is to say that it is an abstract dependent part of the extended subject 
rather than a concrete independent part of it. It is a moment, not a piece. It 
cannot exist independently of the larger whole of which it is a part; it is not a 
being (see 4.3). It may be that there is more to Sartre's application of the term 
'nothingness' to consciousness than this. It may be, that is, that Sartre 
understood the nothingness of consciousness to be the reason why the 
explanations given in terms of consciousness cannot be deterministic, that 
some aspect of the nothingness of consciousness is the reason why it 
escapes the nomological net. But it is difficult to tell whether or not Sartre did 
have this understanding of the term 'nothingness'. Although he claims that the 
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nothingness of consciousness is the root of freedom (B&N: 24-5), it is unclear 
whether this means just that the status of consciousness as a dependent part 
of the extended subject is the root of our freedom from mechanism, or 
whether he also meant the further claim that nothingness is the reason why 
psychological explanations are non-deterministic. 
Sartre's belief that human action cannot be explained in terms of bodily 
mechanisms but must be explained with reference to conscious experience 
and his denial of social determinism, then, are based on his theory that 
phenomenal consciousness consists in a relation between brain or body and 
the object of consciousness, a relation which must be understood as a 
property, an abstract part or moment, of an extended subject comprising the 
body and aspects of its physical environment. But his further claim that the 
explanations of human actions given in terms of experiences are not 
deterministic is not supported by his theory of phenomenal consciousness, 
and it is far from clear quite what grounds he considers himself to have for this 
assertion. The theory of freedom Sartre bases on his ontology of experience 
and the subject, furthermore, has no implications for the traditional question of 
the compatibility of freedom with determinism, since this question is not an 
ontological one. Compatibilists and incompatibilists in this debate agree that a 
free act is one that is to be explained with reference to the aims and projects 
of the subject, and differ only over whether this is sufficient for the act to be 
free. Compatibilists say that it is, so determinism is no threat to freedom so 
long as it does not preclude explanation of action in these terms, and 
incompatibilists claim that a free act is one based on aims and projects that 
are not themselves determined, and so determinism is incompatible with 
freedom (see Honderich 1988,472-5). This question of compatibility, then, is 
independent of the question of the role of mental vocabulary in the 
explanation of human action. 
Sartre's conception of pre-reflective self-awareness, of the awareness we 
have of our own conscious states as they occur, is also based on his account 
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of phenomenal consciousness. As we have seen (2.6), his claim that 
consciousness consists in apprehension of mind-independent reality requires 
that pre-reflective self-awareness is parasitic on this apprehension. Pre- 
reflective awareness, that is, is a result of the deployment in experience of 
determinations applied to the object of experience but based on the aims and 
projects of the subject. The determinations deployed imply the aims and 
projects on which they are based; 'consciousness (of) thirst9 , for example, 'is 
apprehended by means of the glass of water as desirable' (B&N: 102). In 
addition to pre-reflective awareness of the ways in which we are aware of the 
world, Sartre contends that we have pre-reflective awareness of our own 
radical freedom. We have pre-reflective awareness, that is, of the fact that the 
aims and projects that we pursue, and which help to shape our worlds, are not 
the result of physiological mechanisms or social determinism, but can be 
explained only in terms of our own conscious choices, choices that are not 
constrained by previous episodes of consciousness. Reflection on this 
freedom, he contends, reveals our absolute responsibility for the aims and 
projects we pursue and hence for the world we construct around us. And 
awareness of this responsibility is anguish (B&N: 39-40). In order to avoid this 
anguish, in order to conceal the freedom that we are pre-reflectively aware of, 
we engage in 'bad faith' (mauvaise fol): we avoid making explicit in reflection 
the freedom of which we are pre-reflectively aware, and we attempt to 
convince ourselves that we have pre-determined natures that constrain us 
and account for our actions. Sartre's theory of bad faith is partly built on two 
aspects of his theory of phenomenal consciousness: the distinction between 
thetic and nonthetic awareness, and the account of imaginative experience. 
We aim to avoid explicit thetic awareness of the freedom that we are 
nonthetically aware of, and we imagine ourselves as being constrained in 
ways that absolve us of responsibility. The critiques of Sartre's theories of 
thetic and nonthetic awareness and of imaginative experience in chapters 1 
and 3 of this thesis respectively have considerable ramifications for his theory 
of bad faith. 
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In 1.4, we saw that Sartre holds that nonthetic awareness is required to 
explain how events in a person's environment may affect the way that person 
is aware of other things without that person being able to report that those 
events had this effect. The fact that the subject cannot report their nonthetic 
awareness, for Sartre, is evidence that the awareness is nonthetic: 
representational awareness, he holds, is linguistically articulable. But, as we 
also saw in 1.4, this contention conf lates the notion of representation with that 
of conceptual representation. Only conceptual representations are inferentially 
and rationally linked to one another: that is what makes them conceptual 
representations (see 1.4). So it remains possible for a representation of an 
object to be unreportable if it is not conceptual, which is to say that it does not 
stand in inferential relations to beliefs such as the belief that the object is 
represented. In addition to this, we saw in 1.4 that Sartre also holds that 
nonthetic awareness of objects is required to explain how one can deliberately 
turn attention to those objects, but as we have seen this role could equally be 
played by vague representational awareness that becomes more explicit as 
attention is focused, and simple experiments suggest that we do indeed have 
vague representational awareness of objects that we are not focusing 
attention on. 
These two points together have implications for Sartre's theory of bad faith. In 
order to avoid the paradoxical claim that when deliberately hiding some truth 
from oneself, one must already know what that truth is and classify it as 
undesirable, Sartre recommends that we construe bad faith as involving 
nonthetic awareness of the truth while avoiding focusing attention on it and 
hence avoiding explicit, thetic awareness of it (B&N: 54,68-70). The problem 
with this is that if deliberately turning attention towards something seems to 
involve representational awareness of it, then so does deliberately not turning 
attention to it. Bad faith, it seems, requires classifying the undesirable as 
undesirable. But we can modify Sartre's position and claim instead that bad 
faith involves nonconceptual representation of the thing to be avoided: as 
representation, this form of awareness can classify the thing as to be avoided; 
268 
as nonconceptual, this representation will not stand in inferential relations to 
explicit and articulable beliefs and so cannot threaten the subject's cognitive 
ignorance of the thing to be avoided. This modification, though, would bring 
Sartre's position much closer to Freud's: the Freudian unconscious consists of 
representations that are not rationally related either to each other or to 
conscious, cognitive beliefs about reality, and are thereby nonconceptual 
(1957,186-7). But this modification would not bring with it Freud's construal of 
the activity of unconscious representations as the exchange and discharge of 
'cathectic' energy (1957,186-7), the 'blind forces' that Sartre is so opposed to 
(B&N: 52). 
The critique of Sartre's theory of imaginative experience in 3.5 has a more 
devastating impact on an aspect of Sartre's theory of bad faith. Sartre claims 
that bad faith is a form of imaginative consciousness. 'One puts oneself in bad 
faith as one goes to sleep, and one is in bad faith as one dreams' (B&N: 68). 
As we saw, Sartre identifies two characteristics of imaginative experience 
which differentiate it from perceptual experience: imaginative experience 
stipulates the features of an object rather than attempting to discern them, 
and imaginative experience does not posit its object as real and present. The 
second of these characteristics, I argued, is not entailed by the first, cannot be 
considered the sole distinguishing characteristic of imaginative experience, 
and seems obviously false in the case of vivid hallucinations and dreams. So 
the second characteristic should be considered at most an inessential part of 
some imaginative experience, not part of the essence of imagination. This 
relegation of this characteristic to the status of a contingent fact about some 
imaginative experience undermines Sartre's claim that the use of imagination 
in bad faith can never convince the subject that the imagined scenario is real. 
When, in bad faith, Walter considers himself identical with his social role as a 
waiter, according to Sartre, Walter enacts the role of a waiter to such a 
precise degree that his own behaviour becomes an 'analogue' of waiterhood 
in the same way that the picture of Peter is an 'analogue' of Peter or the way 
in which 'the actor is Hamlet' (B&N: 60). Walter can consider himself as a 
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waiter only by taking up the imaginative attitude towards himself, surpassing 
his analogical behaviour towards the intentional object of himself as imagined 
waiter (B&N: 60). Sartre's claim that imagination never posits its object as real 
and present allows him to claim that Walter remains aware that the imaginary 
waiter is not the real Walter, however much he may make-believe otherwise. 
But if this characteristic of imaginative experience is at most only a contingent 
fact about imaginative experiences, then Sartre's move from the claim that 
Walter only imagines himself as a waiter to the claim that Walter is not wholly 
convinced that he is defined by waiterhood is illegitimate: if imaginative 
experience can involve mistakenly positing the intentional object as real and 
present, as it seems to in the cases of convincing dreams and hallucinations, 
then Walter's use of imagination may convince him that he is (identical with) 
the waiter. We may, that is, be as genuinely misled by our use of imagination 
in bad faith as we can be by dreams and hallucinations. 
Sartre's conception of bad faith as involving nonrepresentational awareness 
of truths that we wish to hide from ourselves, and the refusal to make this 
awareness explicit, a refusal aided and abetted by imagining an alternative 
scenario even though this imagination can never wholly convince us, then, 
needs to be modified in the light of my critiques of Sartre's theories of 
nonthetic awareness and imagination. It must be modified, that is, to the claim 
that bad faith involves nonconceptual awareness of the truth, awareness that 
is much like Freud's notion of unconscious mentality in that it does not stand 
in inferential relations to beliefs, and a use of imagination that may convince 
the subject of the reality of the imagined scenario. Sartrean bad faith after 
these modifications is not dissimilar to the Freudian conception of self- 
deception: we can wholly convince ourselves of the falsity of some fact of 
which we do have representational awareness, albeit a representational 
awareness that cannot be noticed to contradict our self-induced false belief. 
The examination of Sartre's theory of phenomenal consciousness in this 
thesis also has ramifications for Sartre's theory of interpersonal relations. 
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Sartre's theory of the structures of interpersonal relations is not based on the 
thoughts we have about one another or the words we use of one another, but 
of the way in which we are phenomenally conscious of one another. The basis 
of interpersonal relations, for Sartre, is 'the look' (le regard). A crucial part of 
this theory is the claim that focusing attention on another person is thereby to 
cast that other person as an object rather than a subject. Although we can be 
aware that there are other subjects, for Sartre, this is something that can only 
be experienced: they cannot be known as subjects (B&N: 302). The 
subjectivity of the other, that is, can be experienced only as part of such 
experiences as shame and pride concerning one's own conduct. Such 
experiences imply the existence of another subject before whom one is 
ashamed or proud (B&N: 253,257,269). Given this experience, I can do 
either of two things: refuse to focus attention on the other person, and thereby 
continue to feel myself an object of their subjective gaze, or focus attention on 
them and thereby objectify them and remove from my experience their 
subjectivity (B&N: 285). But Sartre never makes clear why we cannot be 
positionally conscious of one another as subjects. The investigation of his 
theory of phenomenal consciousness in this thesis, moreover, suggests two 
reasons why he might have considered this to be the case. But these reasons 
would both be mistaken. 
The first is the idea that when I am perceptually aware of something, that 
thing is necessarily an object for me. Perceiving a thing not only involves that 
thing being an object of apprehension, but also an intentional object. Some of 
Sartre's characterisations of the look suggest that this point underlies his 
claim that we cannot be perceptually aware of another person as a subject. 
We cannot pay attention to something as a subject, he writes, because 
cattention is intentional direction towards objects' (B&N: 269). Similarly, 'that 
other consciousness and that other freedom are never given to me; for if they 
were, they would be known and would therefore be an object' (B&N: 271). 
The subject is something 'which by definition I am unable to know - i. e. to 
posit as an object' (B&N: 270). But if, as these quotations suggest, Sartre's 
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reasoning is that experience is only ever of an object and hence we cannot 
experience a subject, his reasoning rests on an equivocation. To call 
something an object of apprehension is just to say that it is that which is 
apprehended, and to call something an intentional object is just to say that it is 
that which the intention is aimed at, in the same way as something can be the 
object of the exercise. Neither of these senses of the term are the same as 
the sense of 'object' as opposed to 'subject', the sense of 'object' as non- 
conscious thing. For something to be at the object-end of an intentional 
relation or a relation of apprehension is not the same as its being a 
metaphysical object, a thing that has no subjectivity. As we have seen (4.6), 
to say that something is at the subject-end of intentional relations or relations 
of apprehension is not to say that it is a metaphysical subject, the subject of 
psychological theorising, something with a subjective life. Sartre holds that it 
is the body or brain at the subject-end of such relations, but that the 
metaphysical subject is not simply this body but includes within it relations of 
apprehension and the entities at their object-ends as well as the entity at their 
subject-ends. So the distinction - between. a metaphysical subject and a 
-metaphysical object is not the same as the distinction between something at 
the subject-end of an intentional relation or a relation of apprehension and the 
thing at its object-end. So the fact that whatever we experience is thereby an 
object of experience does not entail that we cannot experience a 
metaphysical subject as a subject. 
The second reason why Sartre may have considered it impossible to 
experience another person as a subject stems from his theory of the 
application of determinations in thetic awareness. This reading is suggested 
by Sartre's claim that 'the Other-as-subject can in no way be known or even 
conceived as such' (B&N: 293; see B&N: 296). Discussing the wishful thinking 
of a woman on a date, he writes: 'The man who is speaking to her appears to 
her sincere and respectful as the table is round or square, as the wall 
colouring is blue or grey. The qualities thus attached to the person she is 
listening to are in this way fixed in a permanence like that of things, which is 
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no other than the projection of the strict present of the qualities into the 
temporal flux' (B&N: 55). And similarly, when someone looks at me I appear 
as an object to them because, for them, V am seated as this inkwell is on the 
table; for the Other, / am leaning over the keyhole as this tree is bent by the 
wind' (B&N: 262). The idea at play here may be that when we apply 
determinations to one another in experience, we apply them in the same way 
as we apply determinations to objects: they appear to reveal real properties 
that are in some way definitive of the object applied to. Thus, for the other 
person, 'I have an outside, I have a nature' (B&N: 263), and this nature is the 
set of facts true of me that govern or regulate my behaviour; when I look at 
other people, 'I am fixing the people whom I see into objects' (B&N: 266). This 
observation, that we tend to reify one another as having entirely fixed natures 
in the same way as nonsentient things have, underlies much of Sartre's 
subsequent social theory, such as his analysis of anti-Semitism (1946b), and 
as a general sociological observation may well be true. But there seems no 
reason to believe that this reification is inevitable. There seems no reason 
why we should not apply to one another determinations that do not reify. 
Given that the structure of being for-itself can be articulated in words, as 
Sartre must suppose given that much of Being and Nothingness is given over 
to such an articulation, there seems no reason to suppose that it cannot be 
articulated in the determinations we apply to one another in experience. This 
may involve the breaking of an ingrained habit, but this is not the same as it 
being impossible. 
The analysis of Sartre's theory of phenomenal consciousness, then, has not 
found in that theory any support for his claim that we cannot experience one 
another as subjects and are forever doomed to being seen by one another as 
objects with fixed natures. On the contrary, it has provided good reason to 
deny this pessimistic theory of the basis of interpersonal relations. Neither an 
object of apprehension nor an intentional object is an object in the same 
sense of 'object' as a metaphysical object with a fixed nature and no 
subjective life, and there seems no reason why our thetic awareness of one 
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another should not involve the deployment of determinations that apply only to 
metaphysical subjects, to entities with the mode of being 'being for-itself', to 
'non-substantial absolutes', rather than the determinations that we apply to 
the regions of being in-itself that surround us. 
Of the three major tenets of Sartre's existentialism, then, we have found that 
his theory of radical freedom is largely based on his conception of the role of 
relational experiences in the explanation of the behaviour of extended 
subjects, but that it also involves a further claim, the claim that these 
explanations are non-deterministic, that cannot be drawn from his ontology of 
phenomenal consciousness; that his theory of bad faith is based on his theory 
of the relation between thetic and nonthetic experience and his theory of 
imagination, but must be revised in the light of the facts that nonthetic 
experience does not seem capable of performing the task that Sartre ascribes 
to it and that there is no good reason to uphold Sartre's claim that imaginative 
experience can never mislead the subject; and that his theory that the basis of 
interpersonal relations - the look - necessarily involves the denial of one 
another's subjectivity and freedom is not supported by his theory of 
phenomenal consciousness, which on the contrary provides all the materials 
required for its denial. 
5.4 The Last Word 
It is the 'privilege' of the human individual, wrote Simone de Beauvoir, to be 'a 
sovereign and unique subject amidst a universe of objects', yet the subject is 
still constructed of the very stuff of objects, 'is still a part of this world of which 
[it] is conscious'. 'As long as there have been [humans] and they have lived', 
she went on, 'they have all felt this tragic ambiguity of their condition, but as 
long as there have been philosophers and they have thought, most of them 
have tried to mask it. They have striven to reduce mind to matter, or to 
reabsorb matter into mind, or to merge them within a single substance. 
Those 
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who have accepted the dualism have established a hierarchy between body 
and soul which permits of considering as negligible the part of the self which 
cannot be saved' (Beauvoir 1976,7-8). Sartrean existentialism, she claims, 
preserves this ambiguity which others have sought to deny: it constructs the 
soul out of the body and its physical environment, unifying mind and situation, 
and endowing the human individual with a freedom from being determined by 
the physical world without denying the limitations imposed by the resistance of 
being in-itself, of which body and environment are constructed, to our 
projects. 
In this thesis, we have seen just how Sartre does this. The key components of 
his theory of phenomenal consciousness which mark out his theory as a 
distinctive position in the debate over the nature of mind are the claim that 
phenomenal consciousness is not a representation of extra-cranial reality 
generated by neural stimulation, but is a relation between brain or body and a 
part of mind-independent reality apprehended, and the claim that the subject 
of psychological theorising is not the brain or body but a being-in-the-world, or 
extended subject, comprising the body and parts of its environment. We have 
seen that these two claims combine to make a theory of experience whose 
value lies in its distinctive construals of hallucination and of the behaviour that 
experience explains, construals which protect the theory from arguments for 
the claim that experience is representation of the environment occurring within 
a subject which is a pure immaterial soul or a physical brain or body. We have 
seen that this position allows for a satisfactory construal of illusion and of the 
qualitative aspects of experience. And we have seen that his position makes 
explanatory gains over the theories that hold experience to occur within a 
body and identify the subject with that body or the brain. 
In the course of investigating these aspects of Sartre's theory, we have found 
that they are built on a phenomenology, or study of the nature of appearing, 
which can be considered free from theoretical presuppositions, and that his 
ontology of the human is based on a general ontology that construes reality to 
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be ultimately mind-independent in its existence and its structure, but the 
structure of the world to be partly owed to the way in which we are aware of 
this reality as well as partly owed to the structures it has. We have also seen 
that the major themes of his existentialist theory of the nature of the individual 
are to some extent built on his ontology of relational consciousness and the 
extended subject. This ontology guarantees freedom in the sense that it 
entails the falsity of mechanistic and social determinist theories of behaviour, 
but does not itself ground Sartre's additional belief that psychological 
explanations are indeterministic. Sartre's theory of bad faith is built on his 
theory of the classificatory nature of experience and the nature of imaginative 
experience, but in the light of the shortcomings of these theories must be 
revised to allow that bad faith may sometimes mislead subjects into genuinely 
believing the falsehoods that they attempt to convince themselves of. And we 
have seen that although Sartre seems to think his pessimistic view of the 
basis of interpersonal relations is based on his theory of awareness, it is not, 
and seems positively undermined by it. Sartre's affirmation of the 'ambiguity' 
of human existence of which Beauvoir wrote, then, needs an analysis of its 
ramifications for the nature of the human condition that is more cogent than 
Sartre's own. Despite its flaws and shortcomings, though, Sartre's outlook 
provides a distinctive position worthy of the attention of current anglophone 
philosophers. 
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Notes 
Phapter 1 
' Sartre's distinction between using a word as an object and using it as a concept is a 
rewording of the distinction he made in What Is Literature? between the poetic and prosaic 
attitudes to words. The poetic attitude treats the word as a thing, a sound or a shape with a 
history of differing uses by various writers, whereas the prosaic attitude treats the word purely 
as its meaning (1948,1-25; compare 1981,11). Sartre's distinction between these attitudes is 
often mistaken for a claim about the nature of poetry and prose writing, as though he claims 
that poetry employs words as objects in their own right ignoring their meaning and prose 
employs the meanings of words without regard to the words themselves (e. g. Murdoch 1953, 
139-43; Caute 1950, vii-viii; Danto 1991,29). But this is not Sartre's claim: in terms of the use 
/ mention distinction employed in anglophone philosophy (see Quine 1961,140), Sartre's 
claim is that the poetic attitude treats the word in the way in which it is treated when the word 
is mentioned, and the prosaic attitude treats it the way in which it is treated when it is used. 
Where the use / mention distinction allows a word to be either used or mentioned but not both 
at the same time, Sartre's distinction allows any particular occurrence of a word to involve a 
combination of poetic and prosaic attitudes. Sartre's disavowal of stylistic ambition in his 
philosophical writings does not contradict my claim in chapter 2 that 'The Pursuit of Being' is 
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modelled on Proust's epic novel, since the 'style' Sartre disavows is only the deliberate use of 
various senses of the same word. 
2 This use of 'knowledge' to mean 'knowledge of an object' rather than propositional 
'knowledge that such-and-such is the case' may seem unfamiliar to anglophone readers. Ryle 
(1949,161), for example, claimed that such usage 'abuse[s] the logic and even the grammar 
of the verb "to know"'. However this may be with the English verb, it is not the case with 
&connaftre' which is not linked to ideas of propositional content and truth, and usually takes an 
object denoted by a singular term (e. g. 'do you know London? '). Propositional knowledge is 
associated in French with the verb 'savoW, which is always 'savoir que ... ' ('knowledge that 
Note that Sartre's definition of connaissance as 'presence to -' therefore does not in 
itself rival such definitions of knowledge as (for example) 'justified true belief': the latter 
phrase can only be taken as a definition of propositional knowledge, or savoir. 
3 Barnes's translation reads 'attention is an intentional direction towards objects', but the 'an' 
has been added. The original reads: 'Fattention est direction intentionelle vers des objets' (p. 
308). 
4 But not all mental phenomena have physical phenomena as objects. Brentano claims that 
all first-order mental phenomena have physical phenomena as objects, but higher-order 
mental phenomena have mental phenomena as objects. Seeing a tree has a physical 
phenomenon as object, but remembering seeing a tree has the mental phenomenon of 
seeing a tree as its object. This mental phenomenon as object, though, retains its physical 
phenomenon within it. There is no limit, for Brentano, on how many mental phenomena can 
stack up on the back of a first-order mental phenomenon: I can remember thinking about 
wanting to see a tree, and this would involve four mental phenomena, the last of which 
(seeing) includes a physical phenomenon (e. g. 1995,129). 
5 Brentano's use of the term 'physical' to describe private mind-dependent appearances is 
significantly at odds with the current anglophone use of the term to describe public mind- 
independent material reality. Brentano calls mind-dependent appearances phenomena 
'physical' for two reasons. First, they are often taken to be parts of mind-independent reality 
by the subject of the experience, so much so that 'belief in the real existence of physical 
phenomena ... 
[has] achieved the most general dissemination, been maintained with the 
utmost tenacity, and, indeed, even been shared for a long time by the most outstanding 
thinkers' (1995,93). Second, since Brentano takes physicists to be empirical scientists he 
takes them to be studying the mind-dependent entities that they are directly aware of rather 
than a mind-independent reality that lies beyond them and of which they have no experience 
(1995,98-100). For this reading of Brentano's conception of intentionality and his distinction 
between mental and physical phenomena, see also Bell 1990,8-9 and Moran 1996. 
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6 it may seem odd to claim that Chisholm got Brentano so wrong, especially given that he 
translated one of Brentano's works The True and the Evident, so had more than a cursory 
knowledge of Brentano. In my view, Chisholm is not the root of the mistake, but the hapless 
dupe of one Oskar Kraus. Brentano first published his theory of intentionality in 1874 and it 
had a huge impact, particularly on Meinong and Husserl who developed it in different ways. 
Husserl soon eclipsed his master, and by the first decade of the twentieth century was the 
most important philosopher in Europe. Brentano was going blind, and by 1903 was incapable 
of reading. He continued, though, to think about the relation between his thoughts and those 
of Husserl, Twardowski, and Meinong and to dictate notes on these issues. Then he met 
Kraus, who worked with him on notes and manuscripts expressing his later views on various 
subjects including intentionality. After Brentano died in 1917, Kraus was left with a free hand 
to publish whatever of Brentano's later thoughts that he saw fit. He gathered together various 
texts and published them as various books. These posthumous works express the later 
thoughts of Brentano, but are heavily edited by Kraus. The True and the Evident is one of 
them, so the text Chisholm knows best is a work of a post-Husserlian and post-Meinongian 
Brentano. Moreover, in 1924 Kraus published a 'second edition' of the 1874 book Psychology 
From An Empirical Standpoint and gave it a lengthy introduction and a plethora of detailed 
footnotes, which appear as the numbered footnotes in the current English edition, in an 
attempt to show that Brentano's later views are in fact the views Brentano always held (see 
Simons 1995; Moran 1996). Whenever Brentano makes a clear statement of his early view, 
Kraus adds a long, detailed, and quite obscure note explaining how it is that Brentano 
managed to say the opposite of what he really meant. And this, I suggest, is the root of 
Chisholm's mistaken reading of Brentano's early book: he reads Brentano's later views back 
into it, with the help of Oskar Kraus. 
7 The protagonists of this debate not only followed Chisholm in ascribing to Brentano the 
claims that mental events are representational and that this representation has some intimate 
connection with intensionality, they also followed Quine (1960, § 45) in ascribing to Brentano 
a third claim he did not make: Chisholm's view that intentionality is irreducible in the sense 
that it cannot be defined in terms of something else (see Chisholm 1957, ch. 11; Dennett 
1987,340). 
8 Sartre does not seem to have read Brentano himself. He mentions Brentano only once in 
Being and Nothi . ngness, when mentioning 'The intentionality of Brentano and Husserl' without 
distinguishing the theories of the two thinkers (B&N: 25). 
9 In claiming that Sartre uses the term 'consciousness' in a narrow and a broad sense, 
I have 
deliberately simplified the matter. He very occasionally uses the term in a third sense to mean 
an enduring mind, an synthesis over time of successive consciousnesses 
in the broad sense 
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(e. g. B&N: 253). This third sense has no bearing on the issues discussed in this thesis, and is 
anyway rare in Sartre's writings, and so will not be used in this thesis. 
" It may seem that Sartre's theory of the 'nothingness' and concomitant freedom of 
consciousness (e. g. B&N: 24-5) is incompatible with the dependence of consciousness on the 
brain that is implied in my discussion of split-brain patients, on the grounds that the brain is in 
Sartre's terms a part of being in-itself rather than a nothingness, and as such is presumably 
subject to the same causal determinism as the rest of being in-itself. But this dualistic reading 
of Sartre is mistaken. I explain the antireductionist, holistic, monistic ontology of Sartre's 
account of consciousness-in-the-world in chapter 4, where I defend it against arguments for 
reductionism and argue that it is positively superior to reductionism. 
" The distinction between positional and nonpositional awareness grounds a close 
connection between Sartre's use of the term 'connaissance' and knowledge in the sense of 
'knowledge that p' (see note 2, above): if I am nonpositionally aware of a figure standing to 
the left of the centre of my attention, and that person is Pierre, I may not know that that 
person is Pierre simply because I do not have sufficiently detailed awareness of him. Knowing 
that he is Pierre would require the detail of positional awareness (connaissance) of him. I 
return to this point in discussing the thetic component of experience in 2.3. 
12 1 have replaced Barnes's 'seen from the point of view of the "this... with 'looking at the this', 
on the grounds that Barnes's translation is confusing on at least two counts. First, it seems to 
imply that the object of visual perception always has its own point of view on reality. Since 
such objects are often non-conscious chunks of being in-itself and Sartre takes 
consciousness to provide (indeed, to be) a point of view on the world, Sartre does not hold 
that the 'this' always has a point of view. Second, Sartre does not use the phrase 'point de 
vue' in the quoted passage. The phrase I have retranslated is: 'vue de c6t6 du ceci', which 
literally means 'looking at the side of the this'. Unfortunately, this phrase does not clearly 
convey Sartre's meaning, which is: a perception involves consciousness and object; we are 
concerned here with the object. His point is that the negation is not part of the object, but part 
of the consciousness. Vue de c6t6 du consciousness, then, the negation is wholly real: it is 
part of the structure of consciousness, not of the object. 
13 Sartre also claims that imaginative experience is distinct from perceptual experience on this 
score: in imagination, he claims, the object is never posited as present and existent 
(PI: 11 -2; 
B&N: 26). We shall see in chapter 3 (3.5) that there is good reason to reject this claim. 
14 in Sartre's novel Nausea, Roquentin has experiences of his surroundings unstructured 
by 
determinations, and so discovers the gap between the way in which reality is and the way 
in 
which it is experienced (179-85). Moreover, Roquentin 
has these experiences after 
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completing the only project in his life, that of writing a biography. It may seem that Sartre is 
here claiming that it is possible to have experiences that are not structured by projects. 
However, in the light of Sartre's later claim that being for-itself (the type of being had by 
humans) is always and necessarily engaged in projects and hence directed towards the 
future (B&N: 125), this passage from Nausea is best read as a thought-experiment designed 
to dramatise the claim that the determinations of perception are to some extent a function of 
the perceiver's projects. That is, it is best read as the claim that, impossible though it be, were 
one to have no projects, one could perceive reality without instrumental determinations. 
15 in the famous passages from Nausea in which Roquentin discovers the gap between the 
way reality is and the determinations applied to it in experience, he expresses this view in 
linguistic terms: 'Things have broken free from their names' (180). This leads Danto to claim 
that Sartre is attempting to express 'the failure of fit between language and reality' (1991,7). 
However, there are three good reasons not to take these passages as evidence that Sartre 
considered determinations to be linguistic. First, some passages of Nausea can be taken to 
imply that words are parasitic on more basic determinations: 'Words had disappeared, and 
with them the meaning of things, the methods of using them, the feeble landmarks which men 
have traced on their surface' (182). On this reading, Sartre is expressing the view that the 
ways in which reality is structured in experience, thought, and language are all imposed by 
our practical engagement with it (see Murdoch 1953, ch. 1). Second, Roquentin should not be 
confused for Sartre: although Sartre is intending to convey certain ideas in Nausea, these are 
not necessarily the ideas he attributes to t he central character. Indeed, Roquentin is a 
biographer, not a philosopher; use of linguistic terminology seems natural, but his supposedly 
spontaneous experiences and reports of them would seem a little strained if complicated by 
reflections on the relation between the structures of experience and the structures of 
language. Third, even if Sartre did consider determinations to be linguistic when he wrote 
Nausea, this book was published five years before Being and Nothingness. Sartre's views on 
this subject may have changed over this period, just as his views on self-awareness did. It 
is 
for this reason that Being and Nothingness should be taken as the canonical text of the early 
Sartre (see 0.1). 
16 This is the close relation between connaissance and savoir mentioned in note 11, above. 
17 Sartre presumably adopts the view that deliberately turning attention towards something 
requires some prior awareness of it from Heidegger, who argues 
that any enquiry requires a 
prior understanding (Verstehen) of the subject-matter enquired about. 
Heidegger claims that 
this requirement is twofold. First, prior understanding is required 
for there to be any motivation 
for the enquiry: without some comprehension of x, it would not 
be possible to want to enquire 
into x (1962, §§ 2-4,32-33). Second, enquiry is a process of 
interpretation (Auslegung), which 
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simply makes explicit that which was already implicit in understanding (1962, §§ 2,14,32). 
Heidegger's view, in turn, is presumably derived from Meno's Paradox. When Socrates 
declared his intention to enquire into the essence of excellence, Plato tells us, Meno replied 
that such enquiry is useless since unless one already knows what excellence is one will not 
know where to conduct one's search and will not recognise the object of enquiry when one 
meets with it (Plato 1985,80d5-e6). Heidegger follows Socrates in claiming that the pre- 
requisite of enquiry is only an implicit and unarticulated knowledge that is made explicit by 
enquiry, but not so far as to agree that this implicit knowledge is a residue of a former life 
(Plato 1985,81c5-d5). Sartre differs from Socrates and Heidegger in that he transforms their 
claim about enquiry into a claim about awareness. 
" My claim that Sartre implicitly takes determinations to be conceptual does not undermine 
my claim that he does not take determinations to be linguistic, since he would deny that 
concepts are linguistic on the grounds that he denies that any part of the structure of 
consciousness is linguistic (see 1.3 and note 15 above). 
'9 Hubert Dreyfus (1991, ch. 5; 1996; 2000) continues to conflate representational content 
with conceptual representational content. He argues that the dominant construal of action as 
bodily movement initiated or governed by representation of the aim of the act and / or of the 
bodily movements to be made is false on the grounds that action involves 'absorbed coping', 
bodily movement appropriate to the task in the absence of any representation of that 
movement. All of the reasons he gives for his claim that absorbed coping does not involve 
representation, however, boil down to the fact that the agent need not have articulable beliefs 
about the appropriate movements in order to make those movements, which shows only that 
absorbed coping does not involve conceptual representation. 
Chapter 2 
' In reconstructing the form of the ontological argument given by Descartes, I have drawn not 
only on the Fifth Meditation, where the argument is stated, but also on the Third Meditation 
where the principles I claim the argument rests on are stated as part of a different argument 
for the existence of God. Interpretation of the Fifth Meditation is particularly contentious, partly 
due to its brevity. The usual interpretation does not draw on the Third Meditation, but takes 
Descartes to be implicitly echoing Anselm's principle that it is greater to exist than not to. On 
this reading, Descartes is simply claiming that the greatest possible 
being must exist, without 
consideration of the hierarchy of realities (e. g. Williams 1978,154). 
But in the Synopsis of 
Meditations Descartes claims to have 'set out all the premises on which a desired proposition 
282 
depends, before drawing any conclusions about it' (1984,9; see 110). Descartes clearly did 
not understand any of his own arguments, therefore, to involve premises that he did not 
explicitly state. Moreover, Descartes claims that his ontological argument shows not only that 
God exists but also 'at the same time ... that everything else depends on him' (1984,48). If 
we understand Descartes to be claiming that it is greater to exist than not to exist, then 
Descartes has failed to provide the premise that the greatest being is the one on which all 
else depends. These problems do not arise if the Fifth Meditation is read in the light of the 
Third. 
' On the 'two-conception' reading of Kant, however, as Baldwin (1996,86) points out, Sartre's 
position is very close to Kant's. It claims that consciousness is direct apprehension of mind- 
independent reality, but apprehension of it in such a way as to construct the familiar 'world' of 
experience and action. But this point is independent of the question of whether Sartre 
considers being in-itself to have any structure at all, and to what extent he considers the 
structures of experience to map or reveal such a structure. 
3 This reading of Husserl is very controversial. The dominant reading denies that Husserl as 
interested in ontology at all. Although he has a 'tendency to transpose his epistemological 
theories into an ontological mode', on the dominant reading, we must 'disentangle and 
discard' Husserl's ontological language (Bell 1990,168-9; see also Butts 1961,426; Smith 
and McIntyre 1982,98-9; Hall 1982). And not all those who agree that Husserl is concerned 
with ontology agree that he is a phenomenalist (see Drummond 1990). But there is more that 
can be said for Sartre's reading, as we will see in discussing § III of 'The Pursuit of Being' (in 
2.2), and Sartre is not alone in holding it (see also Gurwitsch 1964,184 and 223-7; Philipse 
1995; Priest 1999). Much current Husserl scholarship is based on the Husserl archives in 
Leuven, Belgium, and on the continuing publication of the manuscripts in that archive as 
Husserliana. The archive opened, and Husserliana began, in 1950 - seven years after the 
publication of Being and Nothingness. In addition, Sartre never met Husserl, nor did he hear 
him lecture. Sartre's critique, that is, is based entirely on the works published in Husserl's 
lifetime. In order to understand Sartre's critique of Husserl, therefore, I have relied only on the 
texts available to Sartre and on secondary literature discussing just those texts. 
4 Actually, Sartre lists four embarrassing dualisms. I have missed out the 'duality of potency 
and act' since it does not bear directly on the issue of our access to the world around us. For 
Sartre, reducing existents to their manifestations is not only a way of putting us in direct 
perceptual contact with the world, but also has ramifications for the metaphysics of selfhood 
and for our knowledge of other selves. Although not a direct concern of this thesis, Sartre's 
discussions of selfhood and intersubjectivity are mentioned in 2.4 in order to clarify part of 
one reading of his 'ontological proof'. 
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5 Catalano and Wider presumably take this passage to affirm the view of Roquentin, diarist- 
narrator of Sartre's first novel Nausea, that existence remains hidden until revealed by some 
special experience (see Sartre 1938,182-3). But, as I have mentioned before, it is a mistake 
to confuse Roquentin for Sartre at all, never mind the Sartre of Being and Nothingness (see 
chapter 1, notes 14 and 15, above). 
' Grand Larousse Universel, 1994 edn., s. v. 'Translucide' (15: 10365). Sartre does use the 
term 'transparency' (transparence) once in Being and Nothingness (B&N: 164), but since this 
repeats a point which Sartre first made using the term 'transluciditd (B&N: 103), this use of 
'transparence' should be considered a slip of the pen or a printer's error, not taken as 
indicating a commitment to the transparency (as opposed to translucency) of consciousness. 
Most commentators overlook the distinction between 'transparency' and 'translucency' when 
discussing Sartre's conception of self-awareness, with the notable exception of Morris 1992. 
7 Wider (1997,104-6) also understands this passage as an argument for the claim that 
consciousness cannot be ignorant of itself, but further claims that the argument is not as bad 
as most scholars make out since it is supported by Sartre's claim that to be aware of an 
object is to be aware of that object as other than the awareness of it, and so implicitly to be 
aware of one's awareness. She concedes, however, that Sartre never directly connects this 
latter claim to the passage in question. If I am right, there is a good reason why Sartre does 
not make this connection: he does not consider the passage in question to constitute an 
argument for the claim that consciousness must involve consciousness of it in the first place. 
(Hartmann (1966,20-30) also considers this passage to be an argument for Sartre's position 
but, curiously, does not object to it. ) 
8 This paragraph is followed by a short paragraph in which Sartre introduces his bracketing of 
'of' in the phrase 'consciousness (of) itself', and these two paragraphs break the flow of § Ill. 
The sentence immediately following them is: 'This self-consciousness (conscience (de) sol) 
we ought to consider not as a new consciousness, but as the only mode of existence which is 
possible for a consciousness of somethiny (B&N: xxx; Sartre's italics). But the foregoing two 
paragraphs license no such claim: at most they license the claim that conscious activities and 
consciousnesses that can be reflected on involve self-awareness. The claim is licensed, 
however, by the paragraphs preceding these two, those that ascribe to Husserl the view that 
the ontological self-sufficiency of consciousness requires its transparency. Perhaps the 
paragraphs in Sartre's own voice were inserted at a late stage. 
9 This quotation provides further evidence that Sartre is not presenting his own views here, 
but presenting a view he attributes to his opponents: for Sartre, consciousness is not 
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'existence through and through' but precisely the opposite -a 'nothingness' (e. g. B&N: 28). 
What Sartre means by this will be discussed in 4.3. 
'0 Because Sartre is concerned with Humean rather than Cartesian scepticism, attempts to 
meet the challenge of Cartesian scepticism without asserting our direct access to reality or to 
other facts do not even potentially undermine Sartre's claim that such direct access is 
necessary to avoid scepticism. There are two groups of such arguments: there are those that 
claim that the conclusion of Cartesian scepticism must undermine belief in its premises if it is 
to undermine all beliefs, and hence that it is self -undermining (e. g. Wilson 1978,35-6; Wright 
1991); and there are those that claim that general sceptical scenarios fail to undermine 
individual beliefs such as belief in mind-independent reality or the belief that ripe lemons are 
yellow (e. g. Goldman 1976; Nozick 1981,197-247). The Humean (and Sartrean) claim that 
unless we have direct access to reality we cannot be sure whether it exists or what it consists 
in is not undermined by arguments from either of these groups. 
" Danto's (1975,37) characterisation of Sartre's methodology as an attempt to infer the 
nature of reality on the basis of the phenomenology of experience, therefore, ascribes to 
Sartre a method that Sartre claims - right at the beginning of Being and Nothingness - to 
be futile. 
" It might be thought that learning this fact about the world does not require action as such, 
since merely looking at an object and willing it to move does not result in it moving. However, 
action is sometimes successful. The failure of merely willing an object to move does not entail 
anything about the object, since it only shows that mere willing is not enough to move 
something. The failure of my attempt to lift an object when I know that I have lifted objects 
before, on the other hand, entails something about the object: that there is some fact about it 
independent of me that prevents my usual strategy from working. More importantly, Sartre's 
claim that failed actions reveal the fact that objects have mind-independent natures in virtue 
of which they are subject to deterministic laws does not conflict with his opposition to theories 
that claim that the nature of reality is hidden behind appearances: Sartre has not here 
reintroduced those embarrassing dualisms that he claims to be keen to avoid. This is 
because an entity's 'principle of being', on the basis of which it resists some of my aims, is not 
necessarily hidden: it may be discoverable by further inspection of the entity. Sartre's 
understanding of the relation between an entity's appearance and its true nature will be 
discussed in the conclusions to this thesis (5.2). 
13 This is a further reason why McCulloch's claim that Sartre is arguing for a position between 
those of Descartes and Berkeley (see 2.2) is misleading: Berkeley postulated God to account 
for the resistance of objects, but Husserl did not. 
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14 In The Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre had argued that abandoning the notion of an ego 
separate from the body and the world in general is a sufficient condition for escaping 
solipsism, but in Being and Nothingness he argued that it is only a necessary condition: there 
remains the problem of showing that other bodies are centres of consciousness (B&N: 235). 
Much of the progression of Sartre's thought over his whole lifetime (like much of Proust's 
character Marcel's) is driven by a desire to overcome solipsism and discover the ramifications 
of the way in which solipsism is overcome for inter-personal relations (e. g. B&N: Part Three). 
In an interview towards the end of his life, Sartre claimed that the work on solipsism and 
intersubjectivity was the only significant failure of Being and Nothingness (1981,13). 
" It is crucial to Sartre's argument that he is concerned with understanding 'being', not 
acquiring the concept. That is, Sartre's argument is not to be understood as echoing 
Descartes's meditation on the concept of a single thing capable undergoing change, such as 
a piece of wax (1984,20-2). Had Sartre's argument been concerned to show that experience 
in general must be apprehension of being since otherwise we could not acquire the concept 
'being', the argument would be seriously deficient insofar as it does not rule out the possibility 
that 'being' is an innate concept, a parallel to the conclusion Descartes draws from his 
meditation (1984,26). Innate or not, Sartre's point is that we could not understand the 
concept 'being' without apprehension of being. 
16 It is crucial that this argument is concerned with our understanding of 'being', rather than 
'world' or terms that designate worldly entities such as 'table' or 'tree'. No argument 
concerned to show that in order to understand these latter terms we must be acquainted with 
the referents of such terms (e. g. Valberg 1992,47-54) can establish Na*fve Realism, since 
any such argument is compatible with the Kantian claim (on the 'two-object' reading of Kant) 
that such terms designate sequences of phenomena, beyond which the realm of true being 
lies (Kant 1929, A367-80). 
17 Barnes's translation reads 'as the proof' where I have given 'as a replica'. Sartre's phrase is 
9comme r6plique', meaning a replica, reply, or response. It does not mean proof. 
Chapter 3 
1 McDowell's metaphorical style in Mind and World makes it difficult to be confident that he 
there still construes perceptual visual experiences to be brain events, but I take 
it this is what 
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he means by describing perceptual experiences in causal terms as 'impressions ... impingements by the world on our sensibility' (1994,10). 
2 Prima facie, it might seem as though the strong disjunctivist need not identify the perceptual 
experience with the causal chain, since the experience might be construed as a scattered 
event comprising at least the perceived object and relevant events occurring within the skin or 
within the head of the perceiver but not the events in between. Secunda facie, however, this 
option is not available to the disjunctivist. A scattered event is an event made up of two or 
more distinct parts that are not spatiotemporally contiguous. Since the parts of a scattered 
event are distinct, these parts can in principle occur in the absence of one another. A murder 
by poisoning, for example, may be a scattered event since it involves both an action on the 
part of the killer and the death of the killed, and these events may be spatiotemporally distinct 
and non-contiguous. Given such a scattered event, there is another possible world where the 
killed dies the same death, but as a result of self-poisoning. There is, that is, a single event 
common to the actual murder and the counterfactual suicide (see Sorensen 1985). So if a 
perceptual experience is construed as a scattered event comprising events internal to the 
body plus the object, those events internal to the body could have been brought about in the 
absence of the object. If this event internal to the body is a mental event, then it is a mental 
event that can occur either as part of a perception or as an hallucination depending on its 
causal aetiology. And this, of course, is precisely the view of perception disjunctivism denies: 
the view that a perception comprises a non-environment-involving mental event internal to the 
body plus some fact that relates this event to an appropriate object in the environment. 
Disjunctivists must, therefore, deny that the component of a perception that is internal to the 
body is a mental event. It is not enough just to claim that this component should not be called 
an experience: if there is a mental event common to perception and hallucination, then 
disjunctivism is false regardless of what that common event is called. What is required is the 
claim that when I see the London Eye, for example, the only mental event is the relational 
event of light being reflected from the London Eye, travelling to my eyes, and stimulating my 
visual system. And this, of course, is the claim that a perceptual visual experience is identical 
with a causal chain of events linking object and brain. 
3 McCulloch's proposal that Sartre's conception of experience be protected from the argument 
from hallucination by claiming that perceptual experience has a basic explanatory role and 
hallucinatory experience can be understood only in terms of it overlooks the fact that this 
weak disjunctivist conception of the relation between perception and hallucination differs from 
the account of hallucination Sartre provides in The Psychology of Imagination. McCulloch 
overlooks this, it seems, because he is unaware that Sartre provides an account of 
hallucination (see McCulloch 1994,107-111). 
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4 It may not be necessary that the events are neural, however; if all that is necessary is that a 
certain functional role is played, then the neurons could presumably be replaced by (for 
example) silicon. 
5 On silhouettes and back-lit objects, see Sorensen 1999. 
6 The distinction between type- and token-externalism as I use it is taken from Macdonald 
(1990): type-externalism is the claim that mental properties are individuated partly by 
reference to objects, events, or states of affairs beyond the skin of the thinker; token- 
externalism is the claim that instances of those properties have physical descriptions and / or 
spatio-temporal co-ordinates that include objects, events or states of affairs outside the skin 
of the thinker. Macdonald defends the coherence of combining type-externalism with token- 
internalism about mental states and events in general. When this combination is applied to 
experiences, it is what I have been calling weak disjunctivism, but Macdonald's defence of the 
combination does not block my argument against weak disjunctivism as she does not 
consider the problem raised by claiming that a token experience is generated by a token 
neural stimulation. 
71 have here passed over the prima facie possibility that the experience might not be 
understood as a relation to the object but as a scattered event comprising spatio-temporally 
non-contiguous parts including the object because such a construal of experience is not 
available: see note 2. 
8 Sturgeon refers to disjunctivism as 'Disjunctive Quietism' on the grounds that, so far as he 
can see, disjunctivism fails to provide an account of the nature of hallucinatory experience. 
Although he considers this 'quietism' to be sufficient reason to reject disjunctivism, he 
concedes in a footnote that the quietism is in principle removable from disjunctivism, so a 
non-objectionable form of disjunctivism is in principle available (1998,186 n4), but he does 
not go on to consider any non-quietist forms of disjunctivism. This is presumably because he 
thinks that no such form of disjunctivism has been proposed and is presenting a challenge to 
current disjunctivists to provide one. The disjunctivism Sartre provides in The Psychology of 
Imagination, as I show in 3.4 and 3.5, is non-quietist in just the way that Sturgeon demands, 
and so presents a counterexample to the general claim motivating his dismissal of 
disjunctivism. 
9 Malcolm's claim, though, is that we do not have experiences while asleep, but it seems on 
waking as though we have. Malcolm's argument for this rests on the claim that 'the idea that 
someone might reason, judge, imagine, or have impressions, presentations, illusions or 
hallucinations, while asleep, is a meaningless idea in the sense that we have no conception 
of what would establish that these things did or did not occur' (1959,49-50). But there are two 
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central problems with the argument. First, it rests on Malcolm's definition of sleep-behaviour 
as 'quite relaxed, nearly motionless, and breathing' (1959,27). Given this, he claims, there is 
no behaviour of the sleeper that would indicate occurring experiences, and the sleeper's 
memory after the event may be misleading (1959,35-48). But this misrepresents sleep 
behaviour: in 'light' sleep, subjects move about, perspire, and even talk, as well as exhibiting 
rapid eye movements and a degree of muscular tonality and giving electroencephalogram 
and eletro-oculogram readings resembling those of waking states (see Churchland 1988, 
291-3). Malcolm dismisses this by claiming that in such states people 'are not ... fully asleep, 
although they are not awake' and cannot be dreaming 'in that pure sense of "dream" that has 
as its sole criterion the testimony of the awakened person' (1959,99). This reduces 
Malcolm's position to the generally accepted and unremarkable claim that people do not have 
experiences in 'deep' sleep but only in 'light' sleep (Churchland 1988,291-3; compare 
Malcolm 1959,29-34). The second problem with Malcolm's argument is that it relies implicitly 
on verificationist approaches to meaning in order to ground its claim that it is 'meaningless' to 
suppose that people experience while asleep, and these linguistic doctrines are all either 
crude and oversimplified or just false (see Putnam 1962). 
" In Being and Nothingness, Sartre claims that imagination posits an object 'as existing 
: elsewhere or not existiny (B&N: 26). It is not clear whether this is simply a gloss on the more 
- detailed distinctions made 
in The Psychology of Imagination, a gloss which Sartre provides at 
PI: 12, or whether Sartre has changed his mind and decided that there are only two forms of 
imaginative positing rather than four. It does not matter for present purposes which of these 
interpretations is correct, however, since all that is relevant for present purposes is the 
question of whether it is acceptable to insist that imaginative experience necessarily posits its 
intentional object in a manner different from perception. 
Chapter 4 
'The example, of course, is adapted from Hilary Putnam (1975,139-42). 
Where Putnam 
construes the alternative reality - 'Twin Earth' - as a planet somewhere 
in our galaxy, I 
construe it as a counterfactual reality -a way Earth could have been, 
but is not. This serves to 
sharpen the issue: the same individual can exist in actual and counterfactual situations, 
but 
cannot be on two planets at once. When I say that the counterfactual reality 
'resembles ours 
in all respects except I mean that resemblance to include the 
fact that my body is in state 
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s at position p at time t in both realities (ignoring, as is customary, the fact that water is a 
constituent of human bodies). 
2 This is my translation of Sartre's phrase Ve tout donne leur sens et leur valeur aux parties' 
(p. 123 of original text). Forrest Williams's translation is: 'the whole gives meaning to the 
parts' (I PC: 113), which in losing the term 'valeue loses with it the connotation of explanatory 
value. 
3 Sartre's distinction between analytic and synthetic thought in his early works should not be 
confused with his distinction between analytic and dialectical reason in Critique of Dialectical 
Reason. The earlier distinction, as I have explained, is between two possible views of a 
complex entity. The later distinction is between attitudes to the concepts employed in thought: 
the analytic attitude employs concepts that are already delineated and refuses to alter or 
refine them further, whereas the dialectical attitude, more Bergsonian than Hegelian, treats 
concepts as roughly delineated and fluid, to be constantly refined and reshaped as enquiry 
progresses. Philosophy, claims Sartre in his later work, is a dialectical enquiry because it 
recognises the socio-historical genesis of the concepts it employs and the location of the 
thinker and so does not treat concepts as given but as material to be refined, whereas the 
error of science is to take the uncritical analytic attitude towards concepts that artificially 
detaches them from their socio-historical location. Piaget confuses Sartre's earlier and later 
uses of the term 'analysis' when he claims that Sartre is wrong to claim that science is 
analytical in the sense of reductionist (Piaget 1971,122): as we have seen, Sartre considered 
science to be haphazard in its ontological approach in his early work, so neutral over 
'analysis' in that sense, but in his later work claimed science to be analytical in the sense of 
treating concepts as pre-formed givens. Sartre's later use of the term 'analytical' has more in 
common with the use made of it in twentieth century anglophone philosophy than does his 
earlier use. In particular, conceptual analysis is 'analytic' in this sense, in that it treats 
concepts such as 'mind', 'free will', and 'person', as already having a content that can be 
discovered by means of thought-experiments rather than as vague terms to be given precise 
meanings. 
' Husserl admits that calling abstract, dependent, parts or moments 'parts' stretches the 
ordinary notion of part, according to which the parts of an object can exist independently of 
the object, but points out that he is stipulating a technical term rather than 
describing ordinary 
usage (§ 2). 
5 Hazel Barnes's translation reads: 'Consequently, the results of analysis cannot 
be covered 
over again by the moments of this synthesis'. Sartre's sentence 
is: 'Par suite, les r6sultats de 
Panalyse ne sauraient se recouvrir avec les moments de cette synth6se' 
(p. 37). Barnes 
translates 'recouvrir' as 'to cover over again', but it rather means 
to cover completely or 
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perfectly, as when upholstery covers a chair: 'recouvrie requires the covering to match, 
capture, fit, or coincide with the covered in a precise way. Sartre's claim here is that a 
synthetic whole has moments that do not match, capture, fit, or coincide with the parts of the 
whole, but are distinct properties over and above the structure of the parts, and so are 
overlooked by analysis which focuses solely on those parts. 
6 Sartre's use of the terms 'analytic' and 'synthetic' in his early works (see note 2) derives 
solely from the uge of these terms in anti -association ist psychology. Husserl uses these terms 
in the Kantian logical sense, according to which an analytic truth is one that predicates of a 
subject a predicate already contained in the concept used to pick out the subject, such as 'all 
bachelors are unmarried', whereas a synthetic proposition does not, such as 'all bachelors 
are omnivores' (see Husserl 1970,111, §§ 11-12). 
7 This notion of substance can be traced back to Aristotle's Categories (1984,2a12). The 
common characterisation of a substance as something that can exist on its own is parasitic 
on this notion of substance as something that cannot be predicated of another thing (e. g. 
1984,2a13; cf. la24-5): it means not that a substance is ontologically and metaphysically 
independent of all conditions, but that does not exist or occur as a property of something else, 
which is why Descartes for example can talk without contradiction of human souls and the 
extended universe as 'created substances' dependent for their existence on the continuing 
creative activity of God (1984,31). 
8 This debate is sometimes framed in the language of causal realism, tacitly accepting the 
belief that a true causal explanation of event e in terms of event c is made true by the 
obtaining of some determinate causal relation between c and e that obtains independently of 
being expressed in an explanation, and so is sometimes framed in terms of causal relations 
rather than causal explanations (e. g. Kim 1988,233-8; 1989a, 94; Papineau 2000). 
The claim 
that natural science is explanatorily adequate, causally closed, or complete, on 
this causal 
realist view, is the claim that natural science reports or aims to report 
the complete set of 
mind-independent causal relations with physical events in the effect position. 
The debate, 
however, is independent of this additional claim over the cement of the universe: 
the same 
debate can be held between philosophers who believe that there are no 
mind-independent 
causal relations (as Kim (1988,237-8; 1989a, 92-3) acknowledges). 
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